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ABSTRACT
A Conversation Analytic Approach to the Study of
Utterance Particles in Cantonese
Utterance particles, also known as modal particles or
sentence-final particles, form a class of words in Cantonese
which is of great descriptive and theoretical interest to
linguists. Most of them do not have any semantic content (truth-
conditional meaning), and few can be said to have a consistent
grammatical function. They are notorious for being extremely
resistant to conventional syntactic and semantic analysis. The
aim of this thesis is to seek a better understanding of utterance
particles by concentrating analytical attention on three of them;
namely, LA (1a55), LO (1o55), and WO (wo44).
Adopting a set of theoretical assumptions and analytical
methods in the tradition of Conversation Analysis within an
Ethnomethodological framework, an attempt is made to approach
these objects by examining them in the context of interactional
details in naturally occurring conversations.
From this point of view, each of the three particles is
found to be capable of performing an immense variety of work. LA
has uses that are related to the establishment of common ground.
LO contributes in interesting ways to the achievement of endings
in narratives and other sequences. WO is responsive to sequential
expectedness, and participates in preference organizations.
However, rather than having a central, more or less fixed
meaning, each of these particles has a set of properties which
enter into intricate family relations with each other. The
contribution that it makes to meanings-in-context at
particular points in an unfolding social scene is to some extent
the result of the contextualization of its properties in
sequential environments. They are linguistic items which provide
a resource for the management of a range of conversation
organizational problems.
To the extent that it has produced compelling accounts of,
and fresh insights into these utterance particles, this study
raises a number of theoretical and methodological considerations
for linguistics, including the status of data and evidence in
linguistic description and argumentation, as well as the
possibility of a socially constituted linguistics.
Transcription and Glossing Conventions
The following contains a list of the conventions that are
used for the transcription of the data extracts and the provision
of English glosses throughout the thesis. Some symbols are
idiosyncratic and needed specially for Cantonese; others are now
more or less standard practice in conversation analysis. For a
fuller description of these conventions, see Atkinson & Heritage
(1984: ix-xvi, "Transcript Notation")
Notation	 Meaning 
(n)	 a pause; n is the length of the pause in seconds
(•)	 a slight pause of 0.1 second or less
(****)
	 a stretch of unidentifiable sounds; in so far as
this can be determined, each * represents one
syllable
))
	
a non-linguistic action/event such as someone
coughing, clearing his throat or the telephone
ringing
overlapping of 2 or more utterances (e.g. "xxxx"
"yyyy") produced by different speakers; "["
marks the onset of such an overlap;
"]" marks its end.
"latching"; "="s are used in pairs, one
at the end of an utterance (eg. "xxxx") and the
other at the beginning of the following
utterance (eg. "yyyy") to show that there is no
discernible pause between them
the lengthening of a vocalic segment;
the more ":"s the longer the vocalic
segment; each ":" is of about 0.1 second's
duration.
CC
	
the lengthening of a consonantal segment,
where C is a consonant; each C is of about
0.1 second's duration.
	
.hh
	
in-breaths; the more "h"s the longer the
in-breath; each "h" is of about 0.1 second's
duration.
	
hh
	
out-breaths; the more "h"s the longer the
out-breath; each "h" is of about 0.1 second's
duration.
	
xxxx	 speech (e.g. utterance "xxxx") accompanied
by laughter.
vi
xxxx-yyyy
a brief glottal stop
a glottal stop held over n seconds.
"xxxx" and Hyyyy" are joined together with the
"-" to show that they are being treated as one
unit, for the sole purpose of facilitating the
gloss on the right hand half of the page; no
claim of any kind is made about the phonological,
morphological, or grammatical status of such
units.
PT	 utterance particle
GEN	 genitive morpheme (cf. English "of")
CL	 classifiers
[MPH
	
various kinds of 'emphatic locution'; an a-theoretical
term used for the convenience of providing an English
gloss for each utterance.
vii
Romanization Conventions
The system used in this thesis is based on the Yale system,
but tones are not represented, because a gloss is already
provided for every word and a free translation for every
utterance.
Symbols
IPA
Symbols
IPA
Equivalents Equivalents
b P a a.
d t ai ?a
g IC au air
P Ph aa a
t ti' aai az
k 10 aau av
1 i e E
m rn el ei
n n eu ala
ng 1 i i
f f iu iu
h 1-1 0 3
S 5 OU OU
j tS oi n
ch t sk u U
gw kw ui UL
kw Ow eui Ilj
w
Y
Vy
j
yu Y
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: UTTERANCE PARTICLES IN CANTONESE
1. Grammatical Descriptions of Particles
Most grammars of Chinese since Ma Shi Wen Tong,' including
such widely influential works as Li 1955 [1926], LU & Zhu 1953,
Wang 1955, Chao 1968, and Li & Thompson 1981, identify a word
class, variously referred to as "helping words" (zhuci), "mood
words" (yuqici), or "sentence-final particles". (I will, for
reasons to be given presently, refer to them as utterance
particles.) This word class includes, for Mandarin Chinese, such
bound forms as 7e, ne, ba, ma, a/ya, ou, etc. In Cantonese, we
have (ignoring tones for the moment) a, 7a, lo, wo, ne/7e, me,
je, ja, jek, ama, gwa, tim, and others. While my concern in this
thesis is with utterance particles in Cantonese, not Mandarin
Chinese, it would be useful to take a brief look at the work that
has been done on these particles in both dialects. We can expect
at least some of what has been said about utterance particles in
Mandarin Chinese to be relevant to the study of their
counterparts in Cantonese. On the other hand, the Cantonese
system seems to be much richer and more complicated than the
Mandarin one. In terms of sheer numbers, Cantonese utterance
particles far outnumber their Mandarin counterparts, or those of
any other language that I know of. Previous work on utterance
particles in Cantonese has identified thirty or so of them, but
because they can be used in combination, the actual number of
particles (simple and compound) currently in use in spoken
Cantonese should be in the region of a hundred.
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While most modern grammars of Chinese have identified such a
class of words, not a great deal has been said about them. It is
interesting to note, for example, that they have received rela-
tively little attention in Y.R. Chao's classic work, A grammar of
spoken Chinese (1968). Of the 819 pages of the book, only 20 are
devoted to these particles. What's more, apart from giving some
rough English glosses to a few invented examples containing some
of these particles, 2 Chao offers no particular insight on the
nature of either individual utterance particles, or the class as
a whole. Nor has he indicated any useful way in which these
objects can be approached.
Li and Thompson's Mandarin Chinese: a functional reference 
grammar (1981) gives considerably more attention to this class of
words, reflecting a growing concern in contemporary linguistics
to attach greater importance to 'performance', 'natural speech',
'use', and 'discourse' (although what these terms refer to, and
how the subject matter should be approached are questions that
are far from settled). They have made a commendable attempt to
come to some understanding of these particles in Mandarin
Chinese, by describing them in terms of their functions in
discourse. For example, one of the uses of le is described as
relating what is being said to what the addressee has been
assuming (p.263). Another use is to "wrap up a story", in which
case it "signals to the hearer that the speaker is through with
what s/he wanted to say, so that the hearer can now say something
if s/he wants to" (p.287), which is clearly a description that
rests upon some of the insights gained in conversation analysis
(the notion of turn-construction units, for example). In
2
describing ne, they note that it is a "conversational particle
that requires at least two conversationalists, since the function
of ne is to bring the hearer's attention to the significance of
the information conveyed by the sentence in connection with the
hearer's claim, expectation, or belief". (p.305) 	 In the same
vein, ba is described as a particle that is used to "solicit
approval/agreement" from the addressee. (p.307)
While it is a definite improvement on Chao's grammar in this
respect, Li and Thompson's treatment of the utterance particles
is not without its problems. For one thing, there is a distinct
lack of empirical data. It shares with Chao's grammar the
convention of basing analysis on invented examples. I will argue
in the next chapter that invented examples, be they sentences in
isolation, or 'imagined conversations', are no substitute for
spontaneous conversational data. More importantly, they fail to
show how the varied uses of particular particles are related to
some general description of their unique properties. Scattered
statements are made about isolated uses of various particles, but
no general framework is provided in which these can be seen as
parts in relation to a whole. No general picture emerges from
their description which would throw light on the special status
of the utterance particles as a class of linguistic objects.
2. Four Features of Utterance Particles
How have these particles been defined and identified? While
linguists have disagreed about whether particular morphemes
should be included in the class of utterance particles -- eg.
Wang 1955 lists la and de as "mood words" in Mandarin Chinese,
which are not included in Li and Thompson 1981, and, in Canton-
ese, a few particles identified in Yau 1965, eg. ha24 and ho35,
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are not considered to be "basic" particles in Kwok 1984 -- there
seems to be a certain amount of agreement as to the kind of
criteria required for their identification. The distinctive
features of this word class that have been identified in previous
studies include:
1. They have no semantic content.
2. They serve to indicate the mood of a sentence.
3. They are used to express attitudes and emotions.
4. They are attached (as bound forms) to the end of sentences.
Let us examine each in turn.
First, they have no semantic content. The Chinese grammati-
cal tradition draws a basic distinction between "full words" and
"empty words". One account of this distinction goes as follows:
"Words can be assigned to two broad categories: full
words which are representations of concepts, and empty
words which do not in themselves represent concepts,
but are instruments in the organization of language.
The categorization of full words should be based on the
kinds of concepts that are represented, while the
categorization of empty words should be based on their
functions in sentences." (Wang 1954; my translation)
In another account, the distinction is explicated in terms
of "actual things and events": empty words are defined as those
which do not refer to "actual things and events". (Lu 1955:34).
This suggests that the distinction in question is very
similar to the one that is sometimes made between "form words"
and "content words". 3 For the utterance particles, this means
that they would, as empty words, share with other form words such
as aspect markers and various suffixes the feature that they do
not have readily specifiable truth-conditional meanings. One
would also expect them, as form words, to serve certain
grammatical functions.
4
This takes us into the second feature, viz, the function of
utterance particles as indicators of grammatical moods. It might
seem that the distribution of utterance particles can be stated
in terms of co-occurrence restrictions which hold between them
and sentence types. But a close investigation would reveal a
great deal of criss-cross and overlap. In the scheme presented
in Wang 1955, the same particle can be used to indicate a variety
of moods. On the other hand, the same mood can be signaled by
more than one particle. No apparent pattern emerges from his
description. For example, the particle ne is listed under both
"Assertives" and "Dubitatives"; similarly, ma is found under both
"Expressives" and "Dubitatives". On the other hand, one of his
mood categories, "Dubitatives", includes a variety of utterance
particles: ma, ne, and ba, among others. Thus, while Wang's
characterization of empty words would seem to suggest that each
utterance particle could perhaps be described in terms of the
unique grammatical functions that it serves, his own investiga-
tion reveals that precisely the opposite is true.
If we distinguish between sentence types (declarative,
interrogative, imperative, etc.) and speech act categories such
as statements, questions, and commands, on the grounds that there
is not always a regular and direct correspondence between the
two, then it is conceivable that utterance particles may be
markers not so much of grammatical mood, but of modalities or
speech act types. But this is not true either.
As an illustration, consider the particle 16,55 in Cantonese.
It has been described in previous accounts (eg. Yau 1965, Gibbons
1980, and Kwok 1984) as a particle that is attached to utterances
which function as statements. But this does not hold up to a
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detailed analysis of its uses in natural conversation. Given an
appropriate context, an utterance containing this particle can
function variously as a statement, a question, or an instruction,
as the following examples show.
(1) A: mou baasi me?
no bus	 PT
[are there no buses?]
B: hai lo, baa-gung lo
yes PT strike	 PT
[no, they are on strike]
(2) A: keui daap luk-dim-jung baan che lai
he	 take six-o'clock CL	 car come
[he's coming on the six o'clock train]
B: goum mai hou ngaan sin lai-dou lo?
so	 PT very late only arrive PT
[so he'll be arriving very late then?]
A: hai aa
yes PT
[yes]
(3) A: dim heui le?
how go	 PT
[how do I get there?]
B: cho-baasi lo
take-bus PT
[take a bus]
It is clear that B's utterances in these examples are
recognizable as doing the work of reporting ([1]), asking a
question ([2]), and giving an instruction or a piece of advice
([3]). And yet in each case, the same final particle 1o55 is
used. One might argue that the functional categories statement,
question, and command are not the right kind of categories, and
need to be replaced by other taxonomic schemes (eg. Searle 1976);
or that the phonological make-up of the utterance particle may
vary from one instance to the next. I will deal with these and
related objections in the final chapters after I have presented
the results of my detailed analyses of three particles in the
body of this thesis. For the moment, I only wish to point out
the problems with the idea that the functions of utterance
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particles can be explicated in terms of some direct and regular
correspondence between them and speech act types. Also, the
particle used in these examples is not an exception: the same can
be said about most of the other utterance particles in Cantonese.
In addition to the idea of mood, it has often been said that
one of the features of the utterance particles as a word class is
the expression of various attitudinal and emotive meanings.
"When we speak, we often cannot describe something
purely objectively. In most cases, every utterance
contains certain emotions. Such emotions are sometimes
expressed through intonation. But the kinds of emotion
that can be expressed by intonation are after all
rather limited. So there are certain empty words in
Chinese which assist the intonations, in order to make
various emotions more recognizable. We shall refer to
the various ways in which emotions are expressed in
language as mood, and those empty words which express
moods, mood words." (Wang 1955:332; my translation)
The range of functions that have been included under this
general rubric are extremely varied. The variety of "emotions"
and "attitudes" that have been mentioned include affirmation,
doubt, rebuttal, exclamation, the seeking and granting of
permission, consultation, pausing, request, order, advice, and a
host of others. But these notions are notoriously intractable.
Li and Thompson remarked that the utterance particles' "semantic
and pragmatic functions are elusive, and linguists have had
considerable difficulty in arriving at a general characterization
of each of them" (1981:238). One of the main concerns of the
present investigation is to arrive at an understanding of the
unity that underlies the immense range of work that some parti-
cles can do. I will deal with this problem in the analysis
chapters.
The last feature, that these particles are "sentence-final",
is not without problems either. This feature is highlighted in
7
the now familiar term "sentence-final particle". The problem is
that most of these objects that have been identified as
"sentence-final particles" do not actually occur only at the end
of sentences (not that 'sentence' itself is a particularly useful
notion in our attempt to come to a better understanding of the
nature and properties of these objects in the first place). They
also occur at the end of 'smaller' syntactic units such as
clauses and phrases. They may occur at the end of free-standing
words too. Consider the following:
(4) lei si-haa daa-go-dinwaa bei keui la
you try-ASP phone to him PT
[try giving him a call]
(5) hai Gou-gaai, jee chausin godou la
at High-Street that-is just-now there PT
[at High Street, I mean that place just now]
(6) yumou-kau la, bingbambo la, tenrOs la
badminton PT ping-pong PT, tennis PT
[badminton, and pingpong, and tennis]
The particle 7a ("1a55") occurs in these examples after a
variety of constituents --sentences ([4]), adverbial phrases
([5]), and noun phrases ([6]). It may be tempting to think that
these are 'really' surface manifestations of underlying
sentences, which are recoverable through expansion, taking into
account factors like reference and ellipsis. Labov and Fanshel
(1977), for example, employed such a procedure to make explicit
the underlying propositions of the utterances produced during a
therapeutic interview. On the basis of "factual material"
gathered from the interview as a whole, and what is believed to
be shared knowledge between the participants, and by filling out
the referents of the pronouns and other deictic terms in parti-
cular utterances, they provided reconstructions of their
underlying propositional contents. The following is one example
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of such an expansion. (Labov & Fanshel 1977:50)
(7) (a) Utterance:
An-nd so --when-- I called her t'day, I said,
"Well, when do you plan to come home?"
(b) Expansion:
When I called my mother today (Thursday), I
actually said, "Well, in regard to the subject
which we both know is important and is worrying
me, when are you leaving my sister's house where
your obligations have already been fulfilled and
returning as I am asking you to a home where your
primary obligations are being neglected, since you
should do this as head of our household?"
But expansions and reconstructions are not as simple and
straightforward as they might seem. Labov and Fanshel admit that
such expansions are "open-ended":
"There is no limit to the number of explanatory facts
we could bring from other parts of the interview, and
the end result of such a procedure might be combining
everything that was said in the session into one
sentence. For this reason, there is no fixed relation
between text and expansion." (ibid, p.50-51)
Garfinkel (1967:38-42) has shown convincingly (as Labov and
Fanshel acknowledged) that the sense of every ordinary utterance
is "specifically vague" and indefinitely expandable. The task of
expansion quickly becomes impossible, as more and more
relevancies get drawn into the reconstruction that are generated
by the very process of expansion itself.
In the case of "'sentence-final particles", consider the
following conversation extract.
(8) A: lei gamyat m sai faanhok me?
you today not need go-to-school PT
[don't you need to go to school today?]
B: ngaanjau aa
afternoon PT
[in the afternoon]
Here, the particle aa (ie. aa44) occurs at the end of B's
utterance, and forms part of that utterance. It might seem
possible to expand this utterance, so that what underlies it can
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be seen to be "really a sentence". But I see no particular
reason to choose among such possible expansions as:
(9) (a) I have to go to school in the afternoon.
(b) Si (to borrow a useful French word here), I have to
go to school today, only that it is still early.
I will go in the afternoon.
(c) I see that you are mistaken in thinking that I
don't have to go to school today. Your mistaken
belief stems from the wrong assumption that if I am
at home at this hour of the morning, then it must
be the case that I don't have to go to school today.
But in actual fact, although I am at home now,
I will be going to school in the afternoon.
And many more such versions can be constructed. In fact,
indefinitely many expansions are possible, and each one can be
justified. No one particular expansion can be identified as the
underlying sentence of what B said. Are we to conclude that the
particle aa is attached to the end of a sentence, two sentences,
or a paragraph? And this, as Garfinkel pointed out, is not a
problem to do with the massiveness of the content of an utterance
either. Rather, "the very way of accomplishing the task [of
expansion or clarification] multiplies its features" (1967:26)
and renders the task impossible. This is an example of a very
general misconception among linguists, the illusion that a unique
underlying sentence can somehow be recovered from what ls sad,
which is merely its surface manifestation. It is due partly to
this assumption that "sentence-final particle" has been the
accepted term for this class of morphemes. We must recognize
'expansions' for what they are: an expansion is nothing more, or
less, than a translation in disguise. In 'expanding' an utter-
ance, we translate ordinary language into another language, one
in which, for example, information exchange is the primary task,
and is done always through complete sentences that encode propo-
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sitions, a language in which there is supposedly total clarity
and explicitness, in which what is meant and what is said enter
into a perfect and incorruptible relationship. As an analytical
tool, expansion is no more and no less useful than translation.
In translating an utterance into another language, we have not
thereby solved the problem of specifying what it means; we have
merely delayed the question. Thus, there is no principled way in
which 'underlying sentences' can be reconstructed from ordinary
utterances, for the particles that are found suffixed to them to
be characterized as sentence-final.
That is why I believe that the term "utterance particle" is
a more appropriate one than "sentence-final particle", or tradi-
tional terms like "helping words" and "mood words". Be that as
it may, my terminology does not alter the identity of the target
set of objects under investigation. The set of objects which I
refer to as utterance particles are by and large the same as
those which have been designated in previous accounts under one
of these alternative names.
3. The Linguistic Interests of Utterance Particles
What interests do utterance particles have for the linguist?
The very first thing that one notices about them, as soon as one
actually looks at some natural speech data, is that their
presence in ordinary conversation is massive. The regularity
with which utterance particles occur in Cantonese varies a great
deal depending on the mode of language use. In formal written
Chinese, one finds very few particles. Formal speaking contains
some, but not many, while informal, jocular writing which
attempts to 'imitate' speech contains considerably more. The same
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has been observed of the sentence particles in Japanese:4
"Sentence particles in general are not used in written
materials, such as directions for use, newspaper
articles or essays. Exceptions to this are informal,
personal letters and books written for small children
where the writers' intention lies in producing the
effect of person-to-person conversation. Needless to
say, written records of conversations such as scenarios
are also exceptional cases. Sentence particles, on the
other hand, are essential in conversations where
person-to-person communication is intended." (Uyeno
1971:50)
When utterance particles occur in writing in Cantonese, they
are represented by made-up (to some extent ad hoc) characters in
a similar way that ordinary words are represented. In this
respect, they are treated by native speakers as, if not 'full
words', at least 'quasi words' (unlike, eg. intonation, tone of
voice, and kinesic features which are never represented in this
way). In terms of the tripartite distinction among verbal,
prosodic and paralinguistic resources of meaning, particles are
definitely verbal.
The regularity with which utterance particles occur in
natural, mundane conversation in Cantonese is truly astounding.
An informal count reveals that an utterance particle is found in
continuous talk on the average every 1.5 seconds. It is no
exaggeration to say that they constitute one of the hallmarks of
natural conversation in Cantonese.
But there are indications that this is not a peculiar
phenomenon confined to Cantonese or Chinese. Utterance particles
have been studied in other languages. I shall only mention some
of the studies here, and will leave a discussion of them for a
later chapter, when they can be seen in the light of the findings
reported in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Some languages for which similar
objects have been identified include Japanese (Uyeno 1971;
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Tsuchihashi 1983), Finnish (Karttunen 1975), German (Schubiger
1972), and various American Indian languages in Columbia and
Ecuador (Longacre 1976, 1979). In English, particles like well,
why and oh have been studied from an interactional perspective
(Lakoff 1973, Heritage 1984, Local & Kelly 1986). Brown and
Levinson (1978) have also identified a number of "particles which
encode hedges in linguistic structure" (p.151) in their study of
politeness phenomena in a number of languages, including Tamil
and Tzeltal. Of such particles they observe that they "often
constitute among the most commonly used words in a language, but
are typically omitted from dictionaries and given little
theoretical attention." (ibid) On the whole, it is fair to say
that little attention has been paid to utterance particles, and
the little that has been said about them are often vague,
confusing and inadequate, at times patently false.
Thus one interest of utterance particles for the linguist is
their pervasive presence in natural conversation. How can this be
accounted for? And in what way is this pervasiveness related to
their distinctive nature as a class of linguistic objects?
This, however, requires adequate descriptions of the
particles. How should they be described? We have seen that one
of their defining features is the lack of either a truth-
conditional meaning or a well-defined grammatical function. This
might tempt us into dismissing them as some kind of an optional
extra. On the other hand, while they do not enter into syntactic
or semantic relations, the interpretation of an utterance often
depends crucially on them: the sense of an utterance often cannot
be determined without taking note of the particle that occurs in
it. For instance, given appropriate contexts, the meanings of the
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following utterances could be glossed as follows:
(10) (a) hou bikyan LA "it must be crowded"
(b) hou bikyan LO "it was crowded, as you would expect"
(c) hou bikyan WO "I now realize that it was crowded"
(d) hou bikyan GWA "It's probably crowded"
If, as seems evident from these examples, these particles
have some contribution to make to the overall sense of the utter-
ances in which they occur, just what kinds of contribution are
they?
In order even to begin asking interesting questions about
these objects, we must plant them firmly where they belong: the
conducting of ordinary conversations. They must be seen in
relation to the discourse of which they form a part, and be
approached from that standpoint. In this connection, two
linguists have expressed a similar view as follows:
"Traditional Chinese grammar refers to the sentence-
final particle as vuoici 'mood words'; this term aptly
suggests that the function of these sentence-final
particles is to relate to the conversational context in
various ways the utterance to which they are attached
and to indicate how this utterance is to be taken by
the hearer." (Li & Thompson 1981:317)
"Many times in studying a language we find that there
are certain particles of uncertain meaning which cannot
be defined by the language helper, who nevertheless,
insists that he wants them used at certain points and
not used at others. Almost invariably such particles
of apparently random distribution are subject to
discourse constraints." (Longacre 1978:266)
To give a taste of the kind of contexts in which utterance
particles are regularly found, and to formulate some questions
which may be of linguistic interest, let us examine a short
extract very briefly.
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(11) [TC11:1:169]
L: 'goummmm e:::m
(1.0)
L a 	
(0.8)
1-->L: daai-biu-go aa
daa-gwo-lei wo
S: geisi aa
L: ((clears throat))
2-->	 gamyat lo=
S: =hai me
L: gown ngo yigaa jau
lam-jyu daa-bei-keui::
S: haa#
L: jau::: tai-haa keui
tingyat dim
(.)
L: yahai giu maai keui
seung-lei
3-->S: sidaan la yugo-hai::
4-->L: tai-haa keui dim la:
.hh[hh
[
S:	 [haa
L: so em
(1.0)
L: em
(0.8)
L: first-cousin
has-phoned PT
[so em first cousin
has phoned]
S: when PT
[when?]
L: ((clears throat))
today PT
[today]
S: yes PT
[really?]
L: and I now em
thinking phone-him
[and I'm thinking about
phoning him now]
S: yeah
L: em see he
tomorrow how
(.)
L: maybe ask too him
come-up
[em, to see what he's doing
tomorrow, maybe we can ask
him to come as well?]
S: whatever PT maybe
[I don't mind]
L: see he how PT
.hhhh
[depends on what he's doing]
S: yes
I have underlined the various instances of utterance parti-
cles that are found in this extract, which is taken from a tele-
phone conversation between two cousins, L and S. To begin with,
if one were to imagine the same conversation taking pface, but
without any of the particles occurring, it would sound overly
terse to some, hostile or perhaps funny to others, but in any
case unreal, almost unintelligible. Why? What contributions are
being made by the particles to the meaning of the utterances
individually, and the episode as a whole?
Consider L's first turn. The utterance arrowed 1 is in a
sense a declarative which contains a piece of information, and
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what L might be said to be doing is passing this piece of
information on to S, the addressee. From the point of view of
the "information/content" of this utterance, the particle wo
(wo44) does not appear to be making any contribution: it does not
add any substantive content which is not already represented in
the rest of the utterance. Does it perhaps signal the act of
informing itself? Apparently not, because the informing could
just as well be done without it. Similarly, in L's reply to S's
question "when?" in the next turn (arrow 2), the particle lo
(1o55) does not seem to add any substance to "today", which seems
as simple and straightforward an answer to S's question as one
can get. Neither can it be said to signal the act of answering.
Essentially the same remarks would apply to the two instances of
the particle 7a (1a55) in S's and L's utterances towards the end
of the extract (arrows 3 and 4). What are these particles doing
here? Why are they used at all?
If we look at the episode from the point of view of what the
two participants might be said to be hoping to achieve, ie. from
the point of view of the purposes that, as overhearers, we might
be able to read from what they have said, things seem to look
clearer. Let us say that what L is trying to do in this episode
is to get S to consider (and even accept) his proposal that in
the meeting that they are arranging, "first cousin" should be
invited as well. Given this assumption, we would be in a position
to consider how the particles that occur in the utterances that L
uses for that purpose might contribute to that purpose. On S's
part, let us say that he begins by waiting to see what L will
eventually say about "first cousin", and, as soon as he realizes
that L is proposing to invite him to their meeting, offers a
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response to the suggestion. The questions that were posed in the
last paragraph can now be given more substance. We can begin to
ask more specific questions about the part that the utterance
particles play in the achievement of the participants' purposes.
How, for example, is the use of wo (wo44) in L's first turn
related to the job of signalling an upcoming proposal? Or, how
does la (1a55) contribute to S's formulation of a response to L's
suggestion? These are questions that may lead to observations
that are of relevance and interest to our understanding of the
particles.
How does L signal an upcoming proposal? How does S show
interest, and how does he show his readiness to hear what L has
to say next? How is the proposal made and received? And how do
the participants handle its consequences? The way in which parti-
cipants make manifest to each other what their intentions are;
the way their behaviours are made intelligible to each other
(hence interpretable as (social) actions); and the way in which
some purpose gets established through conversational exchanges --
in this may lie a clue to the secret of the particles.
Questions like these can only be answered by taking a much
closer and more detailed look at the episode in question, which
in turn requires close analyses of many more episodes containing
the same particles. One would also have to chart their distribu-
tion which, as I will show in later chapters, is far from random.
But these will be distributions that can only be stated in terms
of sequential contexts, and not in terms of syntactic or semantic
relations. These will be my sustained concerns in the analysis
chapters. My point here is to illustrate how questions like
these cannot even be asked unless we situate those utterance
particles that we want to study in conversational interaction
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which is their natural habitat. The asking of these questions
will, I believe, provide a worthwhile point of departure for an
investigation which may yield worthwhile results.
An understanding of the functions of utterance particles in
discourse should be of theoretical interest. For example, it
would reveal ways in which languages have evolved systematic
means of coming to terms with problems that participants are
faced with in conducting practical affairs through everyday
conversational interaction. It would be of interest to a theory
of language to see how such devices are grammaticalized in
linguistic structure.
To look at these objects from an interactional point of view
is to adopt what might be described broadly as a sociolinguistic
perspective. We would expect a close investigation of these
particles to throw light on the sociality of language: the rela-
tionship between language and social interaction would be thrown
into sharp profile through an intimate understanding of the
workings of these objects.
Finally, in so far as the description of utterance particles
can be regarded as pragmatic specifications of the uses of
linguistic items, a consideration of the form such specifications
may take in the case of utterance particles should be of interest
to pragmatics. It should also be of interest to those who are
concerned with the problem of the relationship between grammar
(syntax and semantics) and pragmatics, which has generated some
debates and discussions. But I will take up these and other
general issues until after I have presented my analysis and
findings on three utterance particles in Cantonese.
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CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH STRATEGIES
A general account of the properties of the class of
utterance particles in Cantonese must presumably rest upon
adequate descriptions of at least a handful of individual members
of the class. It thus seems a reasonable schedule to proceed by
examining initially a small number of particles in some detail.
In practice, it is all too easy to yield to the temptation of
studying the whole class all in one go. But this has proved to
have undesirable consequences. One consequence is that one
becomes far too ready to come to conclusions about the properties
of individual utterance particles before their range of uses has
been identified and subjected to detailed analysis. Another
consequence is that, governed by a drive to capture generaliza-
tions as well as provide all the contrasts necessary to
distinguish one particle from another, one tends to approach
problems conceptually rather than empirically. However, it will,
I hope, become clear in the next three chapters that to build a
convincing account of even one utterance particle is not as easy
a task as it might seem, and requires close attention to
empirically found details in the course of trying to come to
grips with particular instances of that utterance particle in
use. It can be argued that at our present state of knowledge,
even this is lacking. A worthwhile project would thus be to
start with a manageable number of particles, and, in the course
of dealing with the particulars of individual instances, develop
and test a set of analytical tools that may prove to be a useful
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starting point for further investigations which would eventually
lead to a deeper understanding of the class as a whole.
I have therefore set myself the much less ambitious, but
relatively manageable task of examining three utterance particles
which are routinely used in ordinary conversations in Cantonese,
with the aim of providing unified accounts of the basic
properties of these particles on the basis of which the
multifarious contributions that each can make to a variety of
interactional tasks can be explicated.
At the outset of such a project, a number of methodological
considerations need to be taken into account. What form should
the data take? How should one go about analysing the data? What
kinds of evidence is one to look for in developing an analysis?
What criteria are there for assessing the adequacy of descrip-
tions? These are the main concerns of this chapter.
1. Everyday Conversational Data
1.1 Naturally Occurring Data vs. Constructed Data
For any claims about the distinctive properties of
individual utterance particles to have an empirical content, some
data base containing instances of these particles must be
obtained. One familiar strategy in previous studies is to
construct sentences which contain the particles in question and
to identify their forms and functions through comparisons and
contrasts. For example, one could construct minimal sentence
pairs, which are formally identical except for the final
particles that they contain, and ask what meaning differences
correspond to the formal contrasts. This method hinges on an
appeal to native speakers' intuitions about what each of the
sentences in question means, and the relationship between them.
20
Indeed, native speakers' intuitions have been a standard form of
data in linguistic studies since the 'Chomskyan revolution'.
However, while constructed examples based on intuition or
memory may supplement natural speech data, they can never replace
them. The meanings of example sentences are not identifiable
independently of a target community of readers. In practice,
readers are implicitly asked to supply 'standard contexts' with
reference to which definite senses can be assigned to constructed
sentences. In thus appealing to, and taking for granted, the
readers' common understanding of such things as the ordinary
meanings of linguistic expressions, or what is a reasonable thing
to say in a given situation, the relationship between context and
interpretation is rendered invisible. More importantly, the
constraint on what counts as a reasonable example makes a great
deal of what actually happens in naturally occurring talk
unobservable by fiat.
"... however rich our imaginations are, if we use hypotheti-
cal, or hypothetical-typical versions of the world we are
constrained by reference to what an audience, an audience of
professionals, can accept as reasonable. That might not
appear to be a terrible constraint until we come to look at
the kinds of things that actually occur. Were I to say
about many of the objects we work with "Let us suppose that
this happened; now I am going to consider it," then an
audience might feel hesitant about what I would make of it
by reference to whether such things happen. That is to say,
under such a constraint many things that actually occur are
debarred from use as a basis for theorizing about conversa-
tion... Our business will be to proceed somewhat differ-
ently. We will be using observation as a basis for theoriz-
ing. Thus we can start with things that are not currently
imaginable, by showing that they happened. We can then come
to see that a base for using close looking at the world for
theorizing about it is that from close looking at the world
we can find things that we could not, by imagination,
assert were there. We could not know that they were
'typical'. Indeed, we might not have noticed that they
happen." (Sacks 1984:25)
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The limitations of data generated by intuition and memory
are particularly obvious in the study of utterance particles.
Considered in isolation, the meanings of utterance particles are
notoriously elusive: attempts to provide conventional dictionary
definitions are fraught with difficulties.
Placing them in the context of constructed sentences does not
take us very much further. Without recourse to 'contextual
factors' such as who is speaking in what capacity to whom, the
topic of conversation, the type of speech event that is taking
place, etc., the sense of a constructed sentence like (1), in
which the particle 7a55 has been inserted, remains indeterminate.
Any of the glosses in (2) may be appropriate in some context, and
many more glosses can be provided with a corresponding change in
the circumstances in which the utterance is heard.
(1) toi seungmin yau pun faa LA
table on there-be CL flower PT
(2) a. There must be a pot of flowers on the table then?
b. One of the things that I noticed was that there was
a pot of flowers on the table.
c. Let us suppose that there is a pot of flowers on the
table.
As will become clear in the next three chapters, the range
of positions-in-conversational-sequences and the variety of
contributions that utterance particles can make to interactional
tasks is not something that can be appreciated without actually
looking at a fair amount of conversational data. I do not think,
having performed such a task, that this can be done through the
collection of materials on the basis of intuition or memory
alone. Constructed sentences in isolation do not as a rule tell
us a great deal about the functional properties of these objects.
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Constructed dialogues too have to be used with care and
discretion. While they may look 'more natural', in practice they
appeal to essentially the same kind of imagination and projection
as constructed sentences. The same question remains: the
procedures with which meanings are arrived at of sentences in
constructed dialogues is just as much in need of investigation
and explication as the case of sentences in isolation. Further,
no amount of imagination can produce the kinds of linguistic and
interactional details that have been shown to be crucial to our
understanding of participants' interpretive procedures.
Empirical work in conversation analysis has identified a range of
such finer details in the organization of talk: pauses and the
phonetic details around them, laughter, false starts, self-
repair, overlapping, and many more (see, for example, two of
Jefferson's perceptive analyses of the fine details of talk : the
"a/an" alternation [1974], and the role of laughter in creating
an auspicious environment for the "unpackaging of a gloss"
[1985]; also, Local & Kelly 1986 on the interactional
significance of different phonetic renderings of the particle
"well"). In general, "anyone who is familiar with conversational
materials ... will be vividly aware of the limitations of
recollection or intuition in generating data by comparison with
the richness and diversity of empirically occurring interaction."
(Atkinson and Heritage 1984:3)
The preference for intuition-generated data in linguistics
stems in part from a distrust for spontaneous speech as a viable
source of data. It is sometimes believed that speech (as opposed
to language) is prone to all sorts of inconsistencies and mishaps
(performance errors), and is by their very nature not amenable to
23
systematic investigation, and therefore unusable as data. Even if
they can be handled in some systematic way, the description of
performance regularities must await corresponding advances in our
understanding of those aspects of competence relevant to their
description, le. the study of competence is logically prior to
any attempt to come to terms with performance.
However, this apprehension about the usability of natural
speech data has, since Chomsky's (1965) widely influential
programmatic statement on this issue, proved to be unfounded.
Work in sociolinguistics and conversation analysis, to name just
two areas of research, has shown that performance data can be
treated systematically on various levels of analysis. On the
levels of phonological and morphological structure, Labov (1972a,
1972b) has shown that some aspects of performance are not only
amenable to systematic treatment, but yield important insights
into the ways in which the form a linguistic item takes is
indicative of social group membership. Research in conversation
analysis has shown beyond any doubt that, when one examines
linguistic actions and interactions closely, it soon transpires
that naturally occurring talk is every bit as orderly and
regulated as any other kind of social phenomenon.
If, as has been abundantly shown in the literature, natural
conversation is subjectable to formal description, what about the
objection that, even if this is a viable form of data, it
presupposes some prior understanding of linguistic competence?
Since this objection rests on the assumption that linguistic
performance (action) is the realization of competence
(knowledge), it raises the whole question of the relation between
linguistic knowledge and action. I shall consider this question
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in more detail below. Suffice it to note at this point that this
is not a necessary assumption to make, and, if indeed there are
strong reasons for not making it, then there would not be any
need to meet the objection in the first place.
1.2 'Raw' Data vs. Elicited Data
Within the broad category of 'performance data', a
distinction can be made between what one might call 'raw'
conversational data on the one hand (consisting simply of
recordings of, say, chats between friends and neighbours, or
members of the family), and data collected from structured
interviews and questionnaires on the other. The use of the latter
kind of data (which might loosely be called 'survey data') is
often dictated by the adoption of a dependent-and-independent-
variable paradigm. For correlational sociolinguistics, the basic
strategy is to collect instances of linguistic items, assign them
to classes (variants) within a set of dependent variables,
describe their distribution vis-a-vis a set of 'contextual
factors' (independent variables) which are supposed to be
identifiable independently of the use of those linguistic items,
and then work out by statistical methods the relationships
between the two sets pf variables. One central aim of this kind
of research is to show that variations in the forms of linguistic
items can be predicted, in statistical terms, on the basis of
these relationships.
While many of the findings of correlational sociolinguistics
provide us with interesting facts about the systematicity of
linguistic variation, this kind of research glosses over the ways
in which social categories such as age, sex and social class
figure in the actual interpretive work that constitutes the
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dynamics of linguistic interaction. The assumption that 'context'
is identifiable and definable independently of language (and that
the relation between context and language is essentially a
determining and one-sided one) oversimplifies the picture. In
reality, it is more likely to be one of "mutual elaboration"
(Sharrock & Anderson 1986:53):
"Activity in and observation of the setting are ways of
acquiring a progressively full sense of what the code is and
how it works, and a progressive awareness of that also gives
an increasing capacity to identify actions for what they
are." (ibid)
Thus, while it is true that the statistical relationships
that are found to hold between linguistic items and contextual
factors cannot be expected (and are not meant) to have any
predictive power with regard to particular occurrences, it is
worth considering how one might provide an account for those
cases where a particular instance does not fit a proposed
statistical relationship. For example, what are we to say about
the use of a variant by a female speaker, which is supposed to be
used by male speakers 'most of the time'? The problem is not that
there are always exceptions to rules. Rather, in what way is the
interactional work that is being achieved in this particular
instance related to its 'unpredictability'? It would be unwise to
dismiss such instances as random variation, because these are the
cases which would provide us with the most interesting kinds of
evidence for our understanding of the complex relationship
between language and society --the ways in which linguistic items
contribute towards the shaping and definition of the 'context'.
These are therefore cases which are in the greatest need for
close analytical attention. And yet it is precisely these
instances that the dependent-and-independent-variable approach
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has the least to say about.
Rather than to chart the social distribution of utterance
particles or to summarize their normal usage statistically, my
aim, in the first instance, is to come to an intimate under-
standing of the properties of three utterance particles which
make it possible for them to perform the kinds of interactional
work that they can be empirically found to perform. To achieve
that aim, I would need to look in detail at the ways in which
they contribute to the meanings of situated utterances in
particular instances of conversational interaction. For the
reasons outlined above, the data for such a project would best be
in the form of 'raw' recordings of natural conversations.
Apart from these considerations, there is an important
reason for using 'raw' conversational data. One of their
attractions lies in the fact that recordings of naturally
occurring talk, in virtue of their public availability, are
conducive to analytical advance. Alternative and subsequent
analyses can always be performed on them. For instance, any dis-
agreement over the proper analysis of a particular data piece
would have that very record as a common ground on which the
relative merits of contending analyses can be assessed. Insights
not available at some stage of knowledge in which a particular
analysis is performed can be used to subsequently analyse an
'old' extract, thus providing for the constant refinement of our
understanding of it. Thus, with a recording of naturally
occurring talk, "... I could get my hands on it and I could study
it again and again, and ... others could look at what I had
studied and make of it what they could, if, for example, they
wanted to be able to disagree with me." (Sacks 1984:26)
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1.3 Everyday Conversation
Before presenting a description of my data-base, I should
give an account of what I understand to be 'everyday conversa-
tion'. The most explicit account of what 'everyday conversation'
is usually taken to mean in sociology and linguistics is the
following, given by Goffman.
"...conversation, restrictively defined, might be identified
as the talk occurring when a small number of participants
come together and settle into what they perceive to be a few
moments cut off from (or carried on to the side of) instru-
mental tasks; a period of idling felt to be an end in it-
self, during which everyone is accorded the right to talk as
well as to listen and without reference to a fixed schedule;
everyone is accorded the status of someone whose overall
evaluation of the subject matter at hand --whose editorial
comments, as it were-- is to be encouraged and treated with
respect; and no final agreement or synthesis is demanded,
differences of opinion to be treated as unprejudicial to the
continuing relationship of the participants." (Goffman
1981:14)
This characterization is, as Goffman himself noted, a rather
restricted one. For the purpose of data-collection, I have
relaxed some of his criteria slightly to include a few more kinds
of data that were readily available.
1.3.1 Number of participants. 	 Due to practical constraints
imposed by relatively detailed transcriptions (eg. identifying
different voices on the tape), I have limited myself to
collecting only conversations in which there are a maximum number
of four participants; in the majority of cases, there are two or
three participants. In any case, it seems that everyday
conversation with a single shared focus of attention does not
normally involve more than three or four participants. When
four, five or more persons do get together to talk, they tend to
split up into smaller conversational groups quite quickly.
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1.3.2 Non-instrumental purposes. 	 The distinction between
instrumental and non-instrumental purposes is a difficult one to
make. In additon to idle chats, I have included informal
counselling sessions and unstructured interviews, where there is
in a sense some instrumental purpose to the talk. Nevertheless, I
think they are sufficiently unscheduled and unplanned to warrant
inclusion.
1.3.3 Course unscheduled.	 This is a criterion which I have not
only adopted but taken to be central. In terms of turn-
allocation, everyday conversations are invariably locally
managed, ie. turns are never pre-allocated. There is never a
'fixed agenda'.
1.3.4 Continuing relationship of the participants. 	 This too
is retained as a criteria, although I have included some less
than clear cases like informal counselling sessions and
encounters between strangers. In a broad sense, however, the
possibility is always left open that the relationship of the
participants may continue into the future.
1.3.5 Co-presence. 	 A further feature, which is implicit in
Goffman's characterization ("when... participants get together")
is that of 'co-presence'. Everyday conversation takes place in
situations where participants are 'present together', ie. can
directly see and hear each other, and attend to each other's
behaviour. The fundamental importance of face-to-face
conversation in human linguistic interaction, while in a sense
patently obvious, cannot be emphasized more. Lyons (1977:63-64)
refers to it as the primary use of language:
"The most typical form of language-behaviour is that which
occurs in face-to-face conversation between members of the
same culture; and this is what will be meant by the term
'normal language behaviour'. All other uses and manifesta-
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tions of language, both written and spoken, are derived in
one way or another from normal language behaviour understood
in this sense." (Lyons 1977:63-64)
Levinson (1983:43-44) underscores its centrality for
functional approaches to the study of language acquisition and
language use:
"...rather than look for a series of static functions or
contextual parameters, one should attend directly to the
single most important dynamic context of language use, name-
ly, conversation, or face-to face interaction. The centra-
lity of this functional matrix for language use hardly needs
arguing: face-to-face interaction is not only the context
for language acquisition, but the only significant kind of
language use in many of the world's communities, and indeed
until relatively recently in all of them. Those interested
in functional explanations of linguistic phenomena ought
then to have a considerable interest in the systematics of
face-to-face interaction." (Levinson 1983:43-44)
1.4 The Observer's Paradox
Finally, consideration must be taken into account of what is
often cited as the main practical difficulty in recording
naturally occurring talk, namely, the so-called 'Observer's
Paradox'. According to Labov (1972a:61), the investigator whose
aim is to collect samples of the vernacular, the form of speech
employed by speakers when they are most at ease, is faced with
the problem of how to reconcile this with the contradictory fact
that when informants are aware that they are being observed, they
cannot be fully at ease. While this is to some extent a problem
that we have to live with, there do seem to be two mitigating
factors. First, tape recorders are perhaps not as strange and
intrusive as when they were first used in early linguistic
fieldwork. Not only has their size been greatly reduced, many
people have got used to it as a natural part of ordinary
household settings. This is true at least in the metropolitan
environment of Hong Kong, where most people are much less
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conscious of tape-recorders than they were, say, twenty years
ago. More importantly, given what is known about the finer
details in the organization of conversation, it is unlikely that
small linguistic details can be consciously monitored for any
length of time. My experience is that conversationalists'
initial uneasiness soon (after at most a couple of minutes) gives
way to whatever is the current conversational concern: one just
cannot both attend to what is being talked about and keep
worrying about the recorder at the same time for too long.
1.5 The Database of the Present Study
Working under the guidance of the various methodological
considerations outlined above,' I have selected from a collection
of audio-recordings twenty hours or so of conversational data
obtained from a variety of sources, including face-to-face chats,
casual interviews, telephone conversations, and radio programmes.
They contain speech samples from a large number of speakers whose
social characteristics in terms of such conventional parameters
as age, sex, socioeconomic class, occupation, and education are
extremely diverse, who were involved in one way or other in some
natural, mundane conversation for a variety of purposes and in a
range of situations. The spontaneity or naturalness of these
conversations obviously varies from one kind of situation to
another. For instance, chats among friends are more natural than
conversations among presenters and personalities on radio
programmes, while casual interviews are of a rather different
character again. But they all provide instances of everyday
social interaction conducted largely through talk, and are in
this respect, fundamentally different from imaginary data.
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2. Ethnomethodology
In analysing the utterance particles in the next three
chapters, I will be developing and demonstrating an approach to
the analysis of the particles, on the basis of a set of
analytical tools and research procedures commonly used in
Conversation Analysis (CA). Many of CA's fundamental assumptions
cannot be appreciated without an understanding of Ethnomethod-
ology, where its roots lie. I will therefore discuss, in this
section, some of the theoretical tenets of Ethnomethodology.
Instead of giving a detailed account, however, my aim is to
outline those salient features of Ethnomethodology which are of
special interest to linguistics in general, and to my present
purposes in particular, while ignoring those aspects which relate
more closely to philosophical and sociological research.'
Of the many insights of Ethnomethodology, which interlock
and intertwine to form a systematic and thoroughly consistent
approach to the investigation of social action, I have singled
out three fundamental components, and shall discuss them under
the following headings.
I. The reflexive character of the accountability of social
actions
2. The indexical. character of natural language descriptions
3. The documentary method of interpretation
2.1 The Reflexive Character of the Accountability
of Social Actions
Arguably the central insight of Ethnomethodology is
encapsulated in the idea that social actions are accountable, and
that this accountability has a reflexive character. Garfinkel
summarizes this theoretical stance as follows:
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"... the activities whereby members produce and manage
settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with 
members' procedures for making those settings 'account-
able'. The 'reflexive', or 'incarnate' character of
accounting practices and accounts makes up the crux of
[ethnomethodology's] recommendation." (Garfinkel 1967:1;
emphasis mine)
Social actions are "account-able" in the sense that they are
"observable-and-reportable, ie. available to members as situated
practices of looking-and-telling" (ibid.) Thus an utterance is an
answer-to-a-question insofar as it is recognizable, and
recognized, le. observable, as an answer-to-a-question. It is
also reportable: it can be formulated as an answer-to-a-question.
There are numerous ways of doing formulating, one of which is to
report to a third party that my interlocutor has answered my
question; another is to formulate it in the immediate conversa-
tion itself, eg. in the turn after the one in which my interlocu-
tor is heard to have provided an answer, I can display my hearing
of it as an answer, and in so doing ask for confirmation,
clarification, justification, etc. But the point is not merely
that linguistic actions can be so recognized/observed and
formulated/ reported. Their accountability, their patently
rational, objective and orderly character resides in the very
activities through which such things as a question-answer
sequence are managed as situated practices. That is, the
procedures whereby participants' manage, for example, a question-
answer sequence are identical with the interpretive schemes with
which sense is made of a linguistic action as an answer-to-a-
question. The analytic focus here is on the way participants
organize their linguistic activities in such a way that they are
accountable, ie. on their procedures or methods of sense-making.
The idea that social actions are accountable is not new or
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even terribly interesting, if all one is saying is that actors
can observe and report their own activities. Self-reports, in
linguistics as in sociology, are fraught with difficulties as a
form of data: they may be misleading or wrong in the sense that
they may not be an accurate or true representation of 'what
really happened'. What Garfinkel is recommending, however, is
not that we should ask actors to provide us with accounts of
their actions and take those accounts as data, still less as the
truth. Instead, the whole question of the goodness of fit
between actors' accounts of their actions and what these actions
'really are' (eg. from the point of view of 'exact sciences') is
bracketed (as in phenomenological bracketing), and, as it were,
put to one side. It does not concern us and it does not interest
us. We have bracketed it because our aim is to study how actors
can determine, to their satisfaction, that a particular action on
a particular occasion of use is in fact what it is made out to
be. How this is managed is a distinctly ethnomethodological
question. Having thus bracketed such questions as the
reliability, validity or scientific adequacy of actors' accounts,
we are in a position to see how speakers actually use those same
accounting practices in interpreting and making sense of
(assigning senses to) each other's actions.
One way in which this fundamental insight can be apprecia-
ted, from the point of view of linguistic studies, is to consider
the relation between linguistic knowledge/norms and action/use/
behaviour.
A fundamental question in linguistic studies is how
linguistic communication is possible. The usual form in which
this question is posed is: what is it that a community of
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speakers must know in common in order that linguistic expressions
have the meanings that 'speakers of the same language' understand
them to have? According to the prevalent, rationalist view, the
aim of linguistic investigations is to specify, as accurately as
possible, the nature of this common knowledge, ie. linguistic
competence. The understanding of a linguistic expression is
modelled as a process which, given a linguistic form as input,
computes, with reference to a dictionary and a set of linguistic
rules, a meaning. This takes place (ideally) irrespective of the
'contexts' in which linguistic expressions are used. The
possibility of communication is then attributed to the fact that
speakers of the same language share essentially the same
machinery which assigns meanings to linguistic forms.
The relation between form and meaning is, however, neither
simple nor straightforward. One of the nuisances that linguists
have encountered is the part that 'context' plays in the assign-
ment of meaning representations to linguistic forms. The problem
is this: if, as mentioned in the last paragraph, the production
and comprehension of linguistic expressions is to be captured by
a model which assigns meaning representations to linguistic forms
in a decontextualized manner; and if, as has been found to be the
case in empirical itudy after empirical study, the meaning of
linguistic expressions often cannot be sufficiently specified
without taking into account 'contextual factors', how should
context be accommodated within such a machinery?
Various lines of attack have been followed in the search for
a solution. For instance, insurmountable problems which have
cropped up in syntax and semantics have been taken over by
pragmatics, where an attempt is made to relate truth-conditional
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meanings to meanings-in-context (eg. Searle's speech act theory
and Grice's ideas about conversational cooperation and
implicatures). On another front, some sociolinguistic research
has tried to deal with contextual variation, by studying the way
variation in linguistic form can be stated in terms of contextual
variables. Other sociolinguistic studies have identified socio-
cultural norms as a means of describing the order and regularity
underlying linguistic behaviour. All these can be characterized
as attempts to fill the gap between system-meaning and meaning-
in-context, by providing the decontextualized machinery with
various supplementary devices.
Despite arguments over a great many details in these
proposals, one basic assumption remains unchanged: to the extent
that there is order in linguistic actions/behaviour, it is to be
sought at the level of linguistic knowledge/norms. There is
general agreement amongst linguists that the meaning of an
utterance is 'given' in the rules, conditions, norms and maxims
that govern or guide linguistic behaviour, independently of the
actual, situated, occasioned contingencies surrounding their
.occurrence. Knowledge or norms provides, in this view,
mechanisms that would determine the grammaticality,
acceptability, appropriateness, or felicity of linguistic actions
(performance, speech acts, behaviour, use), and a basis for the
possibility of communication.
But there is a fundamental difficulty with this conception
of how rules and norms of linguistic actions can be used to
explain speakers' behaviour. For rules and norms to be able to
account for linguistic actions and behaviour, one must show how
they can be applied to specific instances of linguistic actions.
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One must show, for example, that the meaning of a particualr
utterance spoken on a particular occasion can be computed by
applying certain relevant rules or norms. However, far from being
automatic and unproblematical, their application to specific,
concrete, situated 'points' in an unfolding scene requires
crucial decisions to be made as to whether and how particular
rules or norms are to apply in each particular case. A
prerequisite for the successful application of context-sensitive
rules or norms is that a particular situation must be
recognizable and identifiable as one to which they can apply.
Thus, social actors are often assumed to be "cognitively equipped
to recognize situations in common and, once the situation is
commonly recognized, the application of common norms enables the
actors to produce joint actions." (Heritage 1984:108) But the
rules and norms do not themselves tell the actors how to TE'EF>-
nize situations, and how to arrive at identical/common recogni-
tions/ definitions of the situations in which they interact. In
order to apply these rules and norms, we would therefore need a
further set of rules to tell us how to recognize situations and
circumstances so that we would know whether a certain rule or
norm can be invoked, and how to use it. What is needed is a set
of rules which would govern or guide our identification and
definition of situations independently of the original rules. But
it can be shown that we can never have such a further set of
rules, because the criteria for identification, etc. can never be
given in advance of the use of the original rules in our attempt
to make sense of each other's utterances. Even if we could give
some specification in advance, there is no guarantee that it
would apply to a particular case.
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I propose to show this by considering, as a specific
example, one of Grice's famous maxims of conversation (Grice
1975, 1978), the maxim of Quantity. Before doing that, however,
we must be clear about the nature of these maxims, and what they
are supposed to be designed for. Grice makes it very clear that
the primary motivation behind this proposal is to show that the
alleged discrepancies between formal logic and natural language
are not as great as they are usually made out to be, by providing
an apparatus which would fill the gap between 'what is said' and
'what is meant'. Specifically, these devices are "conditions
governing conversation" (1975:43), ie. they are normative
constraints which, in speaking to each other, participants can be
seen to be following. They are not meant to be prescriptive
stipulations of how people should speak, or even descriptive
statements of how people do speak (although there is a sense in
which they should, and do, speak in the manner stipulated in
these maxims). Rather, they form a "basis which underlies"
(1975:48) participants' conversational (and other purposive and
rational) behaviour. Throughout his presentation, Grice talks
about the "following" and "observance" of the maxims. For him,
therefore, the order with which conversations are conducted is to
be sought at this level of description. The maxims are in this
sense norms that underlie, and explain, behaviour. This is also
the standard way in which the maxims are understood in the
literature. Levinson, for example, characterizes them as "a set
of over-arching assumptions guiding the conduct of conversation"
(1983:101). They are conduct-guiding in the sense that they are
normative constraints which regulate conversational conduct, the
adherence to which gives conversational conduct its orderly
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character.
Consider now the maxim of Quantity:
(i) Make your contribution as informative as is required
for the current purposes of the exchange.
(ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is
required.
In the following discussion, I will use the expression
'optimally informative' to describe an utterance which conforms
to the maxim of Quantity. In this sense, the maxim of Quantity
may be regarded as an 'optimal informativeness' requirement. With
reference to this requirement, then, optimally informative
responses to a question will be seen as normal and unproblem-
atical, while responses which are not optimally informative (ie.
more, or less, informative) will be heard in such a way that some
reason will be sought as to why the response is not optimally
informative. As mentioned, the point of the maxim is not that
speakers should, or do, literally contribute optimally
informatively every time they speak. Rather, it is meant to be a
norm which guides or regulates conversational exchanges, so that
speakers and hearers can invoke it, and check to see if in saying
something their interlocutors are following it, and, if not, why
not.
For this maxim to be usable for the purposes for which it is
designed, we need to know, for any specific case, what is to
count as following, and what is to count as not following, the
norm. In order to do that, we need to have some criteria for
assessing the degree of informativeness of utterances, because
according to this maxim, utterances which are optimally informa-
tive have followed the requirement, and those which are not have
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not. To be sure, Grice is not saying that how informative an
utterance is is something that can be determined independently of
the context in which it is used. In fact, he stresses that the
informativeness that this maxim refers to is informativeness "as
is required for the current purposes of the exchange", ie. given 
the purposes of the current exchange, an utterance that is more,
or less, informative than is required will be deemed to have
violated or flouted the maxim. Thus the apparatus needed is one
which would assess the informativeness of utterances relative to
a given set of purposes.
Consider in the light of this the following example:
"Suppose I say: 'Nigel has fourteen children'.	 I shall
implicate [by the maxim of Quantity] that Nigel has only
fourteen children, although it would be compatible with the
truth of [this statement] that Nigel in fact has twenty
children. I shall be taken to implicate that he has only
fourteen and no more because had he had twenty, then by the
maxim of Quantity.. .1 should have said so. Since 1 haven't,
I must intend to convey that Nigel has only fourteen."
(Levinson 1983:106)
Notice that, as the utterance in question is presented as
one to which the maxim of Quantity applies, it must be considered
in relation to some circumstances in which it is said, for the
maxim is formulated specifically to apply to utterances in
context. While we are not actually told what "the current
purposes of the exchange" are, we can, and do, nevertheless
imagine that the utterance occurs, say, in some 'usual'
conversation, for some 'usual' purposes. Thus the recognizably
natural and plausible character of the example turns on the fact
that we are willing to accept that, for the kinds of 'usual'
situations which we can imagine, the utterance in question would
not be deemed to be more, or less, informative than is required.
That is, we are willing to accept that for the kinds of 'usual'
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purposes that we can imagine, the difference between fourteen
children and twenty (or nineteen, or fifteen) is not an
immaterial one. On the basis of this judgement, we are willing,
like Levinson, to draw the implicature "only fourteen, and no
more than fourteen" by the maxim of Quantity. The application of
the notion of 'optimal informativeness' seems in this case to be
unproblematical.
But now, suppose, in response to my neighbour's request "I
need fourteen plates", I said, "I've got fourteen plates".
Unlike in the previous example, it might not matter if in fact I
had twenty. To this it might be countered that, in this case,
the current purpose of the exchange is to establish whether I
have no less than fourteen plates, and so whether I in fact have
more is, unlike in the previous case, immaterial. Therefore no
similar implicatures are to be drawn from this utterance. This
is certainly true. The problem, however, is this: if there are
situations in which such implicatures can be drawn, and other
situations in which they cannot be drawn, how are we to tell
whether a particular situation is a case of one or the other
kind? Clearly, some further guidelines will be needed in order
that the maxim of Quantity can be used to derive the "only, but
no more than..." implicature in some situations but not others.
Would it be possible, in general, to provide specifications which
would allow us to assess the informativeness of an utterance
relative to certain "current purposes", in advance of particular
instances of the application of the maxim?
This might be done by adding to the maxim a supplementary
condition such as: "In the case of numerically quantifiable
items, the stated value will be taken to implicate 'only the
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stated value, and no higher than the stated value', unless the
current purposes of the conversational exchange are such that the
difference between the stated value and some higher value is
immaterial".
But such a supplementary condition does not take us any
closer to a solution of the problem. We would still need a set of
procedures with which to decide whether a specific case at hand
is one in which the difference between the stated value and some
higher value is immaterial. Suppose I say "I've got ten pounds".
And suppose it turns out that I have eleven pounds in my pocket.
How would the 'optimal informativeness' requirement be applied?
Will my utterance be judged to be less-than-informative? Will I
be held accountable for this inaccuracy? But clearly these
questions cannot be decided in advance of a specific occasion on
which the maxim is invoked and applied to an utterance. If this
is what I said to my wife who was gazing into a shop window,
contemplating whether we had enough money to buy a saucepan that
would cost eleven pounds, then my action may well be taken as an
attempt to conceal the truth. It might then become an accountable
matter. But if what she wanted to buy was a loaf of bread, then
the difference between ten and eleven pounds might (hopefully) be
judged to be 'immaterial', then this question would not, and
cannot reasonably, be raised. Notice that the supplementary
condition does not help, because whether a particular situation
is such that the difference between ten and eleven pounds is
material is a decision that needs to be made in every particular
case, and cannot be made independently of the situated
contingencies surrounding the application of the norm. That is,
whether the difference between a stated value and some higher
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value is material is a matter that is open to negotiation. 'What
is sufficiently informative' relative to some current purposes
can never be specified in advance: it is essentially and always,
an occasioned accomplishment. Instead of having a set of
stipulations as to what counts as optimally informative in
certain situation types, participants have to demonstrate, to
their own satisfaction, the fit between the norm and the case at
hand, every time the norm is invoked. They have to, as Garfinkel
puts it, apply the rule every time "for another first time".
It is clear from these examples that the maxim of Quantity
can only work if we assume that some procedures can be specified
in such a way that whether a specific situated utterance is as
informative as is required for some current purposes can be
determined. However, rather than being a question that can be
answered independently of the application of the maxim, such
decisions are made in the very act of applying the maxim to a
specific case at hand. The decision concerning an utterance's
informativeness in part constitutes an interpretation of that
same utterance. From an ethnomethodological point of view, social
actions explicate and at the same time are explicated by conduct-
guiding norms like the maxims of conversation. Hence the
reflexivity of the 'accountability of actions.
Returning to our original question about the relation
between linguistic knowledge and use, what light has our
discussion shed on this relation? It is customary in Linguistics
to conceptualize linguistic knowledge as that which underlies and
determines use. The meaning of an utterance is to be derived
from information that is in a sense already there in the system.
An utterance can be understood, its meaning recovered, insofar as
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it can be decoded as an instance of an underlying sentence, whose
sense can be determined in terms of system-internal relation-
ships. Against this, Ethnomethodology insists that an utterance
can never be explicated in terms of a meaning residing intrinsic-
ally in the code. To understand the meaning of an utterance is
to assign it a sense. This requires two (not one) mutually
dependent preconditions: knowledge of a code, and mastery of its
use or application. Using the code as an interpretive scheme, an
utterance is treated as an instance of (a document pointing to)
the code (a presupposed underlying pattern), and a meaning
assigned to it in terms of that code. But this instantiation is
always open to negotiation, always accountable. Thus while our
knowledge of the maxims of conversation must be assumed in order
that our conversational conduct can proceed in an organized,
orderly manner, the knowledge does not consist of instructions
about what decisions are to be made at particular points in
actual situated interactions. We are still left to apply these
rules every time "for another first time". In general, while our
linguistic actions cannot be recognized for what they are without
the rules, the rules (knowledge) are empty, and explain nothing,
without the use. What emerges is a relation between knowledge
and action that is l"profoundly reflexive" (Heritage 1984:6).
"[persons, including both lay and professional analysts]
frequently must elect among alternative courses of interpre-
tation and inquiry to the end of deciding matters of fact,
hypothesis, conjecture, fancy, and the rest, despite the
fact that in the calculable sense of the term 'know', he
does not and even cannot 'know' what he is doing prior to or
while he is doing it." (Garfinkel 1967:78).
Garfinkel uses the phrase "in the calculable sense of the
term 'know'" to refer to the sense in which (for linguistics)
speakers are said to have internalized a set of rules (including
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norms, maxims, and conditions of appropriate usage) which deter-
mines the way meaning is to be computed from a given utterance.
In this sense, actors cannot be said to know what the utterance
means prior to the act of hearing and interpretation, for meaning
does not reside in the code, waiting to be recovered. Nor can
they be said to know what the utterance means while they are
hearing and interpreting it, for that is not how they go about
computing its meaning. Rather, they appeal to 'what everyone
knows' and common-sense rationality (what is reasonable) by
getting others to agree that this particular case fits a rule. In
contrast to the idea that senses are already there in the system,
Garfinkel proposes to look at meaning-in-context and common
understanding as 'occasioned accomplishments', products of
concerted work by participants in giving definite senses to
utterances by negotiating, demonstrating, and establishing their
goodness of fit to presupposed rules and norms.
It is interesting to compare here Wittgenstein's similar
remarks on what one can (or cannot) be said to be doing when one
says one understands. Wittgenstein stresses the futility of the
misguided project of looking for something (eg. a mental process)
that is understanding. He also stresses the procedural character
of understanding.
"B understands the principle of the series" surely doesn't
mean simply: the formula "a n=...." occurs to B. For it is
perfectly imaginable that the formula should occur to him
and that he should nevertheless not understand. "He under-
stands" must have more in it than: the formula occurs to
him. And equally, more than any of those more or less
characteristic accompaniments or manifestations of under-
standing. ...(1958, para.152)
"We are trying to get hold of the mental process of under-
standing which seems to be hidden behind those coarser and
therefore more readily visible accompaniments. But we do
not succeed; or, rather, it does not get as far as a real
attempt. For even supposing I had found something that
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happened in all those cases of understanding, --why should
it be the understanding? And how can the process of under-
standing have been hidden, when I said 'Now I understand'
because I understood?!
And if I say it is hidden --then how do I know
what I have to look for? I am in a muddle."
(1958, para.153)
The possibility of linguistic communication and common
understanding becomes, in this view, not a substantive, but an
operational, problem. Actors in a common-sense world who choose
rational courses of action as means for the achievement of
practical ends do not proceed on the basis of prior substantive
agreements, eg. what the scope of application of a rule is, and
how it is to apply to particular cases. The very fact that
decisions and judgements are constitutive of rule applications
means that such prior agreements cannot be there. This is not a
question of rules having accidental exceptions; it is a problem
that arises in every act of rule-application itself.
In highlighting the centrality of the reflexivity of the
accountability of social actions, Garfinkel draws our attention
to the common sense rationality of everyday activities, what he
calls 'practical reasoning'. The problem is to learn about how
persons, in the course of conducting everyday affairs for
practical purposes, make a recognizable feature of their actions
the 'goodness of fit' between those actions and certain
interpretive schemes. One important thing to learn about is
therefore the methods in terms of which the reasonableness or
otherwise of actions can be determined. Their recognizably
rational character is a product of concerted work on the part of
participants in 'making of' accounts, such 'making-of' being
bound up with (not independent of) "the socially organized
occasions of their use" (Garfinkel 1967:3). It is in this sense
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an ongoing, contingent accomplishment.
The rationality of our actions is not to be measured against
some independent scientific criteria, but must be a topic of
study in its own right, for the reasonableness and rationality of
our actions is a practical problem that we as social actors are
confronted with in the everyday activities that we are engaged
in. Participants in interaction rely on and take for granted, the
procedures whereby their practical actions can be made out to be
reasonable, normal, expectable, appropriate, etc. The deeply
reflexive relation between knowledge and action is a condition of
their interactions.
"Not only do members... take that reflexivity for granted,
but they recognize, demonstrate, and make observable for
each other the rational character of their actual, and that
means occasional, practices while respecting that reflexi-
vity as an unalterable and unavoidable condition of their
inquiries." (Garfinkel 1967:8)
It is this fundamental reflexivity that Ethnomethodology
proposes to treat as a topic of study in its own right. Instead
of asking what members' substantive agreements (eg. 'mutual know-
ledge', 'shared knowledge', 'common ground', 'presupposition
pool') consist of, on the basis of which linguistic communication
is possible, Ethnomethodology focuses on the procedural,
operational structure of 'common understanding' and the how of
intelligibility. How do participants design their actions in
such a way that their 'motives' and 'intentions' are made a
recognizable feature of their talk? How is intelligibility
accomplished in situated interactions?
For the linguist, these Ethnomethodological insights mean
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that many basic assumptions of the enterprise have to be reconsidered.
One doesn't 'explain linguistic behaviour' in terms of rules of
competence, conditions governing the successful performance of speech
acts, maxims of conversation, variable rules, sociocultural norms
guiding linguistic interaction, etc. Rather, linguistic knowledge can be
regarded as assumed underlying patterns which are used as interpretive
schemes in participants' performing and making-sense-of each other's
linguistic actions. Instead of going round in circles about the
epistemic and ontological status of linguistic knowledge and use,
Ethnomethodology proposes a shift of investigative attention to
organizational issues.
2.2 The Indexical Nature of Natural Language Descriptions
The centrality of the notion of 'indexical expressions' for
Ethnomothodology can be seen in the following programmatic statement of
Garfinkel's:
"I use the term 'ethnomethodology' to refer to the investi-
gation of the rational properties of indexical expressions
and other practical actions as contingent ongoing
accomplishments of organized artful practices of everyday
life." (1967:11)
The notion 'indexical expression' is a familiar one in philosophy
and linguistics. These are words and phrases whose sense and reference
cannot be determined independently of the contexts in which they are
used. In linguistics, canonical examples of indexical expressions are
often discussed under "deixis", which include demonstrative pronouns
like "this" and "that", personal pronouns like "I" and "you", adverbs of
place and time like "here" and "now", as well as grammatical categories
like tense, and 'discourse-deictic words' (Levinson 1983:96) like "so"
and "well". 2 They have been a - constant source of trouble for linguistic
analysis, because of the way their interpretation is tied to the
contexts of utterances, so that the truth-value of 'the same sentence'
containing these expressions may vary from situation to situation
depending on who said it, to whom, when,
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and where.
Ethnomethodology's proposal is not that there are indexical
expressions in language, but that natural language expressions
are essentially indexical. In this view, contrary to what is
sometimes assumed, a definite sense cannot as a rule be assigned
to a linguistic expression in isolation. The point is not that
sentences may be semantically ambiguous; that, for instance,
"Visiting relatives can be a nuisance" has two possible senses.
Rather, the argument is that the terms of a linguistic expression
are intrinsically indeterminate and negotiable, and that the
sense of an utterance in context is determinate only insofar as
it is made out to be so through sense-making procedures that
assign definite senses to indeterminate expressions.
Assuming that the sense of an utterance is in part a
function of the senses of the words in it, consider the word
"relatives" in the above sentence. In what way can it be defined
so that it can be said to have a determinate meaning, independent
of the context in which it is used? Can a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions be specified with reference to which the
appropriateness of the application of the word in every instance
of use can be assessed? Whatever criteria one might propose to
circumscribe the use of the word 'relative', there are bound to
be occasions of its application in which some part of this
definition may turn out to be defeasible. For instance, is my
brother-in-law's brother a relative of mine? Perhaps, but I am
not all that willing to call him that because I have only met him
casually once or twice. On the other hand, I am perfectly
willing to accept that I have a few relatives who live in some
far-off land in China, although I have not even seen them or
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heard from them. This is not to say that we don't really know
what 'relative' means. On the contrary, we believe, and assume,
that everyone knows what 'relative' means. But this presumed
common knowledge consists not so much in some shared substantive
definition which stipulates what the range of cases is that the
word can be used correctly to label, but in the very practice of
applying a more or less "uncircumscribed" concept in actual
instances of use (Wittgenstein 1958, para.70). It is in this
sense that the assignment of a sense to an utterance is always,
in Ethnomethodological terms, an occasioned accomplishment.
While most linguists would readily recognize the existence
of deictic expressions in languages, many would hold that these
are after all only exceptions to the rule. Most other words are
semantically fairly 'stable', and can by and large (as long as we
admit of 'borderline cases') be defined in terms of semantic
features. Many would be wary of taking the ethnomethodological
position too seriously, namely, that other linguistic expressions
are not really different in nature from what are traditionally
recognized as indexical expressions.
Thus it might be argued that while the interpretation of
linguistic expressions may vary according to the contexts in
which they are used, core semantic specifications are necessary
in order that the minimal set of meaning contrasts that exist in
the linguistic system can be captured, a core meaning that
remains constant and independent of contextual impingements. It
might even be argued that one cannot begin to document the
contextual variations of the meaning of a linguistic expression
until this central structurally necessary meaning has been
specified. That is, a distinction needs to be made between the
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system-internal meaning (truth-conditional meaning) of words and
sentences, and their meanings-in-context.
Against this view, Ethnomethodologists argue that such a
distinction cannot be upheld, and that all linguistic expressions
are intrinsically indexical. That is, what is true of deictic
expressions turns out also to be true of words which are not in
the usual sense deictic. Consider the word "chair". If some
linguistic expressions can be said to be objective (as opposed to
indexical), this must be one of them. But as soon as one
actually proposes some features in an attempt to set up the
necessary semantic contrasts which would enable the linguist to
state the meaning differences between "chair" and other lexical
items in the language, one realizes that they can always be shown
to be defeasible. For instance, what are the defining features
of a chair? Let us suppose that one of the defining features of
a chair is that it has four legs. But a chair with only three
legs can nevertheless be referred to as a chair. Or, it might be
argued that its defining feature is a functional one, namely, a
piece of furniture for sitting on. But this does not take us any
further: a three-legged chair may not be fit to sit on, but it
could be referred to as a chair all the same. Obviously, further
refinements can be made to the definition, but the defeasibility
of the conditions would remain the same. Further, as Wootton
(1975) shows, even if one were able to invoke a certain defini-
tion of a chair, and came to understand it on the basis of this
definition, that still would not provide for the assignment of a
determinate sense to the word 'chair' independently of a
particular occasion of its use.
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"Suppose I wanted to sell a chair, and after I have placed
an advertisement in a newspaper someone comes to the door
and says, 'I've come about a chair.' Assume that I have done
a componential analysis of the word 'chair' and on this
basis can assign a semantic description to that word in this
utterance. The problem is, however, that I do not hear this
utterance as referring to any old chair but to a very
specific chair, the one that I advertised, and if I did not
hear it in that way then one could surely expect
considerable misunderstanding." (Wootton 1975:35)
While native speakers may well be convinced that a parti-
cular semantic representation captures 'the usual meaning' of a
sentence, this should not mislead us into thinking that the sense
thus arrived at is somehow the meaning of the sentence (default,
neutral, literal, or whatever). As soon as we start talking about
what a sentence ordinarily or usually means, we have entered the
common-sense world of everyday social interaction, for which
speakers' common understanding is itself in need of explication.
There are as usual interesting parallels in Wittgenstein's
later philosophy. His doctrine of "finitism" is a case in point
(Bloor 1983:25). Against the background of the traditional
realist-nominalist controversy, ie. the arguments over whether a
class of things to which a concept applies have something in
common other than the name with which they are labelled,
Wittgenstein proposes the famous notion of "family resemblance".
He shows that while . a class of things to which a concept applies
do in a sense share features in common, they do not all possess
some indispensable feature that defines the essence of the
concept. Nor are they grouped together only because they happen
to have the same name. Individual instances are assigned to the
same family, and referred to by the same name, on the basis of
occasioned decisions about their family resemblances. Thus,
supposing that X, Y, and Z are members of the same family, there
might be features shared by X and Y which are also shared between
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Y and Z. On the other hand, some common features between X and Y
need not be shared by Z at all. And none of these features can
be said to be necessary or defining of the class. "Their common
property is the result of their being assigned to the same class,
not the cause." (ibid., p.31)
The point of this is that the sense of a word is not 'fixed
in advance', so that its application to things and events is
governed without problem or residue by a set of criterial
features. Rather, its meaning is determined on particular
occasions of its use.
It might be argued that communication would hardly be
possible if words have no fixed meanings. But, as we have seen in
the discussion of "reflexivity" above, common understanding, from
the ethnomethodological point of view, does not consist of agree-
ments on substantive matters (such as the criterial features of
the words in a language), but of 'design principles', methods or
procedures by which meanings are made of forms which are
indexical, which by this very nature, require 'context-tying' in
order to be interpretable. If human linguistic communication
were to depend entirely on objective expressions, we would not be
able to say even the simplest things without running into an
endless chain of demands for elaboration and clarification.
Thus, far from being a hindrance to communication, the index-
icality of linguistic expressions provides the very basis for
communication.
"Garfinkel proposes a change in attitude, pointing out that
indexical expressions are not a nuisance in the context of
ordinary discourse, for such discourse goes about its
orderly way through the use of such expressions. Everyday
discourse has a plain sense which the users have no
difficulty in grasping. Their exchanges, rather than
suffering from, actually depend upon the indexical nature of
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expressions, and it is through a grasp of the circumstances
of an utterance that persons are able to assign it a
definite sense." (Sharrock & Anderson 1986:43)
2.3 The Documentary Method of Interpretation
We saw that one of the questions that can be asked within an
ethnomethodological framework about linguistic communication is:
what sense-making procedures are available to participants in
interaction through which meanings are occasioned? A topic for
investigation is therefore the methods with which 'what is known'
and 'what is said' are used in a mutually elaborative way to
produce 'what is meant'. Garfinkel describes 'the documentary
method of interpretation' as follows:
"The method consists of treating an actual appearance as
'the document of', as 'pointing to', as 'standing on behalf
of' a presupposed underlying pattern. Not only is the
underlying pattern derived from its individual documentary
evidences, but the individual documentary evidences, in
their turn, are interpreted on the basis of 'what is known'
about the underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate the
other." (Garfinkel 1967:78)
Most of the ingredients needed for an explication of the
documentary method of interpretation have already been introduced
in our consideration of "reflexivity" and "indexicality" above.
We saw that and how linguistic knowledge and action are
mutually elaborative. Thus, the use of rules, norms, and maxims
as interpretive schemes provides a "seen but unnoticed" back-
ground against which sense can be made of utterances. With
reference to these interpretive schemes, linguistic 'appearances'
(ie. utterances) are treated as 'documents pointing to'
underlying patterns. On the other hand, the use of utterances as
documents pointing to patterns, provides the evidence that is
needed to project and establish patterns underlying actions.
We also saw that utterances, as indexical expressions, do
54
not have given, essential meanings. Rather, meanings are a
result of participants assigning senses to utterances through
'contextual determinations'.
"Given the enormous array of possible contextualizations for
a statement and hence of possible interpretations for it,
and given also that the producers of the statements can
never literally say what they mean, then the producers of
statements can only make themselves understandable by assum-
ing that the recipients are accomplishing the relevant
contextual determinations for what is being said."
(Heritage 1984:96-7)
A demonstration of the method of documentary interpretation
was given by Garfinkel (1967, ch.3) in the form of a 'student
counselling experiment', in which students were told that
research was being done to "explore alternative means to
psychotherapy 'as a way of giving persons advice about their
personal problems' (sic)" (ibid., p.79). The subjects were told
that they should ask about ten 'yes/no questions' about a
particular personal problem that they had. They were told that
the counsellor would answer their questions to the best of his
ability. Without the subjects knowing it, however, the
counsellor's 'yes' or 'no' answer given at the end of each
question was pre-given from a table of random numbers.
Despite the admittedly artificial character of the
experimental situation, many of Garfinkel's findings are of great
interest to students of linguistics. Here is a small sample of
them: (ibid., pp.89-94)
1. The counsellor's 'yes's and 'no's were perceived as
answers-to-questions. They were heard as "advice".
2. "Subjects sometimes started with the reply as an answer
and altered the previous sense of their question to
accommodate to the reply as the answer to the retro-
spectively revised question".
3. "Incomplete, inappropriate, and contradictory answers"
are handled with a variety of means, as sensible
answers-to-questions, eg. they may be inappropriate
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"for a reason".
4. Patterns in the advice were searched for and perceived.
In general, what were from one point of view senseless
dialogues were given definite sense through the subjects' use of
the documentary method, employing interpretive schemes to produce
patterns (meanings) to 'appearances' treated as evidence, and to
organize and accomplish what for them were 'counselling
sessions'. Random 'yes's and 'no's were treated as evidence
pointing to underlying patterns which make them meaningful.
Subsequent research in Conversation Analysis, using natural
speech data, has confirmed many of Garfinkel's insights in this
demonstration, and shown that participants have means available
to them to make sense of, and understand, each other's
utterances-in-sequence.
An important implication of this ethnomethodological insight
for linguistics is that one can approach natural dialogues by
looking for (1) the kinds of resources available to participants
for treating linguistic forms as documents of underlying
patterns; (2) the underlying patterns that are established on the
basis of linguistic evidence; and (3) the ways in which meanings-
in-context are constructed through these interdependent means.
For my present Purpose of investigating utterance particles
in Cantonese, these proposals suggest that instead of looking for
'core/intrinsic meanings' of the particles, or a set of criteria]
semantic or pragmatic features, these objects may be approached
from the point of view of their discourse-deictic properties.
Close examination of instances of their use in context can be
expected to yield insights into the ways in which aspects of the
documentary method feature in the organization of language.
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3. Conversation Analysis
Having thus set an ethnomethodological backdrop, I will
outline in this section a number of methodological considerations
distinctive of Conversation Analysis (CA). My aim is to record
briefly only those assumptions which are most relevant to the
analyses to be developed in the next three chapters. I will
therefore not go into detailed arguments which may be necessary
to establish some of these assumptions.3
Following Heritage (1985:1), I will start with a discussion
of the basic orientation of CA, under the following three
headings:
"1. Interaction is structurally organized;
2. Contributions to interaction are both context shaped and
context renewing; and
3. These two properties inhere in the details of
interaction so that no order of detail in conversational
interaction can be dismissed a priori as disorderly,
accidental or irrelevant."
3.1 The Production of Orderliness in Conversation
One of the fundamental assumptions of research in CA, which
is derived from Ethnomethodology, is that the order and organiza-
tion of conversational interaction are to be described as
"structures in their own right, which ... stand independently of
the psychological or other characteristics of particular partici-
pants" (ibid.) Instead of viewing participants in interaction as
bundles of idiosyncratic, 'social', or psychological attributes,
CA treats them, just as they treat each other, as rational social
agents who are partners in concerted activities. "Settings of
organized everyday affairs" (Garfinkel 1967:1) are produced and
managed through sense-making procedures with which meanings are
occasioned in conversational contexts. Utterances are in this
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sense documents or evidence via which participants' psychology
(eg. their intentions) are made manifest. Wootton describes this
central concern in CA as "the concern that conversation analysts
have with how people, in their dealings with each other, document
for each other what is taking place" (MS:8) Thus, private
intentions and feelings have no place in linguistic communication
until they are demonstrably publicly displayed. The documentary
method of interpretation provides no 'time-out', so that every
utterance produced in some context is treated, essentially and
unavoidably, as purposeful action, ie. as 'meaning something'.
This provides a basis for the possibility of meaning, and there-
fore communication.
3.2 The Mutual Explication of Utterance and Context
The assumption that utterances are context shaped and
context renewing is derived from the notion of reflexivity
discussed above. Thus while utterances, being essentially
indexical, cannot be interpreted independently of a context, the
occurrence of each utterance in itself reconstitutes and
transforms the context. A context explicates and is at the same
time explicated by an utterance.
While it is a mundane observation that the actual business
of linguistic interaction takes place in real time, the
consequences of this for the conduct of conversational
interaction have not always been taken up seriously. One
consequence of the time-bound nature of conversational
interaction is that linguistic objects find themselves in
constant sequential relationship to one another. A solid finding
which has merged from CA studies is that inferences and
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interpretations of utterances draw on these sequential
relationships. Indeed, it has been argued that these
relationships constitute a primary aspect of an utterance's
'context', so that its interactional import cannot be
sufficiently determined independently of its placement in a
sequence. Schegloff, for example, maintains that
"...no analysis, grammatical, semantic pragmatic, etc. of...
utterances taken singly and out of sequence, will yield
their import in use, will show what co-participants might
make of them and do about them." (1984:31)
An utterance such as "did you" may, in different sequential
contexts, be made out to be a question, an acknowledgement, a
threat, a compliment, a complaint, etc., depending in part, but
crucially, on the immediately preceding and following turns at
talk. Thus, "sequences and turns within sequences, rather than
isolated sentences or utterances" have been identified as CA's
"primary units of analysis" (Atkinson & Heritage 1984:5).
The mutually elaborative relation between utterance and
context also means that utterances must be built with a specific
orientation to the circumstances in which they are used. In
particular, they need to be designed with reference to the parti-
cipants for whom they are intended. This central feature of
conversational interaction is often referred to in the literature
as "recipient design". The primacy of "recipient design" has
been documented time and again in CA studies. Thus, Schegloff's
study of "place formulation" (1972a) stresses the importance of
assumptions about who the recipient is, where he lives, what
places he has been to, and a host of other contingencies, for the
design of place descriptions. Jefferson (1985) shows how
"glosses" (undetailed descriptions) are "unpackaged" (detailed)
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at precisely those points in conversations where the recipient
has clearly manifested a "willingness" to go into the details of
the glosses.
3.3 The Empirical Investigation of Observable Details
Conversation analysts assume that features such as those
mentioned so far inhere in the details of interaction. For
conversation, this means that no 'small phonetic details',
apparent 'performance errors', and other 'irrelevancies' of talk
should be ruled out a priori as perfunctory, haphazard or non-
contributive. Heritage mentions two major consequences arising
from this assumption. First, this has led to "a general retreat
from premature theorizing" (1985:2), and the building of what
Levinson (1983:285) calls "an empirical tradition" which is
lacking in pragmatics, and in linguistics generally. Second,
"every effort is made to render empirical analyses answerable to
the specific details of research materials and, in every way, to
avoid idealizing the latter." (1985:2)
A related point may be referred to as 'respect for the
individual case'. The best known example of this orientation is
Schegloff's (1972b) reanalysis of conversation openings to take
into account one apparent exception out of 500 data extracts. He
changed his initial analysis "call-recipient speaks first" into
one which hinges on a "summons-response" organization, which
turned out not only to be able to handle all of his data, but
explicated them better, eg. the third position being, under the
new analysis, a means for the introduction of 'first topic'.
Another example is Jefferson's (1984) intensive analysis of one
single data extract, out of which a great number of insights have
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been gained on "disjunctive and stepwise topic shifts". While it
would be unrealistic to pretend that the analysis of single cases
does not have limitations, it would be equally unwise to dismiss
its value too hastily. At the very least a meticulous and
perceptive account of a single case would provide a valuable
point of entry for the examination of further and more data. In
any case, whatever descriptive account is offered for any class
of phenomena, it must ultimately be answerable to individual
cases.
3.4 Evidence
Next, we need to consider what kinds of evidence are usually
sought in CA studies. The crucial feature here is what might be
called the 'proof procedure', which means that the professional
analyst's interpretations of particular turns at talk are
constrained by the interpretations that are made by the
participants themselves of those same turns at talk in the course
of their conversation. These latter interpretations are manifest
and available in the data themselves, as interpretations of prior
turns are evidenced and displayed in subsequent turns. As
conversational data are publicly available and can be subject to
independent scrutiny, particular analyses are always open to
revision and re-analyses. Thus, far from being what might at
first sight seem an unconstrained subjective exercise, claims
made in CA studies on the basis of data that are publicly
available are empirical in nature, ie. they are systematically
open to confirmation and disconfirmation.
"While understandings of other turn's talk are displayed to
co-participants, they are available as well to professional
analysts, who are thereby afforded a proof criterion (and a
search procedure) for the analysis of what a turn's talk is
occupied with. Since it is the parties' understandings of
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prior turns' talk that is relevant to their construction of
next turns, it is their understandings that are wanted for
analysis. The display of those understandings in the talk
of subsequent turns affords both a resource for the analysis
of prior turns and a proof procedure for professional
analyses of prior turns -- resources intrinsic to the data
themselves." (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:729)
Wootton (MS) lists five types of evidence that are regularly
used in CA to support empirical claims: (MS:9)
I. matters concerning sequential placement
2. co-occurring evidence within a turn
3. subsequent treatment of the object in question
4. discriminability of the object
5. exploitation of the object's properties
3.4.1 Sequential placement
	
As mentioned in connection with
the 'proof procedure', detailed consideration of the sequential
placement of conversational objects (such as the utterance
particles that are being studied in this thesis) often furnishes
the analyst with evidence about their properties. Specifically,
examination of the distribution of a conversational object across
a range of sequential types (eg. different kinds of adjacency
pairs) may turn up properties that are not perspicuous when it is
considered in relation to only a limited number of language
games.
3.4.2 Co-occurrence within a turn
	 Other linguistic materials
that occur within the same turn as a conversational object under
investigation may provide supporting evidence for a particular
analysis. In the case of utterance particles, examination of a
collection of data may reveal co-occurrence patterns between a
particular particle and some syntactic or semantic structures.
These can then be used to support or cast doubt on a proposed
analysis.
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3.4.3 Subsequent treatment
	 Another kind of evidence is
available in the form of the way instances of a conversational
object under investigation are treated in subsequent turns within
particular conversations. This kind of evidence can only be
gathered through detailed examination of individual data
extracts. Thus claims about the properties of an utterance
particle may find support in the kinds of sequential implications
that are evidenced in subsequent turns.
3.4.4 Discriminability
	 The properties of a conversational
object may be more adequately specified when it is compared with
other objects which occur in similar sequential positions.
Wootton emphasizes the importance of evidence obtained from
systematic comparisons, "the absence of [which] weakens the
discussion of many interactional items in the literature" (ibid.,
p.14). For example, comparisons may be made between two
particles both of which occur regularly in reporting sequences,
which may yield evidence that help to discriminate one from the
other.
3.4.5 Exploitation of the object's properties
	 Particular
instances of an object which fail to confirm a proposed analysis
may usefully inform an analysis by providing evidence of the way
properties of the object can be exploited for special inter-
actional purposes. Apparent counter-examples and deviations must
therefore be examined in even closer detail, to see whether they
demand modifications or overhaul to a proposed analysis, or else
provide evidence for the correctness of the analysis in ways that
have been overlooked.
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3.5 Criteria for Assessing the Adequacy of an Account
Finally, I should mention briefly the kind of criteria that
have been used in CA for assessing the adequacy of proposed
analyses. Wootton (MS:23-24) gives an explicit account of the
main kinds of considerations involved.
1. "The analysis should be based on thorough and compelling
accounts of the data fragments from which it derives, accounts
which attend to the unique and context-specific features of these
interactions as well as their decontextualized properties."
(ibid., p.23)
2. Restrictions as to the positions and sequences within
interaction in which the analysis holds should be stated.
3. Analytic claims need to be supported by the kinds of
evidence mentioned above. "Any analysis which relies heavily on
frequency considerations while leaving a residue of relevant
cases unaccounted for must be considered weak" (ibid.)
4. The Present Project
Transcriptions of conversational data were scanned, and data
extracts containing instances of three particular utterance
particles were collected. The three particles selected for
investigation are LA (1a55), LO (1o55) and WO (wo44), which are
among the small handful of utterance particles that are most
frequently used in Cantonese conversation. About a hundred data
extracts containing each were studied, of which fifty were
subjected to close contextualized examination, in which process
developing analyses were constantly tested and refined. The work
of each particle in any particular interactional moment was
examined in relation to the manifest purposes of the participants
concerned. Particular attention was paid to their sequential
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contexts, ie. their placement in a variety of sequential environ-
ments, and their sequential implications as evidenced in their
treatment in subsequent turns.
While particular data extracts have received sustained
analytical attention, my aim is not to defend a series of
fragmented analyses. I wish to show that the particular kinds of
work that these particles are demonstrably capable of performing
are relatable to unified accounts of their discourse-deictic
properties. I shall argue that the range of interactional tasks
that each of them can contribute to can be seen to be the product
of the mutual elaboration of the particle's presumed general
properties and the particularities of the sequential environments
in which it occurs. More generally, I wish to show how the
application of CA techniques to the investigation of these
conversational objects would tell us about the kinds of
interactional problems that their uses orient to, and the ways in
which solutions to such problems have impinged upon the structure
of the language.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMON GROUND IN CONVERSATION:
THE UTTERANCE PARTICLE LA
By 'LA', I refer to the utterance particle which has the
segmental shape /la:/ and the suprasegmental accompaniment of the
high level tone; hence its representation in other accounts
variously as lal, 1a55 and lla (le. /la/ with tone 1). There are
other particles with the same segmental make-up but different
tones, eg. /la:/ with low level/falling tone, and /la:/ with mid
level/falling tone, but they will not be studied here. I have
used LA consistently, both in the transcripts and in the text,
and since, of the three Pals, this is the only one that I will
be concerned with, the proposed convention should not cause any
confusion. The actual phonetic make-up of instances of LA may
vary, particularly as a result of a variety of intonational
modifications, but I will ignore these complications unless they
seem relevant to an argument, and will proceed to analyse all
those utterances in my conversational data which can be clearly
and unambiguously identified as containing instances of LA.
Further, although I will be analysing mainly instances of LA in
which it occurs singly as a simple particle, if we assume that
the properties of compound particles are partially determined by
that component particle which occurs last in the compound, my
treatment should in principle be extendible to compound particles
where LA constitutes the last component.
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1. Previous Descriptions of LA
Previous studies of Cantonese utterance particles have been
few and far between. What follows is a brief survey of available
definitions and descriptions of LA.
Three of the more widely used Cantonese-English dictionaries
have included LA in their entries. Lau (1977) describes it as a
"final particle" which "expresses the idea of requesting,
commanding, or advising at the end of imperative statements;
expresses the idea of an agreement of some kind having been
reached." Meyer and Wempe (1935) also identifies it as a "final
particle", and describes it laconically as "emphatic or
euphonic". Huang (1970) describes it as "sentence final; used
with commands or requests, or final agreement".
Yau (1965), a study in which one of the aims was to gauge
native speakers' intuitions about utterance particles in
Cantonese, adopts a descriptive framework which treats the
function of every particle as a bipartite union of a denotative
value and a connotative value. A particle's denotative value is
its "S-Q function", which we can think of as a scale ranging from
Statement (S) to Question (Q). Subjects in Yau's experiments
were asked to place an inventory of particles along the scale,
and, by averaging tfie ' results, Yau assigns each partice to one
of five types : "S-type" (ie. basically statement-particles), "Q-
type" (basically question-particles), "SQ type" (half-way in
between),' and so on. As a result of this experiment, LA was
classified as a member of the "Q-type", "question" being defined
as "an utterance which demands a verbal confirmation" (p.39)
Further experiments asked the subjects to judge the degree to
which a selection of particles were "relevant" to a set of
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descriptive labels, including "coaxing", "surprised", "hesita-
ting", "fault-finding", and eight others. On the basis of the
results obtained from this second experiment, each particle is
assigned a set of connotative values. For LA, these include:
"coaxing", "persuading", "reminding", and "politely urging".
Gibbons (1980) describes a selection of utterance particles
using a speech act framework. Particles are categorized in terms
of one major dichotomy : representatives vs. directives. Within
the class of directives, a sub-division is set up between "ques-
tions" ("those [speech acts] that require a response in terms of
a reply"), and "mands" ("those [speech acts] that require a
response in terms of action") (p.767). Further, a three-point
scale is used to indicate the "strength" of a particle, the
degree to which a response is expected, "1" being the weakest and
"3" the strongest. In terms of these taxonomic parameters, LA is
described as a mand which has a strength of 2. It is also
briefly glossed as a "request".
The most recent study to date is Kwok (1984) whose main
concern is to identify the "core meaning" of each utterance
particle from an examination of a two-hour corpus of telephone
conversations. LA is said to be "...similar in function and,
indeed, in pronunciation to 'la' in Putonghua", and has the
function of expressing (following Chao 1968) "lively enumera-
tion". It has "a certain lack of definiteness, a lack of
finality or completeness [and] hesitation" It may express "the
idea that we are dealing with a list of something which is not
complete", or "indicate that the speaker has not yet reached the
end of the story." (p.55-57)
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The most striking thing about these descriptions is that
they tell us rather different things about the particle. It is
almost surprising that they claim to be characterizing the same
particle, rather than two or three different ones. It should
become clear in the course this chapter that the reason for these
discrepancies is that these authors have
provided us with partial pictures of the kinds of work that this
particle can perform. Each has given emphasis to some uses but
played down or ignored other uses. I will show that each of these
descriptions could be a viable interpretation of some aspects of
the functioning of the particle in discourse, but none has
succeeded in capturing the essence of the problem, namely, how is
it that LA can be used in such a large variety of ways?
Taking these characterizations as revealing the authors'
(and their informants') intuitions about the particle, we may
summarize these intuitions as follows:
(1) LA is an utterance particle;
(2) It is used in requests, commands, and 'urgings', and in
some way 'demands' or 'requires' a response;
(3) It may express 'agreement' of some kind;
(4) It has a certain element of 'indefiniteness' and
'incompleteness';
(5) In a story or account, it indicates that the speaker
has not yet reached the end.
For ease of reference I will refer to utterances of which LA
forms a part 'LA-suffixed-utterances'. Part of my task will be
to examine the distribution of LA-suffixed-utterances.
In the following sections, I shall examine data fragments in
which LA-suffixed-utterances are found to occur in various kinds
of sequential contexts, and describe the kinds of properties that
LA exhibits by explicating its contributions to the overall
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meaning of the utterances in which it occurs in relation to the
sequential contexts. The main kinds of sequences in which LA-
suffixed-utterances occur include:
(1) Reportings and Story-tellings
(2) Listings and Instructions
(3) Understanding checks
(4) Suggestions
(5) Agreements
(6) Pre-closings
2.Reportings and Story-tellings
One of the conversation organizational problems that co-
participants have to deal with in reportings is the need to
sustain mutual orientation as to what they are doing, where they
are at any point in the report, and what to do next. Reportings
regularly proceed in a step-by-step fashion, with the co-partici-
pants pausing at certain points in the reporting to check out
their whereabouts (eg. Sacks, 1972a, 1972b, Schegloff 1972a, and
Pomerantz 1984b). These are specifically points in a reporting
where the establishment of certain 'facts' about times and
places, people, situations, etc. as things-known-in-common are
dealt with as subsidiary, background issues, the clearing of
which may facilitate the report's progress. This kind of ground-
clearing work can be done in a variety of ways. For example, a
certain 'fact' in a report may be formulated as a thing-known-in-
common on the assumption that this is "what everyone knows"; a
place may be formulated as known-in-common which the co-partici-
pants "just passed through", and so on.
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LA is not the only particle that can be used to segment an
extended reporting into chunks; neither is it a necessity that
some particle be used. In fact, reportings may be segmented into
chunks which do not end in a particle at all. The point, how-
ever, is that LA is sometimes used for such segmentation; and we
want to know, just in those cases where LA is used, why it is
used: what are the regular features that go with LA-segmentation?
Consider first an instance of LA in a reporting sequence.
(I) [TC:1:134]
P: .hhh hai# goum le::: wajee Mrs	 P: .hhh yes so PT perhaps Mrs
Wong le:[: heui-jigei tung o= 	 Wong PT herself with me
[	 [yes and perhaps Mrs. Wong
[	 she talked to me--]
L:	 [mm	 L: mm
P: =gong le:: jau [waa (.) a:m	 P: talk PT em say (.) em
[	 [and said--]
L:	 [mm	 L: mm
(0.8)	 (0.8)
P: jee: (.) e:::: (.) gamchi hai:::: 	 P: I-mean (.) e: (.) this-time
(0.5) keu::i: jei# aa:: seuiyiu-	 is (0.5) she I-mean em need
dou hai keui:: godi:: hoksaang	 be she those students LA
--AA:	 [I mean, em, now that her
students are needed]
L: mm	 L: mm
P: ge bongsau [(.) soyi le:: jau:::: 	 P: of help (.) so PT em
[	 [to help, so em--]
L:	 [mm	 L: mm
(0.7)	 (0.7)
L:	 keui: [:	 L: she
P:	 [yatding yiu chingcho lo=	 P: must should clear PT
[she has to be clear--]
L: =hai=	 L: yes
P: =ha# yatding yiu chingcho hai matye P: yes must should clear be
what
[she has to be clear what
it's all about]
L: ha ha	 L: yes yes
This is an extract from a longer telephone conversation
where P has called to tell some 'bad news' to L. But before he
discloses what the bad news is, P embarks on a report of the
circumstances leading up to the occurrence of the bad news.
Focusing on the LA-suffixed-utterance, which I have arrowed, a
few observations can be recorded. First, it occurs in a place
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where P is recognizably in the middle of his report. Notice how,
on the appearance of LA, L produces a minimal continuer, "mm",
following on from which P continues. Second, P is manifestly
seeking confirmation as to his assumption that the description of
the situation in question ("now that her students are needed") is
something that L, the recipient, can be expected to know. Third,
this ground-clearing will serve as a basis for further detailing
of the circumstances which will eventually lead up to the
communication of the 'bad news'.
In [2] below, L, the reporter, is giving P an extended
account of what kind of research he has been doing.
(2) [TC:1:140]
L: ... soyi jee::# e:: ngo# jee in#
	
L: so I-mean# em I# I-mean in#
ngo m-hai waa jou yatgo:: .hhh (.)
	
I not say do one .hhh (.)
-->e:: systematic ge survey LA=	 em systematic of survey LA
[so I, I mean I'm not
doing a systematic survey]
P: =hai
	
P: right
L: soyi 		 hhh (0.3) 'jiugai jau 	 L: so .hhh (0.3) probably then
m yinggoi yau mee mantai ge:	 not should there-be any
problem PT
[so there shouldn't be any
problems]
LA occurs at a point when the formulation "systematic
survey" is presented. P's perfectly timed minimal recognition
token ("hai") confirms the reporter's assumption, as displayed in
the LA-suffixed-utterànce, that "systematic survey" is a thing-
known-in-common. In so doing, the conversational participants
have managed to clear the ground for further telling to proceed.
Notice that L's turn following P's minimal recognition token is
designed in such a way as to tie back to his previous turn, and
is clearly hearable as a continuation of the report. It is
interesting to note how this continuation is related to the
ground-clearing work initiated through the use of LA, and the
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subsequent co-ordinated establishment of a common understanding.
Consider next an instance of LA at a point in a report where
the identity of a location is at issue.
(3) [MAK:1:055]
M:	 ngodei:: gamat dou cho dik-s
yaai ngo dak yat-gaa che je: (0.4)
ngodei [leung-gaa che
[
[
[
J:	 [haa
M: sun gau aamaa (0.4) gamat
chaichai heui aamaa (0.5)
1->goumaa### hai:::: G gaai
2->(.)
3->jee chausin go-dou LA
4->(0.6)
5->ngo sailou dou keuidei cho yagaa
diksi (.) mei pick-maai ngodei
yago yan heui (.) goum ngodei
yau lingngoi yagaa aa cho yigaa
che heui=
J: =ha#
M: we today also take dik-s
cos I have one car only
(0.4) we two cars
[today we took a [taxi] too
cos I have only one car
(0.4) we needed]
J: yes
M: before enough aamaa (0.4)
today together go PT (0.5)
then### in G street
( • )
that-is just-now there LA
(0.6)
my brother place they
take one taxi (.) then pick-
up us one person go (.) so
we also other one aa car
this car go=
[two cars, cos all of
us went together today,
so in G street, I mean
that place just now,
my brother's place, they
took one taxi (.) then
picked up one of us (.)
and we took another em
this car]
J: =yeah
This extract is taken from a longer sequence in which M
reports to J what she did earlier that day : she and her family
went to have lunch in a restaurant. The reporting reached a
point when M, upon mentioning the name of a street ("G street"),
pauses to seek mutual identification and recognition of the
location in question. Her assumption of shared knowledge is
exhibited through the production of a LA-suffixed-utterance
(arrow 3: "the place just now LA") which re-formulates the
earlier "G-street", and presents it now as a location whose
identity the recipient ought to be able to establish. However,
unlike the last episode where the recipient issues a continuer,
73
the LA-suffixed-utterance in this instance is met with a silence
(arrow 4). In response to that, M does another re-formulation
(arrow 5: "my brother's place"), this time without the particle,
leaving no gap for recognition noises, and carries straight on
with her report.
The silence following LA in this data fragment shows that
the occurrence of LA does not guarantee a response (at least a
verbal response such as a continuer), which, given the nature of
the turn-taking system (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974), is
only to be expected. What is interesting, however, is the way in
which silences immediately after the production of LA are inter-
preted by the reporter. 2 While it is conceivable that such
silences might be heard as indicating trouble, eg. that the
recognition and identification being sought is not available, an
inspection of the data shows that this is regularly not how
silences in this position are interpreted. A common way in which
reporters deal with these silences is to sequentially delete the
ground-clearing project initiated by the prior LA-suffixed-
utterance, and proceed with the report as if the display of
recognition being sought was after all inconsequential. Thus, in
[3], while M does produce a second re-formulation (arrow 5) after
the silence, she continues the report as if the identity of the
location being referred to by the previous two formulations does
not matter. This suggests that while LA is a means for the
initiation of a subsidiary project the aim of which is to
establish common understanding, the main project (in this case,
the report) need not be held up until the ground is cleared.
Nevertheless, the pause following LA is a potential place
for recognition or supportive noises like "mhm" and "ha"
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("yeah"), ie. J could have provided some kind of ground-
cleared/go-ahead signal during that brief interval. It is one
thing to keep going in the course of reporting, not leaving any
gap for potential confirmation of common ground being achieved,
and quite another to move on after a display of the assumption of
the availability of common ground. I suggest that during the
0.6-second-silence (arrow 4) M would be looking for signs of
confirmation or else possible trouble (e.g. non-recognition),
and, upon not getting any response one way or the other, moves on
in a way that is mutually endorsed, and therefore warranted. Her
assumption of the availability of shared knowledge concerning the
identity of "G street" has now been publicized and put on record.
By virtue of that, the next bit of reporting can now be seen as
being continuable as a result of the 'silent endorsement'.
The examples studied so far may have given the impression
that we are dealing with a simple rule according to which any
expression of the form "C + LA" (C=constituent) is to be inter-
preted as saying that the speaker intends to check whether the
hearer can successfully identify the referent designated by C.
The procedures involved, however, seem rather less straight-
forward. The next extract shows that the observations made so
far would need to be iefined in order for the work of LA in
reportings to be fully explicated.
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(4) [FEEL1:1:306]
P: gamaa mui-yat-go gong-daai-waa-ge-
yan ne:: du:: yau buihau-ge yansou
ge nei yiu::w jee wan-cheut
go leiyau heui wai-mee-si goum
jungyi gong-daai-waa [sinn-dak ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 l
[	 l
[keui LA::]
jee la peiyu keui:: e: fong-jo-hok
2-->LA: ngo m-jungyi keui keui
3-->jau-wai heui waan LA::=
L: =mm mm
4-->C: goum keui a yigaa nei ji LA
hou-do-di ye hou kapyan saimanjai
5-->LA::=
P: =mm mm=
C: =gogo waan dinjiyauheigei aa goum
keui heui di hou jaap aa di
deifo:ng .hh
P: well every one-who-lies
PT also has background
reason PT you must I-mean
find-out the reason he
why so like lie first
[well everyone who lies
has a reason, you have
to find out why he likes
to lie]
C: he LA
I-mean PT for-instance he
um after-school LA I
not-like he he everywhere
go play LA
[he, I mean for instance,
after school, I don't like
him to go and play
everywhere]
L: mm mm
C: but-then he um now you
know LA many things very
attract children LA
[but then he um, these
days you know there's
such a lot that attract
children's attention]
P: mm mm
C: everybody play video-games
PT so he go some very
scruffy PT the places .hh
[everybody's playing video
games so he goes to these
really scruffy places]
C, a parent, is here calling a phone-in programme on the
radio to ask for advice about the trouble she is having with her
son, who "goes to play everywhere after school". In response to
P's suggestion that she should "find out why her son likes
lying", C gives an account of her trouble. One interesting
feature of troubles-tellings is that 'facts' are given not merely
for the sake of the record, but are also sensitive to the nature
of the state-of-affairs-being-reported as a complainable. It is
important for an appreciation of the work accomplished by LA in
this fragment to note that C's portrayal of the situation
provides not only a statement of the problem she is having, but
also the grounds for treating that state-of-affairs as a
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complainable.
Five LA-suffixed-utterances occur in close proximity,
providing not only a background against which the problem can be
stated --"so he goes to these really scruffy places", but also
the grounds for C's assessment of the situation. It can be seen
that all five occurrences of LA exhibit a design which is geared
towards the portrayal of the state-of-affairs as a complainable.
In this sense, the contribution of LA in this kind of sequence
may be described as ground-laying rather than ground-clearing,
although the two kinds of work are obviously related. The LA-
suffixed-utterances in (4) are concerned with various aspects of
the situation that is causing her worries: the person who is the
source of the trouble (arrow I); the time and kind of situation
pertaining to the son's (mis)behaviour (arrow 2); an expected,
reasonable, seen-by-any thing to feel on the part of a parent
under similar circumstances (arrow 3); the times they're
a-changing (arrow 4); and the proliferation of undesirable
temptations to the young (arrow 5). In thus furnishing a basis
for her anxieties, and displaying her assumption that the
recipients can be expected to understand her situation and see
the reasonableness of.her actions and feelings, C is managing an
appeal for sympathy.
As a background against which C's trouble is to be located
and understood, the import of the various LA-suffixed-utterances
cannot be determined prior to C's statement of her problem. Take
for instance the two utterances arrowed I and 4. In I, the
successful identification of the referent of "he" as C's son
would not allow the recipients to work out what the problem is or
why it is causing worries, still less what C is trying to do.
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Similarly, in (4), the sense of "now" cannot be determined until
at least after the next clause has been delivered --e.g. "now"
this very moment in time, "now" on this occasion, or "now" these
days? In general, the identity of an object, a state-of-affairs,
etc. is often determinable only retrospectively. What is crucial
to a description of LA is the display of the assumption that
common understanding is available, rather than the substantive
sharing of information or propositions. In this data fragment,
the contribution of LA to the overall management of appeal for
sympathy can be systematically accounted for, though not in terms
of a simple mechanism which would compute the interactional
import of utterances on the basis of the correct identification
of the referent of each constituent preceding every occurrence of
LA.
One further observation should be recorded. It was noted in
connection with the last extract that, while LA in no way
guarantees a response, there is evidence that it sets up a
special kind of place for such objects to occur. It was
suggested that a gap may be left immediately following LA in
which potential problems of recognition and identification can be
raised and resolved. ,The instances of LA in the present extract
suggest that a strategy is available where no gap is left at all,
namely, the vowel of the particle can be lengthened, and similar
analytic work as described above can be carried out during such
time as the speaker holds on to his/her vowel (arrows I, 2 and
4). Further, since the basic phonetic shape of the particle is
such that it ends in a long vowel, it may well be that not even
special lengthening is necessary. That is, the very duration
needed for the production of even the shortest instance of this
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particle is, with regard to the kinds of problems that typically
crop up at such points, enough for an analysis to be made and a
decision reached.
Another use of LA which is related to the ground-clearing
and ground-laying kinds of work is one in which this particle
contributes to the announcement of a 'topic area' on which some
extended talk is about to be delivered. Examples can be found in
a variety of topic-initial positions, eq. in post-greetings
position, where LA-suffixed-utterances are used to gain ratified
access to an extended slot for the delivery of a story or report.
Consider an example of this in (5).
(5) [TC:1:095]
L: wei
P: wei mgoi Mr. Lam aa
L: ngo hai aa
P: aa Mr. Lam aa
L: hai aa
P: aa Patrick aa=
L: =aa Patrick
P: hai
L: hai=
P: =aa:: jau::[: (ngo#)
[dim aa lei# ha#
P: ngo tung ngo haaujeung (.)jau joi
2-->king-gwo LA:
3-->L: mm=
P: =gwaanyu lei::: jee seung jou
interview go gin si
L: hai
L: hello
P: hello please Mr. Lam PT
[hello Mr. Lam please]
L: I be PT
[speaking]
P: em Mr. Lam PT
[em Mr. Lam?]
L: yes PT
P: em Patrick PT
[em it's Patrick here]
L: oh Patrick
P: yes
L: yes
P: em well (I)
L: how PT you yes
[howareyou/whatsup]
P: I with my headteacher (.)
em again talked PT
[I've talked to my
headteacher again]
L: mm
P: about you I-mean want do
interview that CL event
[about you-- I mean want
to do interviews]
L: yes
This is the beginning of a telephone conversation, an
extract of which was examined earlier, where P has called to
deliver L some bad news. Without going into details, and
following Schegloff (1968) and Button and Casey (1984), I assume
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that the first arrowed turn (L's "what's up, P?") can be
characterized as a topic initial elicitor, which invites the
recipient to state his 'reason for call' ('first topic') or
otherwise initiate some other topic. It happens that in the
immediately subsequent turn (arrow 2), P does introduce first
topic, indicating that his call is to be about something somehow
arising from his "further talk with the headteacher". This turn
can therefore be identified as first-topic-initial. The point of
interest here is that the topic that is being introduced is
introduced in such a way as to require an extended 'preface' of
some kind, in which P will give an account of the kind of
circumstances that led to the news-as-yet-to-be-disclosed.
This interpretation is not being offered as one that has the
benefit of hindsight. On the contrary, I am suggesting that
signalling an upcoming extended report which will lead up to the
first-topic, and, arising from that, proposing a provision for
some extended slot in which to do the reporting, is what P's turn
(arrow 2) is doing. A piece of evidence would be L's response in
the next turn (arrow 3) where a minimal continuer is offered,
which signals 'go-ahead', whereupon the turn is returned to P
once again for further reporting.
The turn arrowed 2, the first-topic-initiator, does its job
of topic-initiation in a way that is specially marked by LA,
namely, it introduces a topic, which although opaque in its
specifics, nevertheless is claimed to be known by the recipient
in a special way. Specifically, LA effects one big claim, which
is that L should, upon hearing the description offered in this
LA-suffixed-utterance, know the kind of thing that he (P) is
going to talk about. A rather subtle distinction is involved
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here. It's one thing to not know what someone is talking about,
and quite a different thing to not know what particular topic
it is that one's co-conversationalist is going to end up
introducing, but nevertheless know 'the sort of thing' that they
are up to, the kind of business that they have in mind. Indeed,
given sufficient and sufficiently specific prior dealings with
the co-conversationalist, even more specific (though necessarily
as yet uncertain) inferences can be made. Thinking in terms of
the particulars of this present instance, P's first-topic-
initiator is designed in such a way as to record P's assumption
that the mention of "further talk with the headteacher" should
ring a bell for L, and, although it is clear that until P
discloses the news L is not going to know exactly what he is
talking about, he (L) is assumed to be able to make inferences
sufficient to make sense of P's upcoming reporting. Contrast
this with the kind of situation where one simply has no idea what
one's interlocutor is talking about.
As mentioned in connection with the last extract, what is at
issue is not reference-recognition. Thus, through the use of LA,
the topic introducer displays his/her assumption that the
recipient can work put the import (in some way that is less
specific than the eventual topic, but more specific than the mere
referent) of the topic initial. Here, P is proposing and seeking
L's confirmation that it is a warranted assumption that L, upon
hearing the LA-suffixed-utterance, should be able to make the
necessary inferences to arrive at the conclusion that he (P) is
going to talk about some particular business related in some way
to his "talking to the headteacher", and not just something about
the headteacher. The possibility of dealing with fairly fine-
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L: =mm=
	
L:
E: gogo jau-lok-heui tong dou 	 E:
yauseui aa=
L: =mm=
	
L:
E: =.hh dimji daiyat le (.) gogo o	 E:
beng saai WO hh=
tuned intentions such as this is, I suggest, accomplished through
the kind of work that LA can perform.
In story-telling sequences, LA sometimes appears at points
where, for one purpose or other, the assumption of certain common
understandings between story-teller and recipient needs to be
documented. Through LA-suffixing, the story-teller can clear or
prepare the ground for subsequent stages of the story to be told,
while maintaining his/her claim to an extended slot to carry on
and finish telling the story.
(6) [SS:CH:1:408]
E: ee: o ochi ge s saigo si
	
E:
o changge teng-go: z yau-ya-chi
yat-chi le: .h[hh
[
[
L:	 [ha#=	 L:
1->E: =jee tai ngaujai le (.)
	
E:
jee go# jee gogo sengbaan heui
2->	 tai ngau LA=
L: =mm=	 L:
E: =.hh tai yun ngau le jau:: honang	 E:
o gochi m ji yaumou lokyi aa=
um I once GEN s small time
I have heard z once
once PT .hhh
[um once when I was small
I once heard]
yeah
I-mean watch cows PT I-mean
every# I-mean everyone all
go watch cows LA
[I mean watching cows, I
mean everyone went to watch
the cows]
mm
.hh watch finish cows PT
then perhaps I that-time
not know whether rain PT
[when we finished watching
the cows, I dont know
if it was raining]
mm
everyone go-down pond at
swim PT
[everyone went down to the
pond to swim]
mm
.hh it-turned-out next-day
PT (.) everyone all ill all
PT hh
[it turned out everyone
became ill the next day,
all of them]
Notice that E's report of "cow-watching" has been formulated
twice: once through the utterance ending in le (arrow 1), and
then again through the LA-suffixed-utterance (arrow 2). The LA-
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suffixed-utterance is in this sense a reformulation of the
immediately prior utterance. For one reason or another, the
recipients' recognition of the activity of "cow-watching" on the
basis of the first formulation is judged by the story-teller to
be potentially problematic. The second description is thus
designed in such a way as to provide for the issuance of
recognition displays. As it turns out, this is offered by L, the
recipient, in the form of a minimal continuer (mm), which gives a
go-ahead, whereupon the story-teller continues with the story.
(7) instances LA in a similar position, but the problem here
is not a straightforward one of recognition.
(7) [SS:CH:1:325]
A: yau-di-yan hou dakyi gaa
L: mm
A: heui le: o# o sik yat go
L: mm
A: yigaa jung heung ngodei hokhaau
duk ge
L: [mm
A: [hou dakyi ge=
L: =mm
A: .hh jau:::
(0.3)
-->A: m-ji heui haimai mee-si LA
sanfu ding mee mee gaau-go-
lai LA
L: mm
A: heui sengyat le
(0.3)
A: dou yau siusiu::
(0.3)
A: waigeui yan
(0.4)
A: ge gamgok seng:yau ...
A: some-people are very weird PT
[some people are really
weird]
L: mm
A: he PT I# I know one CL
[he em, I-- I know one]
L: mm
A: now still in our school
study PT
[he's still studying in our
school]
L: mm
A: very funny PT
[he's really funny]
L: mm
A: .hh and
(0.3)
A: don't-know he whether
what LA father or what what
taught LA
[I don't know what has
happened to him, the Father
or whoever it was has taught
him or something]
L: mm
A: he always PT
(0.3)
A: also has a-little
(0.3)
A: apprehensive-of people
(0.4)
A: GEN feeling often-has
[he's always a bit apprehen-
sive of other people]
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The arrowed utterance here has an interesting feature. It
is (to borrow Garfinkel's term) specifically vague. The speaker
"doesn't know what has happened" to the protagonist of the story,
but indicates clearly that something has happened to him, one
such thing being that "the Father or whoever it was" had taught
him. These descriptions provide vague but suggestive background
material which would come into play in the interpretation of the
story-teller's subsequent portrayal of the protagonist's
behaviour. Thus, while this background material is brought up
only to be quickly dropped again (as events-of-a-certain-kind-
that-need-not-concern-us-here), the strangeness of such
circumstances has nevertheless been put on record as known-in-
common, such common understanding constituting a condition for
the appreciation of the import of subsequent components of the
story.
To summarize, in Reportings and Story-tellings,
conversational participants are constantly and pervasively
oriented to the recognizability, identifiability, and under-
standability of objects, persons, times, places, situations, and,
more generally, the kinds of things that are being talked about.
The utterance particle LA regularly contributes to the public
recording of mutual 'understandings which may serve to clear or
prepare the ground for the continuation, appreciation, and under-
standing of subsequent stages of a report or story.
3. Listings and Instructions
One of the most likely places to locate instances of LA is
in listing sequences, where the 'lister', for one purpose or
another, provides a list of items.
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(8) [SS:D2:178]
1 I: goum hokhaau leuibin yaumou di
2	 matye clubs lei yau:: (0.7)
3	 e:: yaumou join-dou di matye
4	 club
I: so school in whether some
what clubs you have (0.7)
e:: whether joined some
what club
[so are there some clubs
in the school? have you
joined some clubs?]
5 A: e:::	 poutungwaa LA:: A: e:	 Putonghua PT
6 [.hh .hh
7	 I: [mm I: mm
8 A: science club LA: A: science club PT
9 I: mm
10 A: e#
11	 (1.5)
12 A: jung yau: me (.)
13	 astronomy LA::=
14 I: =mm
15 A: .hh e::::m
16	 (0.9)
17 A: table tennis LA:: hh hh
18	 [.hhh .hh heh heh]
19 I: [mm hou do wo haq
20 A: heh heh heh heh
21 I: ha#
22 A: hai-goum lo
I: mm
A: e#
(1.5)
A: other there-be what (.)
astronomy PT
[what else (.) astronomy]
I: mm
A: .hh e:::m
(0.9)
A: table tennis PT hh hh
.hhh .hh heh heh
I: mm very many PT yeah
[mm such a lot]
A: heh heh heh heh
I: yeah
A: that's-it PT
(8) is a listing sequence in which A, in response to I's
question about the clubs that she has joined in the school, sets
out to list the clubs that she has joined. The first feature to
note about these listing sequences is the 'one-at-a-time' manner
in which they proceed. This means not simply that the lister
segments his/her list up into item-by-item chunks and delivers
one item at a time. The 'one-at-a-time' feature is a coordinated
achievement, in which the 'completion' of an item involves as
much work from the recipient as it does from the lister. Witness
how at each 'stage' in the listing, the recipient produces an
acknowledgement/ recognition token, which marks the stretch of
talk in the prior turn (from the lister) as constituting 'one
item on the list': 7 in response to 5-6, 9 to 8, 14 to 12-3, and
19 to 17-8. Another regular feature of listings is that LA is
suffixed at the 'end' of each item. More precisely, the
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occurrence of LA constitutes a proposal that an item has been
delivered, le. it provides a recognizable 'end' to an item on a
list. That is, part of the job of LA in this kind of sequence
can be characterized in this way: one, it marks the lister's
proposed boundary/end of the current item and seeks acknowledge-
ment/ recognition; two, it displays the lister's intention to
move on and disclose the next item on the list. This 'continua-
tion proposal' is an important feature of LA in this kind of
sequence. Notice how the two silences (lines 11 and 16) are
demonstrably interpreted by I, the recipient, as A's. In both
cases, I is manifestly doing waiting, it being incumbent on A,
having produced the last item and suffixed it with LA, to 'move
on' with the listing. Note also that, after A's "table tennis
LA" (line 17), and the immediately subsequent laughter, I returns
the turn to A with "yeah" (line 21) for possible further listing,
although, as it turns out, A could not find a further listable
item and thereupon proposes to finish the listing ("that's it",
line 22). This is a neat example of how lay conversationalists
produce analyses of turns of talk in a way that is responsive to
the properties of this utterance particle.
(9) gives another example of the use of LA in a listing
sequence. In this case, the listable items are persons. Notice
how, as in the previous fragment, LA signals the end of one item,
and promises the beginning of a next item.
(9) [DJ2:2:430]
H: OK .hh viu-m-yiu dimcheung aa 	 H: OK .hh whether-want dedicate PT
[OK do you want to make any
dedications?]
C: e:: dim bei ngo dedi maami LA:: C: um dedicate to my dad mum LA
ngo sailou WxFx LA:: .hh 	 my brother WxFx LA .hh
Celina LA Judy LA::
	
Celine LA Judy LA
[um I dedicate ((the next song))
to my dad and mum, my brother
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(0.4)
C: e:: Nancy LA::
(0.2)
C: Ellen LA::
(0.4)
C: aa-D LA SxSx LA::
(0.4)
C: HT Gongng Gongyip Junghok
form fri yi: chyun-baan LA::
(0.5)
C: Jeung-HY LA Jeung-GW LA
Alan LA YxNx LA:
(0.5)
-->C: leidei leung-go LO=
H: =doje:
M: hai waa sik 'goumm do yan
gaa lei
(0.3)
C: Jeng-SM LA fei-G LA::
Amy-K LA:: .hh e::
aa-Kay LA Wendy LA::
WxFx, Celine, Judy]
(0.3)
C: Jeng-SM LA fat-G LA
Amy-K LA .hh um
Kay LA Wendy LA
[Jeng-SM, fat G, Amy-K, um
Kay, Wendy]
(0.4)
C: um Nancy LA
[um Nancy]
(0.2)
C: Ellen LA
[Ellen]
(0.4)
C: D LA SxSx LA
[D, SS]
(0.4)
C: HT Tech-- Technical School
form three E whole-class LA
[HT Technical School Form
3E, the whole class]
(0.5)
C: Jeung-HY LA Jeung-GW LA
Alan LA YxNx LA
[Jeung-HY, Jeung-GW, Alan, YxNx]
(0.5)
C: you two PT
[you two]
H: thank-you
M: yes wow know so many people PT you
[yes, wow you know such a lot
of people]
The amazingly long list (as M, one of the two DJs, found it,
as evidenced in the last turn in the extract) is segmented into
chunks, the boundaries of which are demarcated by LA. Instances
of the particle are either followed by a brief gap of silence, or
latched on to a next. item. In either case, the recipients offer
no continuer or acknowledgement token. Notice that the first
turn in this fragment projects a dedication job, and provides the
caller with an extended slot in which she can mention all the
names that she wants to mention. Given this structural provi-
sion, continuers and acknowledgement tokens are not strictly
necessary. One thing, however, is necessary for the DJs to do in
order to co-ordinate the construction of a list: they must listen
for the caller's end-of-list proposal, come in at the right
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M: =aa ha ha ha ha ha=
J: =Fansi-haai-bou (0.6)
-->saam-go LA gam yinhau (.)
aa: jau: yat-go
moment, and respond to it in some way. In (9), the end-of-list
proposal comes with two features. First, the item delivered is
"you two", which can be heard in terms of the convention that the
last persons to whom one may dedicate a song are the DJs them-
selves. Thus "you two" strongly implicates end-of-list. Second,
the item is bounded this time by LO (the subject of the next
chapter), not LA.
A related kind of work that LA does in listing sequences,
which might be called updating, can be seen in (10).
(10) [MAK:1:036]
J: =gammmaa: oi-jo: go: (.) lei#
	
J: and-then had one (.) you#
teng lei gong maa Fansi-haai-bou
	
listen you say maa Vermicelli-
lo:=	 crab-hot-pot lo:
[and then we had a (.) you#
I took your advice, Vermi-
celli-and-crab Hot-pot]
M: aa yes yes yes yes yes
J: Vermicelli-crab-hot-pot (0.6)
three LA then and-then (.)
aa: then one
[Vermicelli-and-crab Hot-pot
that's three, and then then
one]
This is taken from a longer listing sequence in which J
tells M what dishes she has had at a restaurant the night before.
She has gone throug4 two items, and is currently listing the
third. 3	The arrowed utterance proposes an update: "so that's
three", and, through LA-suffixing, records the assumption that
both parties are now agreed that they have gathered three items
on the list, and are now going to embark on a possible fourth.
Another kind of sequence which shares a lot of similarities
with listings are instruction sequences. Again, some of LA's
properties make it a useful particle in instruction-giving, of
which (11) is an example.
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(11) [TC:2:165]
K: goum ngo: yinggoi (0.4) dimmm
	 K: so I should (0.4) how
jou le [yigaa	 do PT now
[	 [so what should I do now]
C:	 [la lei sausin le em ngo 	 C: PT you first PT em I for
-->tung lei cheut jeung fei sin LA=
	 you issue CL ticket first LA
[now first you, I'll issue
the ticket for you]
K: =ha[i	 K: yes
C:	 [dou lei: ng seunglei lo fei	 C: when you ng come-up get
pick up ticket go yat le
	 ticket pick up ticket
that day PT
[when you come to get the
ticket, on the day when
you pick up the ticket]
Like listings, instructions also regularly proceed in a
step-by-step manner. A 'step' in the instruction is achieved
through co-ordinated work on the part of both the instruction-
giver and the instruction-recipient. In (11), K's confirmation
token after C's LA-suffixed-utterance marks the proper receipt of
the first step in the instructions and at the same time signals
'go-ahead' for the second step to be described. One of the
problems in instructions, especially when the steps are construed
as dependent one on another, is that the imparting of subsequent
steps is often conditional upon the proper giving and receiving
of a prior step. Hence the need for pausing and checking.
4. Understanding Checks
Given the kinds of properties of LA that have been identi-
fied so far, it comes as no surprise that the particle can occupy
positions in sequences where the professed immediate aim is to
check that mutual understanding obtains.
Understanding checks are performed typically as a side-
sequence, 'inserted' in the middle of an ongoing project which
has not come to conclusion. The 'checking' is analyzable as an
insertion by virtue of the fact that upon its completion, the
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next turn will be designed so as to tie back to the utterance
which immediately preceded the inception of the understanding
check sequence. This is important because understanding checks
are rarely performed for the sake of checking; they can be used
for a variety of interactional purposes.
Given this distinction between an on-going 'main project'
and a checking side-sequence, understanding checks can be charac-
terized as either speaker-initiated or recipient-initiated. By
speaker is meant that person who is speaking, and in speaking, is
addressing himself/herself to the on-going main project, just
before the understanding check sets in. Now it is not necessary
that the speaker first pauses, and then produces a separate
utterance to start an understanding check. More often, they
would design utterances in such a way as to build in a check. In
this way, many of the examples that we have considered so far are
characterizable as cases of speaker-initiated-understanding-
checks. One regular feature of speaker-initiated-understanding-
checks is that, upon completion, the floor will then be returned
to the speaker for further pursuance of the on-going project. In
the case of recipient-initiated-understanding-checks, they can be
designed in a variety of ways, one of which is to build in a
display of 'confidence', showing understanding or appreciation,
and, as a further consequence of that, perform some interactional
task pertaining to the project at hand. An example of this can
be seen in (12).
(12) [MAK:1:040]
M:
	
	
saam bak ng
man dak m dak aa
(0.4)
J: m-sai aa saam bak yi jaa::=
M: three hundred five
dollars can not can PT
[did it cost three hundred
and fifty dollars? (is my
estimate too low?)]
(0.4)
J: less aa three hundred two jaa
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[less, it was only three
hundred and twenty]
M: =yeah I thinking be about
PT haa
[yeah, I guessed it's about
that]
J: so including beer PT
[and this included beer]
M: soft-drinks PT those
things-like-that LA right?
[soft drinks and things like
that, right?]
J: yeah so
M: yeah yeah
M: =o ngo lam-jyu hai gamseungha
[gala	 haa ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
J: [gam lin-maai] be-jau wo:[::
[
M:	 [hei-
seui aa go-di gam-ge-ye
--> LA: [hamaa
[
J:	 [haa:::[:: gam]
M:	 [hahaha]
(.)	 (.)
J: dou gei dai aa	 J: still quite reasonable PT
o go[k-dak hou dai] aa
	 I feel very reasonable PT
[	 ]	 [it was rather reasonable, I
[	 ]	 feel it was very reasonable]
M:	 [haahaahaahaa ]	 M: yeah yeah yeah yeah
(12) is taken from near the end of a price-assessment
project, in which J provides M with a list of information about
the food that she has had in a restaurant the night before, their
prices, etc. and asks M to give her opinion on whether the prices
are reasonable. The first turn in this extract is where M,
having received all the information that she needs, attempts a
guess about the total cost of the meal in question ("could it be
as low as 350 dollars?"). As it turns out (J's next turn, "not
that much, only 320 dollars"), the actual cost was slightly lower
than M's estimate. Subsequent to that J reveals that she has not
even mentioned all the food that they had ("and that included
beer as well"). It is at this point that M displays her under-
standing through a LA-suffixed understanding check (the arrowed
turn), which exhibits her assumption that by "beer" J is also
referring to "soft drinks and things like that", although she did
not actually mention them. This supplementary formulation that M
is offering therefore performs the task of checking the validity
of her expanded version, and embodies at the same time a claim of
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access to J's mind. In short, a strong and confident way of
demonstrating one's understanding of 'the kind of thing that the
interlocutor is talking about' is managed through the offering of
a LA-suffixed understanding check for confirmation.
(13) is an extract from a point earlier on in the same
conversation, when J and M are still doing the listing.
(13) [MAK:1:036]
J: =gammmaa: 01-jo: go: (.) lei#
teng lei gong maa Fansi-haai-bou
lo::::=
M: =aa ha ha ha ha ha=
J: =Fansi-haai-bou:: (0.6)
1->saam-go LA gam yinhau (.)
2->aa: jau:: yat-go .hh=
3->M: =sei-go [sung LA:]
[	 ]
	
4->J:	 [louseunn]nnnn
mee sijiu louseunn [daaiji aa
[
[
[
	
M:	 [aa
J: and-then had one (.) you#
listen you say maa Vermicelli-
crab-hot-pot lo:
[and then we had a (.) you#
I took your advice, Vermi-
celli-and-crab Hot-pot]
M: aa yes yes yes yes yes
J: Vermicelli-crab-hot-pot (0.6)
three PT then and-then (.)
aa: then one
[Vermicelli-and-crab Hot-pot
that's three, and then then
one]
M: four dishes LA
[four dishes]
J: asparagus
what chili asparagus
scallops PT
[asparagus, what, chili-
asparagus-scallops]
M: yeah
Following the update (arrow I), and just when she is
displaying her intention to deliver the fourth item, J begins to
show signs of difficulties with the search (arrow 2: "then-- one-
-"). The interest of M's next turn (arrow 3) lies in the fact
that it proposes to further update the list as now containing
four items, before the fourth item is delivered ("so that's four
dishes"). Further, the offer of the update is done in such a way
as to suggest that the main project (price-assessment) should be
carried on, in spite of the unavailability of the name (and
identity) of the fourth item, and as long as it is mutually
understood that there is a fourth item. It thus projects a
9la
possible side-sequence which, if it were successful, would have
avoided the search problem that the conversational participants
are faced with at this point in the price-assessment project. As
it turns out, however, J overlaps and produces the name of the
fourth item, thus sequentially deleting M's checking-sequence-
initiator. It is interesting, nevertheless, to see the role LA
plays in this exchange, and the way it contributes to the design
of M's understanding check, by virtue of its 'ground-clearing'
and 'continuation' properties.
The next fragment provides an example of a variation on the
understanding check which is speaker-initiated, and which
succeeds in generating a side-sequence.
(14) [TC:1:175]
L: [ngo daa-go-dinwaa lok-lei si:nn=
[
S: [o#
L: =tai-haa lei faan-jo mei=
S: =hai LO=
L: =goum ngo haang lok-lei ji-ma
S: haa (.) hou kan je
1-->lei ji ngo lidou dinwaa LA lei du:
L: e 	 	 yau
S: (	 )
L: yi gau ng baat ling sei=
S: =haa
L: GxxLxxFaaYun dai-yat-kei=
S: =hai aa hai [aa
L:	 [yasaam lau
(0.5)
L: Y
S: haa=
L: =hou aa=
2-->S: =goum lei::::
(0.5)
L: I phone down first
[I'll phone first]
S: aha
L: see you return not
[to see if you have come
home]
S: yes PT
[right]
L: and I walk down PT
[I only need to walk
down]
S: yeah (.) very near PT
you know my here phone-number
LA you anyway
[yeah it's so near, you know
my phone number here anyway
dont you]
L: em have
[em I have it]
S: (	 )
L: two nine five eight zero four
S: yeah
L: GxxLxxFaaYun phase-one
[((S's address))]
S: yes PT yes PT
L: twenty-third floor
(0.5)
L: Y
[((Flat)) Y]
S: yeah
L: good PT
S: so you
(0.5)
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S: lei tai ngo faan-jo mei sin LA=	 S: you see I return not first
[see if I'm home first]
This extract comes in the course of an arrangement sequence,
in which L and S are arranging to meet the following day. When
the arrangements are being finalized, S initiates (arrow 1) a
side sequence whose immediate concern is to check whether one of
the pre-conditions for the implementation of the arrangements is
fulfilled, namely, whether L has his phone number (as, under the
being-finalized arrangements, L is to phone S before he goes to
his apartment). This generates a longish sequence, in which
mutual understanding is established concerning L's knowledge of
S's phone number and address. Note that upon completion of this
subsidiary project, the turn is passed back to the speaker, who
then re-attends to the arrangements (arrow 2).
As a last example, (15) offers interesting evidence of the
way this particle, through performing the task of an under-
standing check, may contribute to the accomplishment of a variety
of interactional tasks. 'Establishing common understandings' is
but a minimal characterization of its properties.
(15) [FEEL1:1:223]
P: =goum nei yau-mou yeuk-go keui 	 P: so you whether-have dated her
heui-gaai aa
	 go-out PT
[so have you ever dated her?]
(0.7)
.
	(0.7)
C: a:::: yau aa gan-m-jung aa	 C: em have PT once-in-a-while PT
[em I have, once in a while]
P: mm keui heui-m-heui aa	 P: mm she whether-go PT
[mm does she go?]
C: a::: keui yausi yiu heui yausi:::
	
C: em she sometimes would go
yausi 	 	 yausi yau heui	 sometimes sometimes sometimes
yausi mou-heui aa	 would go sometimes would-not
go
[em sometimes she does
sometimes she doesn't]
-->P: o:: goum dou yau paakto LA	 P: I-see so actually have go-out
m-syun amnyun aa	 LA not-really secretly-in-
love
[I see so you have actually
been going out, that isn't
really being secretly in love
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with someone]
L: gown-a janhai m-syun ngamlyn
	 L: then really not-really
wo::[:::	 secretly-in-love PT
[	 [well then it really isn't
[	 secretly in love]
P:	 [mhhh heh heh	 P: mhhh heh heh
C, the caller to a radio phone-in programme, is here seeking
advice about his problem, which, as he formulated earlier on in
this conversation, is that he is "secretly in love" with a girl.
There then follows a series of fact-finding questions in which P,
one of the presenters, asks about the caller's age, occupation,
the circumstances in which he came to know the girl, and so on.
[15] begins with P issuing yet another question ("so have you
ever dated her?"), and, upon finding out that C has in fact dated
the girl, and the girl has "sometimes" agreed to go out with him,
she presents, in the arrowed utterance, a version of C's
relationship with the girl for confirmation. This utterance is
LA-suffixed, and has the appearance of an understanding check.
Indeed, it can be argued that officially P j, 	 an under-
standing check, 'trying to get the facts straight'. Notice,
however, that the understanding check is designed with no gap
left following the particle LA. Instead, P delivers right on the
heels of the understanding check the conclusion she has come to
("that isn't really being secretly in love with someone"). Thus,
while P is officially offering a proposition for confirmation,
the way in which it is executed overrides the possibility of
getting any confirmation or disconfirmation. This suggests that
the display of understanding and the seeking of confirmation,
when done through the use of LA, can have a strong, confident
quality. Through presenting paakto ("going out") as a
(possibly) valid description of C's relationship with the girl,
and through offering this formulation in such a way as to display
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her intention to assume that C should know this too, and should
therefore confirm her understanding, P can be seen to be
'actually' challenging C's earlier formulation ("secret love").
That this is what she is doing is, I believe, plain to C, as it
is to any lay overhearer and professional analyst alike. In
addition, the challenge will be felt to have a particularly sharp
edge, as, thanks to LA, the utterance is designed in such a way
as to point to the fact that P somehow has strong reasons to
believe that C knows that the counter-formulation now being put
forward is correct, and would go with it, implying therefore that
C must know that his original formulation is incorrect. That is,
in officially seeking to establish a common ground, which turns
out to be one that is incompatible with a previous one, P
manages, within the contextual particulars of the conversation,
to challenge the validity of the old common ground on which the
original self-diagnosis was based.
To summarize, the utterance particle LA is a resource which
plays a role in various procedures with which conversational
participants can establish to each other's satisfaction the
degree to which mutual recognition or identification of objects,
persons, events, etc. are available, or that common understanding
of situations and contexts obtain. Further, in such sequence
types as reportings, story-tellings, listings, and instructions,
it often contributes to ground-clearing and ground-laying work,
and strongly implicates continuation.
5. Adequate Descriptions
Schegloff (1972) has shown that particular descriptors of
locations ("formulations of place") produced on particular occa-
9 4
sions of use can be seen as context-sensitive 4 selections from an
indefinitely large set of equivalent descriptions of 'the same
thing'. He shows that one kind of consideration relevant to the
selection of a location formulation (eg. whether to say
"America", "California", "San Diego" or "Miramar Street") has to
do with the identifications made by interactants as who each
other is (eg. Is the interlocutor an American, a Californian, a
San Diego resident, or whatever?). The question whether a parti-
cular description selected and presented is an adequate one is a
constant and pervasive conversational concern. A description is
adequate in so far as the recipient, upon hearing the descrip-
tion, can make out its import in terms of whatever interactional
work is being accomplished through the use of that description.
This often requires constant monitoring of the recipient's under-
standing, constant checking to see if the shared understandings
that are being assumed are actually available. There are a few
kinds of interesting evidence in my data to throw some light on
the work that LA can perform which is sensitive to this sort of
problem.
First, instead of occupying turn-final position, LA is often
immediately followed, within the same turn, by an explicit
questioning of the availability of common understanding, le. by
such objects as haimai, haamaa and haawaa (objects similar
to question tags in English, eg. "isn't it", "don't you", etc.).
Each of the arrowed instances of LA in (16)-(19) is followed by
some variant of hai-m-hai ("is it not"). And, in every case, a
response confirming the adequacy of the LA-suffixed-formulation
occurs in the following turn.
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(16) [DJ1:2:203]
T: 'o (.) jaudim gunnei goumyeung
haamaa=
P: =m-hai gunnei ge::
T: o (.) jee j# e: jaudim fongmin-ge
-->yatdi 'jisik goumyeu[ng LA hamai]
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
P:	 [hai LA haha]
(17) [DJ1:2:246]
P: m-hai ge:: jigei .hh jigei yau
duksyu han dou yigaa mmaa aaai
hhh yigaa jeutji jouye lak
-->T: ha# waan-aa samyun goum LA:::
hai[mai aa
[
[
[
P:	 [hai LA::
(18) [TC:2:613]
K e 	 	 go cleaning disk keui
-->yau LA ha[maa
[
[
W:	 [yau
(19) [SS:CH:1:468]
A: janhai hou heuigaa lidi jaidou
lai jimaa[::
[
[
L:	 [mm
A: [doyu
L: [yausi	 lidi:: hai:::
(0.3)
L: .hhh jee::
(0.7)
L: housiu ge sihau jau housiu gaLA
-->mou-baanfaat LA hai[mai
[
[
[
A:	 [mm
(0.5)
T: I-see (.) hotel management
like isn't-it
[I see, hotel management
sort of thing, isn't it]
P: not management PT
[not really management]
T: oh (.) that-is j# e: hotel
concerning some knowledge
like LA right?
[oh, so it's some knowledge
about hotels, that sort of
thing, right?]
P: yes LA yeah
[yes, yeah]
P: no PT self .hh self from
studying long-for until now
PT EXCL hhh now at-last work
PT
[not really, I .hh I've
always wanted (to travel)
since I was in the school,
and now at last I'm working]
T: yeah realize wish like LA
right PT
[yeah, so now you'll be able
to do what you've always
wanted to do, right?]
P: yes LA
[that's right]
K: e 	  CL cleaning disk he
has LA right?
[em the cleaning disk, he's
got it, right?]
W: has
[yes]
A: really very pretentious these
system PT
[it's really pretentious,
these are only systems]
L: mm
A: unnecessary
L: sometimes these are
(0.3)
L: .hhh I-mean
(0.7)
L: funny GEN time then funny LA
can't-help LA right?
[sometimes when things are
funny they are funny, you
can't help it, right?]
A: mm
(0.5)
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L: jee m-seuiyiu-waa:-heui::
(0.5)
L: gaabaan m-housiu goumeung aa
L: I-mean no-need-to
(0.5)
L: pretend not-funny like PT
[there's no need to pretend
that they're not]
Second, LA is regularly found following 'approximations',
descriptions which are either explicitly modified by such adverbs
as dou35 ("about"), as in (20)-(22), or couched in particular
kinds of syntactic constructions, eg. leung saam go ("two or
three"), sei m yat ("four or five days"), as in (23).
(20) [FEEL1:2:112]
B: o: (.) mhm (.) gel-noi jichin	 B: I-see (.) mhm (.) how-long
ge si aa
	
ago 's thing PT
[I see, mhm, how long ago
did this happen]
-->S: e: yat lin chin dou LA
	
S: e: one year ago about LA
[em about a year ago]
(0.5)
	
(0.5)
B: yat nin chin
	
B: one year ago
S: ha [ha
	
S: yes yes
B:	 [hm hm
	
B: hm hm
(21) [TC:2:98]
K: jau::: 'yinggoi le (.)
keui jauhai::: e::
ss-CPS yat-baak (.) luk-sap
W: ha#
(0.8)
K: goum le: jau: yau near letter
quality daanhai ngo jau m-ji
heui gei faai
(.)
W: ha#
(0.6)
K: e:: h# yu# ngo man-go:: yaudi
poutau keui jau waa saam-sap
-->dou LA goum=
W: ha# (.) ngo lam dou hai goum-
seunghaa
K: and should PT (.)
it be e::
ss-CPS a-hundred-and-sixty
[and it should be CPS a
hundred and sixty]
W: yeah
(0.8)
K: and PT and has near letter
quality but I then not-know
it how fast
[and it has near letter
quality but I don't know
how fast it is]
(.)
W: yeah
(0.6)
K: e:: h# yu# I have-asked some
shops they then said thirty
about LA like
[I've asked some shops and
they said it's about thirty]
W: yeah (.) .I think also be
about-that
[yeah, I think it should be
about that too]
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(23) [TC:1:158]
S: heui dou geido-dim-jung dou aa
(1.4)
L: jiugai m-wui hou: 'ye: (.)
yanwai:: mee je: (.) sikfaan ii-ma
S: o:: 'gamm aa=
L: =ngo lammmmm (.) baat-dimmmm (.)
-->	 baat-dim gau-dim LA::
(0.4)
L: 'lei:: tingmaan# tingyat faan
mee gaang aa=
S: =tingyat faann (.) gau::-dimm
(22) [TC:2:665]
K: bwo ngo lam m-hai hou do ye
-->geje (.) [yat doi dou LA
[
[
[
W:	 [mm
W: mm
(0.6)
K: haa lo-saai# gwo-lei tai-haa
dimeung ...
K: but I think not very many
things PT(.)one bag about LA
[but I don't think there are
too many things, about one
bagful, I should think]
W: mm
W: mm
(0.6)
K: yes take-all over-here see
how
[yes, we can take everything
over here, and see what
it's like ...]
S: go till what-time about PT
[you'll be there until
about what time?]
(1.4)
L: probably won't very late(.)
because what PT (.) have-a-
meal PT
[probably not too late,
because em it's only for
a meal]
S: oh so PT
L: I think (.) 8-o'clock (.)
8-o'clock nine-o'clock LA
[I think 8 8 or 91
(0.4)
L: you tomorrow-night tomor-
row work what shift PT
[which shift are you working
tomorrow night-- tomorrow?]
S: tomorrow work(.)9-o'clock
[the 9 o'clock shift]
The third kind of objects with which LA regularly co-occurs
within the same turn, which are in a sense also approximation
markers, are modifiers like gown, goumyeung, godi --which
may be glossed in English as "like", "sort of", "sort of thing".
,
In the three extracts to follow, LA is found attached to
formulations of time ([24]), manner ([25]), and people ([26]).
(26) is particularly interesting, where an individual proper name
is used to designate groups of individuals --thus, "Angel godi
LA" (roughly, "Angel et al.") is used to refer to Angel and other
persons who are associated with her.
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(24) [TC:2:553]
K: lei dak-m-dak aa yugo#
(0.7)
K: yathai ngo heui LA
W: ngo tung lei lo LA
(0.3)
W: lei yau m sik lou
(0.3)
K: mm
(0.8)
K: ting::yat (.) e fong-jo-gung
-->goum LA
K: you whether-can PT if#
[can you do that, iffl
(0.7)
K: perhaps I go PT
[maybe I can go]
W: I for you get PT
[I'll get it for you]
(0.3)
W: you also not know way
[and you don't know the way
there]
(0.3)
K: mm
(0.8)
K: tomorrow (.) e after-work
like LA
[tomorrow, em after work,
like]
(25) [SS:CH:1:384]
E:	 haubin je# jaai mou-
yan WO danhai keui li# (.) ji
gwan (.) dakyingaan heungchin
jong-yat-jong go bo WO (.)
-->yau m-hai hou daailik goum LA
L: mm
E: .hh honang o jigei::::
(0.9)
E: jigei gamgok keui LA hhh [hhh
[
L:	 [mm
(26) [DJ1:2:271]
T: ...dim go hou-m-hqu
P: .hh hou aa
(0.6)
P: .hh e::::
(1.4)
P: goum mou-mat yan gala=
T: =aihhyaa heh heh heh .hhh
lou:[yau heimaa dou yau]=
P:	 [e:: yau geigo:: ]
T: =leung go gw[a:::
[
[
P:	 [geigo chi-jo-jik
E: at-the-back real# really
no-one PT but it li# (.) CL
cue (.) suddenly forward
hit CL ball PT (.)
but not very hard like LA
[there was really no one at
the back, but it-- the cue
suddenly hit the ball, it
wasn't very hard]
L: mm
E: .hh perhaps I self
[perhaps I myself--]
(0.9)
E: self feel it PT hhh hhh
[felt it myself hhh hhh]
L: mm
T: dedicate song would-you
[would you like to do
your dedications]
P: .hh good aa
[yes]
(0.6)
P: .hh e::::
(1.4)
P: and not-many people PT
[there aren't many people]
T: my-god heh heh heh .hhh
buddies at-least also have
P: e: there-are a-few
T: two CL PT
[come on, you must have at
least two buddies]
P: a-few quitted those few PT
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go geigo lo:::
T: hou aa::::
P: e:: aa-Hing aa aa-Keung
-->godi LA:
T:	 m[hm
-->P: [Angel godi LA:
(0.2)
T: yaumou do: wan keuidei kinggai aa
[a few, those few who've
quitted]
T: good PT
[OK]
P: e:: Hing PT Keung those LA
[e:: Hing, and Keung, and
those]
T: mhm
P: Angel those PT
[Angel and those]
(0.2)
T: do-you often see them talk
PT
[do you often see them and
talk to them]
Finally, LA is found attached to non-committal answers to
questions, such as "so so" in (27), "a bit" in (28), and "it
depends" in (29).
(27) [DJ1:2:205]
T: goum dou houchi ge seunnei aa	 T: so really seem quite smooth
PT
[so things seem to have gone
quite smoothly for you then]
(0.3)	 (0.3)
-->P: .hhh maamaadei LA::::	 P: .hhh so-so LA
[well, so so]
T: yi:: houchi e:: m-[hai hou jung]yi= T: oh like e:: not very like
P:	 ((***)	 ]	 p: (***)
T: =goum wo hawaahh heh [heh heh heh 	 T: like PT do-you heh heh heh
[	 [oh, you don't sound as if
[	 you like your job too much,
[	 do you]
P:	 [hai aa m-hai	 P: yes PT not very like
hou jungyi	 [no I don't like it much]
(28) [DJ1:1:118]
B: yanwai keui:: hou hoisam jaulei
yau gaulik sannin gwo aa
C: ha#=
B: =haawaa
(-)
-->A: mmmmm mm-ji aa (.) siusiu LA
B: hhh heh heh
B: because he very happy soon
have Lunar New-Year pass PT
[because he's very happy
that it'll be Chinese New
Year soon]
C: yeah
B: is-that-right?
(-)
A: mmmmm don't-know PT (.)
a-little-bit LA
[mmmmm I don't know,
a little bit]
B: hhh heh heh
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(29) [SS:CH:1:384]
L: lei seun-m-seun aa lei m seun
	
L: you whether-believe PT
you not believe
[do you believe it? you
don't]
(0.6)
	
(0.6)
A: leung-tai LA
	
A: both-view PT
[it depends]
This range of co-occurrence evidence suggests that one way
in which the particle LA is used can be explicated in terms of
procedures in conversational interaction with which common under-
standing of objects, processes, times, places, manners, persons,
feelings, assessments, situations, --in short, 'what is being
talked about', is established. LA-suffixing provides a device at
points in a conversation where the establishment of such common
understandings is an immediate concern. Through the use of LA,
speakers can display their trust in the recipients' ability to
work out the situated sense and interactional import of formula-
tions presented as adequate descriptions.
It is interesting to note that a number of particles in
English have apparently similar uses. For instance, James (1983)
identifies a set of "compromisers", including expressions like
"sort of", "like", and "you know". These discourse particles are
treated as "metaphorical expressions" which "compromise on" the
literalness of the heads that they modify.5
"...the significance of compromisers such as "kind of" ...
is not to qualify, 'downtone', 'hedge on', or, paradoxic-
ally, 'compromise on' the propositional content of their
heads. ... What compromisers do 'compromise on' is the
literalness of their heads --as figurative constructions."
(James 1983:200-201)
According to James, a central function of these compromisers
is that they indicate to hearers how the meanings of the heads
which they qualify are to be derived. Thus, the meanings of
phrases and clauses with which compromisers are in construction
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are to be derived from figurative interpretations, treating the
actual phrases and clauses used as representations of, or stand-
ing for, equivalent expressions in absentia, expressions which
are 'socially synonymous'. The significance of compromisers
would therefore lie in their indication of a "something-like"
relationship between their heads and socially synonymous
expressions, and, through this, contribute to "a certain
'informality' of style and 'intimacy' of relationship"
(ibid.,p.202).
"the LIKE-element may be glossed as 'I invite you to inter-
pret the head as a synonym of like significance'. The
assumption underlying this invitation is that there is
sufficient perceived, desired or imagined interpersonal
rapport --however specified-- to warrant, justify or support
an appeal to these hearer interpretation capacities."
(p.199)
It is clear that the kind of compromiser-constructions
discussed by James share many characteristics in common with the
kinds of LA-suffixed-utterances discussed in this section. It
might therefore be possible to regard LA as having a similar role
to play in conversations.
However, while there do appear to be a great number of
similarities between this Cantonese utterance particle and the
English compromisers, one reservation needs to be considered.
Notice that James' account relies on an implicit distinction
between imprecise expressions and full or exact propositional
specifications. Compromisers are regarded as linguistic objects
which mark their heads as vague, imprecise expressions, which
need to be interpreted in special ways (ie. as opposed to exact
locutions). Within an ethnomethodological framework, any
distinction between vague, imprecise, metaphorical expressions on
the one hand, and exact, precise, literal ones on the other is
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problematical. It has been argued in the last chapter that all
linguistic expressions are essentially indexical. That is,
linguistic forms, be they 'precise' or otherwise, are made sense
of through the employment of essentially the same kinds of
contextualization and interpretive procedures. 6
 In this view,
the work of LA consists not so much in marking the linguistic
forms to which they are attached as expressions of a special
kind, inviting the hearer to apply special interpretive
procedures. Instead, we can think of LA-suffixing as a resource
that may go into the design of utterances, one which displays the
speaker's assumption that the recipient can be trusted to carry
out the required contextualizations and to determine the sense
and import of certain formulations. Obviously, such a display
need not, and cannot, be done at every turn in a conversation.
Nevertheless, should such a display be needed for some inter-
actional purpose (eg. the charting of multi-stage projects), it
is a device that can be employed. In this way, it can contribute
to the constant negotiations of common understandings on the
basis of which further reportings, descriptions, tellings, etc.
can proceed. We are therefore dealing not with substantive
matters like the degree of exactness, explicitness or precision
with which states-of:affairs are designated, but organizational
issues.
Another particle in English which seems to have comparable
properties is "OK". Condon (1986) describes its distribution in
terms of various "levels of organization" (topics, adjacency
pairs, speech-acts), noting that it often occurs at junctures
where more than one of these levels converge: "OK appears at
points in the discourse when the organization of the talk
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coincides with a larger, non-linguistic organization of the
event." (1986:73) It is often found to occur at such junctures
to signal a return from off-task activities (such as joking) to
the main task (but never the other way round). In so doing, it
re-invokes interpretive schemes that have been temporarily held
in abeyance in the course of a side-sequence. In this sense, it
is said to have an "orientation" and "keying" function.
"One function that an utterance with the properties of OK
might serve is orientation. ... By keying or calling into
play all those expectations not made explicit by utterances
in the interaction, OK creates environments in which func-
tions can be accomplished by extremely elliptical forms."
(Condon 1986:95)
It will be clear from these descriptions that the kinds of
organizational problems that "OK" is sensitive to are very
similar to those that LA is oriented to. As we have seen in the
examples so far, LA is used in certain kinds of sequences to
initiate a subsidiary project, in which the immediate concern is
to confirm the availability of common ground, and, upon finishing
with that side sequence, participants would re-attend to the
ongoing main project. This suggests that different languages may
have evolved different formal means to deal with very similar
interactional problems. Observations that have been made on
various kinds of discourse particles in different languages may
well generate empirically motivated functional categories which
should be of great interest to students of linguistic universals.
Before such general issues are taken up, however, we must
turn to examine three further kinds of sequential contexts in
which LA has a major role to play: suggestions, agreements, and
pre-closings.
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6. Suggestions
Previous descriptions of LA have sometimes referred to the
particle as some kind of a marker of requests (see section 1
above). Some instances in my data do seem to be characterizable
as requests within the particular sequential contexts in which
they occur. (30) and (31) below provide two such examples.
(30) [TC:1:178]
S: =goum lei::::
	
S: so you
(0.5)
	
(0.5)
S: lei tai ngo faan-jo mei
	
S: you see I return not
1-> sin LA=	 .	 first LA
[see if I'm home first]
2->L: =ha ngo d# ngo daa-jo-dinwaa 	 L: yeah I d# I phone
bei lei sin lo
	
to you first PT
[yeah I'll phone you first]
[31] [TC:1:115]
L: ha# .hhh goum ngo::: (.) tingyat
daa-bei-keui aa
P: hou aa
(0.3)
P: a::[:: nei yugwo daa=
[
L:	 [jau::
1->P: =jau seungjau daa LA
L: [hai
P: [yanwai ngodei haajau jau wui:
(0.5)
P: je:i [( ...fong...) 	 ]
L:	 [a::: m-sai faanhok] hai=
P: =yat-dim-sei:: jihau jau fonghok
2->L: o goumyeung hou aa
.hhh ngo tung keui gongaagong
tai-haa keui gokdak dimyeung
That the LA-suffixed utterances
L: right .hhh so I (.)
tomorrow phone-her PT
[right so I'll phone her
tomorrow]
P: good PT
(0.3)
P: em you if phone
[em if you phone,--]
L: so
P: then in-the-morning phone LA
[phone in the morning]
L: yes
P: because we afternoon then
will
[because in the afternon
we'll--]
(0.5)
P: I-mean	 (...breaks...)
L: em no-need-to go-to-school
yes
[em no classes yes]
P: twenty-past-one after then
finish
[school finishes after
twenty past one]
L: oh then good PT
.hhh I with her talk
to-see she feel how
[oh that's fine I'll talk
to her to see how she feels]
(arrow 1) in [30] and [31]
are heard as requests is evident from the recipients' responses
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(arrow 2). In (30), this comes in the immediately next turn,
where L shows his understanding of, and intention to comply with,
S's request that he (L) should phone to see if he (S) is home
first.	 In (31), L's initial response "hai" ("yes") is overlapped
by P's detailing of the grounds of his request. However, as soon
as this is done, L returns to the request and shows his
compliance by indicating that the proposed course of action
("phoning her") is something that he intends to take up.
(32) instances a variation on this
Response-to-the-Request' pattern.
(32) [DJ1:2:270]
P: hou mun aa
1->T: haaiyaa m-hou oum mun LA:::
heh heh heh [ngodei sung di]=
[	 ]
[	 ]
P:	 [heh heh heh	 ]
T: =go bei lei teng la#
aiyaa paa-aa lei la# heh heh
.hhhh dim-go hou-m-hou
2->P: .h hou aa
'Request followed by
P: very bored PT
[I'm so bored]
T: come-on not so bored LA
heh heh heh we give some
[come on, cheer up, heh heh
heh]
P: heh heh heh
T: songs to you listen PT
frightened-by you PT heh heh
.hhhh dedicate-song good-
not-good
[we'll play you some songs,
I'm giving in, heh heh
dedicate a song, OK?]
P: .h good PT
[OK]
Here, instead of getting an immediate response (notice that
P could have responded during the time when T is holding on to
the vowel of her LA),.T finds herself in a position where her
plea is not responded to one way or another. She then produces
laughter, to retrospectively key her plea as a not-so-serious,
perhaps friendly one. And, upon getting some response this time
from P (in the form of laughter), she proceeds to offer her
something other than 'mere words' to cheer her up (ie. songs).
Thus the plea "come on, cheer up" gets transformed in the course
of a fairly short space of time into an offer, one that P finally
takes up (arrow 2). But the fact that the offer is made
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explicitly as an alternative/additional means of cheering her up
means that her acceptance of it can now be seen as a positive
response to the initial plea, ie. she can be deemed to have
(indirectly) agreed to comply with it after all.
It was noted in the last section that LA often co-occurs with
u hai-m-hai" ("isn't it") or some variant thereof. In connection
with requests, it was found that, apart from "hai-m-hai", LA is
also regularly followed, within the same turn, by "hou-m-hou"
(literally, "good not good", ie. "Is that agreeable to you?").
Consider an instance of this in (33).
(33) [F[EL1:1:260]
L: nei# nei batyu se fung seun bei
1->keui LA 	 	 (.) hou-m-hou aa=
2->C: =hou aa
L: hai fung seun dou se chingcho lei
waa ngo in seung jou lei sailou
This suggests that LA can be used
L: you you perhaps write CL
letter to her LA (.) whether-
good PT
[perhaps you can write her a
letter, what do you think?]
C: good PT
[OK]
L: in CL letter in write clear
you say I not want be your
brother
[in the letter tell her
once and for all I don't want
to be your brother]
not only to display the
assumption of shared knowledge, it can also display the assump-
tion of the availability of mutual agreement on, or endorsement
of, a proposed course of action. The two kinds of uses can be
united if we characterize these uses of LA as a device for
displaying the assumption of common ground, and elicitation of
agreement on the recognizability of objects, events or states-of-
affairs, the adequacy of descriptions, or the desirability or
efficacy of proposed courses of action. Thus, the properties of
LA are such that while it can lend itself to the performance of
requests, it can on the same systematic basis be used for
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plea, advice (as in (33)), and suggestions in general.
Further support comes from the following fragments, in which
it is clear that LA-suffixed suggestions need not propose courses
of action that are to be carried out by the addressee. They may
also be about actions that are to be carried out by the speaker.7
What matters, for LA-suffixed suggestions, is not whether some
future action is predicated of the addressee, but the elicitation
of mutual agreement on some proposed
extracts (34) and (35) show.
(34) [TC:2:553]
W: e:::: ngo lam-jyu 'tingyat
heui lo
(0.3)
K: tingyat
W: ha#
(.)
K: .hhhh goumyeung (.) e 	
(1.0)
K: lei dak-m-dak aa yugo#
(0.7)
1->K: yathai ngo heui LA
2->W: ngo tung lei lo LA
(0.3)
W: lei yau m sik lou
(0.3)
K: mm
(0.8)
K: ting::yat (.) e fong-jo-gung
goum LA
[35] [TC:2:176]
X: o keui hai: hokhaau aa
K: o keui gamyat faan-jo
hokhaau aa=
X: =hai aa hai aa=
K: =o goum ngo daa-heui hokhaau
-->LA (.) m-goi (.) baaibaai
course of action, as
W: e:::: I thinking tomorrow
go get
[em I'm thinking of fetching
it tomorrow]
(0.3)
K: tomorrow
W: yeah
(.)
K	 hhhh like-that (.) e 	
(1.0)
K: you whether-can PT if#
[can you do that, iffl
(0.7)
K: perhaps I go LA
[maybe I can go]
W: I for you get LA
[I'll get it for you]
(0.3)
W: you also not know way
[and you don't know the way
there]
(0.3)
K: mm
(0.8)
K: tomorrow (.) e after-work
like LA
[tomorrow, em after work, like]
X: oh he at school PT
[oh he's at school]
K: oh he today has-gone
school PT
[oh he's gone to school
today, has he]
X: yes PT yes PT
[yes yes]
K: I-see so I phone school
LA (.) thanks (.) bye
108
[I see, well I'll phone
him at school then,
thanks, bye]
(34) contains an interesting instance where a LA-suffixed
suggestion is responded in the next turn by a counter-suggestion
which is also LA-suffixed. Both utterances predicate a proposed
course of action of the speaker. Instead of hearing L's turn
(arrow I) as a promise, notice that W's response (arrow 2) treats
the prior turn as doing a suggestion. Through presenting a
counter-suggestion, W makes it plain that no agreement is being
offered on L's proposed course of action. W proposes instead
that he (W) should do the collection, and follows that up with a
provision of the grounds for making that counter-proposal.
Similarly, in [35], the arrowed utterance is one in which K, the
speaker, proposes to do the phoning. Again, while the utterance
is in a sense an exhibition of the speaker's intention to perform
some future act, it is characterizable more as a proposal to deal
with the problem created by the unavailability of the person the
speaker was calling to find, rather than a commitment.
It will be clear from the extracts examined in this section
that LA-suffixed suggestions include, but form a much more
general class of actions, than requests. By virtue of its common
ground securing propekies, LA contributes to the doing of
suggestions by eliciting recipients' agreement on some proposed
course of action. Thus, instead of describing LA simply as a
marker of requests, the present account provides a systematic
basis for the explication of the way in which this particle
contributes to the performance of a variety of requests,
suggestions and advice.
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P: =m-hai gunnei ge::
T: o (.)
1->yatdi
2->P:
jee j# e: jaudim fongmin-ge
'jisik goumyeu[ng LA hamai]
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
[hai LA haha]
7. Agreements
From what has been said about LA so far, it should come as
no surprise that it regularly occurs in agreement sequences as
well. Far from being a device which is used only to elicit and
secure agreements, however, LA is often found suffixed to
utterances which offer (positive) responses to such elicitations,
as can be seen in (36) and (37) below.
(36) [DJ1:2:203]
T: 'o (.) jaudim gunnei goumyeung
	 T: I-see (.) hotel management
haamaa=
	
like isn't-it
[I see, hotel management
sort of thing, isn't it]
P: not management PT
[not really management]
T: oh (.) that-is j# e: hotel
concerning some knowledge
like LA right?
[oh, so it's some knowledge
about hotels, that sort of
thing, right?]
P: yes LA yeah
[yes, yeah]
(37) [DJ1:2:246]
P: m-hai ge:: jigei .hh jigei yau
duksyu han dou yigaa mmaa aaai
hhh yigaa jeutji jouye lak
1->T: ha# waan-aa samyun goum LA:::
hai[mai aa
[
[
[
2->P:	 [hai LA::
P: no PT self .hh self from
studying long-for until now
PT EXCL hhh now at-last work
PT
[not really, I .hh I've
always wanted (to travel)
since I was in the school,
and now at last I'm working]
T: yeah realize wish like LA
right PT
[yeah, so now you'll be able
to do what you've always
wanted to do, right?]
P: yes LA
[that's right]
In both fragments, an understanding check (arrow 1) is
responded to by a confirmation that is LA-suffixed (arrow 2).
Rather than characterizing LA strictly in terms of speaker-
elicitation or hearer-confirmation, it would seem to be much more
sensitive to the properties of this particle to stress the role
that it plays in displaying mutual agreement and common under-
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standing. This also shows why attempts to state the meaning of
this particle in terms of simple glosses have proved to be
extremely difficult and unprofitable. For instance, one might
want to gloss LA as 'I now invite you to confirm that ...'.
However, it should be clear, at least from (37), that such a
gloss would only work for some occurrences of LA in some 
contexts, but not others.
Notice that to say that LA-suffixing provides a device for
the signalling of agreement is but a minimal characterization.
Other interactional tasks may be accomplished through the use of
LA-suffixed agreements.
(38) [FEEL1:1:243]
C: aahai ngo maanmaann dou
teng ni::: ligo jitmuk aa
(hai japgaang)
1-->P: [hawaa
2-->L: [hawaa
C: hai aa=
P: =goum nei teng ngodei ligo jitmuk
le:: yinggoi teng-dou ngo sisi dou
hyun yandei (nge) jou mee dou yiu
jigei choicheui jyudung aa .hh
mouleun nei wan-gung yau-hou::::
.hhhh e 	 	 wan nei-ge chintou
yau-hou:: .hh samji.hai
'sik 'neui'jai (.) hai-mai?
(0.5)
C: hai (maa)
P: nei [yiu jigei baangaak aamaa
[
C: oh-yes I every-night too
hear you this programme PT
(be habit)
[oh yes I listen to your
programme every night
(its a habit)]
P: really
L: really
[do you really]
C: yes PT
[yes]
P: so you hear our this
programme PT should have-
heard I often too advise
people (nge) do what too
must self take positive
PT .hh whether you look-for-
a-job be-it .hhhh em look-
for-your-future be-it .hh
even be get-to-know-a-girl
(.) right?
[well if you listen to our
programme you should have
heard how I often advise
people to take the initiative
whether they are looking for
a job, or looking for a
future, even getting to know
a girl, right?]
(0.5)
C: yes (PT)
[yes/(is that so?)]
P: you have self grasp PT
[you have to take the
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[
L:	 [mmmm
P: baangaak geiwui tungmaai .hh e
baangaak lei
[seung jou ge ye aamaa]
[	 ]
[	 ]
C: [keui	 yausi It]
C: yausi m-bei geiwui ngo be::::
P: keui m-bei geiwui nei? ho:::
jigei wannn gmaa geiwui m-hai
yiu tang yan lei bei:: gaa
hai yiu jigei 'jai::jou gaa
ming-m-'ming?
L: daai keui yausi dou yingsing
tung lei heui-ha-'gaai dou m-wui
waa m-bei geiwui lei golowo
3->P: hai [LA::::
[
L:	 [bagwo lei jigei dou m
ji dim hoi hau go::ng je
hamaa[::
[
[
[
C:	 [( hai aa ...	 )
opportunities yourself]
L: mmmm
P: grasp opportunity and .hh
em grasp you want do 's
thing PT
[take the opportunities to do
what you want to do]
C: she sometimes
C: sometimes not-give chance
me PT
[sometimes she doesn't
give me any chance]
P: she not-give chance you? PT
self find PT chance not must
wait people come give PT
be must self create
whether-understand
[she doesnt give you any
chance? So what? You have to
find the chances yourself,
not wait for someone to give
you chances, you have to
create the chances, do you
understand?]
L: but she sometimes too agree
with you go-out also won't
say not-give chance you PT
[but she sometimes goes out
with you too, so you can't
really say she doesn't give
you any chance]
P: yes LA
[quite right]
L: but you self really not
know how open mouth say PT
is-that-so?
[but you don't really know
how to say it to her, is
that so?]
C: yes PT
(38) instances one way in which LA-suffixed agreements can
contribute to the accomplishment of participant alignments.
Here, a three-party talk is going on in which the caller tells
troubles and asks for advice from the two presenters, who also
act as counsellors. Now, there is no mechanism whereby the two
presenters are automatically aligned vis-a-vis the caller: there
are clear instances where the two openly disagree. But there are
also moments of achieved unity between the two, when they are
aligned as one party giving advice, thanking, praising or
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reproaching the caller. Witness just such a moment (arrows 1 and
2) where the presenters respond in unison to C's disclosure that
he listens to the programme every night. I suggest that what is
going on in the turn arrowed 3 can be explicated in terms of this
possibility of achieved unity. The three parties concerned have
been talking about possible ways of solving C's problem of not
knowing how to tell a girl that he is "secretly in love" with
her. He complains that the girl never gives him a chance. L then
gives counter-evidence to show that the woman in question does
actually give the caller chances to express his love from time to
time, thus challenging the caller's earlier claim. It is at this
point that P, the other presenter, comes in and issues an agree-
ment: "hai LA" (arrow 3). Through exhibiting her claim of shar-
ing common judgments with L on the current issue, P displays her
affiliation to L's position, and is in a sense joining in to do
some team-work. The unity-as-a-team is an achievement in that it
is a product of the work that the two members collaboratively put
into this agreement (disagreement would be a more appropriate
label, because what the two as a team is doing is disagreeing
with C's assessment of the intention of the girl in question)
sequence in which one member produces evidence against the
caller's claims, and the other offers agreement.
8. Pre-closings
The presence of LA in pre-closing sequences is pervasive.8
Consider first a few fragments extracted from near the end of
conversations where some LA-suffixed-utterances seem to have a
role to play.
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K: hou aa
W: dak gala yinggoi mou mantai ge
-
->K: hou LA
W: OK [hai-goum-sin
K:	 [mm baaibaai
(41) [TC:2:156]
J: OK=
-
->K: =goum: laibaai-sei gin LA
-
->J: hou LA
K: ha=
J: =laibaai-sei gin lei
(40) [TC:2:144]
-->W: hou LA ngo tung lei man:: saai
-->	 sin LA
W: good LA I for you ask all
first LA
[OK I'll ask everything for
you first]
K: good PT
[good]
W: can PT should no problem PT
[it's OK shouldn't be any
problem]
K: good LA
[OK then]
W: OK that's-it-then
K: mm bye-bye
J: OK
K: so Thursday see LA
[so see you on Thursday]
J: good LA
[right]
K: yeah
J: Thursday see you
[see you on Thursday]
K: OK K: OK
J: baaibaai J: bye
K: baaibaai K: bye
(42) [TC:2:172]
K: mmmmmmm (.) sap-dim-leng aa	 K: mmmmmm (.) about-10-o'clock
hou[-m-hou aa	 PT is-that-OK PT
C:	 [hou aa hou [aa	 C: good PT good PT
K:	 [sap-dim-bun	 K: half-past-ten
[dou	 about
C: [OK hou aa hou aa=	 C: OK good PT good PT
K: =ha=	 K: yeah
C: =hou aa=	 C: good PT
-->K: goummm tingyat gin LA=	 K: so tomorrow see LA
[so see you tomorrow]
-->C: =tingyat gin LA
	
	 C: tomorrow see LA
[see you tomorrow]
K: m-goi-[saai	 K: thank-you-very-much
C:	 [m-goi-saai-nei	 C: thank-you-very-much
K: baai[baai	 K: bye
C:	 [baaibaai	 C: bye
An examination of the arrowed turns in these extracts yields
two observations. First, the turn components in question have
the form "X + LA" where X is one from a limited set of objects --
either the word "hou" ("good"), or a restatement of some arrange-
ments made earlier in the same conversation (eg. "... gin" ["see
you on ...] or its variants). Second, the final exchange of
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goodbyes do not get done until each participant has produced at
least one such turn. It can be seen from (40) to (42) that both
of these conditions apply just before closing. Turn components
that have this design may be characterized as pre-closing
initiators, the primary function of which is to generate pre-
closing sequences which may lead eventually to conversational
disengagement.
An immediate interest of such turn components lies in the
light that they shed on the question of how the properties of LA
that have been identified so far may constitute a systematic
basis for the particle to play a part in the kind of work that is
accomplished in preparation for the final suspension of the turn-
taking system. The pervasiveness of LA's presence in these
environments is something that clearly deserves close attention,
and demands an account which would relate its contribution to
this kind of closing-preparatory task to its other uses that have
been studied so far in this chapter.
The contribution of LA to the accomplishment of this kind of
task is especially transparent in the environment where such LA-
suffixed-utterances come right at the heels of arrangement
sequences, as in (43) and (44).
(43) [TC:1:177]
S: =goum lei::::
(0.5)
1->S: lei tai ngo faan-jo mei sin LA=
L: =ha ngo d# ngo daa-jo-dinwaa
bei-lei sin lo=
S: so you
(0.5)
S: you see I return not first LA
[see if I am back first]
L: yeah I d# I phone-you
first PT
S: =hai lo hai lo (.) ha#=
2->L: =ha=
S: =ngo chaammdo dou-hai:::
yugwo 'baat-'dim-bun-jung
dou jau le=
L: =mm=
[yeah I'll phone you first]
S: yes PT yes PT (.) yeah
L: yeah
S: I about probably
if half-past-eight
about leave PT
[if I leave at about
half past eight]
L: mm
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S: ngo gau-dim-'saam dou aa
	
S: I quarter-past-nine about
yinggoi faan-dou-lai gala=	 em should be-back PT
[I should be back by
quarter past nine]
L: =ha#=	 L: yeah
Immediately prior to this fragment, S and L have agreed to
meet the following day, and that L should phone to see if S is
home first. While it seems clear that in one sense the co-parti-
cipants here are engaged in 'reconfirmation' work, checking out
agreements made earlier about the future meeting, there is a case
for reading more into the exchanges. One of Schegloff and
Sacks's (1973) findings about pre-closings is that 'reconfirma-
tion' sequences of the kind illustrated in [43] are often likely
candidates for the generation of pre-closing sequences. Notice
that S's restatement of a prior arrangement (arrow 1) could have
developed into a pre-closing sequence and established the
relevance of conversational closure. As it turns out, however,
just when L has bidden "pass" (arrow 2), S re-opens the topic
about the time he should be home the next day, thereby generating
further talk on the topic. This lasts four more turns, before
the pre-closing is attempted again. It can be argued that part
of the work that LA is doing in the turn arrowed 1 is ironically
precisely not seeking confirmation, although that is what it
professes to do officially. The whole point of re-stating
arrangements that have already been made, without saying anything
new about them, and, in addition, to offer this for the co-
participant's confirmation, is a means of proposing that a point
has been reached in the conversation where movement into closing
can become a relevant, appropriate, opportune next activity.
(44) provides an example of a successful pre-closing
initiator.
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(44) [TC:1:154]
L: =hou aa hou aa (.) ha# .hh goum
ngo hoyi tingyat tung keui gong
P: hou aa=
L: =((clears throat)) hou aa=
P: =lei yau sigaan jau bei go dinwaa
-->keui LA: [(keui dou)
[
[
L:	 [ha# ha# ngo tingjiu daa
bei keui=
L: good PT good PT (.) yes .hh
so I can tomorrow with her
talk
[fine, yes, so I can talk
to her tomorrow--]
P: good PT
L: ((clears throat)) good PT
P: you have time then give a
call her LA (she too)
[give her a call then when
you have time]
L: yes yes I tomorrow-morning
phone to her
[yes yes I'll call her
tomorrow morning]
P and L have, prior to this extract, arranged for L to phone
P's headteacher the following day. In the arrowed turn, P re-
does his suggestion: "give her a call when you have time".
Following our line of argument, this utterance can be
characterized as a pre-closing initiator. Unlike in the previous
extract, this pre-closing initiator successfully generates the
following sequence.
(45) [TC:1:154]
(continuation of (44) until the end of the conversation)
P: =lei yau sigaan jau bei go dinwaa
1-->keui LA: [(keui dou)
[
[
L:	 [ha# ha# ngo tingjiu daa
bei keui=
P: OK
L: OK (.) mm=
P: =hou=
L: =hai-goum-sin
2--> LA [(.) Patrick (.)
P:	 [hou
L: =mm=
P: =hou=
L: =baaibaai=
P: =baaibaai
P: you have time then give a
call her PT (she too)
[give her a call then
when you have time]
L: yes yes I tomorrow-
morning phone to her
[yes yes I'll call her
tomorrow morning]
P: OK
L: OK (.) mm
P: allright
L: OK-then PT (.)Patrick(.)
[OK then Patrick]
P: allright
L: mm
P: allright
L: bye
P: bye
In the turn arrowed 1, P, through re-making his suggestion,
and specifically re-making it in such a way that it contains
nothing unsaid before, and, further, through building it in such
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(0.6)
L: ha#=
S: =jeui-do m jau lo
yugo hai
L: dak gala m-wui hou ye ge
(.)
L: ha#
(.)
1->L: [hou aa
2->S: [hou LA
L: OK=
3->S: =hou hai-goum-sin LA=
4-> =Wxx faan-jo mei aa
L: faan-jo la
a form as to project a reconfirmation sequence, passes the turn
on to L for possible reconfirmation or topic generation. L, in
his turn, re-iterates his intention to do as arranged, reiterat-
ing while not opening up unmentioned mentionables (such as new
topics), and passes the turn back to P, who acknowledges receipt
of reconfirmation with a free-standing "OK", making it plain that
he is not opting for further topic generation either. There
follows an exchange of 'passes' (L's "OK mm" then P's "alright").
With both participants having had their chances to offer further
topic for talk, then having passed them, the stage is set for
gradual disengagement. This is done by L in the turn arrowed 2, a
familiar pre-closing formula, "hai goum sin LA" (literally
"that's it for the time being LA"), which proposes that, should
nothing else be raised in the next turn, co-participants may move
on to do closing. As it happens, P concurs with "allright",
passing the turn back now to L to do an exchange of "goodbyes".
Consider finally a variation of this in (46).
(46) [TC:1:182]
S: =yugo taai ye::
	 S: if too late
[if it's too late]
(0.6)
L: yeah
S: thats-all not leave PT
maybe
[maybe you can stay here]
L: can PT won't very late PT
[that's OK, it won't be
too late]
(.)
L: right
(.)
L: good PT
S: good LA
L: OK
S: good that's-it-then LA
Wxx return not PT
[fine that's it then is Wxxx
back yet?]
L: returned PT
[he's back]
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Here, a pre-closing-favourable environment is simultaneously
and jointly produced by the participants (arrows 1 and 2, said in
unison). S eventually takes on the task of initiating pre-
closing, again with the familiar object "hou hai goum sin LA"
(arrow 3). However, as it turns out, just at the point when the
turn is being passed on to L for a possible 'go-ahead' which
would lead on to closing, he (S) latches it up with a question
that has all the characteristics of a 'rush-through': an abrupt
increase in loudness, and a concurrent sudden increase in tempo
and pitch height (arrow 4). 9 The latching is done perfectly,
leaving no gap for L to respond to the closing proposal. Through
doing this rush-through, S exhibits a 'sudden change of mind',
sequentially deletes the immediately preceding pre-closing
initiator, and mentions an unmentioned mentionable: "is W back?"
(47) shows how the conversation continues from that point, and
how the pre-closing is eventually re-done, leading, the second
time, to a successful closing.
(47) [TC:1:183]
(Continuation of (46) until the end)
L: OK=
1->S: =hou hai-goum-sin LA=
2-> =Wxx faan-jo mei aa
L: faan-jo la
(.)
S: o: [(
	 )
L:	 [mou aa keui dou mou
cheut-heui houchi=
S: =haa?
L: hai-dou aa keui
S: 'goum gwaaijai?
L: ha#
L: OK
S: good that's-it-then PT
Wxx return not PT
[fine that's it then is Wxxx
back yet?]
L: returned PT
[he's back]
(.)
S: I see
L: no PT he anyway not
go-out apparently
[no he didn't go out
apparently]
S: really?
L: be-here PT he
[he's here]
S: so good-boy
[staying in and behaving
like a good boy?]
L: yeah
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S: aa::: siuho wo=
3->L: =ha=
4->S: =janhai (.) goum hou LA=
5->L: =hou LA=
6->S: hai-goum-sin LA=
L: =mm hai-goum=
S: =baaibaai=
L: =baaibaai
S: EXCL rare PT
[oh that's rare]
L: yeah 
S: really (.) so good PT
[really. OK then]
L: good PT
[OK]
S: that's-it-then PT
L: mm OK-then
S: bye
L: byebye
The newly generated topic --the whereabouts of W-- lasts
nine turns (from arrow 2 to arrow 3), in the course of which the
asking of W's whereabouts gets turned into a joking sequence (the
details of which need not concern us here), ending in the turn
arrowed 3 (L's "ha", "yeah" done with laughter, but very short),
which displays L's understanding of, and retrospectively
formulates the prior turn as the end of, the joke, as well as his
token (one might say 'formulaic') appreciation of it. At the
same time, the lack of enthusiasm evidenced in L's response to
the joke makes it quite clear that there is no intention on his
part to pursue the subject (W's "behaving like a good boy",
etc.). In the turn that immediately follows (arrow 4), S then
proposes to end the subject ("goum hou LA"). Following L's
'pass' in the next turn (arrow 5), S re-initiates pre-closing
(arrow 6), again using the 'classic' LA-suffixed-token that was
used in the first attempt (arrow 1). This second time, the turn
is passed successfully on to L, who concurs, subsequent to which
closing is achieved through an exchange of goodbyes.
Our examination of these examples suggests that the part
that LA plays in a variety of pre-closing sequences goes some-
thing like this. First, a pre-closing favourable environment
needs to be constructed in order that preparatory work can be
done to effect conversational disengagement. There appear to be
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two major ways of achieving such an environment. One is to
produce a 'contentless' signal ("hou LA") which records the
speaker's assumption that mutual understanding and agreement
obtains, but adds nothing new to what has been said so far in the
conversation, and, in so doing, proposes to yield the turn.
Another way is to re-state prior arrangements in such a way as to
highlight their agreed-on, mutually-understood status, again
adding nothing new, and yielding the turn.
Following on from such pre-closing favourable environments,
one of the participants can initiate pre-closing. One available
procedure is to produce ready-made tokens like "hai goum sin LA"
("that's it then for the time being") which propose that, should
the speaker have the other party's consent, closing can be a
relevant next activity. Thus pre-closing initiators would need to
be built under three requirements. One, it needs to put on
record the speaker's assumption that whatever needed to be dealt
with in that conversation have, to the satisfaction of both
parties, been dealt with. Two, it needs to signal that the
speaker has no further matters to raise. Three, upon the
successful clearing of such grounds, they can move on to the next
activity, which, in this sequential position, is closing.
In this we find i basis for the pervasiveness of LA-
suffixing just prior to, and in, pre-closing positions. The
production of pre-closing favourable environments, as well as the
doing of pre-closings, are interactional tasks that require
design resources with which participants can document to each
other their analysis of the conversation's progress. Specific-
ally, the establishment of a mutually endorsed 'no further
business' analysis is a condition, and preparation, for the co-
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ordinated entry into closing.
9. LA as a resource for establishing common understanding
Having studied a variety of instances of LA, we are now in a
position to attempt a general characterization of its systematic
properties. The fundamental question that needs to be asked is:
what constitutes the basis for this particle to occur in the wide
range of sequential environments in which it has been found to
occur, and, in so doing, to perform the considerable variety of
interactional tasks that it has been found to perform? The
customary question asked by the linguist is: what does this (and
any other) particle really mean? What semantic and/or pragmatic
specifications are needed to circumscribe this meaning? A
profitable reformulation of this question would seem to be: how
can its contributions to the performance of a variety of inter-
actional tasks be systematically explicated in terms of the
mutual elaboration of its presupposed unique, underlying
properties and the specifics of particular contexts in which it
occurs?
Let us begin with a recapitulation of some of the observa-
tions made in the previous sections which will need to be taken
into account in a general description.
(1) In Reportings, Story-tellings, Listings and
Instructions, LA may occur at points where participants are
temporarily oriented to the recognizability or identifiability of
certain objects, persons, places, times, manners, events,
situations, etc., --in general, the thing-known-in-common status
of some thing-being-talked-about. In these sequential environ-
ments, the establishment of shared understandings may be a
condition on which the continuation of the ongoing project
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depends. By displaying the assumption of the mutual recogniz-
ability, identifiability or understandability of one description
or another, LA contributes to the accomplishment of ground-
clearing or ground-laying work which may be needed for the
continuation, appreciation, or understanding of subsequent stages
of the current project (reportings, listings, etc.).
(2) LA is often used to initiate a side sequence the purpose
of which is to establish that some state-of-affairs has been
understood, recognized or identified to the participants' satis-
faction. These side sequences have been referred to as Under-
standing Checks, which, as we saw, may be speaker-initiated or
hearer-initiated. These occur regularly in the course of some
ongoing project, and, upon their occurrence, a side sequence is
generated which deals with some matter which is subsidiary to the
main project, but whose clearance is somehow a condition for its
continuation, or moves onto a projected next activity. LA-
suffixing provides a means with which understanding checks can be
built in such a way as to display strong claims of access to the
co-participant's private world (eg. 'what they have in mind').
In fact, the uses of this particle in Reportings, Story-tellings,
Listings, and Instructions can be seen as particular kinds of
speaker-initiated understanding checks.
(3) The adequacy of a description is a constant and
pervasive interactional problem that participants are oriented to
and needs to be dealt with from time to time in the course of a
conversation. LA is a device with which this problem can be
addressed by displaying the speaker's analysis (le. under-
standing) of the current situation as one in which the formula-
tion fits and is adequate. When certain common grounds are
123
assumed to obtain, expressions which look imprecise, vague, or
non-committal (neither-here-nor-there) may be produced and
presented as adequate descriptions.
(4) LA occurs in utterances which are used to make requests,
suggestions and advice and contributes to the seeking of mutual
agreement on the desirability or efficacy of a proposed course of
action.
(5) LA can be suffixed to agreement-seeking as well as
agreement-giving tokens to signal that common assessment or
judgement of some matter at hand obtains.
(6) LA has a pervasive presence in pre-closings. Some of
the most familiar ways of initiating pre-closings involve the
employment of LA-suffixed-utterances. In this environment, LA
contributes to the work of confirming that no party concerned has
further topics to open, and the establishment of mutual agreement
on a move into closing.
This summary suggests that the many ways in which this
particle is used in a range of sequential positions to accomplish
a variety of interactional tasks can be systematically related to
a common basis. A minimal characterization of this basis goes
something like this. At the minimum, the particle provides a
linguistic resource with which conversation participants can, at
particular points in an unfolding interactional scene, document
to each other their assumption that what is being talked about is
something known-in-common. Depending on the sequential context,
this property of LA can be put to many varied uses. Thus, in an
ongoing report or story, the reporter/story-teller's use of LA-
suffixing to establish common understanding would be heard as
'pausing before continuation'. When produced by the report/
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story-recipient, however, LA-suffixed-utterances would be heard
as understanding displays and checks. In the environment after a
first assessment, the same device used to secure common ground
would be heard as an agreement. When used with certain kinds of
turn components, it may be heard as an attempt to initiate pre-
closing.
Notice that it is not the aim of such a characterization to
provide a definition of the particle by giving a gloss of 'what
it means'. The meaning-in-context and interactional import of
particular instances of LA-suffixed-utterances cannot be computed
from decontextualized glosses of its components (one of which
being the particle). Instead, they can only be derived from
complex contextualization procedures whereby the general proper-
ties of the particle are integrated within the particulars of the
context (the sequential context being a crucial consideration) in
which it occurs.
Thus there is no mechanism which guarantees that one thing
or other is bound to happen when LA appears. In this sense, LA
is not a marker of some readily definable functional category.
As Brown & Levinson (1979) point out, meanings-in-context are
derived using linguistic resources as guides to highly complex
inferential processes.
"...interactants do not generally treat socially significant
linguistic features as simple signals of social facts --but
rather take into account the interactional and social
context in their evaluation of these features in highly
complex ways." (1979:292)
With this proviso, the particle LA can be described as the
grammaticalization of a solution to a specific problem in the
social organization of conversation, namely, the interactional
problem of the availability of shared recognition, identifica-
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tion, and understanding at particular points of an ongoing
discourse. It is a linguistic resource with which co-partici-
pants can secure shared understanding, and through that, to
achieve a variety of interactional tasks.
We seem to be dealing with a phenomenon that lies in between
two kinds of ways in which understandings are achieved in
conversation. On the one hand, participants obviously must rely
on assumptions about what their conversational partners must know
and understand. They may proceed by simply assuming that the
interlocutor knows what they are talking about. In this sense,
what is said and what is meant is treated as unproblematical.
This kind of assumption is clearly needed, or else one would not
be able to say anything at all to anyone. For instance, while
resources are available to check whether one's recipient has
successfully identified the object, person, place, etc. that one
is talking about, conversation participants do not do this at
every possible turn. Notice that one kind of evidence in support
of this comes from repair sequences, which do in fact occur from
time to time. That repair sequences should occur at all points
to the fact that something which was assumed to be a thing-known-
in-common turns out to be problematical.
On the other hand, there are cases where the recogniz-
ability, identifiability, or understandability of an object, an
event, a situation, etc. is raised explicitly as a problem. That
is, a description may be presented in such a way that its
adequacy is 'problematized'. In my Cantonese data, the utterance
particle ge35 is regularly used to perform this kind of task
(and generate identification sequences). These, then, are cases
where speakers make little or no assumption that their co-
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participants know what they are talking about.
In addition to these two kinds of ways in which under-
standings can be accomplished, there is an in-between method with
which speakers can display their assumption that the interlocutor
ought to know what they are talking about, although they are not
entirely prepared to take that as a certainty. In these cases,
speakers can, through the employment of resources available to
them, design their descriptions in such a way as to display the
assumption (as opposed to simply assuming) that the object,
event, situation, etc. being portrayed is a thing-known-in-
common. The very fact that this assumption is displayed would of
course give rise to the possibility of a response, which may
support that assumption, or 'problematize' it. What I am
suggesting is that LA is a resource in Cantonese with which this
third kind of procedure is made available to conversational
participants.
Notice that there is a fundamental difference between my
treatment of LA as a device for the establishment of common
ground in the course of an ongoing interaction and other studies
in which notions like "mutual knowledge", "shared knowledge", and
"presupposition pool" are employed. 10 It has been suggested, for
example, that the notion of "mutual knowledge" is required for a
psychological model of speech comprehension. 11 Indeed, an even
more fundamental role in linguistic studies has been attributed
to it:
"virtually every ... aspect of meaning and reference ...
requires mutual knowledge, which also is at the very heart
of the notion of linguistic convention and speaker meaning."
(Clark & Marshall 1981:58)
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According to the mutual knowledge model of speech comprehen-
sion, hearers' interpretation of utterances depends on a context,
which is conceptualized as a set of propositions that are shared,
and known to be shared, by the speaker and the addressee. For
instance, in connection with the problem of definite reference,
Clark & Marshall (1981) claim that in order to successfully
communicate what a definite description refers to, the inter-
locutors must have certain shared knowledge, and know that they
share this knowledge. Thus, for a definite description t (eg.
"the movie showing at the Roxy tonight") to successfully refer to
a referent R (eg. "Monkey Business"), the speaker must know that
t refers to R, and the hearer must also know that t refers to R.
On top of that, A must know that B knows that t refers to R, and
B must know that A knows that t refers to R, and so on ad
infinitum. In general, this infinite chain of conditions may be
represented as follows: (Sperber & Wilson 1982:63)
"A speaker S and an addressee A mutually know a proposition P
if and only if:
(1) S knows that P.
(2) A knows that P.
(3) S knows (2).
(4) A knows (1).
(5) S knows (4).
(6) A knows (3).
... and so on ad infinitum." 12
According to this ' mutual knowledge model, for two or more
persons to successfully perform a co-ordinated act, eg. upon
hearing the request "please shake hands", to shake hands with
each other, they will need to be sure that each knows, and that
each knows the other person knows, etc. (ie. mutually know) what
"shake hands" mean. If either person does not know what it means
to shake hands, or if he/she cannot be sure that the other person
knows, or if he/she cannot be sure that the other person knows
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that he/she knows, etc., then the co-ordinated act will not come
off. Even if they somehow managed to perform an act that could
be recognized as hand-shaking, but without the intention and the
mutual knowledge, they would not be deemed to have successfully
done as requested.
To see how this position is untenable, let us imagine that,
upon hearing the request "shake hands", A holds out his hand,
only to find that B is not doing the same. What is one to make
of this scene? Would one say that the co-ordinated act has
failed to come off, because one of the parties does not under-
stand what shaking hands means, or has failed to grasp the
illocutionary point of the request? This is certainly one of
many possible accounts of the scene, but it need not be the only
one. That is, one might equally well have reached other, quite
different, conclusions. For instance, the failure might be
attributed to B's unwillingness to shake hands: perhaps he is
holding a grudge against the other person? Or it could transpire
that B was having his hands tied at the back. Perhaps it was a
practical joke. It is impossible to say what conclusions can be
drawn without access to the actual circumstances in which this
utterance was produced and heard, and the subsequent behaviours
performed by the parties concerned. To make sense of the scene
is to see that the hand shaking has failed to come off for a 
reason. What that reason might be cannot be determined
independently of what one makes of the scene. For instance, 'the
same event' may be seen and described as 'an English language
lesson' or 'referee dealing with two rough players'.
Next, imagine that A and B do actually shake hands upon
hearing the request. The mutual knowledge theory requires that
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they must share an identical, or at least sufficiently similar,
definition of what hand shaking means, and, further, that each
must know that this knowledge is shared, and that the other knows
that he/she knows, etc., before the appearance of hand shaking
can be regarded as a true and successful joint act. In order to
be able to decide whether A and B's actions are genuine manifest-
ations of the joint act of hand shaking, one would presumably
have to ask at some point the question whether they have actually
understood the request and performed as requested; or whether
they might not have somehow hit upon the right thing to do
without knowing it. But as soon as we ask such questions, we
notice that they are loaded questions, not disinterested or
necessary ones, ie. they are themselves questions asked for a
reason. Further, we notice that, should accounts be needed,
essentially the same accounting practices are involved in cases
of failure as in those of success. That is, one's account of the
successful performance of hand shaking cannot be constructed
independently of one's reading and understanding of the scene.
In a scene describable as 'an English lesson', one might say
"Look, he obviously understands the expression!", or "He deserves
full marks: he wouldn't be able to do that if he did not know
what the expression meins." In a scene describable as 'referee
dealing with two rough players', however, no such things are
likely to be thought or said in the first place. 'Knowing what
an expression means' is not a description that applies to every
case of a successful co-ordinated act. It applies only to some
language games.
Mutual knowledge is thus something that one may infer from
the behaviour of interactants --for example, what, upon hearing
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an utterance, they then go on to do. Far from being a pre-
condition for common understanding and a guarantee of successful
communication, mutual knowledge is a result of inferences and
interpretations applied to observable behaviour.
Implicit in the concept of mutual knowledge is what one
might call a substantivist assumption, ie. the assumption that
"successful communication", "correct comprehension", or "genuine
understanding", consists in "recovering intended interpreta-
tions". The problem is formulated as : how is it possible for
participants to understand each other's utterances? What must a
hearer rely on to ensure that the interpretation of a particular
utterance is the one intended by the speaker? And the form of
the solution is taken to be a mechanism whereby this match
between two (or more) minds can be ensured. In reaction to this
prevalent view, Garfinkel (1967:30) proposes that
"'Shared agreement' refers to various social methods for
accomplishing the members' recognition that something was
said-according-to-a-rule and not the demonstrable matching
of substantive matters. The appropriate image of a common
understanding is therefore an operation rather than a common
intersection of overlapping sets."
Our study of LA has provided evidence for the idea that
common understandings are an interactional achievement, and that
there are linguistic means with which participants can carry out
operations that are needed to establish common understanding.
The range of work that LA has been found to perform shows that it
is sensitive to the establishment of common ground as an
organizational issue. LA is a linguistic resource with which
participants can document to each other their analysis (and
therefore understanding) of the situation --"where they are" in
the course of a conversation, "who they are" and what each can be
expected to know, and "what they are doing"-- and, through that,
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to accomplish a variety of interactional tasks. We saw, for
example, how an understanding check can, in a particular
sequential context, be heard as a challenge.
Rather than being a pre-condition for the successful
recovery of "intended meanings", common ground is treated here as
an interactional achievement. Participants are constantly
oriented to the availability of common ground (shared under-
standing) as an interactional problem, and deal with it through a
variety of means in a variety of ways in the course of conversa-
tion. LA is of special interest in this respect, for the light
that it sheds on the relationship between linguistic forms and
the management of common agreements and understandings.
10. Summary
A close examination of LA in ordinary conversation reveals
that it can be put to use in a large variety of ways. The
specific interactional tasks that it can be used to perform
within the particulars of concrete conversational moments can,
however, be explicated in terms of its conversational structural
properties. Such a description is required for the diversity of
its positional and functional characteristics in a range of
sequential environments to be related to a common basis.
One way of looking at this common basis is to regard LA as
the grammaticalization of a solution to a particular kind of
problem in the organization of conversation, namely, the need to
negotiate and achieve common ground. Thus, a description may be
presented as an adequate formulation, and its assumed adequacy is
displayed to the recipient through the use of LA. It may also be
that the clearing or laying of certain grounds (eg. background
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material) would provide a basis for further stages of some
current main project to proceed. Or it may be that some course
of action is proposed in such a way as to display the suggester's
confidence in the suggestion-recipient's agreement as to its
desirability, appropriateness or efficacy.
A bonus of this account is that it is capable of providing a
basis for a range of intuitions that previous studies of LA have
yielded. We noted at the beginning of this chapter a number of
intuitions that have been documented in previous studies. These
include: (1) LA is used in requests, 'demanding' or 'requiring' a
response; (2) it may express 'agreement having been reached'; and
(3) it has an element of 'indefiniteness' and 'incompleteness'.
I have shown that LA can partake in the formulation of requests
and suggestions, as well as agreements, and that it can be used
in extended accounts of various kinds to 'show that the account
has not reached the end'. But I have also shown that it can do
much more. More importantly, the range of work that this
particle can perform are now systematically related to "common
ground establishment" as a central feature.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ENDINGS IN CONVERSATION:
THE UTTERANCE PARTICLE LO
The utterance particle to be dealt with in this chapter is
represented throughout as 'L0'. Following the convention
established in the last chapter, 'LO' (written in capital
letters) is used as an abbreviation for /1055/, that particle
which has the segmental shape /lo:/, and the suprasegmental
accompaniment of the high-level tone. Confusion should not arise
from this convention as we are dealing only with /1o/ in the high
tone, and not /10/ in the mid or low tones, which are regarded as
different particles. '
 As explained in the last chapter, phonetic
variations will not be considered in detail unless they seem
relevant to an argument.
Following the practice established in the last chapter, I
will refer to utterances where LO occurs at or near the end as
LO-suffixed utterances. In the following sections, a number of
LO-suffixed utterances will be examined in relation to a range of
sequential environments. While the aim of such a survey is to
uncover organizations that may shed light on the particle's
general properties, attention will be given to the interactional
tasks that are achieved through particular instances of its use.
A number of general observations arising from this survey will
then be discussed and the properties of the particle will be
noted with a view to arriving at a unified account, on the basis
of which its varied uses can be explicated. Finally, I will
demonstrate how various intuitions documented in previous
134
descriptions of this particle can be handled systematically in my
proposed account.
1. Question-Answer Sequences
LO can be found suffixed to utterances which occupy the
second position in a Q-A sequence, i.e. utterances which are
designed as 'answers' to a 'question' in the preceding turn.
'Question' and 'Answer' are categories that have to be defined
with reference to each other. The occurrence of a question sets
up a sequential implication such that the immediately following
turn will be examined and interpreted with 'answer' as a central
possibility. An answer, in its turn, constitutes evidence of the
recipient's analysis of the preceding turn as a question. Let us
begin with a few examples.
(1) [TC11:1:169]
L: 'goummmm e:::m
	
L: so em
(1.0)
	
(1.0)
L: a 	 	
	
L: em
(0.8)
	
(0.8)
L: daai-biu-go aa daa-gwo-	 L: first cousin em
lei wo
	
has-phoned PT
[so em first cousin has
phoned]
1-> S: geisi aa
	
S: when PT
[when?]
L: ((clears throat))
	
L: ((clears throat))
2->	 gamyat LO=
	
today PT=
[today]
3-> S: =hai me
	
S: =yes PT
[did he?]
(2) [FEEL1:1:576]
1-> B: .hhh goum nei yigaa jou
maye gaa
C: ngo yigaa hai: ee:::
S1->	 (.)
C: jee#
S2->	 (0.6)
C: jou# ee hai# mau yago daai
geikau dou jou hangjing::
S3->	 (0.4)
2-> C: ge:: ee yanyun LO
B: .hhh so you now do what PT
[so what are you doing now]
C: I now at um
(-)
1-mean
(0.6)
C: do um at a-certain one big
organization place do
administration
(0.4)
C: GEN um staff PT
[I'm, I mean, working in, um
a certain big organization
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3-> B: h[ai ma
[
C:	 [jee:: di=
B: =jee siusiu-ge neui-
keungyan
C: .hhh heh heh
(3) [FEEL2:3ii]
1-> L: mm yau-geidaai aa=
C: =keui gamnin ee duk
form-one
2->	 sapsei seui LO::
3a->B: sap[sei-seui
3b->L:	 [o: o: ligo lingei
ee:::: hai goum gaa-la
as an administrative staff]
B: yes PT
[are you]
C: I-mean some
B: That-means little strong-
woman
[so you're a little strong
woman]
C: .hhh heh heh
L: mm how-old PT
[mm how old is he]
C: he this-year um study
First-form
fourteen years PT
[he's in First Form this
year he's fourteen]
B: fourteen
L: oh oh this age ee::::
is like-this PT
[oh well children at this
age are like that]
In each of these extracts, the asking of a question (arrowed
I throughout) is followed by an answer from the recipient
(arrowed 2) in the next turn, and then, in the turn following
that, the questioner responds to the answer by issuing some form
of information receipt (arrowed 3). We thus have a three-position
sequence with the following structure:
Position I : Question
Position 2 : Answer
Position 3 : Receipt
Each of the LO-suffixed utterances in extracts (1) to (3),
which occupies Position 2 in the above structure, is offered as
an answer to a question in Position I. That they are intended
and heard as answers can be seen from two observations. First,
each of these utterances provides a piece of information in order
to fill a gap left by a WH-question in the previous turn
(Position 1): "today" in response to "when?" in (1);
"administrative staff in a certain big organization" in response
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to "what job?" in (2); and "fourteen years old" in response to
"how old?" in (3). These LO-suffixed utterances are clearly
designed with an orientation to the preceding turn as a question,
and their own status as an answer to that question. Second, the
turn components occupying Position 3 in the above examples can be
characterized as "information receipts": hai me? (did he?),
haima? (are you?), and sapsei-seui (fourteen). They are
information receipts in the sense that they display the speakers'
treatment of the preceding turn as one in which some information
has been supplied --in the case of the above examples,
information supplied in response to an information-seeking
question occurring in Position I.
Looking more closely at the placement of these information
receipts, notice that each begins at a point immediately or very
soon after the occurrence of the particle LO, defining thereupon
the previous stretch of talk as not only an answer, but an answer
that has come to an end. That an answer has come to an 'end' is
not a matter of unilateral decision: an answer can only be said
to have come to an end when a co-participant has initiated a
receipt. The end of a turn is constituted by a turn transition.
Thus, 'the end of an answer' is a co-ordinated achievement: it
requires a speaker to propose that an utterance has come to a
possible end, and a recipient to 'agree' that it indeed has come
to an end. One of the features of LO in a Q-A-R sequence can be
stated precisely in terms of this kind of interactional work: it
acts as an 'end-of-answer' proposal.
To detail: in (1), the information receipt occurs without
any noticeable time gap right on the heels of LO. In (2), notice
that C's utterance in Position 2 contains several 'pauses': the
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intra-turn silences marked Si, S2 and S3 in the transcript. Their
characterization as 'pauses' turns on the way they are heard by
the co-participant. They are, as it were, 'disregarded' and
treated as pauses, not completion, and are not exploited for turn
transition. In terms of syntax and semantics, C's utterance up to
the point where the 0.4-second silence occurs could be regarded
as 'complete' --"hai mau yago daai geikau dou jou hangjing" is
syntactically complete, and can be glossed, roughly, as "I'm
doing administrative work in a large institution", which is just
as good an answer to the question as the one that is eventually
constructed. As it turns out, C 'prolongs' the answer by
'adding' "staff LO", at which point turn transition occurs,
showing that the answer is now, at this point, treated as having
'really' come to an end. In this sense, LO-suffixing can be
characterized as a completion proposal, signalling, in a Q-A-R
sequence, that the answer has reached a point of possible comple-
tion. B's placement of her response evidences her agreement to
treat the point marked by LO as the end of C's answer. In
general, since sentences could be extended indefinitely, on the
basis of syntax and semantics alone, there is no telling in the
course of the production of a sentence where it is going to end.
(3) contains further evidence of the way in which LO is
heard as a completion proposal. Notice how the two answer-
recipients (B and L) are agreed on where the answer ends: they
come in to issue their respective receipts almost simultaneously
just after C's LO-suffixed utterance. It can be seen from B and
L's placement of their information receipts that they have
independently reached a similar hearing of LO as an end-of-answer
proposal, and, in response to that, effect turn transition to
138
establish the LO-suffixed utterance as a complete answer.
Another interesting feature of these answers is that states-
of-affairs are presented as simply and unproblematically known,
ie. having a sound common-sense epistemological basis. Thus they
may be information pertaining to an individual's personal
biography (e.g. one's job, as in (2)); 'facts' stamped with the
authority of a subject's first-hand experience (e.g. the time of
a phone call received by the speaker, as in (1)), or things which
the speaker can claim to know about (e.g. the age of one's son,
as in (3)).
Apart from personal biography, first-hand experience, and
the like, another major basis for a knowledge claim is natural
logic. A proposition can be presented as having the status of
knowledge on the basis that it is a conclusion reached through
practical (common sense) reasoning. The particle LO is a resource
in Cantonese with which such presentations can be designed.
Consider an example of this in detail.
(4) [MAK:1:001]
J: mhai aa mhai wokman lei gaa J: no PT not Walkman it-is PT
i ji igo mee lei goo=	 you know this what it-is PT
[no it isn't a Walkman
you know what it is?]
M: =samgei lei gaa	 M: radio it-is PT
[is it a radio?]
(0.4)	 (0.4)
	
--> M: keset [lei goLO:]
	
M: cassette-recorder it-is PT
[	 ]	 [it's a cassette recorder]
J:	 [1 i g o :]::	 J: this
J: luk-gan-yam gowo (.) hoyi:	 recording PT (.) can
[this is recording, it can]
J's second utterance in the first turn ("you know what it
is?") can be characterized as an 'exam' question. Following
Heritage (1984:284-290), who quotes Searle (1969:66), 'exam'
questions can be distinguished from 'real' questions in this way:
"In real questions the speaker wants to know (find out) the
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answer; in exam questions, the speaker wants to know if the
hearer knows." Heritage argues that the status of a question
(whether it is a 'real' question or an 'exam' question) cannot be
determined independently of its sequential context : there is
nothing in the form of a question that can identify it as 'real'
or otherwise. He suggests that one of the regular ways of
finding out what the status of a question is is to look for some
evidence in the third turn of a three-part sequence, in which the
question forms the first part, and the answer, the second. The
status of the question (in the first turn) can be retrospectively
formulated as being 'real' or 'exam' in the third turn. Thus, an
information receipt in the third turn (such as "oh", a "change-
of-state token") points back to the question in the first turn as
a 'real' question. Assessments and evaluations of answers (such
as "that's correct", "no", "you're guessing", etc.), on the other
hand, point back to the question as an 'exam' question. That is,
'real' questions are defined in terms of a "question-answer-
receipt" format, whereas 'exam' questions are defined in terms of
a "question-answer-comment" format. (5) and (6) below are
examples of real questions and exam questions respectively.
(5) (=Heritage's (31), p.285)
1--> S: .hh When do you.get out. Christmas week or the week
before Christmas.
(0.3)
2--> G: Uh::m two or three days before Ch[ristmas,]
3--> S:	 [0 h :,	 ]
(6) (=part of Heritage's (34), p.288)
1--> T: Where else were they taking it before they (1.0)
started in Western Australia?
(2.0)
T: Mm hm?
(0.5)
2-->P1: Melbourne?
(0.5)
3--> T: No[:::
2-->P2:
	 [(	 )
140
3--> T: No::
In the light of Heritage's account, J's question in (4) can
be identified as an 'exam question', not because the object whose
identity is being questioned (the cassette recorder) belongs to
J, so that she should know what it is, for there is no guarantee
that people should always know the identities of objects that
belong to them. Rather, the status of J's question can be
determined retrospectively from her own response to M's answer
(ie. the third turn: "this is recording, it can"), which
indicates that she did not ask the question in order to find out
what the thing is.
A closer look at the interactional tasks achieved in this
episode will throw some light on the properties of LO. 	 We may
begin by asking what practical problem J is facing and how she
goes about trying to solve it. Roughly, the problem that J is
facing is how to get M to agree to be recorded. Specifically,
her problem is to 'find some place' in the conversation where it
would be appropriate for her to 'reveal her purpose', which is
that she intends to seek M's consent to be recorded. One way in
which this problem can be solved is to provide for an occasion in
which she can get to do a request. And one way of doing that is
to set up a sequence in such a way that, by virtue of features in
its organization, a slot is provided for in which a request
(though not necessarily an explicit asking for permission) can be
'properly' and 'naturally' done.
Levinson (1983:6.4.3) shows how pre-requests operate to gain
ratified access to a turn at talk in which the request can be
dealt with. The structure of pre-request sequences is
(1983:357):
141
Position I: Pre-request
Position 2: Go ahead
Position 3: Request
Position 4: Response
One use of pre-requests is to set up a sequential environ-
ment which would allow the requester to get to do a request as a
'proper thing to do' upon the issuance of a go-ahead. Looking at
(4) in this light, we can see how a comparable (but different)
kind of work is being achieved. J's test question sets up a
three-part sequence in such a way that the one who asks the
initial question in Position I (in this case, J herself) will get
a slot in Position 3 in which she can make a comment on the
answer by addressing such issues as its correctness. This then
will be a place where she, the 'examiner', can 'reveal the true
identity' of the object in question, which can lead up to the
doing of her request. In this way, the request or announcement
can be built naturally as a response to the preceding turn, and
'packaged' in the form of a revelation.
M's response in Position 2 consists of two successive
attempts at answering J's question. A tentative 'guess' is first
ventured, in the form of a question ("is it a radio?"). Then,
upon not receiving an immediate confirmation (note the 0.4-second
silence following this first answer attempt), M quickly switches
into a declaration: "keset lei go LO" ("It's a cassette
recorder"). Note how this second answer attempt is presented as
a conclusion that follows naturally from information gathered
from the first attempt: the object in question is either a radio
or a cassette recorder; it is probably not a radio (from the lack
of confirmation); therefore it must be a cassette recorder.
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Thus, with the use of LO, the second answer attempt is built in
the form of a conclusion reached through practical inference.
To detail the part that LO plays in this sequence, remember
that the target utterance (arrowed in the transcript) is produced
as a candidate answer to a test-question. Not just any answer,
but an answer designed in a particular way. It is formulated as
a description of 'what the object must be', and makes it clear
that the identity of the object in question is anything but a
mystery to the examinee, which would then suggest that what is
problematic and unknown is the point of the exam itself: why
question the identity of an object which is known? This is the
'implied question' that J's response in turn 3 must now orient
to. Thus, the LO-suffixed utterance, through formulating an
answer to an exam question as a fact the known-ness of which
rests upon a sound basis, passes the turn back to the examiner,
who must now give an account of the purpose of the exam. But this
turns out to tie in exactly with what the examiner set out to do:
she can now get to do her request through 'naturally' revealing
the purpose of the exam in response to that challenge. In this
way, a solution to an interactional problem is achieved through a
Q-A-C sequence, in which LO has a systematic contribution to
make.
In addition to the 'completeness' and 'epistemology'
features is what might be called a 'backward-looking' feature.
Unlike some other kinds of answers, the sense and import of a LO-
suffixed answer can generally be established independently of
further information. Formulating a piece of information with LO-
suffixing displays the assumption that the context within which
that piece of information can acquire its full sense and import
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can be constructed either from the immediate interaction, or
through a backward search. Consider (7) and (8), two extracts
that are highly revealing in this respect.
(7) [DJ7:1:091]
Dl: wei::	 Dl: hello
(0.7)
	 (0.7)
Cl: w[ai	 Cl: hello
02:	 [wai::	 D2: hello
Dl: hai:: lei giu mee meng	 Dl: hello you called what name
neui-jai	 girl
[hello what's your name,
girl?]
(.)
	 (.)
Cl: Ada	 Cl: Ada
Dl: Adah[hh	 Dl: Adahhh
Cl:	 [hai	 Cl: yes
? : g[oum	 ?: so
02: [Ada lei dou ji go yauhei D2: Ada you too know CL game
dim waan gaalaa haa	 how play PT PT
[Ada you know how to play
the game don't you]
(.)	 (.)
Cl: ji-ji-del	 Cl: know-a-bit
LA:[:	 PT
[	 [a little bit]
Dl:	 [hhh [heh .hhh ]	 Dl: hhh heh .hhh
02:	 [ji-ji-del]	 D2: know-a-bit PT
LA[:	 [a little bit]
1-->DI:	 [laam-jai le	 Dl: boy PT
[what about the boy]
(0.3)
	 (0.3)
2-->C2: aa-(k)hei	 C2: aa-(k)hei
[((speaker's name?))]
(0.2)	 (0.2)
3-->D1: hai lei giu mee meng aa
	 Dl: yes you called what
name PT
[yes what's your name?]
(0.3)	 (0.3)
4-->C2: aa-kei LO	 C2: aa-kei PT
[Kei]
(0.5)
	 (0.5)
5-->DI: aa-kei 'L0:: (.)	 Dl: aa-kei PT (.)
ngo dou m[ei jidou]=
	 I yet not know hhheh heh
[	 ]	 raa-kei LO::", I don't
[	 ]	 know yet hhheh heh]
D2:	 [aa#-kei:]	 02: aa-kei
Dl: =hhhheh heh	 Dl: hhhheh heh
D2: aa-kei haimai dai-yat-chi 02: aa-kei whether first-time
daa-lei waan li-go yauhei
	 phone play this game PT
gaa
	 [aa-kei, is this the first
time you called to play
this game?]
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Here, two callers, one female (Cl) and the other male (C2),
have called to take part in a game on a radio phone-in programme,
hosted by two Disk-Jockeys (D1 and D2). Two LO-suffixed
utterances occur in this extract, once in C2's second mention of
his name (arrow 4) in response to Dl's question, and then again
in Dl's response to that answer in the immediately following turn
(arrow 5).
Starting from the turn arrowed 1, Dl's "what about the boy"
is clearly heard by C2 as a question asking him what his name is.
Witness his provision of an answer in the turn arrowed 2. In the
midst of a great Oa] of laughter, D1 somehow missed the answer,
and issues a rephrased, more explicit question (arrow 3). Thus
C2 finds himself being asked the same question for the second
time. He responds by giving his name again, but suffixes it this
time with LO. Of greatest interest in the present context is how
the recipient, D1, interprets this LO-suffixed utterance, as
displayed in her next turn (arrow 5).
Features in the design of this turn provide solid evidence
of the way in which tiny, apparently unintegrated objects like
particles are taken fully into account by co-participants in
assigning meanings to utterances in conversation. The turn
begins with DI quoting and mimicking C2's prior turn ("aa-Kei
'0:::"), exaggerating it and heightening its dramatic effect by
giving "LO" extra stress, also lengthening the vowel
considerably. Following that an account is given ("I don't yet
know [your name]") of her asking the caller's name in her
previous turn (ie. arrow 3). The provision of this account
displays Dl's reading of C2's prior turn as something of a
complaint. Through presenting a justification for her question,
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Dl constructs a line of defence against the complaint.
That C2's "aa-Kei LO" (arrow 4) can be heard as a complaint
is, I wish to suggest, illustrative of what I referred to as the
backward-looking feature of LO. The particle invites the
recipient to look backward in the discourse for some feature in
the context in order to establish a link between the present
utterance and something that has been said before (in this case
the giving of his name the first time round). The interactional
import of the utterance (complaining through answering a question
in a special way) is to be worked out on the basis of such a
link.
Consider one more example of this backward-looking feature
in (8) below.
(8) [MAK:1:044]
M: hai laa:: ngodei gamyat
dou yiu# heui la#
ngodei saa-at-dim-jung
heui vamchaa laa ha ha ha
1->	 deng-jo wai
2-> J: hai-mai hou do yan aa=
M: yes PT we today
also want# go PT
we eleven-o'clock
go have-tea PT ha ha ha
reserved seats
[yes today we also want#
went we went to have tea at
eleven (we had) reserved
a table]
J: whether very many people PT
[was it crowded]
3-> M: =aa m ngo deng-jo wai LO:: M: =PT m I reserved seats PT
[um I had reserved seats]
4->	 (0.4)	 (0.4)
5-> M: ngo mai waa:-teng [ngo=	 M: I [MPH told-you I
[	 [didn't I tell you]
6-> J:
	 [o o o	 J: yeah yeah yeah
M: =seung singkei-luk heui	 M: last Saturday go reserve PT
deng-ding aamaa=	 [last Saturday I went and
reserved ((a table))]
The most interesting feature of (8) in the present context
is the 'repeat' of the string deng-jo wai ("have made a
reservation"). It occurs first at the end of the first turn
(arrow 1), and is 'repeated' in the turn arrowed 3, this time LO-
suffixed. There is a fundamental difference between these two
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occurrences, in that the second time the string occurs, it is
offered in response to a question in the preceding turn (arrow 2:
"was it crowded?"). Note, however, that while it clearly orients
to J's preceding utterance as a question, this turn is not
formulated as a straightforward answer to it. The question being
couched in an 'A-not-A' form, a straightforward answer would be
"A" or "not A". But the propositional content of M's response
departs from these limits. Instead of directly answering the
question, the response is built in the form of a LO-suffixed
utterance which points back to an earlier mention of "seat
reservation". By attributing the status of a known fact to "seat
reservation", this response points to the availability of an
answer by means of an inference from a known state-of-affairs:
the fact that M had made a seat reservation means that she could
not possibly have had any difficulty in getting seats.
So far, we have seen how LO can be used to formulate answers
to questions in ways that are systematically explicable. But this
particle can also be found suffixed to answer-receipts (ie.
Position 3 in a Q-A-R sequence). While answers may be received
with 'plain' tokens of receipt such as "o" ("I see"), resources
are available for the recipient to display his/her treatment of
an answer as 'expected' in some way. This is certainly relevant
to 'exam' questions, where the questioner passes some comments on
the answer, but it has a wider use than that. (9) below contains
an instance of LO used in a way that displays the answer-
recipient's recognition that the answer has provided evidence
which confirms an expectation.
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(9) [FEEL1:1:452]
B: goummmm neidei dongsi
fansau hai wai mee
yunyan aa
(0.7)
C: keui [(	 #)
B: [jee wai (.) jinghai
jidou nei jou gwo
cheuisi:: goumyeung aa
C: hai [aa
[
1-> B:	 [seungseun m jingji
goum ge
(0.7)
2-> C: ee::: keui waa ngo:::
(.)
C: jee keui waa ngo hou m
hou m saisam la::::
(0.3)
3-> B: m'hm [hai LO::=
[
C:	 [ha# ha#
B: =jee .hhh ee holang keui
wui gokdak nei:: .hh ee
m gau taitap la:::
haimai aa
B: so you then separate
be for what reason PT
[so when you separated,
what reason was it for]
(0.7)
C: she (
	 #)
B: I-mean for (.) only
know you do ASP
cook like-that PT
[I mean was it only because
she knew you had been a
cook]
C: yes PT
[yes]
B: believe not only so PT
[not only that, I believe]
(0.7)
C: um she say I
(•)
C: I-mean she say I very not
very not caring PT
[um she said I mean she
said I wasn't wasn't
very caring]
(0.3)
B: mhm yes PT
[mhm that's it]
C: yeah yeah
B: I-mean .hhh um perhaps she
would feel you .hh um
not enough loving PT
right PT
[I mean perhaps she felt
you weren't loving
enough, right?]
The three turns arrowed 1, 2 and 3 can be identified as
forming a Q-A-R sequence. Without going into details, I take it
that B's utterance in Position 1, in spite of its syntactic form
of a declarative, is intended, and heard, as a question (as
evidenced, for example, by C's provision of an answer in the next
turn, and B's subsequent receipt of this answer). Further, it is
heard as a question that seeks information concerning 'other
reasons that C's girl friend has left him'. Notice that the
question is built in a special way: it is not formulated as a
'straight-forward/ naive question' that seeks some information
that B does not have but wants to have; rather, the 'asking' is
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done in the form of a 'statement' of a belief that what is known
so far cannot be 'the whole truth' (arrow I: "not only that, I
believe"). In this way, the questioner indicates her 'suspicion'
that more has yet to be revealed. Let us call this kind of
question 'leading' questions. There are some interesting
similarities between leading questions and exam questions. We
noted that the questioner in an exam question sequence can
retrospectively formulate the question in Position I as an exam
question by displaying his/her knowledge of the answer 'all
along'. In a similar way, the questioner in a leading question
sequence can deal with the answer in a way that relates it to the
'suspicion' that was built into the original question. In the
case of B's question in (9), the design of the question is such
that it signals B's 'suspicion' that some information of a
certain nature has been missing. That is, B's question signals
'suspicion' of a quite specific kind: she suspects that there is
some reason why C's girl friend has left him which C has not yet
revealed. Looking at the question in this way, it can be seen
that B's token of receipt in Position 3 has a special kind of
design, namely, the answer is received in a way that ties it back
to the leading question. That is, LO in B's answer-receipt (arrow
3: "yes LO" [that's it]) displays that the information being
received is treated as providing evidence that confirms an
earlier suspicion. Thus, the receipt is built, through the use of
LO, as one that treats some state-of-affairs (there being
additional reasons why C's girl friend has left him) as something
that confirms an earlier suspicion.
A similar kind of work is done through the use of LO in the
following episode.
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(10) [MAK:1:048]
J: =haiaa hou aa#
(.)
J: daanhai le: e hai yau
go mantai::
(.)
J: mee mantai le
(.)
J: jau-hai [.hhh
[
[
[
M:
	
[gaau-[tung mantai
J:
	
[odei ssss=
J: =ge::i-go yan
heui le
(0.3)
J: dou mou che: ge=
M: =hai la
(.)
M: gaautung mantai
ngo jau-hai waa
• ((8 turns omitted
.	 how she and her
• trouble finding
J: =yes good PT
(.)
J: but PT e be there-be
one problem
(.)
J: what problem PT
(•)
J: it-is •hhh
[yes it's good, but there
is a problem, and what's
the problem? it's •hhh]
M: transport problem
J: we ssss a-few persons
a-few persons
go PT
(0.3)
J: none not-have car PT
[we ssss none of us who
went has a car]
M: yes PT
(.)
M: transport problem
I EMPH say
[that's right (.) it's the
problem of transport,
that's what I said]
in which J related to M
friends had a lot of
transport to go home))
J: daahai jau keui hai::
yugo lei yiu yim le:
jau yim keui go-dou::
[ge ma#-yee:
[
[
-> M: [nei pangyau gaaksip LO
mai-jau-hai
J: =but then it be if you
have-to dislike PT then
dislike it there GEN what
[but if there's anything
to say against it, it's
that the place is--]
M: you friend inaccessible PT
PT EMPH-be
[inaccessible to your
friends]
In the first part of this extract, J and M have mutually
identified "a problem of transport" as a negative feature of the
restaurant that they have been talking about. The object that I
wish to focus on is M's LO-suffixed utterance in the arrowed turn
("it's inaccessible to your friends LO"). This is produced in
response to J's preceding turn, in which the question of what
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negative features the restaurant can be said to have is raised
again (J: "but if there's anything to say against it, it's that
the place is ...". But just when J has provided sufficient
indication of her intention to name a negative feature of the
restaurant, she displays signs of a search difficulty
("...godou::"). It is at this point that M's LO-suffixed
utterance comes in, and a central task that it can be seen to be
performing is to display understanding of J by supplying her with
the name of the problem she was having difficulties identifying.
Notice that the 'help' being offered is constructed in such a way
as to include a description of some state-of-affairs portrayed as
a previously mentioned 'fact'. Hence, M's portrayal of her
suggested problem as something that she had mentioned before (jau
hai waa "that's what I said").
To take an inventory of the observations made in this
section: LO is regularly used, in Question-Answer sequences, to
make an end-of-answer proposal, ie. to present an utterance as
the whole contribution. It is also a means with which answers
can be presented as known facts. In addition, it provides an
instruction for co-participants to initiate backward searches and
to establish links between information presented in an utterance
and information recoverable from what has been said or done
before, so as to determine the sense and interactional import of
the utterance.
2. Reportings
Reportings consist, among other things, in the construction
of one, or a series of, descriptions that can be interpreted as
an account of 'what happened/ is happening/ will happen'. Let us
call each of these descriptions a report-component. Some,
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(12) [MAK:1:050]
J: =gameung le: ngodei
chamyat jau yiwai:: e:
baasi jung yau aa jee
[sik-yun laa=
[
[
[
[
M: [mou gaalaa=
M: =o
(0.3)
J: gameung dimji cheut-dou
lei le yunloi heui sei-
sap-hou jaam godou le
yiging:::=
although not all, report components present 'what happened', etc.
as natural, reasonable, or necessary consequences that follow
from some conditions or circumstances.
(11) [MAK:1:073]
J: =goum o o mou aa go-an-si
jau chuet-dou-lai le
cheut-dou-lei jau hou
genghok aa
[goum-jau]=
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
M: ['mmm	 ]
J: =seung wan deungfong
yamye goumj yap-jo-heui
-->	 yamye LO
M: o:: o o
J: so I I didnt PT then
so came-out PT
came-out then PT very
thirsty PT
so-then
[so I I didn't and then we
came out when we came out
we were very thirsty so]
M: 'mmm
J: =want find place
drink so went-in
drink PT
[we wanted to find some
place for a drink so we
went in for a drink]
M: oh I see
M: =mou che la#=
J: =and-then PT we
yesterday then thought e:
bus still there-be PT
I-mean finish-eating PT
[and we thought yesterday
there would still be a bus
running I mean after the
meal]
M: not-have gaalaa
[there wouldn't be]
M: yeah
(0.3)
- J: and-then unexpectedly came-
out PT realize go service-
40 stop there PT already=
[and when we came out, we
realized (when) we went to
the stop for service 40, it
was already--]
M: =no bus PT=
[there weren't buses
anymore]
J: =sei-sap-hou em le yiging J: =service-forty-M le already
(0.3)	 (0.3)
J: mou-saai laa=
	 J: no-more PT=
[there weren't any service
40M anymore]
M: =hai-gam jeui-hou
	 M: in-that-case the-best
[ge fongfaat( )diksi LA]
	 GEN way ( ) taxi PT
[	 ]	 [so the best thing to do
[	 ]	 is (	 ) a taxi, right?]
J: [gou::m soyi le jau (.) ]= J: so therefore le then (.)
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J: =aamaam: jau-yau diksi
	 there-happen to-be taxi
m-mai jit-jo diksi	 so stopped taxi
-->	 cheut-lei LO:[:	 come-out PT
[	 [there happened to be a
[	 taxi so we took a taxi
[	 and came out]
M:	 [o:::	 M: o:::
[I see]
(11) and (12) are two extracts from the same conversation in
which J is giving M a report on 'what she did' on two occasions.
In each case, a report component is constructed as a description
of 'what happened'. Further, the events that 'happened' are
presented as ones that follow naturally from some given circum-
stances. Their naturalness has a specific basis: they are
portrayed as events that took place as a result of, or in
response to, some set of circumstances, ie. as things that can be
expected to happen given those sets of circumstances. In (11),
LO is suffixed to "so we went in for a drink", an event portrayed
as 'what happened' as a result of the circumstance "when we came
out we were very thirsty so we wanted to find some place for a
drink". "Going in for a drink" is thus portrayed, not, for
example, as something that was in any way unusual, but as some-
thing that arises naturally from the circumstances described.
Similarly, in (12), "so we took a taxi and came out" is depicted
as a consequence of there being no bus service left, and "there
happened to be a taxi". Again, "taking a taxi", which is reported
as that which happened, is presented as something that followed
naturally or reasonably from a set of circumstances. Thus, in
both examples, we see how a report component can be constructed
as the description of an action/ event which is natural.
Consider next a sequence which throws further light on this
feature. (13) below shows how a compliment may be built in the
form of a report, and is do-able in this way by virtue of LO-
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suffixing, with which a state-of-affairs is portrayed as arising
naturall y and reasonably from a given set of circumstances.
B: however hackneyed saying
as-long-as nice-to-hear
then like hear PT
[however hackneyed some
words are, as long as they
are nice to hear, we like
to hear them]
C: yes PT I every-night hear
L: right
C: until really not willing
sleep have-to hear finish
before want sleep PT
[I listen to it ((your
programme)) every night,
wouldn't go to bed until
it's over]
haimai aa m] L: oh like-this isn't-it PT in
].	 [oh really]
.hhh ] B: really .hhh
The report here consists in the provision of a description
of a 'habit': C can't go to bed until she has finished listening
to the programme every night. Nowhere is a compliment explicitly
stated. C's LO-suffixed utterance, however, is clearly heard as
a compliment. What is the basis for this hearing? A central
feature of the arrowed utterance is that it presents C's
listening to the programme as something that is regular and
predictable (it happens "every night"), as well as being a
natural consequence of some circumstances that have been left
unstated. Through LO's portrayal of C's listening as a
consequence, the report points to the radio programme as the
circumstance that induces 'compulsive hearing'. Hence the
possibility of hearing it as a compliment.
(14) is a longer report in which E relates an 'inexplicable
event' to two recipients L and A at a point in their conversation
when they are talking about 'the supernatural'.
(13) [FEEL1:1:288]
B:=gei loutou-ge syutwaa jiyiu
houteng jau jongyi teng
ge-[la
[
[
[
[
C:	 [hai aa [ngo maanmaan teng=
L:	 [mou-cho
C: =dou dou in hang fangaau
yiu teng yun sin seung fan
[
[
[
[
L:	 [o: goum-[yeung
[
B:	 [haiwaa
154
(14) [SS:CH:1:408]
E: ee: o ochi ge s saigo si
o changge teng-go: z
yau-ya-chi
yat-chi le: .h[hh
[
[
L:	 [ha#=
E: =jee tai ngaujai le jee
go# jee gogo sengbaan
heui tai ngau LA=
L: =mm=
E: =.hh tai yun ngau le
jau:: honang o gochi
m ji yaumou lokyi aa=
L: =mm=
E: =gogo jau-lok-heui tong
dou yauseui aa=
L: =mm=
E: =.hh dimji daiyat le
(.)
E: gogo o beng saai wo hh=
L: =mm=
E: =jau: gogo tong le aamaam
yau-yan ne: jau hai-o-dou
jam-sei-go aamaa=
L: =mm=
E: =.hh goum gogo yiwai godou
1-->	 yau mee si LO=
L: =chyunbou beng saai
(0.3)
E: ha#=
2-->E: =[gogo	 beng	 LO]
[	 ]
A: [hou laan-gong seun]-m-
seun ge idi ye:: seun-bat
seun-yau-lei ...
E: um I once GEN s small time
I have heard z
once
once PT .hhh
[um once when I was small
I once heard]
L: yeah
E: I-mean watch cows PT I-mean
every# I-mean everyone all
go watch cows PT=
[I mean watching cows, I
mean everyone went to
watch the cows]
L: mm
E: .hh watch finish cows PT
then perhaps I that-time
not know whether rain PT=
[when we finished watching
the cows, I don't know
if it was raining]
L: mm
E: everyone go-down pond at
swim PT
[everyone went down to the
pond to swim]
L: mm
E: .hh unexpectedly next-day PT
(.)
E: everyone all ill all PT hh=
[it turned out everyone
became ill the next day,
all of them]
L: mm
E: and that pond PT just some-
one PT then there
drowned PT
[and in that pond, someone
had just been drowned
earlier]
L: mm
E: .hh so everyone thought
there there-be what thing PT
[so everyone wondered what
it was]
L: all ill all
[everyone became ill?]
(0.3)
E: yeah=
E: =everyone ill PT
[yeah everyone was ill]
A: very difficult-to-say
whether-believe PT these
things believe-it-or-not
[it's difficult to say,
whether one should believe
such things, it's up to you to
believe or not believe them]
_
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The two LO-suffixed utterances (arrows 1 and 2) in (14) have
very similar characteristics as those examined in some of the
previous extracts. The utterance "so everyone wondered what it
was LO" (arrow 1) is constructed as a description of 'what
happened' as a result of a set of circumstances, namely, that
everyone who swam in the pond got ill, and someone was drowned in
the pond earlier the same day. The "wondering" is portrayed as
arising from the co-occurrence of these two events. "Everyone was
ill LO" (arrow 2), like (8) (the seat reservation episode), is
formulated as a factual description, the known-ness Qf which is
establishable on a prior identical description (E's earlier turn
"it turned out everyone became ill the next day, all of them").
In both instances, the work of LO can be described in terms of
the analysis developed so far : some state-of-affairs is being
related to a prior description, or as a natural consequence of a
given set of circumstances.
Another notable feature of the two instances of LO in this
datum is the relation between the occurrence of the two LO-
suffixed utterances and the 'ending' of the reporting. The first
of these utterances can be characterized as a story-ending
proposal that comes OR the heels of a particularly 'smooth'
reporting sequence, in the course of which minimal continuers
("ha#"s and "mm"s) are provided at all the 'right places'. The
ending becomes relevant upon E's utterance "so everyone wondered
what it was" (arrow 1). L returns with "everyone became ill?",
and, in so displaying his understanding and appreciation of the
import of the story, contributes to its 'ending' (Sacks 1974).
Notice how A, the other recipient, also produces, on his part, an
independent display of understanding and appreciation: "it's
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difficult to say, etc". This constitutes an evidence that the
two report-recipients are agreed on 'where the story ends'. For
our present purposes, note that both E's story-ending proposal
and his confirmation of L's story-ending response (arrows 1 and
2) are LO-suffixed. One property of LO which can be seen clearly
from these two instances is that it can be used to propose that
an account/ report/ story has come to an end, and to invite some
response from the story-recipient(s) to jointly achieve an
ending.
Observe that, by virtue of this 'end-of-story proposal', tne
"wondering" is described not only as an action that arises
naturally from a set of circumstances, it is also presented as
'the reporter's whole contribution (for the moment)'. Through the
ending proposal, this report about people's "wondering" can serve
as the punch line. The 'moral' of the story is thus that there
are strange happenings that make people "wonder why". The use of
LO to mark the story's possible completion at this point is done
for a particularly apt reason: under the circumstances as
portrayed in the story, one 'naturally wonders why'; beyond this
wondering, however, is a realm not to be trespassed by language.
Finally, consider two data extracts in which LO occurs, not
in utterances which do reportings, but in those which are issued
in response to reports or report components. I will refer to
these utterances as 'report responses' in the rest of this sec-
tion. Report responses can 'make of' the preceding report (or
report component) in a variety of ways, but I shall only examine
two instances, (15) and (16), which will throw some light on the
properties of LO. These are examples of how 'comments' can be
offered in response to a report component in such a way as to
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exploit the properties of LO in order to achieve a variety of
interactional tasks; in the case of (15) and (16), 'dismissing a
complaint' and 'fooling someone' respectively.
(15) [MAK:1:011]
M: lei hou laan waa go:-dou# M: you very difficult say
yatyeung gaamaa haimai-laa 	 everyone same gaamaa right?
[peiyu-waa (.)	 for-instance (.)
[	 [it's difficult--everyone's
[	 not the same, right? for
[	 example]
J: [hai-la::	 J: yes
M: tingjiu heui haang pe	 M: tomorrow-morning go walk
aa-R ayaa:: jeui long 	 e.g. R EXCL most hate
a haang la haang	 is walk PT walk
[matgwai	 what-on-earth
[	 [about going for a walk
[	 tomorrow R (said) god I hate
[	 walking what's the point]
1--> J: [gam mai m-hou haang 	 J: so then don't walk PT
[LO:	 [don't walk then]
2--> M: [gam mai m-hou haang LO: M: so then don't walk PT
lei [haidou	 you here
[	 [don't walk then, you're]
J:	 [heui mai hai ukei 	 J: she then be home
[hon-munhau	 look-after-the-house
[	 [she can stay behind and
[	 look after the house]
M:	 [heh	 M: heh
3--> J: [dang di yan lei LO:::	 J: wait the people come PT
[	 [wait for people to come]
M: [heh hh hh	 M: heh hh hh 
A brief examination of the interactional tasks achieved in
this sequence will reveal some properties of LO which should by
now be familiar. M, in the turn preceding arrow 1, reports to J
that R "hates walking" The reporting (like all reportings) is
formulated in a way that bears the signature of the reporter, ie.
the formulation of the report represents the reporter's reading/
understanding of the 'reportable'. In this case, R is reported
as saying she "hates walking" in a way that is hearable as a
'complaint'. J's response to this reported complaint, in her LO-
suffixed utterance (arrow 1: "don't walk then LO") is constructed
in the form of a 'recommendation' (as if R was there to receive
it, hence the 'play-acting' character of this and the following
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two turns). Further, it is a recommendation built as a conclusion
that follows naturally form some given circumstances. It proposes
that the description of R's dislike for walking can be treated as
a premise, and that "don't walk then" is a reasonable inference
from this premise, ie. "if she hates walking, she can not walk"
is being presented as a natural course of action, something that
anyone under similar circumstances can be expected to do.
How then does our characterization of these two turns tie in
with the interactional task of 'dismissing a complaint'? J's
"don't walk then LO" is a report response, in the sense explained
above. We noted that this report response is built in the form of
a recommendation. Further, it is a recommendation that is formu-
lated as a 'natural' conclusion that can be drawn from the
reported complaint as a premise, ie. it embodies the claim that
it is 'natural' and 'reasonable' to infer from the fact that one
hates walking the conclusion that one should not walk. The status
of this recommendation as a warrantable conclusion is crucial for
the work that it is designed to perform, which is that it
evidences J's treatment of the reported complaint as somehow
'puzzling': if one doesn't like walking, one can simply not walk,
why complain? Thus, the claim that the recommendation being
offered is a warrantable inference --a claim that is exhibited
through the use of L0,-- by pointing to its own 'reasonableness',
'exposes' R's counter-position, and thus her complaint, as
'unreasonable'. (cf. (4), the "cassette recorder" episode
examined in the last section, where M's LO-suffixed utterance
displays puzzlement, and, through that, questions the ground for
J's initiation of the 'exam').
159
The next two LO-suffixed utterances (arrows 2 and 3) can be
characterized along similar lines. M's "don't walk then LO"
(arrow 2) is identical in form to J's utterance in the preceding
turn. Just as the preceding turn is constructed in the ways as
described above, M's 'echo' is built with an orientation to its
own warrantability as an inference drawable on the basis of R's
complaint as a premise. By providing a 'copy' that overlaps with
the 'original' (M's turn begins in overlap with J's production of
LO), M exhibits her understanding of J's position. While the use
of this kind of understanding display does not guarantee the
hearing of it as providing support and sympathy, that this parti-
cular instance is so hearable can be seen from the fact that M's
laughter in response to J's next LO-suffixed utterance (arrow 3)
evidences her retrospective formulation of her own previous turn
as doing an alignment. The 'chorus' effect that is achieved
through M's 'echo' highlights the coparticipants' mutual ratifi-
cation of the status of the inference being drawn as warrantable,
natural. Without going into details, the third LO-suffixed
utterance can similarly be heard as a warrantable inference drawn
from the premise that R "hates walking", as a means of, first,
displaying her treatment of M's preceding turn as hearable-as-
supportive; second, extending her dismissal of the reported
complaint in a more explicit way; and, finally, summarizing the
work mutually achieved so far and proposing topic closure.
Thus each of the three instances of LO in (15) performs a
similar kind of work. In each case, an utterance is constructed
in such a way as to make transparent its status as a conclusion
inferred from known premises.
(16) shows how this and related properties of LO can be
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exploited to do 'fooling someone'.
(16) [MAK:1:013]
J: aa-L hou seung haang aa:: J: L very-much want walk PT
L tung A-J waa haang aa::	 L and A-J say walk PT
heui waa baat-dim-jung	 she say eight-o'clock
lei-dou aa:: [tingyat (.)
	 arrive PT tomorrow (.)
[	 [L wanted to walk very much
[	 L and A-J said they would
[	 come for a walk she said
[	 (they) would arrive at 8
[	 tomorrow]
M:	 [o: ngaam aa M: o: correct PT
[that's a good idea]
J: giu ngodei dang-maai heui J: ask we wait-for her PT
hem [wo:	 [asked us to wait for her]
M:	 [hou:: hou hou hou	 M: good good good good
[hou	 good
J: [gam o #aak-gwai	 J: so I fool
heuidei o waa lei	 them I say you
bat-dim-jung	 eight-o'clock
lei aa [(.) o m-ji ]=	 come PT (.) I not-know PT
[	 ]	 [so I fooled them and said
[	 ]	 are you coming at 8? I
[	 ]	 don't know]
M:	 [#aan di bo:]	 M: late too PT
[that's too late]
J: bo::[:: gameung	 J: PT like-this
M:	 Paan di bo:(.)[haa	 M: late too PT (.) yeah
[	 [that's too late, yeah]
J:	 [haiaa J: yeah
(.)	 (.)
J: yanwai odei:: haang-saan	 J: because we walk-hill
di ye dim ji je waje	 GEN thing how know PT
[odei in luk luk [m luk dim	 maybe we 5 6 6 5 6 o'clock
[	 [	 [yeah (.) the thing about
[	 [	 mountain walking is you
[	 [	 just don't know maybe
[	 [	 we'll get up at five six
[	 [	 six five or six]
M: [haa	 [heisan	 M: yeah	 get-up
lok (.) gammai haang	 PT (.) then
1-->	 haang [LO: ho	 walk PT right?
[	 [yeah when we get up
[	 we'll walk, right?]
J:	 [haiaa	 J: yeah
2-->	 haiaa o haiaa gameung LO:
	 yeah I yeah like-this PT
[yeah yeah I yeah
that's it]
Let us focus our attention on the first arrowed turn. "We'll
walk" is portrayed as an action the occurrence of which is
dependent upon the condition "when we get up", ie. what time the
"walking" takes place will depend on what time the "getting up"
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takes place. LO-suffixing helps to relate the "walking" to the
"getting up", ie. the utterance is designed in such a way as to
embody the claim that the time at which the walking is to take
place follows plainly, naturally, and reasonably from the
condition. The dependency is portrayed as 'in the nature of the
thing being talked about', something that is neither unusual or
out of the ordinary.
For the co-participants, the point of the exercise is to (in
a play-acting sort of way) fool L and A-J. But how is the fooling
achieved? It is done by making L and A-J believe that the time
they proposed to come may be too /ate. That the time L and A-d
proposed to come is assessable as "too late" turns on the claim,
embodied in the LO-suffixed utterance, that it is in the nature
of "morning walks" that they are done "when one gets up", and one
might just get up "at five or six", a time earlier than the time
at which L and A-J proposed to come. The contribution of LO to
this fooling project is that it can be exploited to mark the fact
that it is in the nature of morning walks that their happening
depends naturally on some circumstances: the time at which people
get up being unpredictable (it could be "five or six" in the
morning), the time at which they start walking may be earlier
than "eight o'clock". Whether L and A-J find this claim
plausible and whether they would be taken in is irrelevant. In
fact, part of the fun may come from the implausibility of the
proposal. For instance, the ones being fooled might reason that
the time at which one gets up and the time at which one starts
walking can surely be decided on and fixed in advance. But then
what does it matter, if fooling is heard as a joke?
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To summarize this section, report components, as well as
report responses, can, through LO-suffixing, be so constructed as
to present a state-of-affairs as dependent upon, or arising from,
some given circumstances, or as a conclusion that is naturally
inferable from some known premises. LO can also draw co-partici-
pants' attention to the possibility of story completion or topic
closure.
3. Cognate Formulations
The understanding/ interpretation of an immediately
preceding turn can be displayed in a number of ways, one of which
is to offer a 'cognate formulation', a formulation which captures
the import of the preceding turn in a variant form. LO is often
found suffixed to such cognate formulations.
(17) [SS:CH:1:163]
M: dinsi samgei sengyat
gaau aa
P: a:
M: dou mou-mat-dim hok #e
P: hh heh heh .hh jau-mm
-->	 teng-gwo aa syun LO:
M: ha#
(18) [SS:CH:1:165]
P: dinnou godou dou:#
(0.7)
jee gong yingman jung
dogo gong jungman
M: mm
(0.6)
P: yingman ji beiga::u (.)
yi-[di daa]-yap-heui aa
[	 ]
[	 ]
M: TV radio all-the-time
teach PT
[((Putonghua)) is being
taught on TV and the
radio all the time]
P: yeah
M: really not-really learn PT
[haven't really learned
much of it]
P: hh heh heh .hh just listened
PT forget-it PT
[heh heh one just listens to
it and then forgets all
about it]
M: yeah
P: computer there also
(0.7)
I-mean talk English even
more-than talk Chinese
[about computers, I mean,
one uses English more than
Chinese]
M: mm
(0.6)
P: English words more (.)
easier enter PT
[it's easier to enter
using English words]
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M:	 [yi-di ]
M: mm
(1.4)
P: jungman
y[iu maai jeung kaad]
[	 ]
[	 ]
M:	 [jungman yiu hok-go]
M: easier
M: mm
(1.4)
P: Chinese
have-to buy CL card
[as for Chinese one has
to buy a card]
M: Chinese have-to learn-again
[as for Chinese one has to
learn again]
(.)
	
(.)
-->M: yiu hok-go LO
	
M: has-to learn-again PT
[one has to learn again]
P: hai LA	 P: yes PT
[yes]
(1.0)	 (1.0)
P: yiche jung saai sigaan tim P: also more waste time PT
[it also wastes more time]
In (17), in response to M's "haven't really learned much of
it", P displays his understanding of the import of this utterance
by offering a cognate formulation: "one just listens to it and
then forgets all about it LO". The distinctive feature of a
cognate formulation is that some state-of-affairs is presented as
a fact independently known to the speaker. As 'another way of
putting the same thing', a cognate formulation is a regular means
of displaying the speaker's understanding of the import of the
preceding turn. For instance, P's cognate formulation in (17) is
offered as another way of describing the situation portrayed in
M's preceding turn, namely, nothing much can be learnt from radio
and TV programmes that teach Putonghua. Through LO's marking of a
similar situation (namely, one doesn't often take such programmes
too seriously) as something that the speaker has independently
come to know, P displays his understanding and appreciation of
the prior turn.
In (18), P offers in the first turn his opinion about the
relative values of "English" and "Chinese" in the use of
computers, by way of a comparison: "English is used more often",
and "it is easier to enter [commands] in English". M offers a
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cognate formulation in the following turn: to enter information
in Chinese, "one has to learn again". As in the previous
instance, LO helps to present "one has to learn again" as a fact
independently known to M, the offering of which as a variant
description of the disadvantages of using Chinese in computing,
at the point in which it occurs, displays M's understanding of
the import of P's formulation.
(19) below evidences a similar procedure, where L's
'summary' of C's trouble is followed by C's confirmation, by
means of a cognate formulation. Again, C's "fear of losing both"
is presented through LO as something that she already knows, and,
being placed next to L's description of her problematic
situation, offers itself as an independent confirmation of it.
(19) [FEEL1:1:587]
L: goum aa "yu-yu-hung-
jeung-bat-lang-gim-dak
go[bo
C:	 ['hal aa soyi
leaa hou ge:ng
(.)
C: leung-go-dou
-->	 sat-jo-heui LO::
L: so PT "fish-and-bear-
palm-you-can't-have-
both" PT
C: yes PT so
one very afraid
(-)
C: both lost PT
[yes, so I'm afraid that I
may lose both]
4. Confirmations
"hai LO" can occur in the sequential position immediately
following a description, characterization, summary, --in short,
some formulation claiming to represent a situation in some way--
to signal the speaker's confirmation of the validity/ appropri-
ateness of the formulation.
(20) [FEEL1:1:312]
C: =gogo waan dinjiyauheigei C: everybody play video-
aa goum keui heui di
	 games PT so he go some
hou jaap aa di deifo:ng
	 very scruffy PT the places
.hh	 .hh
[everybody's playing video
games so he goes to these
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L: mm=
C:	 [(ngo jee)]
=[	 ]
B:	 [o jee	 ] nidi le
keui yau
(.)
jehai .hhh e nei gun-dak
keui hou yim goum keui
yau sheung heui waan
goumjau ngaak nei
hai-mai aa
--> C: hai LO::
really scruffy places]
L: mm
C: (I I-mean)
B: oh so these PT
he actually
(.)
I-mean .hhh um you control
him very strict but he
but want go play
so lie you
is-that-it PT
[oh well in that case he
really, um, you are very
strict with him but
he wants to go and play
so he lies to you, is
that it?]
C: yes PT
[that's it]
C's first turn in extract (20) forms part of a multi-turn
report on her problems with her son. Note how the two recipients,
L and B, hear this report component differently. L treats it as
'incomplete' by issuing a continuer ("mm"), which C picks up and
'starts to continue' ("I I mean..."). B, however, hears it as
'complete' and moves in to claim the floor. This creates a floor-
competing situation where B's intended report response starts in
overlap with C's intended report continuation. Having outlasted
C's start and gained the turn, B delivers a 'summary' and 'diag-
nosis' of C's problem. The summary takes the form of a descrip-
tion of C's problem with her son: "you are very strict with him
but he wants to go and play so he lies to you". Further, it is
formulated in cause-and-effect terms, proposing not just a
characterization of the problem but also a diagnosis which con-
tains an explanation of the child's behaviour. She ends the
diagnosis by asking for C's confirmation. In the arrowed turn, C
confirms the characterization with "hai LO" ("yes LO").
By asking the reporter to evaluate the summary being
offered, the counsellor (B) explicitly raises the question of the
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correctness of her description. The question is now being raised
whether her understanding of the report, as evidenced in the
summary, 'fits the facts'. In this we see a point in C's build-
ing her confirmation in the form of a LO-suffixed utterance,
namely, by being designed in this way, the confirmation indicates
C's 'satisfaction' with B's summary as a fair description of the
facts that are known to her (C) all along.
Notice also that C stops right there after the confirmation,
leaving it up to B and L to take up the matter in some as yet
undetermined direction.
Consider next a confirmation in an arrangement sequence.
(21) [TC11:1:175]
L: goum ngo dousi::
	 L: so I by-that-time
(0.7)	 (0.7)
L: [ngo daa-go-dinwaa=
	 L: I phone
[	 [I'll phone first]
S: [o#	 S: aha
L: =lok-lei si:n tai-haa
	 L: down first see
lei faan-jo mei=
	 you return whether
[to see if you have
come home]
--> S: =hai LO
	 S: yes PT
[right]
This episode comes from a longer sequence, in which L and S
are making arrangements to meet the following day. Their
collaborative description of the circumstances pertaining to the
meeting is followed, in this extract, by L's proposal to "phone
first and see if S has come home", to which S responds with "hai
LO". This expression --"hai LO"-- is very difficult to explicate
through paraphrasing or translation. Depending on the context, it
may be translated as "I thought so too", or "exactly, that's what
I think", or "now you're beginning to talk", etc. In this
particular context, it serves as a means for S to confirm L's
proposed arrangement, as something that he would have suggested
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anyway, something that he has known to be the thing to do all
along.
A similar sort of evidence comes from the following
fragment, where B produces an agreement of a positive assessment
of herself, which amounts to an acceptance of praise, which is
unusual. Let us examine this sequence in some detail to see how
the work that LO does in the arrowed utterance strengthens some
of the earlier observations about the particle's properties.
(22) [FEEL1:1:568]
B: yau bindou king hei aa
nei seung
(1.2)
C: mm ngo dou m ji
chung bindou
gong hei h[ou
[
[
B:	 [mhm
(.)
B: goumm .hhh ee haa:
(0.3)
1--> B: nei waa-bei-ngo-teng
nei:: lei-jo Heunggong
gel loi aa
(0.5)
C: 'aa?
B: hai-dou cheutsai ga
(0.3)
C: hai aa
(0.4)
B: hawaa
C: hai aa
B: y[igaa
L:	 [dimgaai lei gokdak
hai 11# hai hai diadou
lei Heunggong le
B: mmm kaukei wan di-ye
gong haa jim[aa
[
[
[
B: from where talk start PT
you want
[where do you want to start]
(1.2)
C: mm I really not know
from where
talk start good
[mm I really don't know
where to start]
B: mhm
(.)
B: so .hhh em yes
(0.3)
B: you tell-me
you have-been Hongkong
how long PT
[mhm, so um yes tell me
how long you've been
in Hongkong]
(0.5)
C: what?
B: here born PT
[you were born here?]
(0.3)
C: yes PT
[yes]
(0.4)
B: is-that-so
C: yes PT
[yes]
B: now
L: why you feel
be 11# be from somewhere-
else come-to Hongkong PT
[why do you think she's
from somewhere else]
B: mmm random find something
talk ASP PT
[well just something off
the top of my head (for
the sake of starting the
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[
	2a-->C:	 [haa le[i=
L:	 [o:
C: =janhai houye gejek
B: hhh heh [heh heh]
2b-->C:	 [wan-dou]=
C: =di waatai
3--> B: [.hhhh] hai LO=
[	 l
L: [ha ha]
B: =.hhh goum nei yigaa
jou maye gaa
conversation)]
C: well you
L: yeah
C: really good PT
[well you're really good]
B: hhh heh heh heh
C: found
C: some topic
[finding some topic]
B: .hhhh yes PT
[.hhhh right]
L: ha ha
B: .hhh so you now do what PT
[so what are you doing now]
C's 'praise' of B's ability to find a topic for conversation
(arrows 2a and 2b: "you are really good, finding some topic")
arises from the immediately prior sequence where B can be shown
to have done a misidentification. The turn in question (the
misidentification) is arrowed 1 in (22) ("tell me how long you've
been in Hongkong"). Evidence that this turn is (for the partici-
pants) a misidentification comes from three independent sources.
First, C's response to the question how long she had been in
Hongkong --a period of silence signalling possible trouble,
followed by "what?", which points back to the question as now a
repairable-- indicates that for her, the question is problematic
in some way. Second, instead of recycling her question or
treating C's "what?" as evidence of non-hearing, B responds to it
with a repair which identifies and names the repairable ("you
were born here?"), ie. the problematic assumption in her first
question, that C was not born in Hongkong. Third, subsequent to
that, L, the third participant, explicitly questions B about the
reason for her making that problematic assumption ("why did you
think she's from somewhere else?") Thus each participant has
provided evidence to show that they have independently arrived at
the same reading of the original question, that it is a
misidentification.
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Following on from the repair sequence, C offers B a compli-
ment, praising her for the ingenuity of her attempt to find a
topic for conversation. Research on assessments (Pomerantz 1984,
Davidson 1984) has shown that responses to assessments are sensi-
tive to a preference organization such that compliments (praise
of the recipient), like speaker's self-deprecations, are
regularly rejected (disagreed to). When they are agreed to,
resources are used which would mark the agreement's dispreferred
status. The operation of such a preference organization means
that it can be exploited to serve a variety of interactional
purposes. One way of using this resource is to purposefully
'violate the norm' as a means of 'cracking a joke'. It is in the
light of this that B's acceptance of the praise (arrow 3) and the
laughter that accompanies and surrounds it can find a basis.
Briefly, the action sequence goes something like this. It begins
with C's offering of a compliment (which ironically turns on an
error [B's misidentification] as evidence for the positive
assessment). B responds to this with laughter (between 2a and
2b), displaying her treatment of it as something that 'cannot be
serious'. Upon the completion of 2b, B does an acceptance of the
compliment, issuing more laughter as she goes along. This
'unqualified acceptance' is designed, through the accompaniment,
of laughter, as an unserious acceptance of an unserious
compliment, ie. it is designed to be heard as a joke. To
understand the work of the particle LO in all this, let us
examine B's praise acceptance and the form which it takes in
greater detail.
The compliment acceptance in question is couched in the form
of a LO-suffixed utterance (hai LO). I wish to show that this
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particle has crucial contributions to make to the tackling of a
complex of interactional problems that B is faced with at this
particular point in the conversation.	 Specifically, LO
contributes to two tasks that are achieved through the compliment
acceptance. First, by virtue of its 'backward-looking' property,
LO ties the acceptance back to the misidentification and repair
sequence. Now C's praise is based on a piece of evidence : the
evidence that B is ingenious in finding a topic for conversation
comes from her (B's) act of finding "where C comes from" as a
topic for conversation (arrow 1). However, ironically, this
topic-offer was, as we have seen, treated as a 'mistake'. By
confirming, therefore, through "yes LO", that the praise is a
valid, reasonable inference to make, on the basis of the mistake
as evidence, B endorses C's (ironic) inference as appropriate.
Looking at the basis of the praise in this way, B's compliment
acceptance turns out to be an ironic acceptance of deprecation,
an unusual action that is 'justifiable' in terms of the
embarrassment caused by her mistake.
The particle's other contribution to this episode can be
explicated in terms of the way in which a completion proposal may
serve to initiate a change in topic. Through the use of LO, B
proposes an end to the current topic, which is promptly
abandoned, and initiates a new topic (last utterance in (22): "so
what are you doing now?"). Thus, a complex of actions is
achieved through the 'cracking of a joke' which exploits, among
other things (such as preference organizations), the properties
of LO, in such a way that an unserious (ironic) compliment is
ironically accepted as a deprecation, in an act to 'level the
score' in the wake of a misidentification that has caused some
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embarrassment.
5. Suggestions
Suggestions can be formulated in a variety of ways, one of
which is to put forward a proposed course of action as one that
naturally arises from, or is necessitated by, certain specified
circumstances. LO-suffixing is a regular device for the
formulation of suggestions that are backed by a reason or
justification.
(23) [TC11:1:153]
P: =hai (.) jungyau godi daai P: yes (.) also those tapes
le: hh kheui jou rwaa
	
PT hh she then said 
[	 [yes, also those tapes,
[	 she um said]
L:	 [ha#	 L: yes
(0.5)	 (0.5)
P: jeui-hou bei keui tengteng P: best let her listen PT
tim-wo	 [it would be best if she
could listen to them]
L: hou aa hou aa (.) ha#=
	
L: good PT good PT (.) yes
P: =goum ngo aa shheung
	 P: so I um want
lam-jvu wale bei heui	 thinking perhaps let her 
-->teng-maai sin LO=
	
listen first PT 
[so I um was thinking maybe
I should let her listen to
them first]
L: =hou aa hou aa
	 L: good PT good PT (.)
The target utterance in (23) can be characterized as a
suggestion in which one participant proposes a future course of
action and puts it before his interlocutor for consideration.
One notable feature of this suggestion is that it is placed after
an account: the suggestion that W should listen to the tapes
comes right after a report of how "she [ie. W] said it would be
best if she could listen to them"). Thus, the proposed course of
action is portrayed as one which is a result of a third party's
wishes. LO helps to tie the suggestion to this account, and to
relate it to a basis, thus giving it the status of an action that
is grounded on some given circumstances.
172
The following sequence illustrates a similar concern with,
and a similar solution to, the problem of how a suggestion can be
presented as having a justification. Here, E's suggestion to set
an earlier time for the meeting that is being arranged is
presented as an 'unavoidable' one, necessitated not by her own
personal preferences but by some 'external circumstances' that
are beyond her control. The utterance which performs the
suggestion (arrow 1) is again suffixed with LO.
(24) [TC:11:1:001]
E: tingyat le
(0.5)
E: yunloi le:: tingyat aa
(.)
E: e: yan[wai ngodei=
[
[
L:	 [ha#
E: =lidou e jou godi mee
sangunghei jing# tingyat
hai e tinhaudaan jingdaan
aa=
L: =hai=
E: =goum le:: jau keu::i
( ) jau wui fungbai yat
dyun hou wou# siu-ge lou=
L:	 [o#
=[
E:	 [goum jee-waa le:
'che jau lai-m-dou
ngo ukei lak
L: o:=
E: =goum jee-waa le waiyat
fongfaat le jauhai ngo
(.)
yiu cheut KxxFxx
(	 )e# [(.) jip-lei=
[
[
[
L: [mm
M: =yaplei yugo-m-hai lei
E: tomorrow PT
(0.5)
E: turns-out PT tomorrow PT
(.)
E: e: because we
[tomorrow, it turns out
tomorrow, because we--]
L: yes
E: here e perform those what
opera proper# tomorrow
be e Tin-Hau-Festival
proper PT
[have those opera perform-
ance here, it's proper--
Tin Hau festival proper]
L: yes
E: so PT then it
( ) then will close one
section very ver--
small road
[so a very small section of
the road will be closed]
L: oh
E: so that-means PT
car then can't-reach
my home PT
[so that means cars won't
be able to reach my place]
L: I see
E: so that-means PT the-only
way PT is I
(.)
have-to go-out KxFxx
e (.) pick-you-up
[so that means the only way
is for me to go out to KF
to pick you up]
L: mm
M: come-in or-else you
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m sik yaplei galak
	
not know come-in PT
[or else you wouldn't know
how to come in]
L: o goumyeung
	
L: I see
E: yiche le: jau heimong	 E: also PT then hope
1-->	 hoyi jou-di LO:	 can earlier PT
joudi le: jau e gaautung 	 earlier PT then e traffic
2-->	 yungyi-hungjai-di LO
	
easier-to-control PT
[also I hope we can make it
earlier, traffic will be
easier to control if it's
earlier]
L: 'mmm	 L: mmm
E: gou:m e:: lei:::	 E: so e:: you:::
(1.5)	 (1.5)
L: KxxFxx	 L: KxxFxx
E: baatdimbun heui-m-heui-dou E: half-past-8 whether-can-
KxxFxx aa	 reach KxxFxx PT
(0.9)
L: e: (.) hou aa
[can you be at KxxFxx by
half past eight?]
(0.9)
L: e: (.) good PT
[e: OK]
This extract is taken from near the beginning of a
conversation in which L and E arrange to meet the following day.
As in the previous example, E's suggestion (arrow 1) is preceded
by an account of certain 'external circumstances' ("a small
section of the road will be closed", etc.). The suggestion to
"make it earlier" is designed in such a way as to make
transparent its unavoidability given the circumstances (ie.
possible traffic problems). LO relates the proposed course of
action to a set of circumstances, thus furnishing a basis for the
suggestion.
In the second LO-suffixed utterance (arrow 2) an advantage
of the suggestion is given as a favourable consequence of the
suggested course of action. Notice how the same particle is used
to highlight the relationship between an antecedent (if we make
it earlier) and a consequent (then traffic will be easier to
control).
An important design feature of LO-suffixed suggestions is an
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element of 'ground-provision', ie. a proposed course of action is
presented as one that is backed by a reason or justification.
Particular instances of such a design may be interpreted
differently in different conversational contexts. However, one
interactional function that it recurrently serves is 'negative
politeness', or the avoidance of imposition (Brown & Levinson
1978). The two examples above are clear illustrations of the way
in which the speaker's awareness of a suggestion's potentially
inconveniencing nature can be displayed in the form of an attempt
to provide some grounds for the suggestion. Thus, in (23), the
suggestion to "let her listen to the tapes" is formulated as a
consequence of "somebody else's wish". In (24), the suggestion
to arrange an earlier time for a meeting (which eventually leads
up to E's proposal to meet at eight in the morning, towards the
end of the extract) is presented with a display of the speaker's
awareness of the proposed time being potentially unreasonably
early. Thus, through relating a proposition to some ground or
circumstances (to be recovered through a backward search), the
particle LO contributes to a negative politeness strategy.
6. Advice-givings
In advice-seeking-'and-giving exchanges, LO can be found
suffixed to utterances in which a piece of advice is offered.
Through LO-suffixing, a piece of advice or recommendation can be
presented as a reasonable course of action to take, given certain
'external circumstances'.
(25) [FEEL1:1:234]
C: =keui# gokdak dong ngo
hai sailou aa
P: hha
C: gokdak dong ngo hai
C: she feel treat me as
brother PT
[she feels she thinks of
me as her brother]
P: what?
C: feel treat me as brother PT
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sailou aa
	
[she feels I'm her brother]
(0.5)
	
(0.5)
P: keui dong nei hai
	
P: she treat you as brother PT
sailou aa
	
[she treats you as her
brother?]
C: hai aa
	
C: yes PT
[yes]
P: gown nei mai biusi bei
	
P: then you EMPH show to
keui teng nei m-hai
	
her hear you not
--> sailou LO
	
brother PT
--> jungyi keui mai dak LO 	
	
love her [MPH can PT
[well all you have to do is
to show her that you are
not her brother, that you
love her]
Following C's disclosure of his problem with a woman he is
"secretly in love with", namely, that the woman in question
thinks of him as her "brother", P offers the advice "all you have
to do is to show her that you are not her brother, that you love
her" as an 'only-reasonable' course of action to take under these
circumstances. The use of LO marks the advice being offered as a
course of action that follows from, or is necessitated by, the
set of circumstances described in the advice-seeker's report of
his problem.
But the advice is rejected (arrow I of (26)). This is how
the conversation continued:
(26) (Continuation of (25))
P: goum nei mai biusi bei
	
P: then you [MPH show to
keui teng nei m-hai
	
her hear you not
sailou LO=
	
brother PT
jungyi keui mai dak LO 	
	
love her [MPH can PT
[well all you have to do is
to show her that you are
not her brother, that you
love her]
1--> C: hou laan gong wo
	
C: very difficult say PT
[but it's so difficult to
say that]
P: mee goum naan je P: what so difficult PT
[what's so difficult
about that?]
((about 30 turns later...))
2--> P: nei yatchai sikfaan nei
	
P: you together eat you
hoyi man keui .hhh nei
	 can ask he .hhh you
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waa keisat ngodei goum
friend a:: nei hai-mai
dong ngo 	 	 e
sailou baan je (.) gown
say in-fact we so
friend PT you whether
treat me e:
brother as PT (.) so
[when you have a meal with
her you can ask her, you
can say well we're such
good friends actually but
are you treating me as
your brother?]
3--> C: hai aa keui batlau 	 C: yes PT she all-along
hai dong ngo hai	 be treat me as
sail[ou aa	 brother PT
[	 [yes she has been treating
[	 me as a brother all along]
4a-> P:
	 [gam hh nei waa (.)	 P: then hh you say (.) in-fact
keisat ngo yau m seung jou	 I really not want be
[lei ] sailou aa=	 your brother PT
[	 ]	 [then you can say to her.
[	 ]	 I don't really want to be
[	 ]	 your brother]
	
C: [keui]	 C: she
4b-> P: =ngo seung jou lei-go	 P: I want be your
frie::nd wo	 friend PT
goummm [heh heh heh heh	 so heh heh heh etc.
[	 [I want to be your friend]
5--> C:
	 [(keui )=gojansi C: (she
	 ) before
ngo::: a:: ying keui jou	 I em took her as
gaaje aa goum aa=	 sister PT so PT
6a-> P: =nei::[jigei]=
L:	 [aa:::]
6b-> P: =yiu ying keui jou
gaaje jimaa nei waa
ngo yigaa yau m seung
jou gaa:je: m seung lei
jou ngo gaa:je: aa
ngo seung nei jou ngo
girlfriend aa goum
mai dak LO
[(	 ) I took her as a
sister before, you see]
P: you self
L: aa:::
P: want to take her be
sister PT you say
I now anymore not want
be sister not want you
be my sister PT
I want you be my
girlfriend PT so
EMPH can PT
[you took her as a sister
yourself, you can say now
I don't want you to be
my sister, I want you
to be my girl friend,
that's all you have to do]
C responds negatively to P's advice-offer in the first turn:
the recommendation is very difficult to implement (arrow 1). The
topic is subsequently abandoned, until, at a later point in the
conversation, C re-introduces it, once again seeking advice from
P, who then presents a scenario in which C can clear the
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misunderstanding by asking the woman a question (arrow 2: "are
you treating me as your brother?"), whereupon C rejects it again
as impractical (arrow 3). Following that, P offers yet another
piece of advice (arrows 4a and 4b), which is again rejected
(arrow 5). Finally, this series of repeated advice-giving and
rejection leads up to P's LO-suffixed utterance in the turn
arrowed 6.
The design of this advice-offer (arrows 6a and 6b) must be
seen from within this particular sequential context. It is
placed at the end of a long series of exchanges in which
recommendations have been advanced but rejected. In the light of
this, the LO-suffixed advice-offer can be seen as one desperate
attempt on the adviser's part to convince her interlocutor, once
and for all, of the reasonableness of the recommended course of
action. It can thus be characterized as 'a final offer' in the
sense that similar recommendations have been advanced before, so
this one should by now be familiar. Further, it contains a
completion proposal, and acts as a bid to end the topic: the
advisor is not prepared to continue with this offer-and-rejection
business any longer.
To give a piece of advice is to offer a recommendation as to
how a problematic situation may be handled. It is responsive to
a problem and presupposes an understanding of the circumstances
which have created that problem. LO-suffixing is a regular
feature in advice-givings for it provides a means of establishing
a link between a problem or a set of circumstances on the one
hand, and a recommended solution on the other.
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7. Two Properties of LO
The scattered observations made in the previous sections in
relation to particular instances of LO will now be stated more
generally and systematically. The properties of this particle
will be discussed under two main headings: as a dependency token,
and as a completion proposal.
7.1 LO as a Dependency Token
One way of looking at the dependency feature is from the
point of view of how states-of-affairs are portrayed and
presented in conversation. From this point of view, LO can be
characterized as a device for portraying a state-of-affairs as
one whose sense and significance is dependent on some other,
often previously mentioned, state-of-affairs. For instance,
given a problematic situation, a state-of-affairs may be
portrayed and presented as a reasonable course of action to take
in an attempt to solve the problem. In relation to an action
which has been taken, a state-of-affairs may be portrayed as a
natural consequence or result. On the basis of some known
premises, a state-of-affairs may be presented as a logical
conclusion that can be inferred from those premises.
From the point of view of the hearer, the particle can be
thought of as a device which invites a dependency reading of an
utterance, ie. a reading in which the state-of-affairs presented
in the current utterance is linked up with some other state-of-
affairs in one or more of the following ways, or ways like them:
antecedent-consequent, premise-conclusion, problem-solution,
cause-effect, stimulus-response, intention-behaviour, action-
result, etc.
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Recall some of the examples discussed in the previous
sections. A decision to go for a drink was presented as a result
of "feeling thirsty" (fragment (11)); a course of action was
suggested as a reasonable solution to a problematic situation
(person having problems with a woman who treats him as her
brother: fragment (26)); a conclusion that an object must be a
cassette-recorder was derived, among other considerations, from
the premise that it was not a radio.
More generally, as part of a report or story, an event can
be portrayed as something that follows naturally, reasonably, or
necessarily from some given conditions. In a similar way,
suggestions and advice are sometimes offered as courses of action
that are natural, reasonable or justified, when seen against the
background of some circumstances.
Answer-receipts are sometimes designed with LO-suffixing to
point back to a suspicion, belief or item of knowledge as one
that has been in existence all along. Similarly, a description
may be formulated as one that has been reached independently and
known prior to the other speaker's mentioning of it. In this
way, it can serve to provide a cognate that confirms and supports
the formulation presented in the prior turn.
In these related senses LO is a linguistic resource for the
portrayal of phenomena --be they objects, persons, actions,
events, places, times, manners, or situations-- as known-to-be-
so, reasonable, necessary, or natural, by relating them to some
basis or background.
7.2 LO as a Completion Proposal and a Topic Closure Device
It was noted several times in the previous discussion that
LO can be used as a completion proposal, ie. completion and
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ending are possibilities that LO regularly attends to. For
instance, we saw how this particle can mark an answer as having
reached an end; also, it can raise the possibility of closing
talk on some current topic. Let us take up these issues in a
more systematic way, by looking at some of the examples that have
been considered so far in the light of this 'completion' feature,
as well as some further examples, to examine in greater detail
this property of LO in terms of turn-transition and topic
organization.
To begin with, note that a LO-suffixed utterance often ends
the current turn, and is followed by a change of speaker. In
that next turn, instead of, for example, a continuer being
offered, some response is produced which deals with such matters
as the reception of information, the acknowledgement of a report
component, the confirmation of a summary, etc., ie. a response
that treats the previous turn as doing information-giving,
reporting, summarizing, etc., and deals with it in a way that
displays the hearing of LO as marking the possible completion of
that action.
Consider in this connection a few data extracts, paying
special attention to the turns immediately following the LO-
suffixed utterances (those turns that are asterisked in the
transcripts).
(27) [MAK:1:073] (=11)
J: =goum o o mou aa go-an-si
jau chuet-dou-lai le
cheut-dou-lei jau hou
genghok aa
[goum-jau]=
[	 ]
[	 l
[	 ]
M: ['mmm	 ]
J: =seung wan deungfong
J: so I I didnt PT then
so came-out PT
came-out then PT very
thirsty PT
so-then
[so I I didn't and then we
came out when we came out
we were very thirsty so]
M: 'mmm
J: =want find place
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yamye goumj yap-jo-heui
	 drink so went-in
-->	 yamye LO	 drink PT
*--> M: o:: o o
(28) [MAK:1:050] (=part of 12)
J: =sei-sap-hou em le yiging J: =service-forty-M le already
(0.3)	 (0.3)
J: mou-saai laa=	 J: no-more PT=
[there weren't any service
40M anymore]
M: =hai-gam jeui-hou
	 M: in-that-case the-best
[ge fongfaat( )diksi LA]
	 GEN way ( ) taxi PT
[	 ]	 [so the best thing to do
[	 ]	 is (	 ) a taxi, right?]
J: [gou::m soyi le jau (.) ]= J: so therefore le then (.)
J: =aamaam: jau-yau diksi
	 there-happen to-be taxi
m-mai jit-jo diksi 	 so stopped taxi
-->	 cheut-lei LO:[:	 come-out PT
[	 [there happened to be a
[	 taxi so we took a taxi
[	 and came out]
*--> M:	 [o:::	 M: o:::
[I see]
(27) and (28) contain simple report receipts (le. the
asterisked turns) that evidence the report-recipients' treatment
of the previous turn (which ends in a LO-suffixed utterance) as
having reached a point of completion. It is in this sense that LO
can be characterized as a 'completion proposal'. Further, it is
a proposal which is 'agreeable with', le. should the co-partici-
pant display an agreement to end, the LO-suffixed utterance can
be interactively made an ending.
Essentially the same procedures are operative in sequence::
other than reporting and information-giving. (29) and (30) are
examples of the achievement of the completion of an advice and a
suggestion respectively.
[we wanted to find some
place for a drink so we
went in for a drink]
M: oh I see
(29) [FEEL1:1:234] (part of 26)
P: goum nei mai biusi bei
keui teng nei m-hai
-->	 sailou LO=
	
-->	 jungyi keui mai dak LO
	
P: then you [MPH show to
her hear you not
brother PT
love her [MPH can PT
[well all you have to do is
to show her that you are
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*--> C: hou laan gong wo
not her brother, that you
love her]
C: very difficult say PT
[but it's so difficult to
say that]
(30) [TC11:1:153] (=23)
P: =hai (.) jungyau godi daai P: yes (.) also those tapes
le: hh kheui jau [waa
	
PT hh she then said 
[	 [yes, also those tapes,
[	 she um said]
L:	 [ha#	 L: yes
(0.5)	 (0.5)
P: jeui-hou bei keui tengteng P: best let her listen PT
tim-wo	 [it would be best if she
could listen to them]
L: hou aa hou aa (.) ha#=
	 L: good PT good PT (.) yes
P: =goum ngo aa shheung	 P: so I um want
lam-jvu waje bei heui
	 thinking perhaps let her 
-->	 teng-maai sin LO=
	 listen first PT
[so I um was thinking maybe
I should let her listen to
them first]
*--> L: =hou aa hou aa	 L: good PT good PT (.)
The asterisked turns in these two extracts are produced as
responses to the actions performed in the immediately preceding
LO-suffixed utterances in a way that evidently treat them as
having finished doing what they set out to do. In (29), B's two
LO-suffixed utterances are responded to by C in a way (in this
case, a rejection) that signals her hearing of the preceding
utterance as constituting the end of B's act of advising.
Similarly, L's response in the asterisked turn in (30) shows his
treatment of P's talk up to the point where LO occurred as
constituting a suggestion.
Related to completion proposal is a tendency for LO-suffixed
utterances to pass on to the co-participant the responsibility
for providing a direction for further talk. Extracts (31) and
(32) are illustrations of this feature.
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(31) [FEEL1:1:587]
B: goum keuidei yigaa yiu
nei syunjaak me
(0.9)
C: jee#
(0.4)
C: jee mou yat fong bing
(-)
C: jee yiu o
(.)
C: jee kyutding LO::
(0.3)
*--> B: o o leuung go d ee
.hhh goummmmm nei
jungyi bingo dodi aa
C: leung go dou
chaa-bat-do aa
(32) [MAK:1:020]
J: lei gamyat heui-jo
bin aa
B: so they now want
you choose PT
[well do they want you to
choose now]
(0.9)
C: I-mean
(0.4)
C: I-mean not one side
(•)
C: I-mean want me
(•)
C: I-mean decide PT
[I mean, I mean neither has
asked me to decide]
(0.3)
B: oh oh two CL both d um
.hhh so you
love which-one more PT
[oh oh both .hhh so which
one do you love more]
C: two CL both
about the same PT
[about the same]
J: you today went where aa?
where PT
[where did you go today]
(0.7)	 (0.7)
M: ngo gamyat le (.) ngaanjau M: I today PT (.) afternoon
-->	 heui-jo WxxLxxTxx LO:	 went WxxLxxTxx PT
[today I went to WxxLxxTxx
((a restaurant)) in the
afternoon]
*--> J: .hh aiyaa o kamyat
	 J: .hh EXCL I yesterday
teng lei waa aa
	 listen you say PT
[oh I took your advice
yesterday]
(0.2)	 (0.2)
J: heui-jo WxxLxxTxx aa	 J: went WxxLxxTxx PT
[and went to WLT
Restaurant]
In (31), C's answer to B's question in the first turn is
heard as completed upon the production of the LO-suffixed
utterance, whereupon B receives the answer and then goes on to 
ask another question. Here, it is interesting to note that not
only is C's answer treated as the whole contribution for the
moment, it is also interpreted as showing that the speaker does
not intend to take up the lead for providing a direction for
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further talk. This means that in the next turn, one needs to
deal not only with the completion proposal, but also the problem
of direction-giving. In this connection, note how J's asterisked
turn in (32) is designed to deal with these two problems at once:
through a display of sudden remembering, J manages to receive M's
answer as having been completed, and at the same time, offers a
possible new direction for further talk (ie. her own experience
with the restaurant).
As completion proposals, the particle raises, in some
sequential contexts, the further possibilities of topic closure
and conversational termination. When attached to report
components, LO may serve as a device for constructing conclusions
and punch-lines, thus proposing report completion or topic
closure. Consider two examples in (33) and (34).
(33) [MAK:1:079]
M: (jing kamyat) sik jo saa
	 M: only yesterday eat ASP
l-lunq dimsam aa
	 thirty CL dimsum PT
heh heh heh
	 heh heh heh
[only yesterday we had thirty
plates of dimsum]
J: gamyat?
	 J: today?
. ((6 turns omitted in which M reports to
. J the different kinds of food that
. made up the thirty plates))
M:	 ...	 M: ...
(.) wugok cheun-gyun lei
	
(.) taro-cake spring-rolls
lam-haa yiging goum
	
you think already so
do lak lei lam-haa mui#
	
many PT you think ever#
ung# do yan mai
	
so# many people then
.hh mui yeung leung lung	 each kind two basket
yee saam lung .hh e:
	
or three basket .hh e:
(.)	 (.)
M: monggwo-boudin
	
M: mango-pudding
(0.4)	 (0.4)
M: [di sailougo jungyi=
	
M: the kids love
[	 [taro cake, spring rolls
[	 just imagine there's a
[	 lot already, there were
[	 so many of us, we ordered
[	 two or three baskets of
[	 each kind, and mango
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(1.5)
((J then went on to initiate
J: bo::[:: gameung
M:	 [#aan di bo:(.)[haa
[
J:
	
	 [haiaa
(.)
J: yanwai odei:: haang-saan
di ye dim ji je waje
[odei m luk luk [m luk dim
[	 [
[	 [
[	 [
[	 [
[	 [
M: [haa	 [heisan
lok (.) gammai haang
-->	 haang [LO: ho
[
[
J:	 [haiaa
-->
	 haiaa o haiaa gameung LO:
[
J: ['mmm
M: =sik boudin (.) mmm-mai
(.)
--> M: mmm-mai lidi LO
*_>,
*_>
(34) [MAK:1:013] (=part of 16)
J: gam o #aak-gwai
heuidei o waa lei
bat-dim-jung
lei aa [(.) o m-ji ]=
[	 ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
M:	 [#aan di bo..]
pudding, the kids love--]
J: mmm
M: eat pudding
(.)
M: so these PT
[pudding, so that's
what we had]
(1.5)
a new topic))
J: so I fool
them I say you
eight-o'clock
come PT (.) I not-know PT
[so I fooled them and said
are you coming at 8? I
don't know]
M: late too PT
[that's too late]
J: PT like-this
M: late too PT (.) yeah
[that's too late, yeah]
J: yeah
(.)
J: because we walk-hill
GEN thing how know PT
maybe we 5 6 6 5 6 o'clock
[yeah (.) the thing about
mountain walking is you
just don't know, maybe
we'll get up at five six
six five or six]
M: yeah	 get-up
PT (.) then
walk PT right?
[yeah when we get up
we'll walk, right?]
J: yeah
yeah I yeah like-this PT
[yeah yeah I yeah
that's it]
*-->(1.1)
*-->((Following that M returns to the subject of R's not weking))
In (33) and (34), LO proposes, as in the previous examples,
turn completion. But since each of these utterances is a
component of a report, the possibility of turn-ending raises at
the same time the possibility of the completion of the report
itself. In each case, a silence (as opposed to speaker
continuation or turn transition) immediately follows the LO-
suffixed utterance. This is left until it accumulates into a
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substantial pause, following which a new topic is initiated.
Thus, when suffixed to report components, LO can be used to
propose report completion or topic closure.
Topic closure in its turn raises the possibility of
conversational termination. When, upon topic closure, no further
topic is raised, co-participants may move on to do pre-closing.
Consider an example of this in (35).
(35) [FEEL1:1:379]
1--> L: wakje 'seungsi haa yung	 L:
[goum-ge fongfaat LA
[
[
C:	 [daanhai ngo yau geng	 C:
keui je loi jo di deifong
hok-waai aamaa
perhaps try ASP use such
method PT
[you can perhaps try
using this method]
but I still afraid he
he I-mean long ASP some
place learn-bad PT
[but I'm afraid he may
pick up bad things if
he keeps going to those
places]
((24 turns omitted in which participants
deal with the problem of "bad places"
and matters arising from it))
L: jee yau ditgoumdeu ge
'haan'jai (0.4) jau m-hou
'haanjai saai 'soyau-ge-ye
C: o
2--> L: [lei seungsi haa
[
B: [tungmai jee yugwo hai
ngaak nei gewaa le ngo
seungseun nei dou yiu bei
keui jidou
(0.5)
B: jee nei m-hai-waa goum
jungyi bei keui ngaak
dou ge g[oum
[
[
[
[
C: [hai aa ngo hai
bei heui [jidou ga::
[
L:	 [mm
L: I-mean have a-little-bit-of
constraint (0.4) but don't
constrain all everything
[I mean have a little bit
of constraint, but don't
put limits on everything]
C: oh
L: you try ASP
[try it]
B: and I-mean if [MPH lie you
lie-to you if PT I
believe you also should let
him know
(0.5)
I-mean you aren't so
easy let him cheat
ASP PT so
[and I mean, if he does lie
to you, I think you should
let him know that you are
not that easy to cheat]
C: yes PT I do
let him know PT
[yes, I do let him know]
L: mm
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B: mmhm
(0.4)
B: m[m
	
3--> L:	 [hai LO
4--> (0.8)
5--> L: lei:: seung si haa aa
houmaa
C: hou aa hou aa
L: OK
C: goum m-goi-saai-lei
lowo[::
L:	 [hou aa
hou:: [hou
C:	 [baaibaai=
L: =baaibaai
B: mmhm
(0.4)
B: mm
L: yes PT
(0.8)
L: you try ASP PT alright?
[try it, OK?]
C: good PT good PT
[good good]
L: OK
C: so thank-you-very-much
PT
L: good PT
L: good good
C: bye
L: bye
Looking at the way in which the three participants co-
ordinate to bring the conversation to an end, consider three of
L's utterances in this extract. The turn arrowed 1 ("try using
this method LA") can be characterized as a candidate pre-closing,
for reasons which have been discussed in some detail in the last
chapter, where the ways in which LA contributes to the building
of pre-closings were examined. Briefly, through its placement
after a diagnosis sequence and an advice-seeking-and-giving
sequence earlier in the conversation, a suggestion that the
caller follow the counsellor's advice is regularly heard as an
invitation to move into closing. As it turns out, however, C
overlaps with a report of her "fear", with which an unmentioned
mentionable is introduced, thus initiating possible further talk
on the topic (her "fear"). This in effect erases L's candidate
pre-closing.
Later in the conversation, L makes an attempt to close the
current topic (arrow 2: "try it"). However, like the first
attempt, it is again aborted, but this time as a result of the
other counsellor's offering of an additional piece of advice.
Following these aborted efforts, L finds a place again in the
turn arrowed 3 to make yet another attempt. This is built in the
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form of a LO-suffixed confirmation ("yes LO"), signalling L's
approval of C's action as reported in the preceding turn, but in
such a way (using a bare "yes LO") as to draw the caller's
attention to the possibility of topic completion, and, through
that, conversation closure. This is met with a considerable
silence (hearable as a "pass" from the caller), providing an
auspicious environment for the movement into pre-closing,
whereupon L issues for the third time his suggestion that C "try
it". C's minimal acceptance ("good good") makes it clear that she
is now prepared to move into closing, following which the
participants proceed to an exchange of "goodbyes and bring the
conversation to an end. Thus, it can be seen that, when placed
in an appropriate sequential environment, LO can contribute to
the work of proposing conversation closure.
We have seen in this section how LO regularly raises the
possibility of completion and ending. Before moving on to the
next section, let us look at an interesting counter-example to
the analysis developed so far.
(36) [FEELI:1:586]
C: mou
(-)
ngo seung waa-bei-
lei-te::ng
(.)
ee jee ngo# yau go mantai
gaaikyut m-dou:
(.)
ngo seung man haa lei
dimyeung gaaikyut-dou hou
B: ngo dou m sik daap
mantai gaa bago lei
-->
	 jikgwun gong LO
C: no
(•)
I want
tell-you
(.)
ee I-mean I# have a problem
solve can't
(.)
I want ask ASP you
how solve should
[no I wanted to tell you
um I mean I have a problem
that I can't solve I
wanted to ask you how
to solve it]
B: I really not know answer
question PT but you
might-as-well say PT
[I don't really know how
to answer questions, but
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you might as well say it]
C: hhh hhh heh [heh heh .hhh	 C: hhh hhh heh heh
B: [hnn hnnhnn	 B: nn hnnhnn 
.hhhh	 .hhhh
C: ee ngo sik jo yau leung	 C: um I know ASP have two
go pangyau::
	
CL friend
[um I've made two friends]
The problem that (36) poses for my analysis is as follows.
The first two turns in this extract can be characterized as a
pre-sequence: the first turn seeks access to a multi-turn slot
for the doing of an extended report ("I have a problem that I
can't solve, I wanted to ask you how to solve it"); the second
turn offers a go-ahead. If, according to my analysis, completion
is a central possibility that LO regularly attends to, then the
last thing that we would expect is its being suffixed to
utterances which display an orientation to 'beginning'. But
beginning (eg. the beginning of an extended account) is precisely
what go-aheads regularly attend to, and the go-ahead in this
sequence j. 	 Thus, it appears that we have here an
instance of LO which, far from proposing some kind of ending, is
suffixed to a go-ahead that provides for the beginning of a
projected extended account.
But let us examine the arrowed turn more closely. It is
placed after an extended account proposal, ie. a position in
which a response should be done which will deal with the proposal
in some way. The turn begins in a way that can be heard as a
rejection of the proposal ("I don't really know how to answer
questions"), or else a reason for an upcoming rejection of the
proposal, ie. not offering a go-ahead. Having done that, how-
ever, B produces a conjunction ("but") that retrospectively
formulates the prior utterance as not really projecting a
rejection. Further, it marks the upcoming talk as a concession.
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Following that, a permission is finally given ("you might as well
say it LO"), in the form of a LO-suffixed go-ahead.
But this go-ahead has a special character. It is
interestingly self-contradictory. A permission is officially
given, but the person who is giving this official permission
portrays herself as not "really" being in a position to give the
permission (she "can't really answer questions", but C "might as
well" go ahead). In thus offering a go-ahead which is
inconsequential (ie. she would not be able to answer any
questions, and so there is little point for C to go on and ask
for advice), a context is created which is at odds with the
institutional context which has been operative up to this point
in their interaction, namely, that what the co-participants are
engaged in is recognizably a 'counselling session', where callers
tell their troubles and counsellors wilfully listen. In contrast
to this, an alternative reality is proposed: someone wants to
tell troubles, but the recipient is not 'really' in a position to
listen. Nevertheless, permission is given as a concession that
is necessitated by the circumstances, which ironically turns back
on the possibility of reading the situation as a counselling
session, ie. given that what they are engaged in is a counselling
session, it would be natural and only-reasonable for the
counsellor to give a go-ahead when a caller projects an extended
account. By building the go-ahead as a concession, B manages to
play on the relationship between a counselling context in which
she is a counsellor and one in which she is not 'really' a
counsellor.
Thus, partly through the work of LO, B's go-ahead acquires a
contradictory character. It is officially an invitation for an
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account to begin, but it is constructed in such a way that it can
be heard as 'really' meaning that an account should not begin.
In response to this, C produces laughter, displaying her inten-
tion to hear B's contradictory go-ahead as a joke, and, in so
doing, proposes to restore the counselling context. B then
confirms this hearing by producing laughter herself, displaying
her own treatment of the problematic turn as a joke, thus accept-
ing C's. proposal to return to the counselling context.
Notice that an utterance like "gong LO" ("say it LO") in
this kind of sequential context could be heard as an
unwillingness to listen. A certain sense of reluctance could be
read into this kind of LO-suffixed go-ahead because they are
invitations to proceed which are portrayed as being offered as a
result of the interlocutor's asking (hence a sense of "since you
asked"). In this particular example, however, this reading is
kept in the background, as the co-participants make a concerted
effort to treat the problematic turn as non-serious.
This example suggests that there are ways in which the
potentials of LO can be exploited to build into an utterance
which officially attends to beginning and continuation, an
implicit completion/termination proposal that contradicts it.
Therefore, far from being a counter-example, this extract
provides further evidence that supports my account.
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2-> J: hai-mai hou do yan aa=	 J:
3-> M: =aa m ngo deng-jo wai LO:: M:
8. The Management of Continuation and Extension : LA and LO
It would be wrong to construe 'completion proposal' as a
device that more or less automatically triggers turn transition.
A completion proposal may be dealt with in various ways, and the
co-ordination to end a turn and effect transition is but one of
many possibilities. For instance, we have seen in the last
section extracts in which what comes after LO is silence. An
examination of the data revealed that post-LO silences are
handled in two main ways. They may be lengthened and turned into
a substantial pause (of, say, one second's duration or more), and
used to mark a topic boundary, as we have seen in the previous
section. But another way of handling silence in this environment
is for the speaker to pursue a response. In so doing the
participants will be involved in the business of producing an
extension. The phenomenon of extension, and the related
phenomenon of continuation, are of special interest to this study
for the light that they throw on the two particles LA and LO in
particular, and the Cantonese particle system in general. For
this reason, they will be examined separately in this section.
To begin with, consider an example in which a speaker, upon
the occurrence of silence following a LO-suffixed utterance,
pursues a response.
(37) [MAK:1:044] (=(8))
M: hai laa:: ngodei gamyat	 M:
dou yiu# heui la#
ngodei saa-at-dim-jung
heui yamchaa laa ha ha ha 
1->	 deng-jo wai
yes PT we today
also want# go PT
we eleven-o'clock
go have-tea PT ha ha ha 
reserved seats
[yes today we also want#
went we went to have tea at
eleven (we had) reserved
a table]
whether very many people PT
[was it crowded]
=PT m I reserved seats PT
[um I had reserved seats]
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4->	 (0.4)	 (0.4)
5-> M: ngo mai waa:-teng [ngo=	 M: I EMPH told-you I
[	 [didn't I tell you]
6-> J:	 [o o o	 J: yeah yeah yeah
M: =seung singkei-luk heui	 M: last Saturday go reserve PT
deng-ding aamaa=	 [last Saturday I went and
reserved ((a table))]
From the point of view of LO as a completion proposal, it
may seem problematic that M's LO-suffixed utterance (arrow 3)
does not immediately effect turn-transition. Instead, the
current speaker (M) goes on talking. But the observation that LO
functions as an ending-proposal does not mean that it could end a
turn unilaterally. The co-ordinated character of endings must be
emphasized. The point is not whether LO effects turn transition
upon its every occurrence, but rather, how the next action is
designed in ways that are responsive to its sequential
implications. The LO-suffixed utterance is followed, in this
instance, by a silence (arrow 4), which can be heard by the
speaker as signalling possible trouble such as non-understanding
or non-recognition on the part of the recipient. How do the
participants deal with this problem?
One way of dealing with this problem is for the speaker to
pursue a response. And this is what M seems to be doing in the
utterance following the silence (ie. arrow 5). Starting with J's
turn arrowed 2 ("was it crowded?"), M delivers a response (arrow
3) which is designed to show that, while it does not directly
provide an answer to the question, nevertheless an answer can be
inferred from it (cf. the dependency feature of LO discussed
earlier). The point of interest here is that M, upon seeing in
the silence following her answer (arrow 4) that she has failed to
get a response from the co-participant, issues further talk after
the silence. What is the nature of this talk? In what sense can
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it be described as an extension of the pre-silence utterance?
M's post-silence utterance takes the form of a confirmation-
seeking reminder (arrow 5: "didn't I tell you ...") --a reminder
that she has told J that she had made a seat reservation.
Issuing confirmation-seeking reminders is a way of 'getting facts
straight', and has in an independent study (of English
conversation) been found to be a regular way of pursuing a
response. Pomerantz (1984b) presents interesting evidence to
show that one of the three methods for the pursuance of a
response is to go over the facts and information, which are
assumed to be known by the recipient, on which the original
utterance was based. Here in (37), what M does after the
silence is precisely this: she goes over the fact that she had
told J before that she had made a seat reservation. From this
known fact, one should be able to deduce that she would not have
had any problem in getting seats, and so the question whether the
restaurant was crowded would have been answered.
In the sense that it is an act of pursuing a response upon
not getting one the first time round, M's reminder is perceived
by the interactants as an extension of the previous utterance
rather than a continuation (eg. in the sense of LA being a
continuation proposal). As a piece of evidence, note how J, in
response to this reminder, issues a change-of-state display
(arrow 6), signalling her remembering now of the fact that M has
indeed told her about the seat reservation before. Following
that, the question about crowdedness is abandoned.
Consider next a more complicated case, in which M is giving
P, a classmate of his, an account of MBasic, a programming
language that he "likes most".
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(38) [SS:CH:1:227]
M: ... jeui jungyi hai MBasic M: ... most like be MBasic
(.)
.hh MBasic le: hoyi .hh
jik-cheut printer
(0.6)
M: .hh jee peyu# ee::::
(.)
list jo go program le
msai waa P R jeat gaamaa=
P: =ha#=
M: =keui a# L L list
jau-dak la#
(0.3)
M: jee line printer
P: o:[:
M:	 [line printer list jo
heui mmaa-dak la#
(0.8)
M: waje hai .hh ee jaumm
L print le L print yau
(.)
print gogo statement
1-->	 lokheui LO
(0.2)
M: yau msai hoi P R jeat
.hhh jau msai
2-->	 cheut go P R jeat
cheut-lei LO::
(0.3)
P: run le
(0.3)
P: e-lou:: run aa
(0.3)
M: msai e-lou run
(0.3)
M: jaugoum run aa dak=
P: =run
(0.4)
P: m[m
(.)
.hh MBasic PT can .hh
straight-out printer
[I like MBasic most, MBasic
can go straight out to the
printer]
(0.6)
M: .hh I-mean like um
(.)
list ASP CL program PT
no-need-to say P R #1 PT
[I mean like um listing a
program there's no need to
say PR#1]
P: yeah
M: it PT L L list
will-do PT
[L-List will do]
(0.3)
M: that-is line printer
.)ine printer that is]
P: I-see
M: line printer list ASP
it will-do PT
[line printer list it,
that'll do]
(0.8)
M: or be .hh um just
L print PT L print also
(.)
print the statement
down PT
(0.2)
M: also no-need-to open P R #1
.hhh then no-need-to
show CL P R #1
out PT
[or um just Lprint, Lprint
will print the statement,
no need to open PR#1, no
need to show PR#1]
(0.3)
P: run PT
[what about run]
(0.3)
P: L run PT
[Lrun?]
(0.3)
M: no-need-to L run
[You don't need LRun]
(0.3)
M: just run PT can
[just Run will do]
P: run
(0.4)
P: mm
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(0.8)
P: o:
(0.5)
M: hou-waan aa MBasic=
P: =goum yugo jinghai
cheut go::::
(0.3)
P: pin# ee mon le
(0.7)
M: jinghai cheut go mo#
4-->	 m-sal jaumm print LO
M: [run
(1.3)
M: goummm lei-di result
dosou hai print lokheui
aamaa goum a gaa L
3-->	 lokheui LO:
(0.3)
5-->M: [msai e-lou LO
[
P: [(msai)
(0.4)
M: L gaa maai lok mai
6-->	 printer LO
P: o:::
(0.6)
M: hou-waan
M: run
(1.3)
M: so your result usually be
usually be print down
PT so PT add L
down PT
[so your results are usually
printed, so you add L]
(0.8)
P: oh
(0.5)
M: fun PT MBasic
[MBasic is fun]
P: so if only
output CL
(0.3)
P: pin# um monitor PT
[what if you only want to
see it on the monitor]
(0.7)
M: only output CL mo#
no-need-to just print PT
only outputting to the
mo((nitor)), you don't need
to, just Print]
(0.3)
M: no-need-to L PT
[you don't need L]
P: (no-need)
(0.4)
lok	 M: L add ASP down then down
printer PT
[if you add L, it'll go
to the printer]
P: I see
(0.6)
M: fun
The main interest of this episode lies in the light that it
sheds on the connection between LO on the one hand, and the
notions of 'ending' and 'extension' on the other.
One way of looking at the kind of work that LO performs in
this episode is to consider its contribution to topic organiza-
tion. In terms of topic organization, we may think of the
episode as a whole as a 'unit' (with "MBasic" as the topic), and
refer to its sub-units as "sections". But sections are only
identifiable as sections retrospectively. At the moment in which
each section reaches a point of possible completion, there arises
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concomitantly the possibility of unit closure, ie. each section
is itself a candidate unit.
Consider then the way in which the participants deal with
the problem of unit-closure. M starts with the feature "can go
straight out to the printer" as a thing that he likes about
MBasic, and explains how it works by describing the command
"LList". When that is done, he moves on to a second feature,
"LPrint". This second feature is formulated with a LO-suffixed
utterance (arrow 1: "LPrint will print the statement LO"), which
can be heard as marking the completion of a feature formulation,
ie. it signals that the description of a feature of MBasic has
reached a possible point of completion. In the context of a
report, this raises the further possibility of 'end of report'.
That is, the completion of a description opens up the possibility
of the completion of the report, ie. talk on the current topic
("MBasic"). In this sense, this utterance can be heard as a
unit-closure proposal. It is met, however, with no response
(such as an acknowledgement of receipt) from the recipient.
Hearing in the silence following LO (0.2 second in arrow 1)
potential non-understanding or non-recognition, M produces a
second LO-suffixed utterance (arrow 2: "no need to open PR#1 no
need to show PR#1 LO"). This second LO-suffixed utterance has
one central property. It is, like the last utterance, also a
description of LPrint. However, it is not just any description
of [Print, but one that is built in the form of a supplementation
or elaboration of the last formulation (elaborating "[Print can
print a statement" with, in effect, "without entering PR#1"). In
being so designed, it retrospectively formulates the preceding
silence as signalling possible non-understanding, and a possible
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need for supplementation and elaboration. More importantly, it
retrospectively formulates the last LO-suffixed utterance as an
extendible. This then, like the previous example, is an instance
of one kind of extension, a "speaker-initiated extension" in
which the current speaker, upon not getting some response from
the recipient to a unit-closure proposal, produces further talk,
by building the next utterance as a supplement, detailing, or
elaboration of the pre-silence one.
Being itself a LO-construction, the supplementary
formulation (arrow 2) raises again the possibility of unit
closure. P offers a response this time, although not in a way
that can be heard as agreeing to the ending proposal. Rather,
his response ("what about Run?") initiates a new direction in
which talk on the topic can be extended. In this sense, it is a
hearer-initiated extension, or an "extension invitation". Upon
the occasion of this invitation, M extends his account by dealing
with the feature "Run". Having dealt with it, he returns to the
LPrint feature by issuing another LO-suffixed utterance (arrow 3:
"so your results are usually printed, so you add L LO"), thus
proposing unit closure for the second time. Following a consider-
able silence (0.8 second), during which M could have, but did not
initiate extension, P produces a receipt token, in the form of a
free-standing "o:" ("I see"), which makes unit closure now seem a
'real possibility'. In response to that, M re-issues a positive
assessment of MBasic, evidently attempting to close the topic.
Just when unit closure seems imminent, however, P issues a
second extension invitation, raising this time the question of
outputting to the monitor. The topic-talk gets extended even
further, with M dealing with the question in a succession of LO-
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suffixed utterances, each of which is followed by a silence
("just Print LO" (arrow 4); "no need for L LO" (arrow 5); and "if
you add L, it'll go to the printer LO" (arrow 6)). Upon the
occurrence of LO in each of the first two report components, the
possibility of unit closure arises, but P offers no response. As
it turns out, the completion proposal that comes with the third
description (arrow 6) is finally responded to with a receipt and
change-of-state display ("o:::" [I see::]), one that is free-
standing, and not accompanied by a further extension invitation.
This is evidently heard by M as a possible agreement to end the
current topic, as seen in his response: a reiteration (for the
third time) of his positive assessment of MBasic, ie. 'filling'
the turn in such a way that nothing new is said, constituting a
possible topic-boundary. This time neither participant deals with
the matter any further, thus mutually bringing the sequence to
an end. Subsequently, following a long silence, a new topic gets
generated.
Note that, unlike the extended accounts that were examined
in the last chapter in connection with LA, M's series of LO-
suffixed descriptions of MBasic has quite a different kind of
organization. When a LO-suffixed utterance is used to present a
feature of MBasic, the feature is presented as 'complete', in the
sense that this is all that the speaker has to offer for the
moment. The speaker (M) does sometimes 'go on' to deliver
further descriptions, but this is done in a way that
retrospectively formulates the LO-suffixed utterance as an
extendible --a detailing, elaboration or rephrasing of the
previous utterance. In extended accounts which make use of LA,
continuation is conditional not upon the recipient's production
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of extension invitations (recipients' questions would, as we saw
in the last chapter, be dealt with as side-issues to the main
project). In reportings that make use of LO, further
descriptions are presented as occasioned, 'brought up', not
'planned' or 'promised'. They are offered as after-thoughts,
additions, and elaborations rather than projected continuations.
As a final example of the way participants deal with the
problem of unit closure, consider (39), an extract in which C
describes to B and L a problem she is facing as the 'reason for
the call'. It will be seen that, contrary to LA, which has a
forward-looking quality, LO has a backward-looking quality. Also,
it passes the responsibility on to the recipient to provide a
direction for further talk, if further talk is indeed invited.
(39) [FEEL1:1:587]
C: ee ngo sik jo yau leung 	 C: um I know ASP have two
go pangyau::
	
CL friend
[um I've made two friends]
B: o=
	
B: oh
C: =keuidei dou deui ngo
	
C: they both to me
hou hou ge
	
very good PT
[they're both very nice
to me]
B: m[hm
	
B: mhm
C: [daa ngo yau m ji#
	
C: but I yet not know
(-)	 (-)
jee#	 I-mean#
(0.4)	 (0.4)
1-->C: jee# jungyi bingo 	 C: I-mean love which-one
hou LO:	 should PT
[but I don't know, I mean,
I mean, which one I should
love]
B: goum keuidei iigaa yiu nei B: so they now want you
syunjaak me	 choose PT
[well do they want you to
choose now]
(0.9)	 (0.9)
C: jee#	 C: I-mean
(0.4)	 (0.4)
C: jee mou yat fong-bing	 C: I-mean not one side
(-)	 (-)
jee yiu o (.)
	
I-mean want me
(-)
	 (-)
2-->
	 jee kyutding LO::	 I-mean decide PT
[I mean, I mean neither has
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(0.9)
C: leung go dou
aa [leung go
B: [waa gown
C: =jou ge::
(.)
jou-ge-ye dou
4-->
	 chaa--m-do LO
chaa-m-do
jou# jee]=
hou aa ]
L: goum aa "yu-yu-hung-
jeung-bat-lang- gim-dak"
go[bo
C:	 Phai aa soyi
(0.3)
B: o o leuung go d ee .hhh
.hhh goummmmm nei jungyi
bingo dodi aa
C: leung go dou
chaa-bat-do aa
(leung [go do]u) 'jee
B: [hamaa ]
C: =.hhh leunnn (.)
(.)
hoklik aa:
(.)
jilik aa leung go dou
3-->	 chaa-m-do [LO:
B: [waa=
=goum hou goo=
C: =hhh hhh [heh heh heh heh
B:	 [heh heh heh heh
asked me to decide]
(0.3)
B: oh oh two CL both d um .hhh
.hhh so you love
which-one more PT
[oh oh both .hhh so which
one do you love more]
C: two CL both
about-the-same PT
(both) I-mean
[about the same, (both)
I mean]
B: is-that-so
C: .hhh in-terms-of
(.)
education PT
(.)
qualification PT two CL
both about-the-same PT
[in terms of education and
qualification they're
about the same]
B: oh so good PT
[oh that's really good]
C: hhh hhh heh heh heh heh
B: heh heh heh heh
. ((9 turns omitted in which
. participants dealt with B's
professed "envy" of C's good
fortune of "having two boyfriends"))
:::mmm goum B: is-that-so .hhh um so
you ee:::
(.)
ge chimjat	 feel which-one GEN potential
(.)
better or
interesting more PT
[really? .hh um so you um
which one do you think has
more potential or more
interesting]
(0.9)
C: two CL both about-the-same
PT two CL do I-mean
B: oh so good PT
C: do GEN
(.)
do GEN work both
about-the-same PT
[they are about the same,
I mean, their jobs are
about the same]
L: so PT "fish-and-bear-palm-
one-can't-have-both"
PT
C: yes PT so one very afraid
B: =hawaa .hhh aa:
nei::: ee:::
(.)
gokdak bingo:::
(.)
hou-di waje
cheuimeising do-di aa
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leaa hou ge:ng	 two CL both
(.)	 (.)
leung go dou	 lost PT
5-->	 sat-jo-heui LO:	 [exactly, I fear that one
might lose both]
(0.3)	 (0.3)
B: mhm	 B: mhm
L: mm	 L: mm
B: dou-mmai-yat-ding ge::	 B: not-necessarily PT these
lidi:: gaijuk haang- 	 these continue going-
6-->	 jyu-sin tai:-ding-di LO: 	 out wait-and-see PT
[well not necessarily, keep
going out and wait and see]
(39) can be characterized as a consultation sequence in
which C, the 'patient', gives a series of reports on her problems
under the direction of B, the counsellor. While the reporter is
supposed to know the circumstances that are relevant to her
troubles, she is ironically not supposed to know 'what really
went wrong' --in any case, what the cure or solution to the
trouble might be, the point of this kind of troubles-telling
being, after all, consultation. The sequence proceeds in this
way: in each report component, the reporter presents a
description of her situation, ending in a way that suggests that
the report has come to a point of possible completion. Each LO-
suffixed utterance is used to mark such a boundary. This means
that the patient will stop and wait for further directions from
the counsellor in order to provide her with further 'symptoms'.
Each of the first three instances of LO (arrows 1, 2 and 3)
is followed by a question from B, one of the counsellors, that
invites report extension in an indicated direction. Upon the
completion of C's fourth LO-suffixed utterance, L, the other
counsellor, delivers a proverbial ("fish and bear-palm, one can't
have both"). Schegloff and Sacks (1973:306) suggest that one use
of "proverbial or aphoristic formulations of conventional wisdom"
is as a "topic-bounding technique". That is, a proverbial
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formulation of convention wisdom can be offered by a recipient as
a means of inviting topic-closure or conversation-closure. In the
light of these observations, L's utterance in question can be
seen as doing a similar kind of work: it proposes a boundary (an
end) to the troubles-telling by indicating that the information
given by C has been sufficient, that her problem has been
understood, can be summarized, perhaps even diagnosed. In
response to this proverbial, C produces a LO-suffixed
confirmation, (arrow 5: "exactly, so one might lose both LO")
which endorses L's summary as fitting the known facts, and moves
into unit closure.
That the fact-finding (symptom-finding) project is heard as
having come to an achieved end can be seen in B's subsequent turn
(following confirmation tokens from both counsellors), in which
B, having now identified C's problem, offers an advice/solution
(arrow 6). This provides evidence of her hearing of the
diagnosis sequence as having come to an end: the diagnosis having
reached a point of completion, the offering of advice can then be
done as a proper next activity.
It should be clear from these examples how, upon the
occurrence of LO, various procedures are available to
conversational participants to produce extensions. Thus there
does not exist a simple mechanism whereby whenever an utterance
ends in LO (or, for that matter, any other particle), it will
automatically signal the end of a report or a story or whatever.
Far from it; reports and stories and other sequences can be
extended in various ways, but the extension has a distinctly
different kind of organization from that which was encountered in
reportings using LA in the last chapter. The crucial point is
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that LO has sequential implications quite distinct from those of
LA. Rather than marking the following as a subsidiary task (a
side sequence) relevant to the continuation of the main project,
LO throws wide open the direction in which subsequent talk can
move. Instead of looking forward to a continuation, LO looks
backward to a sequence or sub-sequence as having now been
potentially completed, and at the same time passes the
'responsibility' on to the other participant(s) to take the
conversation in some as yet undetermined direction.
The functions of the particles LA and LO are, from this
point of view, diametrically opposed to each other. In this
respect, LA and LO are particles that, as it were, look in two
different directions in discourse. LA instructs the hearer to
look forward for more things to come, so that the full sense and
import of the present utterance can be determined at a later
point in the talk. For instance, the significance of assuming a
certain common ground will not become clear until a later point
in the conversation. LO, on the other hand, invites co-
participants to look backward so as to locate facts and
information in the background which would help determine the
sense and significance of the current utterance.
This contrastive account will explain a whole array of
differences in the distributional and co-occurrence behaviour of
the two particles.
(1) Receipt tokens like "o:::" ("I see"), "hawaa" ("did
you", was it", etc.), and "janhai?" ("really?") are often found
following LO, but not LA. This can be explicated given the
analyses proposed for these two particles so far. According to
this account, LA regularly seeks or records the sharing of common
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ground, in order to move on with the current project (eg.
reporting), whereas LO is regularly used to signal the end or
conclusion of the current action, in order to bring the relevant
action sequence to a point of completion. Thus when, for
example, a report component is suffixed with LA, it normally
signals the speaker's intention to check out the ground so far
shared in order to continue, but when a report component is
suffixed with LO, the aim normally is to propose that the report
has come to a point of possible completion. Also, the
information contained in the LO-suffixed report-component need
not be shared by the recipient (in fact it usually is not known
to the recipient). This is why LO is often followed by such
receipt tokens, but not LA.
(2) "lei ji" ("you know") is regularly suffixed with LA, but
not LO. Not that LO is never suffixed to "you know" --it is,--
but when it is, it means something like "the fact is that you
know", and cannot be used to check out common ground. This obser-
vation is readily explicable in terms of my analyses. Also, "you
know LA" is regularly followed by more talk within the same turn
from the current speaker, detailing what it is that is being
claimed to be shared..
(3) When LA is not responded to, the speaker would simply
assume that the common ground being referred to is available, and
would continue with the on-going project. When LO is not met
with a response such as acknowledgement, however, what follows is
usually some elaboration, in which the speaker pursues some
display of understanding. Alternatively, the silence may be
construed as an endorsement of topic closure. This has been
discussed above, so I won't go into it again.
205
which in relation to the
last chapter.
(4) My account would also naturally explain why continuers
like "mhm" and "mm" regularly follow LA, but less regularly LO.
Being 'tickets' for continuation, these tokens are used to give
the clearance that LA regularly seeks. On the other hand, when
this kind of continuer is given in response to LO, they are often
hearable as 'not really understanding (yet) what is being done in
the LO-suffixed turn', thus generating elaborations and explica-
tions. It also seems that there is some kind of limit to how
long this elaboration and explication business can go on (3 or 4
at the most, apparently), but for LA, the continuation can go on
for quite long.
(5) One of the most notable differences between "hai LA"
("yes LA") and "hai LO" ("yes LO") is that while the former
usually generates more talk from the speaker, "hai LO" often
occurs singly. Again, this follows naturally from my analyses,
which would predict that a LA-suffixed-yes 'promises' further
talk on the topic, but a LO-suffixed-yes will often be the
speaker's whole contribution for the moment.
As an interesting illustration of some of these features,
consider extract (40), an analysis of
particle LA has been presented in the
(40) [SS:D2:178]
1 I: goum hokhaau leuibin
2	 yaumou di matye clubs
3	 lei yau::
4	 (0.7)
5 I: e:: yaumou join-dou
6	 di matye club
7 A: e::: poutungwaa LA::
8	 [.hh
91: [mm
10 A: science club LA:
11 I: mm
12 A: e#
I: so school in
whether some what clubs
you have
(0.7)
I: e:: whether joined
some what club
[so are there some clubs
in the school? have you
joined some clubs?]
A: e: Putonghua PT
.hh
I: mm
A: science club PT
I: mm
A: e#
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13	 (1.5)
14 A: jung yau: me (.)
15	 astronomy LA::=
161: =mm
17 A: .hh e::::m
18 (0.9)
19 A: table tennis LA:: hh hh
20	 [.hhh .hh heh heh]
21 I: [mm hou do wo ha#]
(1.5)
A: other there-be what (.)
astronomy PT
[what else (.) astronomy]
I: mm
A: .hh e:::m
(0.9)
A: table tennis PT hh hh
.hhh .hh heh heh
I: mm very many PT yeah
[mm such a lot]
22 A: heh heh heh heh A:	 heh heh heh heh
23	 I: ha# I: yeah
24 A: hai-goum LO A:	 like-that PT
[that's	 it]
Throughout this episode, I provides continuers and waits for
further items to be delivered upon the occurrence of every
instance of LA, until the last line, in which LO indicates that
the listing has reached a possible point of completion. Since
this episode has already been analyzed in the last chapter, and
since many interesting features can be readily seen on the basis
of the above discussion, I will not go into any details here.
To summarize, from the point of view of how continuations
and extensions are interactionally managed in conversation, the
major difference between the particles LA and LO can most briefly
be stated as follows: LA has a 'forward-looking' character, while
LO has a 'backward-looking' character. LA seeks some kind of
clearance in order to . 'move on', while LO ties what is being said
to what has been said before, or else proposes that what has just
been said can stand as the whole contribution at the moment,
leaving it up to the other participant(s) to take the
conversation in some as yet undetermined direction.
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9. LO and the Production of Realities
9.1 The Uses of LO
In very general terms, the particle LO makes available to
conversational participants a means with which they can indicate
to each other that the full sense and interactional import of
what is being said is to be determined by reading the current
utterance in such a way as to link it up with something else.
More accurately, the current utterance --be it a description,
representation, report, account, suggestion, advice, agreement,
confirmation, or whatever--is to be interpreted as entering into
a dependency relation (as described in Section 8) with some
state-of-affairs.
Thus, this particle is not a simple device with which
utterances are marked as belonging to certain semantic,
pragmatic, or logical categories. It would be a futile exercise
to try and define an intrinsic or original meaning of the
particle, or even a small number of basic meanings. The
contribution of individual instances of the particle in
particular sequential environments to the overall sense of
particular utterances and to the performance of particular
interactional tasks will always be an occasioned accomplishment.
The particle provides nothing more than a 'loose index', point4ng
to ways of reading and interpreting.
For instance, while LO is sometimes read as indicating a
cause-effect relation, it does not invariably mark an utterance
as "cause" or "effect" as such. An utterance like chi-jo LO
(late LO) in the right contexts can be taken to mean "Because I
was late, therefore [eg. I missed the lecture]" or "Because [eg.
there was a traffic jam], therefore I was late". Rather than
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marking a proposition as "cause" or "effect", "premise" or
"conclusion", "circumstance" or "action", what LO does is to
invite co-participants to assign a dependency reading to the
utterance. In addition, it displays the speaker's assumption
that the co-participant can be relied on to assign those links
and connections that are needed for the utterance's
interpretation.
From the point of view of conversational organization, one
problem that this particle serves as a means to tackle is what I
have referred to as the 'course-charting problem'. By that I
mean the problem of making it mutually clear 'where in the course
of some conversation the participants are' at any given point. in
time, and the related problem of 'how to go on, where to go from
here'. In this respect, LO sets up a turn transition relevance
place in such a way that 'ending' is highlighted as a central
possibility. How it is dealt with is of course tied up with what
kind of an action this current action is. For instance, if the
current action is hearable as 'doing a request', then the
completion of this action sets up a constraint on what the next
might be (eg. dealing with the possibilities of granting or non-
granting). If, however, this occurs at a place that can be heard
as 'at the end' of a report, then it might be a possible thing to
do in the next slot to receive the report in a way that would
reconstruct the last as a topic-closure proposal by 'agreeing
with' it, thus possibly setting up a topic-boundary.
Further, should turn transition occur, then very often in
that next turn, a new direction is provided for further talk to
proceed. The part played by LO in this is that it points to the
possibility, stronger in some sequential contexts than others, of
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the talk moving off in a new direction, a direction which has yet
to be determined up to the point when it occurs. From this point
of view, LO is a means of passing on to one's co-participants the
responsibility of providing a direction for further talk.
In the light of the observations made so far concerning LO's
dependency and completion-proposal properties, let us examine
several apparently widely shared intuitions about what this
particle means.
9.2 Conclusions and punch lines
The conclusion of a report, the punch line of a joke,
the end result of a reasoning process and the like, often take
the form of a LO-suffixed utterance. This is anything but a
mystery given the observations made earlier about dependency: the
sense and significance of these propositions are typically
derived from linking them up with what comes before. Notice,
however, that from the point of view of conversational course-
charting, these conclusions and punch lines are prime candidates
for proposing topic closure. Thus in these constructs one can
see more clearly the connection between the particle's dependency
and completion-proposal features.
9.3 Unnoteworthiness and Obviousness
"To point out what is obvious" (Kwok 1984:58) is
sometimes regarded as one of the meanings of LO. Let us examine
this in terms of the notion of 'noteworthiness'.
A recurrent concern among participants in ordinary conversa-
tion is whether something is noteworthy. By noteworthiness I do
not mean the more familiar problem of newsworthiness. The
problem of newsworthiness has to do with whether the recipient
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already knows what the speaker wants to say. Noteworthiness,
however, refers to a different kind of concern. The problem goes
something like this. In showing recipients that and/or what they
know about something, conversational participants are faced with
a problem of presentation. Knowledge can be presented in a
variety of ways. One decision that often needs to be made is
whether to present some knowledge as something that is ordinary
or extraordinary. This is quite different from the question of
whether the recipient already knows. A speaker may have reason to
believe that the hearer does not already know something, but the
problem still arises as to whether this piece of information that
is unknown to him should be presented as ordinary or othertAise.
For example, when asked what time the train leaves, I may,
knowing full well that the asker does not know what time the
train leaves, still have a 'choice'. I can tell you the time the
train leaves in a way that presents this information as something
that, while you do not already know, should not appear to you to
be in any way unusual or noteworthy.
One regular way of portraying states-of-affairs as
unnoteworthy is to set them against a certain background of
circumstances and conditions in the light of which their
reasonableness and naturalness can be appreciated. LO provides
in this sense a means of constructing natural, reasonable, and
unnoteworthy descriptions. In this we find a basis for the
intuition that this particle "means that something is obvious".
9.4 The "explanation" reading
Another recurrent reading of this particle is that it is
used to "explain things". To say "that's why you need to do
that" is not only to advise or suggest but also to back up the
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advice or suggestion with a reason or justification. Similarly,
it is one thing to tell you that this object in front of me is a
table, and quite another thing to tell you that that's what it
is. The difference is that in the latter case, the utterance can
be read within a context in which an account is somehow being
called for. That is, it will involve a relational reading, one
that is partly induced by LO, in which the description is related
to some circumstances with reference to which it can be heard as
an instruction, demonstration, explanation, and the like. It has
been shown (Pomerantz 1986) that states-of-affairs can be
portrayed in ways which would 'dustify at‘ actkoW, 4a. .e6- action
can be reported in such a way as to show that it is a reasonable
thing to do in the form of "extreme case formulations" (such as
"everyone", "all", "every time"). From this point of view LO is
a means of making such portrayals. A state-of-affairs can be
presented through LO as an objective fact, a reasonable action,
or a necessary, unavoidable event that arises from some given
situation.
9.5 Uncommunicativeness and Irresponsibility
Finally, consider the ways in which, on the basis of
this particle's properties, psychological predicates are ascribed
to social agents, as intentions and motives behind their actions;
as attitude and state of mind; or as more permanent personality
traits, even group attributes and character.
As a clear formulation of an intuition about what this
particle means --what it tells us about the speaker, consider the
following explicit description by a University lecturer in Hong
Kong of "problematic youths in society" as habitual users of LO,
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and their "psychology" and "mentality", as evidenced in their
frequent use of this particle on TV programmes in which they are
interviewed by journalists, counsellors, social workers, and
educationists. (Note, in this connection, that "reluctance" has
also been recorded as an attribute that is closely associated
with the particle LO in Yau 1965:314)
"[The use of LO] shows that the speaker is reluctant [to
talk or communicate], and unwilling to take up responsi-
bilities. [In response to questions in interviews], all that
they manage to do is to repeat other people's words
uncritically.	 [In their behaviour], they do little more
than imitate what others say is the in-thing to do." (Siu
1985:77; my translation)
This comment provides a series of explicitly fumulated
psychological predicates that are attributed to a social group on
the basis of their frequent use of the particle LO. It should be
clear from what has been said about LO in this chapter that these
ascriptions can be systematically accommodated in my analysis. A
basis for the "reluctant" and "uncommunicative" readings can be
found in the particle's conversation organizational properties:
it is a completion proposal, marking the talk up to that point as
the whole contribution, and a means of passing on to the co-
participant the 'responsibility' of providing a direction for
further talk. Hence impressions like "the speaker does not
really want to talk".
But this is precisely the kind of impression that these
"problematic youths" are managing through their talk. From the
point of view of the present analysis, the tendency of these
persons to use a great deal of LO in their speech in situations
in which they are being interviewed can be seen in terms of how
the social scene called 'an interview' is managed and produced.
The bad impression that is created by these sloppy, reticent and
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uncooperative youths contributes to the feeling that these
interviews are somehow unsatisfactory. To examine the part
played by LO in these unsatisfactory interviews, let us contrast
them with ordinary, satisfactory interviews. To put it very
crudely, in an ordinary interview, an interviewer is expected to
ask a series of questions and an interviewee willingly and
happily answer the questions. The interviewee, that is to say,
is expected to display (in many different ways) cooperativeness.
One of the reasons why an interview "doesn't feel right", then,
is that the interviewee withholds such cooperativeness displays.
From the point of view of an interview as a joint
production, its success will depend crucially on whether the two
parties involved (interviewer and interviewee) subscribe to the
same reality and inhabit the same discourse. But clearly an
interviewee may not accept the institutional definition of the
situation. According to this definition, an investigative
interview (of this kind to be shown on TV) is one in which the
aim is to objectively and dispassionately find out the roots and
causes of a variety of "social problems". Within such a project,
the role of the interviewee is to provide information that may
throw certain light on the causes of these problems. More
importantly, however, the interviewee is to, under the guidance
of the interviewer, analyse their own problems and to lay them
open for all to see. The aim of that is to show to the audience
how a problematic personality can be guided gradually towards a
realization of his/her own inadequacies and mistakes. In short,
the problematic youth is to be made to publicly admit that he/she
is sick.
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Being laid on the operation table, as a specimen of a
(social) disease, and being dissected and examined in the public
eye, the problematic youth may refuse to take part in the
complicity that is required to jointly and successfully produce
the interview. They may try to defend themselves by refusing to
accept the premise that there is something wrong with them that
society would benefit from finding out about. I wish to suggest
that one of the devices that can contribute to the management of
that resistance is the particle LO. Through the use of this
particle, answers can be formulated as facts that are
unnoteworthy and simply known to be so, or as natural and
reasonable consequences of conditions and circum-stances. In
addition, the particle would propose to end the turn, stop there,
and leave the business of continuing to come up with probing
questions to someone who regards that as a worth-while activity.
Thus, equipped with LO and other resources, the problematic youth
works towards undermining the investigative interview as it is
institutionally defined by refusing to buy that reality --
refusing, literally, to speak its language.
Looking at it in this way, LO can be characterized as the
grammaticalization of a means to deal with an interactional
problem that participants in conversation are faced with from
time to time. This is bound up with the question of how
realities are presented and interpreted. What counts as an
objective fact? What counts as a warranted inference? What is a
reasonable thing to do in some situation? These are recurrent
concerns of social agents in interaction. The properties of LO
show clearly that, far from being given, 'objective reality' is
constructed in the details of social interaction. We present to
215
each other pictures of the objective world: what things are in
it, what they are like, what laws govern their behaviour. The
problem for pragmatics and sociolinguistics is therefore not how
to identify action-types and event-types, etc. on the one hand,
and linguistic means of realizing them on the other; and then try
and link them up in some way. Rather, what seems to be going on
in linguistic interaction is that realities are constructed,
presented, attacked, defended, shared, and modified in and
through language. An 'ordinary object' for instance, does not
have some set of essential features that, when measured against
some universal principles, will make it 'an ordinary object'.
Rather, it can be formulated as an ordinary object, ie. its
status as an ordinary object is closely bound up with the way it
is presented and interpreted in interaction. In this sense LO is
a linguistic resource that facilitates and constrains the
construction and negotiation of realities as interactional
achievements.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPECTATION AND NOTEWORTHINESS:
THE UTTERANCE PARTICLE WO
The linguistic object represented throughout this
chapter, both in the text and the transcripts, as WO (in
capital letters) refers to the utterance particle which has
the segmental shape /wo/ in mid-level tone. It is variously
represented in the literature as wo, wo44,-Iwo, and wo3 (ie.
/wo/ in tone 3). There are two other particles in Cantonese
which have the same segmental shape but different tones:
wo24 (low-rising), and wo21 (low-falling). But they will
not be studied in this chapter.'
WO has two major variant forms: /wo44/ and /bo44/. In
fact, some studies in the past have referred to this
particle as "bo". For instance, Kwok (1984:93) observes
that "bo44 [is] sometimes pronounced as wo44". But the /wo/
variant, with an initial labio-velar, is by far the most
frequently found form in the Cantonese of contemporary Hong
Kong, although the /bo/ variant, with an initial bilabial
stop, is sometimes used. Examination of the distribution of
these two variants in my data does not reveal systematic
variation along any of the usual social parameters, nor do
"contextual factors" seem to matter. While I am perfectly
willing to leave the possibility of systematic variation
open, I will, for the present purposes, treat these two
forms as phonological exponents of the same utterance
particle "WO".
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Like many other particles in the language, including LA
and LO examined in the previous two chapters, WO can be
used in combination with other particles, forming particle
clusters (compound particles). Like LA and LO, when it does
appear in a cluster, WO always occurs as the last component
in the cluster. Some of the most frequently encountered
combinations include the two-particle clusters /go44wo44/,
/jo44wo44/, /1o44wo44/, and the three-particle clusters
/go441o44wo44/ and /go44jo44wo44/. The actual phonetic
shape of the vocalic segments in the other components may
vary from a front [e] or a central [9] to the back [o], but
there is a tendency for vowel harmony to be maintained, ie.
[o] is the most common shape of the vocalic element in each
of the syllables of the clusters.
There is no better way to develop a firm grasp of the
properties of a particle than to look at a fair amount of
conversational data carefully and closely. As in the
previous chapters, an account will be gradually built up
from detailed examination of instances of WO in a range of
sequential contexts.
1. Reportings and Story-tellings
In the course of giving a report or telling a story,
one of the devices for portraying actions and events as
unusual or extraordinary is WO-suffixing.
As a first example, consider extract (1) below, in
which C, in reporting on her son's misbehaviour, formulates
"he likes telling lies" as a fact that puzzles and intrigues
her, something that she "does not know why". She then gives
her reason for calling as to ask for the counsellors' advice
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as to "how to teach him".
(1) [FEEL1:1:304]
L: mm yau-geidaai aa=
C: =keui gamnin ee duk form
one sapsei seui LO::
B: sap[sei-seui
L:	 [o: o: ligo lingei
ee:::: hai goum gaa-la
C: keui le::
(0.4)
C: jeei::::
(•)
C: jee ngo tung ngo sinsaang
leung-go-yan le
jau hou jik gaa
(0.5)
C: jau m jungyi jee ee yiu
gongdaaiwaa aa ngaak yan
aa goum LA:
L: mm=
C: =daanhai keui le jau 'hou
-->	 jungyi gongdaaiwaa goW0
(0.7)
C: ngo m ji dimgaai soyi ngo
seung chingng-gaau-haa-lei
ngo yinggoi 'dimyeung-heui
gaau kei le
(1.1)
P: gamaa mui-yat-go gong-daai
waa-ge-yan ne:: du:: yau
buihau-ge yansou ge
nei yiu::w jee wan-cheut
go leiyau heui wai-mee-si
goum jungyi gong-daai-waa
sinn-dak
L: mm how-old PT
[mm how old is he]
C: he this-year um study Form
One fourteen years PT
[he's in Form One now
he's fourteen]
B: fourteen
L: oh oh this age
ee:::: is like-this PT
[oh well children at this
age are like that]
C: he PT
(0.4)
C: I-mean
(.)
C: I-mean I and my husband
both-of-us PT
PT very straight PT
(0.5)
C: PT not like I-mean um
have-to lie PT cheat
people PT so PT
[he, I mean, I mean me and
my husband we are both
very straight we don't like
to lie and cheat others]
L: mm
C: but he PT PT very
like lie PT (0.7)
(0.7)
I not know why so I
want seek-advice-from-you
I should how-to
teach him PT
[but he really likes
telling lies I don't know
why so I want to ask for
your advice how should I
teach him?]
(1.1)
P: well every one-who-lies
PT also has
background factors PT
you must I-mean find-out
CL reason he for-what so
like lie first
[well everyone who lies
has a reason, you have
to find out why he likes
to lie]
The son's "liking for telling lies" is presented
against the background "me and my husband ... don't like to
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lie and cheat others", which sets up a contrast between the
parents, who are "straight", and the son, who is, as implied
by the contrast, not so straight. C's formulation of her
son's lying behaviour has this central character: by
portraying the son's behaviour in the light of the parents'
truth-loving character, it sets up a contrast which puts the
son's habit of telling lies in a bad light: it is not
something that straight people are expected to do. The
contrast in question is set up specifically between the
nature of the parents and that of their son (not anybody
else's), invoking some "like parent, like son" rule,
according to which the son ought to be truth-loving and
honest too, but he isn't. The son's behaviour is therefore
seen as something that is strange and puzzling: C "does not
know why", and "wants to ask for advice". Through the report
component "but he really likes telling lies", which has the
form of a WO-suffixed-utterance, C formulates a state-of-
affairs as something that is unexpected and morally
unsettling, something that needs accounting for.
In (2), M is reporting to J how she wanted to get some
ham from the market, but it was closed.
(2) [MAK:1:006]
M: sau gei -dim jek 	 M: close what-time PT
sau baat-dim me	 close eight-o'clock PT
[what time does it close?
does it close at eight?]
(.)	 (.)
J: sau baat-dim aa=
	 J: close eight-o'clock PT
[it closes at eight]
M: =aiyaa ngo yiwai sau
	 M: EXCL I thought close
chat-dim aa ngo lok
	
seven-o'clock PT I go-down
gaai:: [(si) maai foteui aa 	 mar--(ket) buy ham PT
[	 [oh I thought it closes at
[	 seven I went to the market
[	 to get some ham,]
J:	 [sau baat-dim aa	 J: close eight-o'clock aa
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(0.6)
P: se:i-m?
(0.5)
P: tung bin-deui aa=
M: =daai-ek-sing
(0.4)
P: o:
M: .hh go baak fan aa
-->M: maai-m-dou WO
(0.5)
M: ( ) cheungjaan yau sau-
gwai-saai-do::ng
(0.4)
M: je seung maai mee#=
J: =o: jau heui maai-jo di
foteui lam-jyu tingyat
jing-ye batgo sat
sik-m-saai maai-jo
saam baau aa
[it closes at eight]
M: couldn't-buy PT
(0.5)
M: ( ) Cheungjaan also all-
closed
(0.4)
M: I-mean want buy what#
[couldn't get any (0.5)
Cheung-jaan (a shop's name)
was all closed (0.4) I mean
I wanted to get what's-it]
J: I then go bought some
ham thinking tomorrow
make-thing but for-sure
can't-finish bought
three packs PT
[I went and bought some
ham to cook something
tomorrow but we won't
be able to finish it
I bought three packs'
The WO-suffixed-utterance is the report component
"couldn't get any", which is presented against the
background "I went to the market to get some ham". A
contrast is set up between an initial expectation --that she
could get some ham from the market, and a result --that she
couldn't get any. That she could not get any ham from the
market is thus formulated not just as a "brute fact", but as
an unfulfilled expectation.
While a contrast can be constructed explicitly between
two states-of-affairs, as in (1) and (2), extract (3) shows
that WO can be used to set up an implicit contrast.
(3) [SS:CH:1:196]
M: ze:i-m daabo yeng-jo
	
M: Friday play-(basketball)
won
[played basketball on Friday
and won]
(0.6)
P: Friday?
(0.5)
P: with which-team PT
[with which team?]
M: Big-Sing
(0.4)
P: I see
M: .hh over hundred points PT
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(0.7)
P: [geido b]ei gel aa=
[	 ]
M: [yatbaak]
M: =yat-ling-gau baa-gau
(0.6)
P: baa::-gau aa
(.)
P: waa mm do ge yap-jo
[scored over a hundred
points]
(0.7)
P: how-many compare how-many PT
[what was the score?]
M: hundred
M: one-hundred-and-nine eighty-
nine
(0.6)
P: eighty-nine PT
( )
P: wow so many PT scored
[eighty-nine? wow how come
you scored so many points?]
M: .hh hai	 aa	 [daa#	 ]	 daa= M: .hh yes PT play# play=
P: [pings] P: usually
M: =sei	 jit M: =four periods
[yes, we played four
periods]
(0.7)
P: sei:: jit?=
M: =daa MBA gam aa
P: o::
M: sap-m fanjung yat jit
P: gwaai-m-ji LA::
M: gwui dou sei
(3.4)
-->M: daa-daa-haa yau
yiu ting WO
P: heh heh [heh heh
M:
	
[keui siusik e:
siuhok keui siuhok linmaai
yat gaan haause gaamaa
(0.7)
P: four periods?
M: play MBA like PT
[like MBA]
P: I see
M: fifteen minutes a period
P: no wonder PT
[no wonder]
M: tired to death
(3.4)
M: in-the-middle-of-the-match
too had-to stop PT
[and we had to stop in the
middle of the match]
P: heh heh heh heh
M: their recess e: primary-
school their primary-
school connected-to
one CL premises PT
[their recess--the primary
school is connected (with
the secondary); they share
one set of premises]
Here M is reporting to P about a basketball match he
played on Friday. The turn in question (the WO-suffixed-
utterance) is the report component "and we had to stop in
the middle of the match". While, unlike the previous two
examples, no explicit background is provided to contrast
this report component against, two pieces of evidence in the
data would support the contrast reading. First, notice that
P responds to the report component in question with
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laughter, thus exhibiting his reception of the report
component in question as some state-of-affairs that is
somehow out of the ordinary, hence laughable. Second, M
goes on to provide an account for such a state-of-affairs --
it was recess time, and the kids from the primary school,
which is connected with the secondary school, occupied the
playground, thus stopping the match. M's giving of an
account retrospectively formulates the state-of-affairs in
question (stopping in the middle of the match) as something
that calls for an explanation, ie. something that is
extraordinary, unexpected.
It seems clear from examples like (1), (2) and (3) that
one kind of work that WO can do is to contribute, in
reporting sequences, to the construction of report
components which present some state-of-affairs as
unexpected, out of the ordinary, through setting up an
explicit or implicit contrast between a state-of-affairs
that is normal, or expectable, and one that is somehow
deviant, which is in need of an explanation.
To see this property of WO in sharper focus, consider
two extracts in which . this particle is found suffixed to
story components in which some event is presented as
mysterious and inexplicable. In (4), E tells of an
experience he has had with the supernatural at the snooker
table.
(4) [SS:CH:1:384]
L: lei seun-m-seun aa
lei m seun
(0.6)
A: leung-tai [LA
L: you whether-believe PT
you not believe
[do you believe it? you
don't]
(0.6)
A: both-view PT
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[
E:	 [haubin je#
-->	 jaai mou-yan WO
danhai keui li#
(.)
ji gwan
(.)
dakyingaan heungchin
-->	 jong-yat-jong go bo WO
( . )
yau m-hai hou daailik
goum LA
L: mm
E: .hh honang o jigei::::
(0.9)
E: jigei gamgok keui LA
hhh [hhh
[
L:	 [mm
[it depends]
E: at-the-back real#
really no-one PT
but it li#
(.)
CL cue
(.)
suddenly forward
hit CL ball PT
(.)
but not very hard like PT
[there was really no one at
the back, but it-- the cue
suddenly hit the ball, it
wasn't very hard]
L: mm
E: .hh perhaps I self
[perhaps I myself--]
(0.9)
E: self feel it PT
hhh hhh
[felt it myself hhh hhh]
L: mm
Here, WO is found suffixed
"there was really no one at the
hit the ball".
	 I take it that t
to two report components --
back", and "the cue suddenly
he point of the story is
that "something mysterious happened to me". The implicit
background invoked by the mentioning of "no one", "the
back", "the cue hitting the ball" is that under normal
snooker-playing circumstances, one would not expect the cue
to hit the ball of its own accord. Thus, like (3), while no
background is explicitly provided for, a contrast is
nevertheless set up, through the use of WO, between what
ought not to happen, and what actually happened. Notice
also that, as in (3), an explanation --at least an attempt
to explain-- is subsequently given ("perhaps I just felt it
myself"), thus retrospectively formulating the report
components in question as descriptions of events that
somehow call for an account.
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In (5), E is telling another story about a mysterious event
that he heard about in his native village.
(5) [SS:CH:1:408]
E: ee: o ochi ge s saigo Si
o changge teng-go: z
yau-ya-chi
yat-chi le: .h[hh
[
[
L:	 [ha#=
E: =jee tai ngaujai le jee
go# jee gogo sengbaan
heui tai ngau LA=
=mm=
=.hh tai yun ngau le jau::
honang o gochi in ji
yaumou lokyi aa=
L: =mm=
E: gogo jau-lok-heui tong
dou yauseui aa=
L: =mm=
E: =.hh dimji daiyat le
(-)
---> gogo o beng saai WO hh=
L: =mm=
E: =jau: gogo tong le aamaam
yau-yan ne: jau bai-o-dou
jam-sei go aamaa=
L: =chyunbou beng saai
(0.3)
E: ha# gogo beng LO
E: um I once GEN s small time
I have heard z
once
once PT .hhh
[um once when I was small
I once heard]
L: yeah
E: I-mean watch cows PT I-mean
every# I-mean everyone all
go watch cows PT
[I mean watching cows, I
mean everyone went to watch
the cows]
L: mm
E: .hh watch finish cows PT
then perhaps I that-time
don t know whether rain PT
not know whether rain PT
[when we f nished watching
the cows, I don't know
if it was raining]
L: mm
E: everyone go-down pond
at swim PT
[everyone went down to the
pond to swim]
L: mm
E: .hh it-turned-out next-day PT
(-)
everyone all ill all PT hh
[it turned out everyone
became ill the next day,
all of them]
L: mm
E: and that pond PT just some-
one PT then there drowned
ASP PT
[and in that pond, someone
had just been drowned
earlier]
mm
.hh so everyone thought
there there-be what thing PT
[so everyone wondered what
it was]
L: all ill all
[everyone became OP'
(0.3)
E: yeah everyone ill PT
[yeah everyone was illj
L: =mm=
	 L:
E: =.hh goum gogo yiwai godou E:
yau mee Si LO=
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As in the previous extract, the WO-suffixed utterance
in (5) presents an event (that "everyone" somehow "became
ill") as unexpected, strange, even inexplicable. Hence "so
everyone wondered what it was". Its inexplicableness can
also be seen precisely in E's attempt to provide,
prospectively, some possible (but not certain) explanation,
"I don't know if it was raining" --so perhaps it was the
rain that made everyone ill? But perhaps it was something
else? A mysterious link is set up as an alternative
explanation: a possible relation between people getting ill
and "someone had just been drowned earlier in the pond".
Whatever the cause may be, the event is clearly portrayed,
partly through WO, as out of the ordinary and in need of
accounting for.
Extract (6) below provides an extraordinary example of
a report that figures ten occurrences of WO in a row.
(6) [MAK:1:306]
J: aa-S ji-m-jidou o[dei::	 J: S whether-know we
[	 [does S know we--]
M:	 [m ji aa	 M: not know PT
(.)	 (-)
M: .hh aa-S chamat ju:ng	 M: .hh S yesterday even
hou-siu aa	 funny PT
-->	 jau-jo jek gai WO	 lost CL chicken PT
(•)	 .	 (.)
chyu::n: saigaai dou ji	 the whole-world all know
keui gau# jau-gai janhai	 he gau# lost-a-chicken
.hhh keui le yau	 really .hhh he PT has
-->	 jek [gai WO veunci-jo] jek	 CL chicken PT kept CL
J:	 [tschhhhh jhhhhh]	 J: tschhhhh jhhhhh
-->M: gal WO hai kelau WO	 M: chicken PT in balcony PT
.hhh goum ne keui jau	 .hhh so PT he then he# CL
[heui#	 go' j(h)ai le=	 son PT then say
i	 i	 [a chicken on the balcony,
[	 i	 and then he he# his son
{	 i	 said--]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ][ j
[ ]
[ ]
[no, he doesn't, .hh S
was really funny yesterday.
Lost a chicken, the whole
world knew he had really
lost a chicken. He had a
chicken, kept]
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J: [hhh ha heh]	 J: hhh ha heh
	
M: jau waa .hh yiu lok#-	 M: .hh wanted-to go-
	
-->	 lauha waan WO	 downstairs play PT
.hhh mmaa yiu daai-maai	 .hhh so wanted-to take
jek q(hh)ai lokheui tunq	 chicken down with
	
-->	 keui wa(h)an WO	 him play PT
keui aa daai jek gai lok-	 he then took CL chicken
lauhaa .hh jau tunq go	 downstairs .hh and with CL
--> jai waan WO	 son play PT
	
-->	 dimji aa jau-jo jek gai WO	 as-it-turned-out PT
	
-->	 [.iuk WO ] .hh si::ngng-jiu=	 lost CL chicken PT catch PT
.hh the-whole-morning
[he wanted to go downstairs
to play, and he wanted to
take the chicken to play
with him, so he took the
chicken with him downstairs
and played with the son.
But as it turned out, the
chicken was let loose, so
they tried to catch it]
	
J: [heh heh]	 J: heh heh
M: =jau-heui juk-gai	 M: then catch-chicken
ngo gin-dou G	 I saw G.
(.)	 (.)
M: G faan-heui daa-bo	 M: G went-back play-ball
nglei waa-bei-heui-teng
	 we told-him
.hh aa-S jau-jo
	 .hh S lost
	
-->	 jek [g(h)ai mm] WO	 CL chicken PT
[	 ]	 [They spent the whole morn-
[	 ]	 ing trying to catch the
[	 ]	 chicken. I saw G. G went
[	 ]	 to school to play basket-
[	 ]	 ball(?). We told him
[	 ]	 S lost a chicken]
	
J:	 [heh	 heh]	 J: heh heh
M: .hh yatjan () keui waa ()
	 M: .hh and-then 0 he say ()
ngo waa hou LA aa-S
	 I say good PT S
(0.3)	 (0.3)
M: ngo waa lei faan-seung-heui
	 I say you go-back-upstairs
jihau o gin-dou waa-bei-
	 after I see tell-
lei-teng keuidei waa	 you they say
keui mou gam honest	 she won't-be so honest
ga keui wui t(h)onq-jo-lai	 honest PT she will kill-
s(h)ik	 rga waa ngo ]	 to-eat PT say me
	
[	 ]	 [and then he said I said OK,
	
[	 ]	 S, I said you go back
	
[	 ]	 upstairs, if I see the
	
[	 ]	 chicken later I'll tell
	
[	 ]	 you. They said she won't
	
[	 ]	 be so honest, she'll kill
	
[	 ]	 the chicken and eat it,
	
[	 ]	 they said]
	
J:	 [haa haa haa]	 J: haa haa
	
M: .hhh gouma m-gin-jo jek 	 M: .hhh so lost CL
gal LO	 chicken PT
jau-jo jek gal LO jauhai 	 let-loose CL chicken PT so
[and so he lost his chicken,
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ][ ]
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really let loose his
chicken]
The story being told here plays on a linguistic twist.
"jau gal" which literally means "letting loose a chicken" in
Cantonese, is a more or less frozen metaphor often used to
mean something like "opportunity lost". The expression is,
however, applied here to an event in which S lost a chicken
while playing with his son, which application is, of course,
ironically apt. The comical character of the report turns
on the fact that, through a happy coincidence, a frozen
metaphor, which has been stabilized through frequent
application of the description "letting loose a chicken" to
events in which someone has not literally let loose a
chicken (but has, for example, missed an easy goal),
unexpectedly acquires new life and energy through being
appropriately applied to an event in which someone has
literally let loose a chicken. Thus, the fun of the story
is derived not merely from the fact that, given the urban
environment of Hong Kong, something like someone literally
letting loose a chicken can actually happen, but, more
importantly, from the unexpected aptness of a linguistic
twist. This unexpectedness'is highlighted throughout the
story by the use of a whole sequence of WO-suffixed
utterances, marking every turn of the event as happy and
ludicrous.
This extract shows that WO can be used repeatedly
throughout a report or story to heighten the sense of
unexpectedness of the event(s) being related. It also shows
that this particle does not necessarily confine itself to
marking only the unexpectedness of the event portrayed in
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that particular proposition to which it is attached.
Rather, it can be used to give the whole event or state-of-
affairs being reported an unexpected character.
Yet another way of portraying events as out of the
ordinary is to explicitly invoke some rules, on the basis
of which the normality of some state-of-affairs can be
assessed. In so doing, states-of-affairs can be portrayed
as deviations from norms. In the following extracts, WO
marks such deviations from norms.
( 7 ) [DJ1:1:108]
T: wai keisat le:: la aa-C
aa hou# yugwo nei mei
gitfan laa haa daanhai
lei yau yaagei-seui WO
(-)
goum lei yau-di tunghok
aa pangyau yiging git-
jo-fan galak goum nei
yiu tung keuidei baailin
lei sau-m-sau heuidei-di
laisi le
(.)
hou gaamgaai goW0 ngo
sengyat gokdak
C: o: jee (.) ngo: mei gitfan
T: ha[a
C:	 [ngo-di pangyau
git-jo-fan
T: hey actually PT PT C PT ver#
PT ver# if you not
married PT PT but
you are twenty-odd-
years-old PT
(•)
then your some schoolmates
PT friends already got-
married PT and you
have-to with them say-New-
Year-greetings you whether-
accept their red-packets PT
(•)
very embarrassing PT I
always feel
[hey actually look, C, if you
were not married, but you
were twenty-odd years old,
but some of your schoolmates
and friends had already got
married, and you had to say
New Year greetings to them,
would you accept their red
packets? I always find this
quite embarrassing]
C: oh so (.) I not married
[oh so I wasn't married]
T: yeah
C: my friends married
[but my friends were]
((3 turns omitted))
T: wei bago m-hai WO yausi
ngo jau godak hou
gaamgaai goW0 laa lei
T: hey but no PT sometimes
I really feel very
embarrassing PT PT you
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lam-haa seng saa:-seui- 	 consider almost 30-years-
1-->	 yan dou mei gitfan loWO	 old still not married PT
yiging hai 'e hou	 already is I-mean very
gaamgaai LA .hh	 embarrassed PT .hh
lei joi[heui::	 you still go-and
[	 [hey but no, sometimes I
[	 really feel that this is
[	 very embarrassing, just
[	 think, someone who's almost
[	 thirty but is not
[	 married, that's, you know
[	 embarrassing enough, if
[	 in spite of that you still
[	 go and--]
2-->C:	 [dimwui saa:-seui-	 C: how-come thirty-year-olds
yan mei gia# leidei godak	 not-yet marr# you feel
dim aa ligo: ligo: faaidi	 what PT thi:s thi:s quick
bokchik aa-T
	
rebuke T
[how come thirty-year-olds
who aren't marr# what do
you feel about this, this,
rebuke her, quick]
3-->H: yigaa m-hai galaa 	 H: now not PT
[that's not true anymore
these days]
T: hhh heh heh heh heh	 T: hhh heh heh heh heh
T, in the turn arrowed 1, explicitly invokes a norm
according to which people are expected to get married before
thirty ("just think, someone who's almost thirty but is not
married, that's, you know, embarrassing enough"). The
problem she poses for C goes something like this. Given
this norm that she has invoked, and another norm which has
been left implicit, namely, that traditionally, married
couples are expected to give unmarried persons red packets
during Chinese New Year, a conflict between these two norms
would arise in the following situation. People who ought to
have married but have not, would find themselves in an
impossible situation: when saying new year greetings to
friends and peers who are married, should they ask for and
accept red packets? According to the "red packet norm",
they should, because they are single. But to do so would
amount to an admittance of their unmarried status, which,
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according to the "age for marriage norm", would cause them
embarrassment.
Rather than tackling this problem as it is posed,
however, C challenges the validity of T's "age for marriage
norm" by appealing to the other participants in the
conversation to "rebuke her quick" (arrow 2). Thus the
appropriate age for people to get married is turned into an
issue through C's challenge of its validity. H then comes
in to support C's position by characterizing T's norm as an
assumption that is out-of-date (arrow 3).
For our present purposes, we need only note that one
way in which social behaviour is made mutually intelligible
to participants in conversations is through the explicit
invocation of norms. Against the background of such norms,
a state-of-affairs (in this case, "someone who is almost
thirty but is not married") can be marked "deviant" through
the use of WO.
A similar use of WO can be seen in (8), where the way
in which a particular kind of goods is packed is described
as "not ordinary". Such a description will make sense only
if L assumes that both he and W, the interlocutor, know what
it means to have some goods packed in the ordinary way. In
this extract, L explicitly states that the packing he is
describing is "not ordinary packing", invoking a norm as
background against which to characterize the object in
question. As in (7), the unusualness is portrayed through
the use of WO.
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(8) [TC11:2:574]
L: keui yat go hap gown	 L: it a CL box like
[it's like a box]
(0.2)	 (0.2)
L: da# [keui] keui m-hai= 	 L: but# it it not
W:	 [ 0 l	 W: ( )
L: =jipei ss jee keui m-hai 	 L: cardboard ss I-mean it not
-->	 poutung godi fungseung goW0	 ordinary those packing PT
[but, it's not cardboard, I
mean, not ordinary packing]
W: [ha ]	 W: yeah
L: [.hh] keui hai:	 L: .hh it is (.) has CL ss
(.)	 (.)
L: yau go ss gaau-ge sauchau L: has CL ss plastic handle
hai seungbin ge	 at top PT
W: o:
L: jee lei saan-maai go goi
le jau godou dat-faan
go sauchau cheut-lai
[it has a plastic handle
on top]
W: oh
L: I-mean you close CL top PT
PT then there come-through
CL handle out
[I mean whe%1 you close Vne
top the handle comes
through]
We have seen in this section how WO can be used, in
reportings and story-tellings, to present some state-of-
affairs as unusual, extraordinary, and unexpected. Such
deviations from norms and expectations can be portrayed
through the provision of some background which sets up a
contrast between what is expected and what actually happens
(as in (1), (2) and (3)); or the provision of a set of
circumstances in which some strange or inexplicable event takes
place (as in (4) and (5));'or through an explicit invocation of
norms on the basis of which some situation can be seen as
abnormal or out of the ordinary (as in (7) and (8)).
2. Challenging a Position
Previous descriptions of WO have referred to "disagreement"
or "objection" as one of its uses (eg. Lau 1977). But this is
not very accurate, if by "disagreement" one means a unitary class
of utterances having a consistent status in conversational
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exchanges; for instance, that it is always confrontational.
Research in CA has shown that disagreements, like agreements, can
be 'preferred' or 'dispreferred', depending on the kind of
sequential environment that one is talking about. For instance,
in the turn after a self-deprecation, agreement (and not
disagreement) is a dispreferred next. By 'dispreferred turns' is
meant not utterances that individual speakers, for one reason or
another, subjectively prefer not to produce. Rather, it refers
to turns that are dispreferred in terms of specific preference 
orqanizations. 2
 We noted in an earlier chapter that dispreferred
turn components have special design features. WO is from this
point of view a resource that contributes to the building of
dispreferred turns in three kinds of sequences that are sensitive
to preference organizations, namely, challengings, contact
establishments, and confirmation/ disconfirmation sequences. Let
us look first at challengings, and then the other two
environments in the next sections.
One of the places where WO is most commonly found is in a
turn immediately following one in which a position on some issue
is advanced through the invocation of a rule or a norm that is
put forward as generally valid. Specifically, WO is often found
suffixed to turns which undermine or challenge, in one way or
another, the truth, validity or generality of a rule proposed in
the prior turn. Consider an example of this in (9).
(9) [FEEL1:1:330]
L: yanwai sapgei-seui le	 L: because adolescents PT
duk form one ge::: jee 	 study Form One GEN I-mean
yaukei laamjai le::: 	 especially boys PT
[because children at this
age, studying in Form 1,
especially boys,]
C: o=	 C: oh
L: =hai beigaau houdung
	 L: are relatively active
tungmaai wutyeuk di ge=
	 and energetic more PT
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-->C: =keui yau m hai hou
wutyeuk WO
(0.5)
C: ngodei daai keui cheut-
heui waan le
keui le jau sei-se-
laan-sin goum m yun
--> yuk goW0
[do tend to be more active
and energetic]
C: he really not be very
energetic PT
[well but he isn't really
very energetic]
(0.5)
C: we take him out
play PT
he PT then dead-snake-
rotten-eel like not willing
move PT
[when we take him out to
play, he's like a dead
snake he wouldn't move]
In an attempt to make sense of (and account for) the
behaviour of C's son, L, the counsellor, explicitly invokes a
rule, according to which adolescents, "especially boys, do tend
to be more active and energetic". In response to this proposal,
C presents evidence according to which her son is anything but
"active and energetic", evidence which suggests that the rule
proposed by L is perhaps not as general as it sounds. But most
important of all, it seems to have failed to apply to this
particular case, and therefore needs to be modified or even
replaced if it is to have any value in understanding the child's
problems.
Similarly, in (10), in the turn after C's first turn, in
which he complains that the woman he loves does not give him any
chances, L produces evidence that calls the validity or accuracy
of that description into question.
(10) [FEEL1:1:249]
C: yausi m-bei geiwui
ngo be::::
P: keui m-bei geiwui nei?
ho::: jigei wan::: gmaa
geiwui m-hai yiu tang yan
lei bei:: gaa hai jigei
'jai::jou gaa
C: sometimes not-give chance
me PT
[sometimes (she) doesn't
give me any chance]
P: she not-give chance you?
PT self find PT chance PT
chance not must wait others
come give PT be must self
create PT
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P: hai	 [LA::::	 P:
[
L:	 [bagwo lei jigei dou	 L:
m ji dim hoi hau go::ng je
hamaa[::
[
[
[
C:	 [( hai aa ... )
	
C:
ming-m-'ming?
L: daai keui yausi dou
	
L:
yingsing tung lei
heui-ha-'gaai dou m-wui
-->	 waa m-bei geiwui lei goloW0
understand?
[she doesn't give you any
chance? So what? You have
to find your own, not
wait for someone to give
you chances, you have to
create chances, do you
understand?]
but she sometimes too
agree with you
go-out EMPH won't
say not-give chance you PT
[but she does go out with
you sometimes, so you can't
really say she doesn't give
you any chance]
yes PT
[quite right]
but you self really not
know how open mouth say PT
is-that-so?
[but you don't really know
how to say it to her, is
that so?]
yes PT
[yes]
As a further example of how evidence can be presented to
challenge a position, consider (11), an interesting case in which
a participant points to a silence as evidence which casts doubt
on a professed position.
(11) [DJ1:1:088]
C: hh .hh laa
(•)
yausi le ngodei sengyat
dou yau di# yau yat jung
gamge lamfaat aa ganghai
le: jee yugwo bei laisi
(•)
e# ngaang gele jau
m munyi ge
(.)
haa haiyiu jee yapbin
yun-ge le jee sinji gopda#
gokdak hoisam leidei yaumou
lidi goum:: pingin aa goum
m-yiu-dak-ge siseung le
C: hh .hh PT
(.)
sometimes PT we always
EMPH have some# have a kind
like thought PT always
PT I-mean if give red-packets
(.)
e# hard PT then
not satisfied PT
(.)
PT have-to-be I-mean inside
soft PT I-mean before feel#
feel happy you whether-have
these so biased PT so
worthless thought PT
[look, sometimes we always
have this this kind of idea,
when people give us red
packets, we aren't satisfied
if they are hard (coins),
they have to be soft (notes)
before we feel happy, do you
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-->(1.1)
F: mou-sowai ge::: m-hou
mm si-kwui siak ga::::
(0.3)
-->C: m-hai WO lei yu# lei
tausin ngo gin nei dou
yiu haauleui-jo hou loi
sii daap mou-sowai ge
keisat dou yau gaa
haamaa::
(0.3)
F: goum m-hai goum m-tung
man heui lo# lo# lo#
lo do yat fung me
haimai sin
C exhibits in the target turn
have such biased, worthless
ideas?]
(1.1)
F: it-doesn't-matter PT don't
so philistine EMPH PT
[it doesnt matter really,
don't be so philistine]
(0.3)
C: no PT you yu# you
just-now I saw you also
have-to consider very long
before answer it-doesn't-
matter PT actually too
it-does-matter right?
[but no, you you I saw that
just now you had to think
for quite a while before you
said "it doesn't matter", so
actually it does, doesn't it]
(0.3)
F: so no so can't
ask them get# get# get#
get more one CL PT
right? EMPH
[well you can't ask people
fo# fo# fo# for another
packet can you?]
his reluctance to take F's
statement at its face value, and questions its
the long silence before the answer as evidence
doubt F's honesty. WO lays open a discrepancy
appearance of F's answer, and some unexpressed
An alternative way in which positions are
truth by citing
that makes him
between the
reality.
challenged is by
pointing to aspects of a situation as having been overlooked, so
that should these aspects be taken into account, the inadequacy
of a rule or a norm invoked in the prior turn will become
apparent. (12) is an example of this in which a rule put forward
by C, a parent, gets challenged in the next turn by a counsellor
(L). The rule invoked by C says: "bad guys like to prey on
thirteen or fourteen year olds", and, since her son is in that
age range, and has been found to frequent places where such
preying is thought to be particularly intensive, the son is
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portrayed as being in considerable danger of contracting bad
influence. L, in response to this suggestion, puts forward "a
person's intrinsic tendency" as a factor which, when it is taken
into consideration, would weaken the generality of C's proposed
rule, and therefore the basis of her worries.
(12) [FEEL1:1:383]
C: goum godi waai-yan le:	 C: but those bad-people PT
hou jungyi hau jyu di	 very like prey-on ASP the
goum sap-saam-sei seui 	 such thirteen-fourteen
ge seimanjai gaamaa:: 	 years GEN children PT
[but those bad guys like
to prey on thirteen
or fourteen year olds]
L: [keisat hok]	 L: actually learn
B: [liyeung aa] jan aa= 	 B: this PT true PT
[that's true]
L: =goum aa hai	 L: such PT true
(.)
	
(-)
daanhai keisat hok-waai le 	 but actually learn-bad PT
1-->	 ngo jau goum gokdak WO
	 I EMPH so feel PT
(0.3)	 (0.3)
L: keui jigei 'bunsan yaumou L: he himself self whether
2-->	 goum ge kingheung goW0	 have such GEN tendency PT
[that's true, but actually
I feel that whether a
child would pick up bad
things depends on whether
he himself has the
tendency]
C: o	 C: oh
Yet another technique for doing the challenging of a
position is one in which a situation (or scenario) is presented
as one which would, as it were, make life difficult for the
proposed rule. Thus, in (13) below, M's claim that Cantonese
speakers should be able to (at least "sometimes") understand
Putonghua (Mandarin Chinese) is challenged by L who presents a
scenario in which one who "has not learnt Mandarin at all before"
may not find Putonghua quite as easy to understand as M's
generalization might suggest.
(13) [SS:CH:1:059]
M: danhai odei yugo tung	 M: but we if with Mandarin
Gwok-yu hoyi chaa# s#	 can al#(most?) s#
(.)	 (.)
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M: lei hoyi teng-dak-ming
ge hoyi
(.)
M: yausi
L: hoyi teng-dak-ming
M: ha
L: danhai yugo lei janhai
yunchyun mei-hok-go
Gok-yu le:
M: mm
--> L: dou gei-laan-haa goW0
M: mm
P: hoyi seji aa
M: you can understand
PT can
(.)
M: sometimes
[but if we-- Mandarin is
al#, you can understand
it, sometimes]
L: can understand
M: yeah
L: but if you really
completely not-learned
Mandarin PT
M: mm
L: also quite-difficult PT
[you can understand it, but
if you really haven't
learned Mandarin at all
before, it's quite
difficult too]
M: mm
P: can write PT
[then we can write]
Some common features shared by the target turns in the above
extracts are found recurrently in turns which to different
degrees and in different ways challenge the position espoused in
the prior turn. First, they are often prefaced with words like
"but" and "that's true, but", which contribute to the shape of
the current turn as a dispreferred. Second, they often contain
mitigators such as yau in hai hou ("not very") and dou gel
("rather"), which 'soften' the challenges. Third, they are
either accompanied by some evidence that supplies a basis for the
alternative position (as in (9): "when we take him out, he's
like a dead snake he wouldn't move"), or qualified in one way or
another (in (10): "I feel" characterizes the alternative view as
a personal feeling or belief; in (11), a conditional clause
provides some qualification to the contrastive formulation: "if
you really haven't learnt Mandarin before").
Thus the validity of descriptions which are advanced as
general rules or norms may be challenged or undermined in the
next turn. A position is often challenged in such cases by
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pointing to evidence, or (real or hypothetical) situations or
aspects of a situation to which the proposed rule or norm fails
to apply. I suggest that WO plays a part in this by virtue of a
feature which one might think of as "mismatch". With this I wish
to highlight the observation that turn components can be
constructed in such a way as to expose a mismatch between rules
and norms on the one hand, and, on the other hand, features and
aspects of situations which cannot be accommodated by those rules
or norms.
Incidentally, note that the utterance arrowed 1 in (12), at
the point in time at which it occurred, has no specifiable
propositional content: ngo jau goum gokdak WO ("I feel this way
WO"). This suggests that to state the function of WO in terms of
the proposition to which it is attached would be over-
restrictive. Rather, it would seem that the 'scope' of WO must
include at least the current turn as a whole.
3. Contact -establishments
By "contact-establishment" I refer to a two-position
sequence in which a participant exhibits, in the first turn,
his/her intention to locate or get into contact with someone or
something via the recipient, following which the recipient res-
ponds in some way to this request for contact in the second turn.
Instances of this are routine occurrences at the beginning of
telephone calls, where the caller wants to speak to someone who
may not be the call-recipient. But they may also appear under
other circumstances: for example, when someone is looking for .
something, and seeks help from a co-participant.
Data extract (14) shows one relatively simple case in which
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L, the caller, attempts to establish contact with S through X,
the call-recipient.
(14) [TC11:1:258]
((beginning of a phone call))
X: (wan bin-) go	 X: look-for who
[who do you want to speak
to?]
(0.4)	 (0.4)
L: wai	 L: hello
[hello]
(.)	 (.)
chingman S haidou ma
	 please S here PT
[is S there please?]
--> X: fan-jo-gaau loW0	 X: slept PT
[she's already in bed]
L: o: mgoi-lei ha	 L: oh thank-you PT
[oh, thank you]
In response to L's request for contact, the arrowed turn in
(14) provides a reason for X's inability to establish the contact
as requested. As a reason for S's unavailability, "she's already
in bed" is given as a circumstance which would make the
fulfillment of L's request for contact difficult or impossible.
(15) provides an example of a slightly more complex varia-
tion of a contact-establishment sequence:
(15) [TC11:2:018]
((beginning of a phone call))
X: H. International 	 X: H. International
L: wai	 L: hello
(.)
	 (.)
chingman C haidou maa
	 please C here PT
[is C there please?]
1-->X: a (.) lei dangdang ha
	
X: a (.) you wait-a-little PT
[em just a second please]
L: hou aa mgoi	 L: good PT thanks
[fine, thanks]
(8.0)	 (8.0)
2-->X: wai (.) maafaan lei	 X: hello please you
dangdang hou-m-hou aa=	 wait-a-little alright PT
[hello, do you mind
waiting for a while?]
L: =hou aa mgoi	 L: good PT thanks
[fine, thanks]
(48.0)	 (48.0)
3--> Y: deui-m-jyu C gonggan WO
	 Y: sorry C talking PT
[sorry C is on the phone]
(0.3)	 (0.3)
L: o: (.) e::	 L: oh (.) e::
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X's turn arrowed 1 may be characterized as a positive
response to L's request for contact, and is evidently treated by
L as a promise to get him in touch with C (as evidenced in the 8-
second silence that follows, in which L waits for the promise to
be carried out). As it turns out, however, a follow-up is given
(arrow 2), which delays the contact establishment while maintain-
ing the promise (note the subsequent 48-second wait). Following
that, however, Y (another recipient) issues yet another follow-
up, providing this time a reason for X's failure to get C to
talk to the caller (arrow 3: "sorry C is on the phone"). It is
interesting to note the contrast between the first two arrowed
turns on the one hand, which furnish positive responses to L's
request for contact, and the third arrowed turn on the other.
The latter, which constitutes a negative response to the caller's
request for contact, is WO-suffixed, but the two earlier positive
responses are not. In general, in contact-establishment
sequences, WO is used only in negative responses, ie. responses
which propose that the requester's expectation for contact cannot
be fulfilled.
Essentially the same observations would apply to extract
(16) below, which is taken from a face-to-face situation. This
shows that WO performs a similar kind of task in contact-
establishment sequences other than at the beginning of phone
calls.
(16) [SS:D1:123]
X: Mr. Wong le hhh heh	 X: Mr. Wong PT hhh heh heh
[heh hhh	 [where's Mr.Wong?]
--> I: [Mr. Wong:: ngo in ji WO
	 I: Mr. Wong:: I not know PT
[Mr. Wong I don't know]
(0.7)	 (0.7)
I: keui::[:	 a#]	 I: he::: a#
X:	 [goum dim aa] ngodei X: so how PT we
[so what should we do?]
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X: [(	 )]	 X: (	 )
I: [neidei hail cheutbin# (.) I: you at outside (.)
cheutbin dang hou-m-hou? 	 outside wait OK?
[wait outside, OK?]
(0.5)
	 (0.5)
X: hou aa
	 X: good PT
[OK]
One way of characterizing the arrowed turns in (14)-(16) is
to say that they serve to decline a request for contact. As
declinings their design is sensitive to a preference organization
according to which a positive response to a request for contact
is short and brisk (eg. dang-dang "hold on"), whereas negative
responses are longer, usually provide a reason (the provision of
an account is an evidence of its negativeness), and WO offers in
such sequential places a regular device for building
declinings.
Another way of describing this phenomenon is to say that WO
contributes to upsetting an official expectation contained in the
prior turn, namely, the expectation to get into contact with
someone. Notice that in this context "expectations" refer to
those that are generated by the sequential context, and have
nothing to do with what the caller subjectively thinks. We may
need to distinguish between "subjective expectations" and what
one might call "official expectations". For instance, it is
perfectly possible for someone to make a phone call while saying
to oneself "I don't expect she'll be there". It is obviously not
necessary for call-recipients to first identify what the caller's
subjective expectations are in this respect before they can
decide whether these expectations can be fulfilled. Within the
structure of the contact-establishment sequence, call-recipients
may display, through suffixing a negative response with WO, their
interpretation of the caller's request as embodying certain
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official expectations, e.g. that the person the caller wants to
speak to is available. Marking a negative response to a request
for contact with WO is thus one way of doing being unable to
establish contact.
By formulating a negative response to a request for contact
in a special (marked) way, WO can be seen to be sensitive to
politeness. In Brown and Levinson's (1978) terms, responding
negatively to a request for contact, like turning down a request,
would be a potential face-threatening act, and to do it, through
WO-suffixing, by relating some incapacitating circumstances which
make the fulfillment of the caller's official expectations
difficult or impossible amounts to a positive politeness
strategy. This would explain why a response like "fan-jo-gaau"
("she's already in bed", without a final WO) sounds less polite.
This, however, is a separate question. For our present purposes,
we need only note that the kind of work that WO can perform in
contact-establishment sequences is to present a situation as one
which deviates from a given set of expectations.
These findings should be generalizable in the following way.
We have seen how, when someone or something is unavailable, the
response can be suffixed by WO. But it seems at least
intuitively plausible that the same should be true of cases
where, when someone or something is expected to be unavailable
but in fact is available, WO can be used too. It is also
generally true of other kinds of requests.
4. Disconfirmations
In the same way that WO partakes in the building of
challengings and declinations as dispreferred turn-shapes, an
utterance following a confirmation-seeking turn may be WO-
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suffixed to do disconfirmation.
(17) [MAK:1:079]
M: .hhh ha ha ha jinq-hai
	 M: only dimsum even
dimsam dou	 dimsum even
sara l# lung	 thirty l# baskets
[	 [we had thirty six baskets,
[	 and that's just dimsum!]
J:	 [daanhai heui m-hai
	
J: but it not very
hou do variety	 very many variety
lei mai sik-lai-sik-heui
	
you didnt keep-eating the
[go gei yeung ye?
	 few kinds thing
[	 [but there isn't a lot
[	 of variety, wouldn't you
[	 be eating the same things
[	 over and over again?]
--> M: [m-hai WO: hou do la
	 M: no PT very many
[no there was a lot
of variety]
(-)	 (-)
la ngo m sou bei lei
	 look I can count for you
teng la ...	 hear PT
[let me tell you ...]
In (17), J, working on the assumption that the restaurant in
question does not offer a large variety of snacks ("but there
isn't a lot of variety"), presents what she perceives to be a
likely consequence ("wouldn't you be eating the same things over
and over again") for confirmation. M's response in the arrowed
turn, however, rules out that assumption, and informs J that in
fact quite a large variety of snacks was available. An account
then follows in which M provides a whole list of snacks that she
had as evidence that would support her counter-formulation. "No",
suffixed with WO, is used here to do a disconfirmation by
highlighting a discrepancy between an assumption expressed in the
previous turn, and a body of evidence which cast doubt on the
validity of that assumption.
Similarly, in (18), E disconfirms L's speculation that "CH
school" was his (E's ) "first choice" with "m-hai WO" ("no"), and
then goes on to provide an account of his actual choice. As in
the previous extract, an explicit assumption presented in a
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L: but you perhaps you
whether-would sometimes
tired PT sometimes
[but you perhaps couldn't
it be that you were tired?
sometimes--]
E: no PT
[no]
L: perhaps?
A: imagination
E: just play PT
[I had just started playing]
confirmation-seeking turn is disallowed in a particular way: an
assumption of the co-participant's
which contradict it.
(18) [SS:CH:1:277]
L: dai-yat#
(0.3)
L: go:: jiyun
(1.1)
E: [dai-yat]
L: [jauhai ] seun e::
CH [hokhaau]
[	 l
[	 l
-->E:	 [m-hai ] WO
L: m-hai
E: ngo heui goaan z# seung
heui gaan san haau aa
danhai keui yau m ji
dingaai m paai dak o heui
As a final example of the use
consider (19):
is set against some facts
L: first
(0.3)
L: CL choice
[the first choice]
(1.1)
E: first
L: be choose e:: CH ((name of
school)) school
[the first choice was
CH school]
E: no PT
[no]
L: no
E: I go that-CL z# want
go CL new school PT
but it then not know
why not allocate can
me go
[I went, wanted to go to
a new school, but for
some reason they didn't
allocate a place to me]
of WO in disconfirmations,
(19) [SS:CH:1:384]
((following on from E's story about his experience with
the supernatural at the snooker table))
L: bago lei: holang lei
wui-m-wui yausi gwui:
le::: yausi:[:
[
[
[
[m-hai WO=
L: [ha?
=[
A: [sam[lei-jokseui]
2-->E:
	
[aamaam waan] joW0
.((4 turns omitted))
E: [waje	 hai::]
[ ]
L: [yaumou kei#]
E: yau s# ya#
E: maybe be
[maybe it was-]
L: whether-had oth#
E: have s# ha# si# a-little
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[si# siusiu yunyan LA]
[	 ]
 ]
L: [yaumou si-go keitaa ]=
L: =sin (.) jee#
(0.6)
L: jee cheui-jo li chi
ji-ngoi
3-->E: mou WO
L: keitaa [yatchai
E:	 [yatheung
dou m-hai
(.)
E: dou mou:: mat yi-dou
yidi goum ge ye
si# a-little reason PT
[part of it was
imagination]
L: whether-had tried other
[MPH (.) I-mean
[have you had other,
I mean]
(0.6)
L: I-mean other-than this
time apart-from
[um, other than this
one?]
E: no PT
[no]
L: other together
E: all-along
really not
(.)
E: really no what met
these like GEN thing
[haven't really come across
this sort of thing before]
In the discussion that follows an extended report in which E
described his experience of the supernatural at the snooker
table, L and A, the report-recipients, suggest various possible
explanations for what happened (A: "imagination"; L: "couldn't it
be that you were tired?"). to L's suggestion of tiredness as a
possible explanation, E disconfirms with "no", and then goes on
to provide evidence for his claim: "I had just started playing".
Again, in the turn arrowed 3, E attributes to the questioner (L)
the expectation that he (E) may have had similar supernatural
experiences before, by characterizing his negative answer as one
that is incompatible with this expectation.
Thus, WO-suffixed utterances which do disconfirmations share
a common feature: they set up a contrast between an assumption
retrospectively assigned to a previous turn on the one hand, and,
on the other hand, what the respondent construes to be what
he/she knows to be a fact that does not support that assumption.
In each case, the respondent treats the confirmation-seeking turn
as one which embodies certain assumptions which are disconfirmed
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by factual evidence.
To sum up the observations made in this and the previous two
sections, we have seen how, in three kinds of sequential
positions (ie. challengings, contact-establishments, and
confirmation/disconfirmation), WO contributes to the design of
dispreferred nexts. It serves as a resource for the construction
of turns which, with reference to the immediately prior turn,
call into question the validity of a rule or norm invoked in that
prior turn, or its goodness-of-fit to particular cases. They may
also be turns which upset an official expectation, or overturn an
assumption or premise.
5. Thankings
Given the kind of properties that WO has in the sequential
types considered so far --the contribution to the portrayal of
events and states-of-affairs as unusual or extraordinary, and to
the building of dispreferred turn shapes, it might come as a
surprise that this particle can also contribute to the doing of
thanking. And yet WO is one of the most frequently used particles
in thanking sequences. However, once it is realized that
thanking is, in Brown and Levinson's (1978) terms, one kind of
face-threatening act (FTA), then the contribution of WO will
become more apparent. To thank someone is to admit that one has
incurred a debt. According to Brown and Levinson (1978:72),
expressing thanks is an act that potentially threatens the
speaker's negative face. By putting himself in an indebted
position, the thanker will be seen to be humbling his own face.
This would have the unfortunate consequence that the thank-
recipient may seem not to care about maintaining the thanker's
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face. Further, the act of thanking carries with it the potential
implication that one motive of the thank-recipient's in doing the
thanker a service is to bring about a state of imbalance (in
terms of the exchange of goods and services between them), in
which case the thank-recipient's doing of a service may not be an
act that is motivated by pure generosity. One way of avoiding
these undesirable implications is to claim indebtedness in such a
way as to show that the speaker does not think that the hearer
expects to receive any thanks. WO provides a resource with which
a speaker can construct an indebtedness claim in such a way as to
highlight its "unexpectedness", thus managing to portray the
recipient as more generous and pure in motives than he/she might
otherwise appear.
Thus a sort of long-hand for the WO-suffixed utterance in
(20) might be: "although you will not be expecting this, I am
indebted to you for doing me that favour".
(20) [FEEL1:1:409]
L: lei:: seungsi haa aa
	 L: you try ASP PT alright?
houmaa	 [try and see if it works
a]right?]
C: hou aa hou aa
	 C: good PT good PT
[good good]
L: OK	 L: OK
C: goum m-goi-saai-lei	 C: so thank-you-very-much
-->loW0[::
	 PT
L:	 [hou aa= .	 L: good PT
=hou:: [hou	 good good
C:	 [baaibaai=	 C: bye
L: =baaibaai
	 L: bye
Similarly, L's expression of thanks in (21) is suffixed with
WO to give it an unexpected character.
(21) [TC11:1:151]
L: goum ngo dou seung tung
	 L: so I too want with
keui gong chingcho
	 her talk clear
[so I too would like to
clarify this with her]
(0.7)	 (0.7)
L: ha#
	 L: yes
P: .hh hou aa=
	 P: .hh good PT
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L: =hou m hou aa goum# goum
	 L: good not good PT so so
-->	 maafaan-saai lei WO (.)
	 trouble you PT (.)
tung ngo:[:#
	 for me
[	 [OK? thanks for taking
[	 all the trouble]
P:	 [m hou goum gong= P: don't mention it
6. Informings and Remindings
From the point of view of conversational sequencing, the
provision of information can take at least two forms: a piece of
information may be given in response to an inquiry, or it can be
volunteered, ie. offered by the speaker on his/her own
initiative. Volunteering is a means of highlighting an
information item's prominence, and presenting it as noteworthy
information.
One way in which an information offer can be marked as
volunteered is to sequentially misplace it. WO is a regular
feature of such misplaced turns. Consider an instance of this in
(22).
(22) [MAK:1:072]
M: ayaa	 M: EXCL
(.)	 (.)
M: lei gam aa
	 M: you dare PT
(.)	 (.)
1-->M: gwo-saan-che lei	 M: roller-coaster you
dou waan aa	 even play PT
[ooh did you dare, you
even rode the roller-
coaster?]
J: o mou# o mou waan aa::
	 J: I didnt I didn't play PT
(.)	 (.)
2-->J: yiche gwai aa
	 J: and expensive PT
o m-se-dak waan	 I wouldn't-pay-so-much
di-mui waan	 play sisters play
[jhhaa o kei hai]-dou tai=
	 PT I stand there watch
[	 ]	 [I didn't I didn't play,
[	 ]	 and it was expensive
[	 ]	 I wouldn't pay so much,
[	 ]	 only my sisters played,
[	 ]	 I stood there and watched]
M: [yigaa chat-sap#]
	 M: now seventy
3-->M: =yigaa chat-sap man	 M: now seventy dollars
baau-saai WO	 all-inclusive PT
lei ji-m-ji [aa
	 you whether-know PT
[	 [it's seventy dollars now
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[	 including everything do
[	 you know?]
J:	 [o m ji aa .hh J: I not know PT .hh
[I didn't know that]
M: chat-sap man toupiu
	
M: seventy dollars full-ticket
'yam-waan aa	 play-anything PT
[for a full ticket of
seventy dollars you can
play anything]
Note in this extract the sequential placement of the
information offer (arrow 3). It comes after two turns in the
first of which M has asked a question (arrow I), and, following
that, J has provided an answer (arrow 2). A specific sequential
implication has therefore been set up, namely, that the next turn
should deal with the answer in some way. However, instead of an
information-receipt like "o" ("oh") or "hai me" ("really?"), this
next turn consists a piece of information suffixed by the
particle WO. That is, instead of dealing with such matters as
information receipt, Position 3 is now filled by an information
offer. To the extent that information provision is not the kind
of job that this structural position is reserved for, the target
utterance (arrow 3) can be characterized as one that is
"structurally unexpected".
The notion of structural expectation, like preference, is
not to be understood as referring to individual participants'
psychological states (for instance, whether I expect the weather
to be fine tomorrow), but rather to features in the organization
of conversational interaction. Thus, in terms of sequential
structure, each place in a sequence is associated with certain
kinds of actions (but not others) that can be performed in that
environment. A turn which occupies a particular place in a
sequence but performs an action that is not structurally provided
for in that place would in this sense be structurally unexpected.
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Extract (23) is similar to (22) in this respect: in a Q-A-C
sequence, instead of producing a receipt or evaluation of some
kind, J issues in the third turn an information offer.
(23) [MAK:1:001]
J: mhai aa mhai wokman lei gaa J: no PT not Walkman it-is PT
1-->	 i ji igo mee lei gaa=
	 you know this what it-is PT
[no it isn't a Walkman
you know what it is?]
M: =samgei lei gaa
	 M: radio it-is PT
[is it a radio?]
(0.4)	 (0.4)
2-->M: keset [lei goLO:]	 M: cassette-recorder it-is PT
[	 ]	 [it's a cassette recorder]
J:	 [1 i g o :]::	 J: this
3-->J: luk-gan-yam goW0
	 recording PT
[it's recording]
(.)
	 (.)
J: hoyi:
	
J: it-can
This data fragment has been analyzed in detail in the
previous chapter. Briefly, we saw how, in trying to get M to
agree to be recorded, J sets up a sequential environment in which
she can reveal this purpose. Consider in the light of this the
way in which this task is eventually achieved. In turn 3 of (23),
rather than acknowledging receipt of M's answer in the prior
turn, J provides an unsolicited piece of information ("it's
recording WO"). By virtue of the (mis)placement of this turn,
the information that it offers is highlighted for special
salience and noteworthiness. "It's recording" is turned into a
fait accompli and presented as something that M may be interested
to know. In this way, an attempt to secure permission is
achieved indirectly through volunteering noteworthy information.
Apart from participating in the design of misplaced turn
shapes, WO is sometimes found suffixed to utterances which occur,
in terms of topic organization, at the beginning of a section of
talk. Extract (24) illustrates how this particle's contribution
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to topic generation can be explicated, as in the case of
misplaced turns, in terms of its highlighting property, ie.
giving a turn of talk a noteworthy character.
(24) [TC11:1:168]
S: gau-dimmmm
(0.3)
1-->S: bu:n-jung 'jung
faan-dou-lei gala=
2-->L: =haa gau-dim-leng-jung
faan=
3-->S: =haa#
4-->(0.8)
L: 'goummmm e:::m
(1.0)
	
L: a 	
(0.8)
L: daai-biu-go aa
5-->	 daa-gwo-lei WO
S: geisi aa
L: ((clears throat))
gamyat LO=
S: =hai me
S: nine
(0.3)
S: thirty anyway
come-back PT
[should be back by half
past nine anyway]
L: yeah about-nine back
[yeah back about nine]
S: yeah
(0.8)
L: so em
(1.0)
L: em
(0.8)
L: first-cousin
has-phoned PT
[so em first cousin
has phoned]
S: when PT
[when?]
L: ((clears throat)) today PT
[today]
S: yes PT
[really?]
Notice that the silence arrowed 4 in (24) comes at a
sequential place where the three preceding turns (arrows 1, 2 and
3) can be seen to have completed a sequence. Following this
silence, L takes up the turn, and, after producing a few turn-
holding devices, delivers a WO-suffixed utterance (arrow 5).
From the point of view of topic organization, this turn can be
characterized as a topic initial (Button & Casey 1984) in the
sense that it is a proposal which may contribute to the
generation of further talk, if and when it is retrospectively
established as a next topic. Assuming without going into details
that the 0.8-second silence (arrow 4) is construed by the
participants as a place where the exchange about what time S is
going to be at home may have come to an end, then L's subsequent
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offer of a piece of information ("first cousin has phoned WO")
which is portrayed, through WO-suffixing, as noteworthy, would
amount, in this sequential position, to suggesting or proposing a
topic for further talk. WO is in this sense a resource for the
construction of certain turn-shapes which, when placed in the
environment after a potentially completed sequence, can
contribute to the work of retrospectively constituting a topic
boundary, and generating a new topic.
This highlighting property has an interesting implication:
it provides a basis for a reading of WO-suffixed utterances which
has often been cited as the particle's meaning, or function, or
force --namely, as a reminder (eg. Gibbons 1980, Kwok 1984).
From the point of view of the present analysis, "reminding" is an
interactional import that is regularly derived from an utterance
which is designed in such a way as to present a piece of
information as somehow unusual or noteworthy. Consider an
example of this in (25).
(25) [DJ1:2:012]
A: goum e:: ngo gaigwo la
	 A: and e:: I counted PT
saamlau yau hou do aa=
	 third-floor there-be very
many PT
[and em I've done a count,
there's a lot on the third
floor]
B: =mm[m	 B: mmm
[di department head le
	 A: those department heads PT
qit-sai-fan ge
	 all-married PT
[those department heads are
all married]
2-->B: hai aa
	 B: yes PT
[yes]
A: ngodei you m-sal bei-faan
	 A: we also no-need-to return
3-->	 keui WO
	 them PT
[and we dont have to give
them (red packets) in
return]
4-->B: hhh heh h(hh)ai WO
	 B: hhh heh yes PT
[hhh heh oh yes]
A: ho (.) gel dai [aa
	 A: PT (.) very reasonable PT
[	 [what a good bargain]
B: [dal aa mm	 B: reasonable PT mm
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[a bargain, yes]
A is describing here a potentially lucrative situation: it
was close to Chinese New Year time, and, since, in the company in
which A and B work, "the department heads are all married", they
can ask them for New Year red packets (arrow 1). Following B's
receipt (arrow 2), A presents a further feature (arrow 3): being
unmarried, they (A and B) need not give any red packets in
return. So it would be "a bargain" to say New Year greetings to
them.
The turn arrowed 3 has a feature that is reminiscent of some
of the WO-suffixed utterances that we have seen before, namely,
it volunteers noteworthy information --in this case, drawing the
co-participant's attention to a feature of the situation that she
has been describing as one which would make its lucrativeness
even more apparent. That this is heard as a reminder is evidenced
by B's response (arrow 4) in which the information is received in
a way that displays the recipient's treatment of it as something
that has led to a realization or remembrance. I return to the
question of WO-suffixed information receipts in the following
section.
In the same way that 'factual information' can be
volunteered, suggestions and advice can also be formulated as
unsolicited offers of views and opinions that are worthy of
notice and attention. In this way, they can, like information
offers, be heard as reminders. (26) instances such a suggestion.
(26) [TC11:1:009]
E: goum tingyat daaiyeuk
	
E: so tomorrow about
wui yau:: e:m mm m
	
will there-be e:m five five
luk go yan dou LA
	
six CL people about PT
[so there'll be about five
or six people tomorrow]
L: o:: ha hh
	
L: I-see ha hh 
E: ha# goum=
	
E: ye# so
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=lei:[: e:# ngo okei le=
L:	 [ha#
E: =jau yau leung# leung
gaa:: lukyamgei
(0.7)
L: o: ngo dou yau gel
(.)
L: ngo daai maai lei aa=
E: =ha# gou:mm yiu daai
-->	 daai WO
L: hai (.) ngo yau (.) haa
you e: my home PT
L: yes
E: then have two two
CL recorder
[we have two recorders]
(0.7)
L: oh I too have machine
(.)
L: I bring too come PT
[oh I have recorders too
I'll bring them]
E: fine, so:: have-to bring
tapes PT
[fine, so:: got to bring
some tapes]
L: yes (.) I have (.) yes
[yes, I have some, yes]
Assuming that the relevant interactional task here is that E
is trying to get L to bring some tapes to a meeting, then in
building the turn with WO, the speaker's assumption is displayed
that the need to "bring some tapes" somehow needs special
mention. One reason why it is noteworthy is that L may not, at
that moment in which the information is presented to him, be
aware of it. Hence the possibility of hearing it as a reminder.
Like suggestions, advice-offers are often constructed in the
form of WO-suffixed utterances. (27) instances one such advice-
offer.
(27) [DJ1:2:249]
T: 'wei (.) bago dou hai
yat go ngaigei lei gaa
aa-Pat
(0.3)
-->T: siusam di WO
(0.5)
T: .hh e: yugwo goum gungjok
lokheui le jee go yan wui
hou pe ge
(0.7)
P: pe-sai la yiging
T: yaumou gaa::ucho aa
jou-jo luk go yut gung
T: hey (.) but also be
a CL crisis be PT Pat
[hey, but there's a danger
too, Pat]
(0.3)
T: careful more PT
[be more careful]
(0.5)
T: .hh e: if so work keep-on
PT I-mean CL person will
very worn-out PT
[if you kept on working
like this, you'd be
worn out]
(0.7)
P: worn-out PT already
[I am worn out already]
T: whether-have mixed-up PT
worked six CL months work
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lei jau waa waa-bei-
	 you EMPH say tell-
ngo-teng lei pe:::?
	 me you worn-out
[how can that be? you've
only worked for six months
and now you're telling me
that you're worn out?]
The utterance siusam di WO ("Be more careful") in the
arrowed turn in (27) is portrayed, through WO-suffixing, as an
opinion volunteered and presented to the recipient for her
consideration. It is also formulated as something that is worthy
of the recipient's attention. Note in this respect another
feature of this utterance: it is prefaced by a turn-initial wei
("hey"), which is a regular "listen-to-this" (attention-
demanding) device. In this sense the initial and final particles
are complementary devices for the construction of this kind of
advice-offers.
So far in this section, we have seen that WO-suffixing is a
device with which informings and remindings can be constructed.
But just when is an utterance a case of informing, and when is it
a reminder? If to inform you is to tell you something that you
do not already know, and to remind you is to tell you something
that you already know, then informing and reminding would seem to
be two categories that are quite distinct. But many of the
extracts examined above suggest that the relationship between
informing and reminding is much more intricate than this. In any
case, one would need to explain how the same particle has come to
be used for both kinds of acts.
From the point of view of expectation as a parameter to
which the design of utterances is sensitive, eg. whether a piece
of information is portrayed as supporting or upsetting an
expectation, or whether it is presented as noteworthy or
unnoteworthy, the distinction between informing and reminding
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(.)
K: leung-dim-bun aa
Y: hou (.) hou aa
K: goum ngo jau:: seung-lai
lei dou aa=
K: bat-m-chat
Y: ha ha=
K: =N aamaa
Y: hai hai
K: hou aa
becomes much less clear-cut. There are cases in which whether
some turn is doing informing or reminding is a question that
cannot, and perhaps need not, be answered. Consider for example
(27), in which the distinction between informing and reminding
seems to have dissolved.
(27) [TC11:2:068]
K: ngo:::[::	 K: I
Y:	 [seung geidim aa
	 Y: want what-time PT
[what time do you want?]
(1.0)
	
(1.0)
K: ngo::: leu::ng-di:mmm-	 K: I two-something PT
leng-jung aa
	
[I -- after two?]
Y: OK (.)	 Y: OK (.)
leung-dim-bun [aa
	 half-past-two PT
[	 [OK, half-past-two?]
K:	 [hou maa	 K: good PT
[OK?]
-->Y: =hak baat-m-chat WO
(.)
K: half-past-two PT
[half-past-two?]
Y: good (.) good PT
[fine, fine]
K: so I then come-up your
place PT
[so I'll come up to your
place]
Y: yeah eight-five-seven PT
[yeah it's eight-five-
seven]
K: eight-five-seven
Y: yeah yeah
K: N PT
[N Building, right?]
Y: yes yes
K: good PT
[fine]
Is the arrowed utterance an instance of informing or
reminding? From the point of view of the participants' knowledge
states, K either knows or does not know Y's room number, and so
the utterance must be either a case of informing or a reminder.
But there is no way in which one can find out from this utterance
alone whether K knows, or whether Y knows whether K knows.
Neither the particle nor any other feature of this utterance
provides any clue on these questions. Therefore, whether Y was
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informing L or reminding him cannot, on the basis of the
utterance alone, be determined. From the point of view of
noteworthiness, however, it turns out that these need not be
separate categories. An offer of information, opinion, or advice
may be presented in such a way as to point to its own
noteworthiness, and on the basis of this feature, can be heard as
an instance of informing, or reminding, or both. That is, the
question whether the speaker is informing or reminding does not
arise; it does not matter to the interpretation of the utterance
whether the labels 'informing' and 'reminding' can first be
applied to it. In fact, the question whether the target
utterance is by itself a case of informing or a reminding turns
out to be a false question; its 'ambiguity' is but the product of
a wrong question, an artefact that results from over-analysis.
To the participants in interaction, its conversational import
cannot be clearer. Therefore, while it may appear that informing
and reminding are, from an epistemic and logical point of view,
distinctly different categories, from the point of view of
conversational interaction, they are very closely related. In
some contexts, the distinction may even dissolve into
irrelevance.
To sum up, one of the uses of WO is to serve as a device for
the design of turns which offer unsolicited information, views,
and opinions, by highlighting their unexpectedness or
noteworthiness.
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7. Realizations
Following a report-component or story-component, a turn
constructed with WO often serves to display understanding and
appreciation of the import of that report- or story-component.
It does this by retrospectively pointing to the action, event or
state-of-affairs presented in the prior turn as unusual and
noteworthy in some way.
In (28), for example, whilst B and C's report-receipts are
almost perfectly synchronized, the ways in which they treat M's
report component ("...I had my first puff of heroin") are quite
different. Whereas C issues only a minimal, free-standing o ("I
see"), B receives the information in a way that points to the
availability of drugs in prison as something that is unusual and
noteworthy.
(28) [DRUG:2:011]
M: tungmaai le ngo hai
gaamfong yapbin le
yau yingsik-jo baan
panyau
(.)
M: heui hai sik baakfan ge
C: hak
(0.5)
M: goum aa jigei yau
yinghung-gam chang LA
C: ha
M: mmmmmm
(.)
M: ngo yau seung hochi
heui goum le jau hochi
toubei yatdiye goum aa
C: o
M: goum le jau ngo chungyi
le jau hai gaau-dou-so
SB Gaau-dou-so le
mm ngo aa:::
M: and PT I at
prison inside PT
also got-to-know CL
friends
(.)
M: they be take drugs PT
[and also I made some
friends in prison, they
all took drugs]
C: yeah
(0.5)
M: and PT self also
heroism strong PT
[and also I had a strong
sense of heroism]
C: yeah
M: mmmmmm
(.)
M: I also want like
them so PT then like
escape something like PT
[and, like them, I also
wanted to escape from
something]
C: I see
M: so PT then I therefore PT
PT then in detention-centre
SB dentention-centre PT
then I PT
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[so therefore in the deten-
tion centre, in the SB
dentention centre, I aa]
(0.9)	 (0.9)
M: seungsi ngo daiyat daam	 M: tried my first CL
baakfan	 heroin
[had my first puff of heroin]
C: o
	
C: I see
-->B: jee hai:::# gaamyuk
	
B: that-means at prison
yapbin sik goW0=
	
inside smoke PT
[so you smoked it inside
the prison]
M: =ha	 M: yeah
B: jee keuidei dou yau lidi
goum-ge dukban
hoyi:: [gungying
[
[
M:	 [yichin ne=
=jau yau ge
B: that-means they also had
those drugs
can supply
[so there was a supply of
those drugs]
M: before PT then have PT
[there was in those days]
(29) below contains an instance of a proverbial (in the
arrowed turn), which, as we have seen in connection with an
earlier data extract, is a regular device for displaying
understanding and appreciation of a story, and accepting an
ending proposal. B's proverbial retrospectively formulates the
problematic situation as reported in C's earlier turns as a
dilemma: "one can't have the cake and eat it"; and, through that,
displays his sympathy towards C for facing such a tricky
situation.
(29) [FEEL1:1:604]
B: =hawaa .hhh aa::-::mmm
goum nei::: ee:::
(.)
gokdak bingo::: ge chimjat
(.)
hou-di waje cheui-mei-
sing do-di aa
(0.9)
C: leung go dou chaa-m-do aa
[leung go jou# jee]=
B: [waa goum hou aa ]
C: =jou ge::
(.)
B: is-that-so .hhh um
so you ee:::
(.)
feel which-one GEN potential
(.)
better or interesting
more PT
[really? .hh um so you um
which one do you think has
more potential or more
interesting]
(0.9)
C: two CL both about-the-same PT
two CL do# I-mean
B: oh so good PT
C: do GEN
(.)
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jou-ge-ye dou chaa-m-do LO
--A: gown aa "yu-yu-hung-
jeung-bat-lang-gim-dak"
go[WO yau
[
[
C:	 ['hal aa soyi
leaa hou ge:ng
(.)
leung go dou
sat-jo-heui LO::
(0.3)
B: mhm
L: mm
B: dou-mmai-yat-ding ge::
lidi:: gaijuk haang-
jyu-sin tai:-ding-di LO:
work also about-the-same PT
[both are about the same,
I mean, their jobs are
about the same]
L: so PT "fish-and-bear-palm-
you-can't-have-both"
PT then
[so one can't have the
cake and eat it]
C: yes PT so
one very afraid
(.)
two CL both
lost PT
[exactly, so one might
lose both]
(0.3)
B: mhm
L: mm
B: not-necessarily PT these
these continue going-
out wait-and-see PT
[well not necessarily, keep
going out and wait and see]
As a third example, consider (30) in which an information
item is received with a WO-suffixed utterance. Note here the co-
occurrence of turn-initial waa21 with final WO, both regularly
used in this sequential position to do "feeling impressed".
(30) [MAK:1:037]
M: sei-go [sung LA
[
J:	 [louseunnn
(0.6)
J: mee sijiu-louseun-
[daaiji a=
[
[
[
M: [o
--> M: =waa:: hoisin WO
-->	 gm gwai WO di ye:
In the last section, we
M: four dishes PT
[four dishes]
J: asparagus
(0.6)
J: what black-beans-and-chili
asparagus-and-scallop PT
[what was it, asparagus and
scallop with black beans
and chili]
M: o
M: wow sea-food PT
so expensive PT the things
[Wow, seafood, that must be
expensive]
saw examples of WO-suffixed
utterances which are heard as reminders. Interestingly, a WO-
suffixed hai ("yes WO") is also a means of doing "being
reminded". Thus, a WO-suffixed information-offer is sometimes
followed in the next turn by a receipt in the form of a WO-
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suffixed hai. When that happens, the information receipt will,
as a "being reminded" display, point back to the information-
offer as a reminder. (31) is an instance of such a sequence.
(31) [DJ1:2:012] (=29)
A: goum e:: ngo gaigwo la 	 A: and e:: I counted PT
saamlau yau hou do aa=	 third-floor there-be very
many PT
[and em I've done a count,
there's a lot on the third
floor]
B: =mm[m	 B: mmm
A: [di department head le	 A: those department heads PT
git-sai-fan qe	 all-married PT
[those department heads are
all married]
B: hai aa	 B: yes PT
[yes]
A: ngodei vau m-sal bei-faan 	 A: we also no-need-to return
1-->	 keui WO	 them PT
[and we don't have to give
them red packets in return]
2-->B: hhh heh h(hh)ai WO 	 8: hhh heh yes PT
[yes]
A: ho (.) gel dai [aa	 A: PT (.) very reasonable PT
[	 [what a good bargain]
B: [dal aa mm	 B: reasonable PT mm
[a bargain, yes]
However, the information-offer need not be WO-suffixed, as
(32) shows:
(32) [TC11:2:060]
Y: lei# aa	 Y: you# PT
(.)	 (.)
Y: lei seung geisi aa	 Y: you want when PT
[when would you prefer]
(0.7)
	
.	 (0.7)
K: e::::	 K: e::::
(1.0)	 (1.0)
K: tai lei s# j(h)au lei
	 K: see you s# suit your time PT
sigaan LA::
	 I# I these-few-days all
[ngo# ngo li-gei-yat d]ou=
	 [it's up to you, I# I'm
[	 ]	 free these days]
Y: [ngo yigaa dou-hai:: ]
	 Y: I now only
K: =dak
	 K: can
1--> Y: ngo yigaa (.) geibunseung Y: I now (.) basically only
dou-hai goigyun je	 correct-scripts PT
[I'm only correcting scripts
these days basically]
2a-->K: o: yigaa lei goigan-gyun
	 K: oh now you correcting-
scripts
2b-->(.)	 (-)
2c-->K: hai WO hai WO=
	 K: yes PT yes PT
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Y: =gam dou mou mat
(0.5)
Y: e::[:
K:	 [goum-yeung
(.)
K: mou mat keita ye
[oh you're correcting
scripts (these days),
of course, of course]
Y: and really no nothing
[and not much else really]
(0.5)
Y: e:::
K: so
(.)
K: no nothing other thing
[so you don't have other
commitments]
In (32), Y's information-offer (arrow 1) is met initially
with the receipt "o" (arrow 2a), a change-of-state token (in the
sense of Heritage 1984), which displays a change in the speaker's
epistemic state from "ignorance" to "knowledge". Notice,
however, that following a micro-pause (arrow 2b), the recipient
goes on to issue two WO-suffixed "yes"s (arrow 2c). By means of
these tokens, he manages to do more than simply receive a piece
of information, but also assign this newly acquired information a
special status, namely, that it is something that the recipient
should have known, or something that has led him to a realization
or remembrance (eg. that Y marks scripts at araucld this t-ime
every year; or, since Y is a teacher, and this is exam time, he
must be marking scripts "these days", etc.).
It can be seen from this example that "remembering
something" and "realizing something" are done in a very similar
way. To realize something is to see something in a new light,
le. to establish some hitherto unnoticed relations, by placing
some old information in a new context. To remember something is
to call back to mind, to retrieve something from one's memory
(past) into the consciousness (present). Indeed, to re-member is
to re-assemble, putting old bits of information together to form
a new picture, assigning to them a significance which they did
not have until now. It is interesting that these two kinds of
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"mental processes" are both accomplished through WO.
We have seen two major ways in which "realization" is
interactionally managed. First, it can be done through an
adjacency pair, as follows:
(1) Informing/Reminding
(2) Realizing/Remembering
In this structure, Position 2 is regularly occupied by a WO-
suffixed hai, as we have seen in the preceding examples.
A related structure is a three-position one, in which a
confirmation follows in position 3:
(1) Revelation
(2) Realization
(3) Confirmation
Here, a WO-suffixed comment in Position 2 retrospectively
formulates the preceding turn as one in which some unusual or
extraordinary state-of-affairs has been revealed. The structure
requires certain techniques and resources in the design of a turn
occupying Position 2. This turn should be designed in such a way
as to signal a change in the speaker's knowledge state as a
result of some recently received information, and, further, an
indication that this newly acquired piece of information is
somehow unusual, extraordinary, or unexpected.
(33) - (35) provide three examples of this structure in
operation.
(33) (=part of 28)
M: goum le jau ngo chungyi
le jau hai gaau-dou-so
SB Gaau-dou-so le
mm ngo aa:::
(0.9)
M: so PT then I therefore PT
PT then in detention-centre
SB dentention-centre PT
then I PT
[so therefore in the deten-
tion centre, in the SB
dentention centre, I aa]
(0.9)
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1-->M: seungsi ngo daiyat daam
baakfan
C: o
2-->B: jee hai:::# gaamyuk
yapbin sik goW0=
3-->M: =ha
(34) (=part of 29)
1-->C: =jou ge::
(.)
jou-ge-ye dou chaa-m-do LO
2-->L: goum aa "yu-yu-hung-
jeung-bat-lang-gim-dak"
go[WO yau
3-->C:	 Uhai aa soyi
leaa hou ge:ng
(.)
leung go dou
sat-jo-heui LO::
M: tried my first CL
heroin
[had my first puff of heroin]
C: I see
B: that-means at prison
inside smoke PT
[so you smoked it inside
the prison]
M: yeah
C: do GEN
(-)
work also about-the-same PT
[both are about the same,
I mean, their jobs are
about the same]
L: so PT "fish-and-bear-palm-
you-can't-have-both"
PT then
C: yes PT so
one very afraid
(.)
two CL both
lost PT
[exactly, so one might
lose both]
In (35), notice that there is an additional feature in the
WO-suffixed comment (Position 2) that is worthy of attention, and
that is the turn-initial waa2lhaa35 (arrow 2a), an exclamation
that often contributes, singly or in collaboration with other
resources, to the doing of "being impressed". This co-occurrence
provides a piece of evidence in support of my proposal, namely,
that in these sequences, WO is a device with which the prior turn
is retrospectively constructed as a noteworthy and commentworthy
phenomenon.
(35) [TC11:2:189]
1-->K: ... yanwai .hh ngo yigaa	 K: because .hh I now
jungng jou-gan-ye	 still working
(-)
K: and I so have-to
.hh Friday that day PT
then go shopping PT
[because I'm still
working, so I have to
do shopping on Friday]
(.)
1-->K: goum ngo jau yiu::
.hh laibaai-m go yat le
jau:: heui maai-ye LO::
(*)
1-->K: jee ngo lam-jyu yiu
(.)
K: I-mean I thinking have-to
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L:=hai me
E: haa=
L: =jee lei yap-jo
li gaan hokhaau
[mou	 gei	 loi ]
[	 ]
[	 ]
A: [heui yat lin jaa]
yap-jo-lei
E: gau# aamammmm gamlin
yap LO
L: goum lei yichin hai
bin-gaan aa
yiu maai godi ye
(0.4)
2a-->Y: waahaa=
K: =jau laibaai-ng heui
maai=
2b-->Y: =hou-gwai gon WO
lei dou
3--> K: hai aa::
(0.3)
K: yinhau-sin faan-lai
jap-hanglei
buy those things
[I mean, those things that
I have to buy]
(0.4)
Y: wow
K: then Friday go buy
[I'll go and buy on Friday]
Y: terribly pressed PT
you too
[You must be terribly
pressed for time then]
K: yes PT
[yes]
(0.3)
K: only-then come-back
pack-up
[only then can I come back
here to do the packing up]
This organization can be put to many uses, to help
accomplish a range of interactional tasks, eg. the expression of
interest (in stories and reports), concern or sympathy. In what
follows, let us examine one particular kind of purpose to which
this structure is routinely put, namely, offering compliments.
(36) [SS:CH:1:270]
E: li gaan hokhaau i ye
ngo m-hai hou suk aa:
(.)
E: lai-jo mou gel loi=
E: this CL school POSS things
I not very familiar-with PT
[the things in this school,
I'm not very familiar with
them]
(.)
E: come not very long
[havent been in this school
very long]
L: yes PT
[really?]
E: yeah
L: that-means you joined
this CL school
not very long
[so you haven't been in this
school for vey long?]
A: he one year PT came-in
came-in
[he's only been here for
one year]
E: las# just this-year
came-in PT
[just came las# this year]
L: so you before at which-
one PT
[so which school were you
attending before?]
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1-->E: DL	 E: DL
L: DL	 L: DL
E: hou chaa [aa ho	 E: very bad PT PT
[	 [really bad, dont you think?]
L:	 [goum jee lei	 L: so that-means your results
2-->	 singjik# hou hou goloW0::	 results very good PT
(0.3)	 (0.3)
[so your exam results must
be very good]
(0.3)	 (0.3)
3-->E: m m-syun hou aa	 E: not not-really good PT
[not all that good really]
L: m-hai lei hou laan	 L: or-else you very difficult
jyun goW0	 transfer PT
[or else it'd be difficult
to transfer]
E: .hhh seung jyun m-hai	 E: .hhh want transfer not
naan aa hai ts# gobin
	
difficult PT at ts# there
di hokhaa:u::	 those schools
schools
[.hhh it isn't difficult to
transfer from those
schools]
(0.5)	 (0.5)
L: [o	 L: oh
E: [jee saauwai yung-di-gung
	
E: I-mean a-little hard-working
le jau hoyi jyun-dak-	 PT then can transfer PT
dou LA	 [I mean if you just work
a little harder you can
transfer]
(37) [SS:D2:178]
I: goum hokhaau leuibin	 I: so school in
yaumou di matye clubs
	 whether some what clubs
lei yau::	 you have
(0.7)
	 (0.7)
I: e:: yaumou join-dou	 I: e:: whether joined
di matye club	 some matye club
[so are there some clubs
in the school? have you
joined some clubs?]
A: e::: poutungwaa LA::	 A: e: Putonghua PT
[.hh
	 .hh
I: [mm	 I: mm
A: science club LA:
	 A: science club PT
I: mm	 I: mm
A: e#	 A: e#
(1.5)	 (1.5)
A: jung yau: me (.)	 A: other there-be what (.)
astronomy LA::=	 astronomy PT
[what else (.) astronomy]
I: =mm	 I: mm
A: .hh e::::m
	 A: .hh e:::m
(0.9)	 (0.9)
1--> A: table tennis LA:: hh hh	 A: table tennis PT hh hh
[.hhh .hh heh heh]	 .hhh .hh heh heh
2--> I: [mm hou do WO hafl 	 I: mm very many PT yeah
[mm such a lot]
267
3--> A: heh heh heh heh
	
A: heh heh heh heh
I: ha#
	
I: yeah
A: hai-goum LO
	
A: like-that PT
[that's it]
In both (36) and (37), a compliment is offered by way of a
display of realization. By retrospectively pointing to the
respective reports as extraordinary and impressive, the WO-
suffixed comments achieve in offering a compliment. That these
are heard as compliments can be seen from the construction of the
turns arrowed 3 (ie. turns occupying Position 3 in our
structure). In (36), a rejection is issued ("not all that good
really"), and in (37), the WO-suffixed comment is responded to by
laughter (ie. no explicit agreement is given to the complimentary
assessment).	 This is consistent with the general finding that
Denials/Rejections often follow Compliments.
We have seen in this section how, in two sequential
environments, a WO-suffixed utterance can contribute to the
management of realizations. And this contribution can be
explicated in terms of the unexpectedness and noteworthiness
properties that have been identified in relation to other kinds
of sequences.
8. Intuitions on WO
An examination of previous descriptions of the particle
reveals a number of intuitions, which are both instructive and
problematical.
Yau (1965) describes WO as a sentence particle that belongs
to his "S-Q type". By that he means that it is a particle which,
when attached to an utterance, neither clearly marks it as an
assertion nor a question. Since Yau's characterization was based
on results obtained from a questionnaire that attempted to elicit
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native speakers' intuitions about this and other particles, this
indeterminacy between statement and question suggests that either
intuitions about this particle are hazy and uncertain, or that
native speakers find it hard to come to any consensus about its
"grammatical function". In this respect, a look at the way in
which Yau glossed the examples given in the relevant section of
his work (p.301) is instructive: it shows his own intuitions at
work.3
(38) jungyiu jigei yau jibun	 bo(=WO)
besides self have capital PT
[besides, you need to have your own capital, you know]
(39) hoyi jauwai yau bo(40)
can around tour PT
[you can tour around, you know]
While single sentences in isolation do not as a rule reveal
a great deal about the point of using this, and, for that matter,
any other particle in the language, the English translations
provide valuable evidence of the author's own intuitions about
this particle. The fact that both (38) and (39) are translated
with a final "you know" suggests that one function of WO, as seen
by Yau, is to mark a statement as one that is made for
confirmation. It is perhaps in this sense that WO is
characterized as a semi-statement/semi-question: it is not used
to assert or state, or to ask or enquire, but to present a
description for confirmation.
Lau's Cantonese dictionary (1977), however, describes WO as
a final particle that "expresses the idea of contradicting or
objecting in the form of a question" 4 (my emphasis). This goes
against Yau's characterization, according to which this particle
does not mark a question.
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Gibbons (1980), on the other hand, characterizes WO (his
"bo") as an indicator of the illocutionary force of "assertion".
Further, it is described as an assertion marker of "strength 3",
which, in his model, means that the speaker is most strongly
committed to the truth of the proposition.
The same particle is described by Kwok (1984) as one which
"may be suffixed to statements without altering their grammatical
status as statements" (1984:41), le. WO has the grammatical
function of marking an assertion. The compound particle "la44-
wo44" (=lo44wo44), however, was singled out, and described in
quite different terms. It is a "disyllabic particle" which
"should be distinguished from the combination of 1a44... and...
bo44" (1984:93), and is "an interrogative particle which when
suffixed to a declarative [sentence] changes it into a question."
(1984:41). Apart from the problem that there do seem to be uses
of this particle cluster which are non-interrogative, 5
 such an
account would seriously undermine the general claim that particle
clusters function essentially as clusters, le. their functions in
combination can be stated in terms of the properties of the
individual components. Unless there are good reasons why this
particular combination should behave so differently from the
others, one would have to adhere to the assumption that
"1o44wo44" is a compound having WO as a final component. If that
is the case, then Kwok's account will have to be taken to mean
that some uses of WO are assertive, while other uses are
interrogative, in which case we have yet another characterization
which is distinctly different from the three accounts reviewed so
far.
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The difficulties with approaches which rely primarily on
intuitions as linguistic data, coupled with traditional assump-
tions about the relationship between sentence types (declarative,
interrogative, and imperative) and functional categories (asser-
tions, questions, and commands/ requests) --for example, the
assumption that declarative sentences are (normally) used to make
assertions, and interrogatives to ask questions-- show up most
dramatically in previous treatments of this particle. My brief
review shows that the state of our knowledge concerning WO is
nothing short of total confusion, where four investigators have
come up with such disparate, even contradictory accounts of the
same particle. It is variously characterized as a marker of
strong assertions (Gibbons), confirmation-seeking-statements
(Yau), questions (Lau), and sometimes assertions and sometimes
questions (Kwok). 	 Which account is correct?
	 Is WO a question
particle or is it not a question particle? The disparity with
which this particle has been described cannot but make us wonder
whether there isn't something fundamentally wrong with the
question itself. Apart from highlighting the scale of the
difficulties in the task of describing WO (or any other utterance
particle in Cantonese for that matter), my review suggests that
there may be fundamental problems with the way in which utterance
particles have been studied. In particular, there would seem to
be formidable problems with such traditional notions as
"assertions" and "questions", understood in grammatical,
linguistic-semantic or speech-act terms. For instance, in the
appropriate contexts, (40) can be glossed as "So we had to go."
(a declarative), "So you had to go then, didn't you?" (an
interrogative), or "You better go then!" (an imperative).
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(40) goum yiu	 heui loW0
so	 have-to go	 PT
Similarly, the utterances (41) and (42), when isolated from
their respective sequential contexts, lose the senses that they
had in those particular contexts in which they were first
encountered (as an assertion and a confirmation-seeking question
respectively).
(41) [taken from (7)]
seng	 saa-sui	 yan	 dou	 mei git-fan loW0
almost thirty-years-old person still not married PT
(42) [taken from (28)]
hai gaam-yuk yap-bin sik goW0
in prison
	 inside eat PT
There is nothing in the morphology or word order of these
sentences on the basis of which their grammatical status (eg.
whether each is a declarative or an interrogative) can be
determined. Also, in Cantonese (as in Mandarin Chinese), subject
noun phrases are particularly prone to be "deleted" or
"understood". Problems like these have led investigators to
suppose that perhaps sentence particles would provide the
necessary clues. But it should be clear from many of the data
extracts analyzed in this chapter that in isolation from sequen-
tial contexts, whether WO is a question particle is not a very
meaningful question. In.
 fact, this is the kind of question that
is often asked in linguistics which, because it arises from some
misguided assumptions, turns out to be unsolvable, even
misleading.
Another misleading question is: what does this particle
really mean? In an attempt to pin down an answer to such a
question, previous descriptions have often confined themselves
unnecessarily narrowly to one particular use, and called that the
particle's intrinsic meaning. Lau (1977), for example, describes
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WO as a particle which is used for "contradicting" and
"objecting", ie. for disagreements. Although, as we have seen in
an earlier section, the use of this particle in several
sequential types can indeed be associated with the doing of
contradictions and objections, there are many more kinds of uses
to which these labels cannot be applied (eg. thankings). What's
more, disagreement in certain sequential types is but a special
case of a much more general phenomenon, namely, preference
organizations. Thus, even in so far as disagreements are
concerned, it would be a more adequate description to say that WO
serves as a means with which dispreferred turn shapes are formed.
More importantly, in a description which is sensitive to
preference organizations, one can find a basis for
"contradicting" and "objecting" to be derived as possible
readings when the particle's properties are sequentially
contextual ized.
Gibbons (1980) attempts to state the meaning of WO in terms
of the notion of illocutionary force. According to him, WO
indicates that the speaker is "passing on information new to
hearer/ forgotten by hearer" and "shows that the speaker believes
the hearer should already know the proposition" (1980:771). It
is not clear how "new information" is to be understood here,
especially if, according to this account, the hearer is supposed
to "know the proposition already". From the point of view of the
knowledge states of the speaker and the addressee, this would
constitute something of a paradox, for how is it that WO can be
used to pass on both information that is new to a hearer and
information that is already known to him/her? However, I have
argued that the notions of informing and reminding are, from an
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interactional point of view, rather more closely tied to each
other than they might at first appear. Thus, WO is sensitive not
so much to questions like whether a piece of information is old
or new, or known or unknown, but rather to the question of how an
information item can be presented to a recipient in such a way as
to build into that information-offer a reference to background
expectations against which the value of that information can be
assessed. Thus, while it is true that one kind of work that WO
can perform is related to "informing and/or reminding", as a
characterization of the functions of WO, this can only give a
partial, not to say inaccurate, picture.
Finally, WO has been described as a particle that "is used
to remind the hearer to take something into special
consideration" (Kwok 1984:64). Two examples from this account
should illustrate this characterization.
(43) keui bat-jo-yip hau yau chin sin	 waan-dak	 bo(=WO)
he	 graduated after have money before pay-back-can PT
[you must take into consideration the fact that you have to
wait until he graduates and is able to make some money
before he is able to pay you back]
(44) nei yiu	 bun-hoi-saai di-ye	 bo(=WO)
you have-to move-away 	 the-things PT
[but I must tell you that you will have to move
everything away first]
Kwok's "special consideration" looks in some ways rather
similar to my notion of noteworthiness. However, in my account,
"noteworthiness" is used in close connection with the notion of
expectation, so that something is noteworthy in so far as, when
placed against a set of background expectations, it can be seen
to be unusual, extraordinary, deviant, exceptional or unexpected
in some way. Thus, for example, the part played by WO in the
building of information volunteering can be explicated in terms
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of this particle's sensitivity to sequentially defined structural
expectations. In Kwok's account, "special consideration is not
specified in those terms, and it is not clear how it can
accommodate this and other uses of WO.
Further, how should the meaning of an utterance in context
be derived from "special consideration", which is meant to be a
definition of the particle's basic meaning? For instance, if one
assumes that the meaning of an utterance in context is somehow
computed by putting together the meaning of the sentence with the
meaning of the final particle, then one would presumably need to
attach the "meaning" "take this into special consideration" to
the meaning of the sentence to which the particle is attached. In
the case of WO-suffixed "yes"s, what would be the product of that
operation? Would the utterance mean something like "take special
consideration of my agreement"? But if, as we have seen, hai WO
is an information receipt which, when placed after an
information-offer, regularly serves as a means of doing "being
reminded", then how can this be derived from the "special
consideration" definition? In general, it is not clear what role
sequential context is supposed to play in this account.
Instead of thinking of noteworthiness as what this particle
"really means", my approach regards meaning as always to some
extent an occasioned accomplishment. From this point of view,
rather than computing the meaning of an utterance by putting
together the meaning of the sentence and that of the particle, in
an act of interpretation, the properties of a particle will be
sequentially contextualized to yield a specific, occasioned
contribution to the utterance's overall sense and import.
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9. Expectation and Interpretation
Linguistic communication is unimaginable unless participants
assume some degree of sharing of background expectations.
Expectations play a crucial role in the assignment of meanings to
utterances in natural conversa-tion. They form, to use
Garfinkel's term, schemes of interpretation which, when applied
to talk, produce meanings:
"The member of the society uses background expectancies
as a scheme of interpretation. With their use actual
appearances are for him recognizable and intelligible
as the appearances-of-familiar-events." (1984:36)
One major kind of expectations in ordinary conversation is
generated by sequential organizations. Through the use of these
organizations as schemes of interpretation, strings of sounds are
rendered recognizable and intelligible to co-participants as
utterances with determinate meanings, performing definite
actions. In the course of a conversation, various organizations
are constantly at work, so that every utterance will set up
various expectations, eg. expectations as to what the next
utterance might look like. When an utterance is issued which in
one way or another violates or upsets these expectations, then
they will need to be built in special forms. WO is from this
point of view a means wtth which such structurally unexpected
turns are designed. Hence, the part played by this particle in
the formation of turns that are dispreferred (eg. disconfirm-
ations) or sequentially misplaced (eg. in information
volunteering).
In general, WO is sensitive to expectations generated by
various kinds of conversational structures. Thus, apart from
sequential organizations, WO is sensitive also to preference and
topic organizations. It is in this sense a linguistic object
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whose functions cannot be adequately described without taking
into account features in the organization of conversational
interaction.
As a design feature, WO is sensitive to expectations in
another way. With it, descriptions of persons, objects, actions,
events, or situations are built in such a way as to invite
readings in which some rules or norms are invoked and applied to
the current case, and, against these rules and norms as
background expectations, that which is being described can be
seen to be deviant. In this way, states-of-affairs can be
presented as unexpected and highlighted for noteworthiness.
Hence, the use of WO in stories and reports for the formulation
of situations and happenings as somehow unusual, extraordinary,
inexplicable, or unexpected.
In other contexts, WO functions to display that something
noteworthy has recently come into the speaker's consciousness.
In so far as the item or pattern was until recently not "on the
speaker's mind", its appearance or re-appearance can be portrayed
as unexpected. Hence the use of WO in the management of sudden
rememberings, remindings, and realizings.
Given the primacy of "background expectancies" in linguistic
communication, it would not be surprising to find in natural
languages resources with which conversational participants can
invoke norms and standards. But the business of presenting
objects, events and states-of-affairs as unexpected and
noteworthy is seldom done for its own sake. Instead, it
contributes to a variety of practical purposes, e.g. to assess
the value of an object, the truth of a description, or the
reasonableness of an action or argument. To portray something as
277
exceeding or falling below a standard is a means of managing a
range of interactional tasks, such as accusing someone, offering
compliments, sympathy and appreciation, justifying an action or
defending a position, and so on. The particle WO is precisely
such a resource in Cantonese.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that
"expectation" has been used in the description of some Mandarin
Chinese items too. 6 For example, Li & Thompson (1981)
characterize the particle ne in Mandarin Chinese as follows: "As
the final particle of a declarative sentence, ne has the semantic
function of pointing out to the hearer that the information
conveyed by the sentence is the speaker's response to some claim,
expectation, or belief on the part of the hearer." (p.301)
From their description, ne would seem to share many
similarities with WO. The properties of the Mandarin particle as
described by Li and Thompson 7
 would, however, be over-restrictive
for the Cantonese one. For one thing, WO does not occur only in
responses to "claims, expectations, and beliefs". For instance,
we have seen how story- or report-components can be built using
WO. In those positions they can hardly be said to be responding
to a claim or expectation. What's more, the expectations that WO
invokes cannot be restricted to the recipient's. In realization
displays, for example, there is a sense in which the speaker's 
expectations have been disturbed. In general, however, WO is
sensitive not so much to expectations as subjective psychological
states, but structural expectations which are intersubjective.
Expectations generated by sequential organizations, for example,
cannot be said to "belong" to the speaker or the hearer.
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We saw in the previous chapter how states-of-affairs are
sometimes portrayed through the particle LO as unnoteworthy and
"only to be expected". In the light of this, WO is a particle
that does an opposite sort of job: it helps to portray things and
events as unexpected and noteworthy. In this sense it may be
called a marker of unexpectedness. However, in the same way that
LO is not a label to be tagged onto "ordinary objects" and
"unnoteworthy events", WO is not to be regarded as a label to be
attached to things and events whose deviance from ready-made
rules and norms has been independently established. Rather, the
status of a state-of-affairs (in terms of expectedness) is to
some extent always an open and negotiable matter, to be
constructed in the details of linguistic interaction. For
instance, an event may be presented as unusual or extraordinary
in a report or story. But its unusualness or extraordinariness
is not something that is given prior to or independently of the
accomplishing (telling and receiving) of the report or story
itself. Far from independently given, background expectations
are often occasioned through WO. Thus, in a realization sequence,
the unexpectedness, noteworthiness, or remarkableness of a state-
of-affairs is not something intrinsic to the state-of-affairs
itself or determinable on the basis of some general scale or
measurement. Rather, unexpectedness is a quality that is
retrospectively attributed to it partly through the work of WO in
subsequent turns. In this sense, the background expectations
against which this state-of-affairs is to be seen as remarkable
were not even there when the state-of-affairs was reported.
In conclusion, WO is a particle which can be characterized
in the most general way as a linguistic device with which
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objects, persons, events, situations, etc. can be highlighted for
noteworthiness, unexpectedness, or remarkableness. However, far
from defining the particle's basic meaning, these properties are
meant to be contextualized before they would yield any specific
contributions in relation to particular interactional tasks. In
particular, the kinds of work that it can perform are closely
tied to different kinds of sequential positions. Thus, in the
environment after a turn which seeks agreement, confirmation, or
contact, it would serve to mark a dispreferred response. In the
position after a turn in which some general rule or position is
stated, it would serve to challenge or undermine a position.
Within the context of a story or report, it is used to highlight
the unusualness or remarkableness of an action or event being
reported. In the position after an information offer, it can be
heard as remembering or realizing something. In general, the
kind of contribution that this particle has in any particular
occurrence cannot be determined independently of the sequential
environment in which it occurs.
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CHAPTER 6
UTTERANCE PARTICLES AS CONVERSATIONAL OBJECTS
1. The Meanings of Utterance Particles as a Product of the
Interaction between their Presumed Underlying Properties
and Sequential Contexts
An attempt was made in the previous chapters to provide
descriptive accounts of the properties of three utterance parti-
cles in Cantonese. Throughout the discussion, I have stressed
that each particle can be used to serve a wide variety of
interactional tasks, and that the contribution that each makes
towards the overall meaning of the utterance in which it occurs
is anything but simple or straightforward. Indeed, the
contribution of a particle to the sense and import of an
utterance cannot be given prior to, or independently of, the
context in which it is placed. From an ethnomethodological point
of view, characterizations of the properties of linguistic
objects, however empirically informed and painstakingly done,
would provide but half of a dialectic. Whatever basic,
decontextualized properties a particle may be construed to have,
these underlying properties will need to be contextualized within
the particulars of an interaction, before definite sense can be
made of it. For some purposes (eg. writing a dictionary), it is
of course possible to talk about 'the meaning of a particle', in
much the same way as one might talk about 'the meaning of a
word') But this is not the same as to say that the properties
that are identified for such purposes would then constitute a
definition of the meaning of the particle.
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For instance, in my description of the particle LO, we saw
how it can be put to a variety of uses, depending in part on its
sequential positioning. In a narrative (report- or story-
component), it is regularly used to present the event-being-
reported as a consequence arising from some circumstances, or as
an effect resulting from some causes. It is also used to present
a proposition as a reasonable conclusion to draw from some given
premises. It would seem natural, given this kind of use, to find
that this particle occurs also in suggestions and advice-givings,
where some course of action is presented as arising naturally
from, or necessitated by, some circumstances, and therefore a
reasonable thing to do. We may identify a common feature in
these uses as consequence.
But we saw that LO in the position after a report-component
or an assessment, can also contribute to the construction of
cognate formulations (rephrasings of a prior turn) and to display
understanding and appreciation. There is some affinity with the
previous uses, in that there may be said to be an arising-from
feature involved, which bears some resemblance to the consequence
feature --although this has now become somewhat transformed. But
at the same time there has now emerged a new feature, namely,
independent motivation (the sense of "I've always felt this way",
"I've always believed this", etc., of a cognate formulation).
When we turn to the position following confirmation-seeking
turns, (eg. "yes, that's what happened LO"), LO-suffixed
utterances often serve as confirmation tokens which seem to share
with cognate formulations the independent motivation feature.
Indeed, this feature has become, in these kinds of uses,
considerably more central than the consequence feature).
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Continuing the extension, we find that while Independent
motivation is still a prominent feature in LO-suffixed utterances
which are used to do "belief/suspicion confirmed" (often in
Position 3 of a Question-Answer-Comment sequence, eg. "hai LO" [I
knew it ]) , there now seems to be yet another additional
feature: with LO, the known-all-along character of a state-of-
affairs is highlighted.
Finally, a LO-suffixed utterance, in the sequential context
following an information-seeking question, can be heard as a
description of some state-of-affairs as a simple fact. Thus, in
response to a fact-finding question about her son's age, a mother
said "sap-sai seui LO" ("Fourteen").
To facilitate an examination of the complex and fluid
relationships among the various features mentioned above, I have
attempted to arrange them schematically as follows. It should be
clear that the scheme below is but one out of many possible ways
of arranging these features (and that is precisely the point I am
trying to make here, ie. we do not have one necessary or
inevitable way of summarizing these features).
I. Consequence/result (eg. to do 'explaining something')
2. Conclusion (eg. to propose ending of episode/account)
3. Cognate formulation (Arising from a prior turn)
4. Independent motivation (I've always felt that way too)
5. Belief confirmed (That's what I said)
6. Fact (something known all along)
With this simplified, schematic representation, I wish to
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underscore the family resemblance relations that hold between
these features. As one moves from one feature to the next, each
transition looks minimal and unexceptionable. And yet after a
few moves, one finds that one has imperceptibly moved quite a
long way from a few steps back, until one reaches a point when
what seemed a naturally related feature a few moments ago
suddenly becomes, upon looking back, almost unrecognizable.
Thus, while a consequence or result might seem unproblematically
related to a story- or account-ending, it is not entirely clear
how that can be used to build a cognate formulation, still less a
confirmation. And when we reach fact, the lineage between this
and the first feature (consequence) has become rather hard to
trace.
It is therefore quite clear that it will not do to describe
LO as a particle that marks declarative or interrogative
sentences, or to say that it marks an act of explanation,
confirmation, or fact-provision, although it can indeed be used
in all of these ways, and many other ways besides. One would
need to break away from the confines of popular conceptual
strait-jackets such as "marking" (eg. sentence-type marking or
speech-act -marking), and study the range of uses of a particle
by examining the ways in which its properties, when sequentially
contextualized, contribute to the production of meanings-in-
context. As argued in Chapter 2, linguistic items, particles
included, are essentially indexical: they do not have meanings
given in advance. Rather, their presupposed general, context-
free properties are drawn upon as a resource to which
contextualization applies to yield occasioned meanings.
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However, although there can be no adequate specification of
the meaning (or meaning contribution) of a particle prior to its
use, the assignment of meanings in a particular context does
presuppose the existence of certain underlying properties.	 Far
from claiming that there is nothing one can say about these
particles independently of context, I only wish to underscore the
inherent incompleteness, extendibility, and fluidity of their
properties.
With this proviso, I will now summarize, for the sake of
quick reference, some of the structural and functional properties
of the three particles studied in this thesis, as in the table on
the following page.
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Summary of some of the structural and functional 
properties of LA, LO and WO
*******************************************************************************
SEQUENTIAL
ENVIRONMENTS
	
LA
	
LO
	
WO
*******************************************************************************
Narrative
(Story and
Report
components)
Report-
receipt
Suggestions
& Advice
Agreement-
seeking &
giving
Second pair part
of Q-A sequences
To put on record
the availability
of common under-
standing of a
certain descrip-
tion, and to
propose contin-
uation of
narrative
Understanding
check
Seeking mutual
agreement on the
efficacy and
desirability of
a certain
proposed course
of action
To propose
continuation
upon having
established
common under-
standing of a
description
To portray.
answer as
adequate
description
To formulate event
as a natural
consequence of
some circumstances;
narrative complet-
ion proposal
To indicate receipt
of information
which is expected
or 'known-all-
along'; cognate
formulations;
confirmation
To portray proposed
course of action
as 'only reason-
able'
To propose
completion
upon having
reached an
agreement
Completion
proposal
To portray event
as unusual or
extraordinary
against a background
of norms and
expectations
To challenge
a claim or a
position; or to
do realizing
something
To present proposed
course of action
as a reminder
To disconfirm or
disagree
To highlight status
of answer as
unexpected
Thankings
	
To present thanks
as unsolicited
Pre-closing
	
To pass turn
*******************************************************************************
(Suggestive
	
Common under-
	
Conclusion
	
Deviation from
Labels:)	 standing and
	
and
	
norms and
Continuation
	
Completion
	
Misplacement
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The "suggestive labels" in this table are meant to provide a
convenient mnemonics, and must in no way be taken to be the
meanings or definitions of the particles. It should be clear
that it is not my aim to provide, for each particle, a basic,
primary, intrinsic, fundamental, default, inherent, underlying,
system-internal, context-free semantic or pragmatic specification
--what may be regarded as its dictionary definition. Instead, I
wish to learn about the ways in which meanings are achieved in
conversational interaction through contextualizations which draw
upon the presumed underlying properties of these objects. Rather
than giving a specification in terms of a system of semantic or
pragmatic contrasts (eg. among a set of particles that can occupy
the same structural slot in a syntagm), I wish to emphasize the
relationship between the presumed generalized and decontext-
ualized properties of each particle and the contextualization of
these properties in different sequential environments, as well as
the production, out of this interfacing, of situated interpreta-
tions (meanings-in-context). In this sense the previous analysis
chapters can be regarded as demonstrations of the ways in which
utterance particles as conversational objects contribute to the
assignment of meanings to utterances in context.
On a more general level, I wish to address the question of
the raison d'etre of these objects in the language: what are they
in the language for? It was noted in the first chapter that, as
a word class, utterance particles are semantically contentless
morphemes that are regularly found 'attached to' utterances.
They do not in general contribute to the truth-conditional,
literal, denotative meaning or propositional content of the
utterances in which they occur, but have to do with the way in
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which something is said. While these particles do not enter into
syntactic relations, and do not have semantic content, the sense
of an utterance cannot be determined without taking note of the
particle(s) that occur(s) in it. A general objective of this
study, as set out in the beginning, is therefore to determine
just what kinds of contribution these objects have towards the
situated interpretation of utterances in conversational
sequences.
I wish to address these issues by relating the findings
reported in the previous chapters to work that has been done on
utterance particles and similar objects in other languages.
Utterance particles have been approached from various
perspectives in the literature, including: the sentence-type
perspective, the modality perspective, the speech-act
perspective, and the discourse perspective. I will examine each
in turn. While many previous studies in fact adopted a mixture of
perspectives, I shall, for the convenience of exposition,
organize the discussion under these rubrics. Thus the same study
may appear under two or more headings.
2. Utterance Particles as Grammatical Markers of Sentence-types
A classic strategy Is what may be called the substitution
method. Particles are inserted into a constant syntactic frame
to see what grammatical or semantic differences such substitu-
tions may make. This procedure may yield observations that would
sometimes allow the analyst to say that a particle marks a
certain sentence-type. Thus, if the substitution of a particle
into a constant syntactic frame renders the sentence an
interrogative one, it would be described as a marker of the
sentence-type "interrogative".
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Karttunen (1975c), for instance, describes the particle -ko
in Finnish as "a marker of yes/no questions" whose function is to
tell the addressee: "this is a yes/no question. You are directed
to answer this." (p.236)
Corum (1975) identifies two particles in Basque which mark
negations and questions:
"ez negates the statement, al (and othe in the Northern
dialects) changes a statement into a question" (p.91).
Similarly, one of the criteria used in Kwok (1984) for the
classification of sentence-final particles in Cantonese is
whether the attachment of a particle to the end of a declarative
statement would change its sentence type.
In these and other studies, certain particles are depicted
as markers which are sensitive to such sentence-type distinctions
as positive vs. negative, or declarative vs. interrogative. The
assumption is that the simple, positive, declarative sentence is
somehow basic, and that certain particles change them into other
kinds of sentences, eg. interrogatives or imperatives. In this
sense they are regarded as grammatical markers of sentence types.
This way of looking at particles may have an initial
attraction, because there do seem to be particles in the world's
languages which mark the sentences in which they occur as
interrogatives. For instance, ka in Japanese, -ko in Finnish,
and aa21 in Cantonese. But clear cases of this kind of marking
invariably turn out to be in the small minority. Most particles
that have been investigated do not clearly, straightforwardly and
exclusively mark sentence-types. For example, the Cantonese
particle LO might be described as a particle that marks the
grammatical status of the sentence to which it is attached as
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declarative; semantically, this corresponds to the marking of an
assertion. But there are difficulties with such claims.
First, LO-suffixing is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for the identification of declarative sentences. It is
simply not the case that sentences that are suffixed with LO are
always identifiable syntactically as declaratives, or semantic-
ally as assertions. There are clear instances of LO-suffixed
utterances which are intended and heard as questions and
suggestions, among other things. It is not a necessary condition
either, because declaratives are not necessarily marked by LO.
Essentially the same can be said of most of the other particles
in Cantonese: they do not consistently signal a particular
sentence-type.
Second, traditional sentence-type categories are vastly
outnumbered by the utterance particles that have been identified
in Cantonese. If the primary function of these particles were to
mark sentence-types, then the fact that there are so many of them
in the language would become something of a mystery.
Thus, while in some ways attractive and useful, the
sentence-type perspective has rather serious limitations.
3. Utterance Particles as Carriers of Attitudinal and
Emotive Meanings
It has been observed time and again that there are classes
of words in languages which, rather than modifying the proposi-
tional content of a sentence, function to signal the speaker's
attitudes and emotions towards the proposition. Arndt, for
example, in a study of "modal particles" in Russian and German,
says of this class of words that one of their characteristics is
that they "convey no element of the objective message content...
but the subjective emotion or mental attitude of the speaker to
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his interlocutor, to the objective message content, or to another
element of the linguistic situation." (1960:326)
Also, these objects are often likened to prosodic (eg.
intonation) and paralinguistic features (eg. gestures). For
example, Schubiger (1972) compares utterance particles in German
to various intonation patterns in English, and suggests that the
kinds of modalities expressed by some German particles are
comparable to the emotive or attitudinal meanings signalled
through intonation in English.
Similarly, Arndt compares modal particles to intonation and
gestures in the following way:
"Semantically, these minimal morphemes are additives which
complement communication and ease interpretation of the
message beyond its cognitive range, without themselves
carrying a semantic charge. Representing, as they do,
subjective shorthand signals of speaker's attitude to
referent and/or interlocutor, they have some functional
resemblance, not to traditional 'parts of speech', but to
phonemes of intonation and to gestures such as the French
and Mediterranean concessive or remonstrative gesture
complexes." (Arndt 1960:327)
While some utterance particles in Cantonese do seem to have
a modal kind of function, eg. wo24 (not W044) may be described as
a marker of 'Quotative' modality, 2 and LO may be said to have an
'Evidential' kind of function, 3 their properties cannot be
described wholly in terms of such modal categories. For one
thing, features have been identified in the previous chapters
which show that very often, in making sense of what the
interlocutor is saying, the recipient will turn to the particles
not only as evidence of the speaker's attitude towards whatever
he is saying (in isolation), but as evidence of the kind of
interactional problem they are dealing with. Within a modal
perspective, these interactional and conversation organizational
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parameters which many utterance particles are sensitive to would
be overlooked.
A more serious misgiving is that the literature on the
emotive and attitudinal functions of utterance particles is
filled with such problematical and intractable notions like
"degrees of insistence" (Uyeno 1971), "mild disappointment"
(Karttunen 1975 a,b,c), and "unpleasant surprise" (Schubiger
1972). Far from being ready-made functional categories to which
utterance particles can be assigned, these labels are psycho-
logical predicates which are themselves in need of explanation --
how do hearers come to these conclusions about the speaker's
psychological states? More important, since particular particles
do not as a rule consistently or exclusively signal one or two of
such categories, what part do they play in this process of
psychological-state attribution?
Apart from psychological labels, another widely used method
in the description of particles as modality markers is glossing,
where the "meaning" of a particle is given in the form of an
expansion or paraphrase. For example, in a study of the particle
doch in German, Schubiger (1972) describes it as a particle whose
central meaning is: "by the way you talk (or act), one would
think you didn't know (or were ignorant of the circumstances)".
But it is apparent even from the her own examples that doch
cannot in every case be paraphrased in the same way. For
instance, it is sometimes glossed as "obviously", and sometimes
as "since you don't know this, let me tell you ...". The two may
in some contexts be equivalent, but in other contexts they need
not be equivalent. In any case, many of her example sentences
have been glossed differently presumably because there are
292
certain differences in their meanings, or else they could have
been paraphrased in exactly the same way.
Glossing makes sense only in relation to a context. For
example, the use of the Cantonese particle WO in certain contexts
can be glossed as "I find this an extraordinary thing to happen",
and will, for just those contexts, be an adequate gloss. In
other kinds of sequences, however (eg. in informings and
remindings), it would not do to paraphrase this particle in the
same way. In these other contexts, it might be glossable as "in
case you don't know already" or "you may not be aware of this".
A consequence of this is that every gloss has only a limited
range of applications. On the whole, a general gloss works only
for a certain kind of sequential environment, different glosses
being needed for other kinds of sequential environment. There
may be family resemblance relations among these glosses, Oqt ClQ.
one of them can subsume all the others. In short, a particle
does not mark or signal one single way of speaking, only a family
of ways of speaking.
A final problem for the modality perspective is that it
would be hard put to explain why utterance particles are
pervasively present in natural conversation, but appear much less
frequently in certain modes of language use (eg. newsreading and
lecturing) and writing. Specifically, what would the factors be
which motivate the apparent preference, in these modes of
language use, for 'attitude-indicating devices' other than
utterance particles (eg. adverbials)? The key to this problem
lies in the fact that the difference between formal speech and
writing on the one hand and ordinary conversation on the other is
that the former is essentially monologic whereas the latter is
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dialogic. As the kinds of interactional problems that many
utterance particles are sensitive to typically do not come up in
monologues, they do not as a rule figure very prominently in
these modes of language use.
4. Utterance Particles as Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices
Another perspective from which utterance particles have been
studied is what might be called the speech act approach.
According to this view, utterance particles are first and fore-
most indicators of illocutionary forces. Analytical frameworks
which fall into this category are those in which particles are
described in terms of parameters such as the speaker's degree of
commitment to the truth of the proposition, the extent to which
an utterance expects or demands a response, the relative status
between the speaker and the hearer, the "strength" of a speech
act (eg. how "strong" a suggestion is), and the relations between
an utterance and "the rest of the discourse".
Tsuchihashi (1983), for example, attempts to describe
sentence-final particles in Japanese in terms of a speech act
continuum, a "semantic space" ranging from declaratives from one
end to interrogatives at the other. The particles are then
arranged along this scale according to their relative
declarativeness and interrogativeness, determined on the basis of
a number of considerations, including speakers' degree of
certainty to what they are saying, the extent to which a response
is "allowed", etc.
Utterance particles in Cantonese too have been described in
speech act terms. In Gibbons (1980), a number of parameters like
the ones mentioned above are proposed. Particles are then
assigned a value (eg. "+" or "-") against each parameter. As a
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result, each particle is described as a matrix of feature
specifications, in much the same way as sound segments in a
feature-based phonology, or lexical entries in a feature-based
lexicon. In the context of contemporary linguistics, this is a
very tempting option, because it offers a framework in terms of
which things can be seen to fall neatly into some place within an
overall system of oppositions. In practice, however, as soon as
one looks in detail at some speech data in which these particles
are actually used, one often finds that important, even crucial,
aspects of their structural and functional properties have been
left out of these tidy systems.
The simple fact is that upon detailed and contextualized
analysis, most utterance particles turn out to perform quite a
range of tasks, and cannot be assigned to one or two
illocutionary classes. One of the major findings of my
investigation is that utterance particles typically do not
consistently mark a class of moves or acts. Rather, they have
been found to have some rather general and open properties which,
when interpreted within a sequential environment, would
contribute to the construction of particular meanings-in-context.
A similar finding has been reported on some clitics in
Finnish. Karttunen (1975b) describes the functions of the
clitics -han and -pa as follows:
"By adding -han to sentences, we get amelioration,
contradiction, announcement of discovery, appeal to common
knowledge, and request for assurance or giving of assurance.
"-pa is every bit as diverse. It appears in expressions of
certainty, of something just observed, as an intensifier, in
appeals to common knowledge, in rhetorical questions, at the
beginning of stories to mean 'you see', in wish sentences
['if only ...'], in concessives, and in contradictions."
(1975b:4)
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Thus, rather than marking a small number of action types,
utterances in which particles and clitics occur can often perform
a wide range of actions. In this respect, categories like
"declaratives" and "directives" are extremely crude labels whose
value in the description of particles must be rather limited.
For one thing, a great deal of utterance particles simply do not
mark any of these categories. Whether an utterance is an
assertion or a mand or a question often cannot be determined
outside of a sequential context. Rather than having a constant
function such as the marking of an utterance as a question or a
directive, an utterance particle typically interacts with the
sequential environment in complex ways to contribute towards the
overall sense and import of an utterance.
For instance, the particle WO has been described as a marker
of the illocutionary force of "passing on information new to
hearer or forgotten by hearer" (Gibbons 1980:770). Putting aside
the problem of how illocutionary forces can be enumerated, and
assuming that there is an illocutionary force which we can
identify as "passing on new or forgotten information", it can be
(and has been, in Chapter 5) shown that this is but one of the
many kinds of acts that this particle can take part in. For
instance, we saw how this particle can contribute to describing
unusual and extraordinary things and events; challenges,
disagreements, disconfirmations and declinations; thankings;
realizings and rememberings; and many others. In view of this,
the fact that WO can be used to inform or remind is itself in
need of explication: the basis on which a particle can perform
such a wide range of work must be sought elsewhere than in terms
of the marking of illocutionary forces. In the case of WO, its
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varied uses will need to be stated in terms of such notions as
"remarkableness", "commentworthiness", and "unexpectedness",
which are interactional, not actional, categories. In general,
utterance particles in Cantonese (and, I suspect, in many other
languages which have similar objects) cannot be adequately
described as markers of (classes of) illocutionary forces.
5. Utterance Particles as Discourse Markers
Most descriptions of utterance particles in the past have
used a combination of the above perspectives. However, more
recent studies have begun to adopt what may loosely be called a
discourse perspective. I would include under this rubric a range
of methods and approaches which may be quite diverse in theore-
tical orientation and analytical methods, but nevertheless share
one or more of the following features. First, a framework will
be regarded as adopting a discourse perspective if it looks at
particles in relation not only to other sentence elements but
also to units and structures 'beyond the sentence'. Second, if
it attempts to explicate the forms and functions of these objects
within an overarching discourse or conversational context.
Third, it should typically be based on natural speech data,
rather than hypothetical sentences or stock examples.
For my present purposes, it will suffice to illustrate this
perspective by singling out for a brief summary a handful of
discourse particles in English that have received some recent
attention, about which interesting findings have been reported.
These include you know, well, OK, and oh.
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5.1 You know
You know is one of several short expressions in English
which are syntactically loose and semantically elusive. It looks
superficially unstructured and meaningless. However, a closer
investigation reveals that it has an important role to play in
discourse organization.
Following a few schematic remarks by R. Lakoff (1972), which
pointed to the possibility of certain expressions in English
being functionally motivated by factors such as politeness,
Ostman (1981) proposes to analyse you know as "a hedge". Its
"prototypical meaning" is described in the following way: "The
speaker strives towards getting the addressee to cooperate and/or
to accept the propositional content of his utterance as mutual
background knowledge." (Ostman 1981:17) For him, therefore, you
know is an expression which can be employed in conversational
interaction to secure common ground.
In a similar vein, James (1983) identifies a set of
"compromisers", which include expressions like you know, sort of
and like. They are analyzed as "metaphorical expressions" which
"compromise on" the literalness of the heads that they modify.4
In his account, these expressions serve as pointers or indicators
to facilitate the interpretation of utterances: they indicate to
hearers how the the heads which they qualify are to be
interpreted. Specifically, they instruct hearers to derive the
meanings of these heads from figurative interpretations, treating
the actual phrases and clauses used as representations of, or
standing for, equivalent or synonymous expressions.
While no attempt is made to relate this particle to
discourse structures, both analyses give prominence to the
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interactional contexts within which you know plays a role in
meaning assignment. Thus, James (1983:202) suggests that you
know displays "interpersonal rapport", and appeals to the
hearer's interpretive capabilities in deriving the intended sense
and import of a description.
Following the lead of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974),
who suggested that expressions such as well, so, and OK may be
pre-starters or post-completers in terms of the turn-taking
system, analysts became increasingly aware of these particles'
discourse properties. For instance, Goldberg (1980) offers an
analysis of y'know on the basis of a corpus of natural conversa-
tional data, and explicates the role that this expression plays
in topic organization. Y'know is said to be a marker that is
tagged onto topically significant items, marking them as "moves"
that introduce or re-introduce conversational topics. She argues
that, rather than being a free-floating and meaningless filler,
you know is a linguistic device that contributes to the creation
and sustenance of discourse coherence.
Schiffrin (1987) makes a similar attempt at describing the
properties of expressions like you know in terms of their
functions in discourse. In Schiffrin's framework, discourse
particles are treated as markers of the "contextual co-ordinates"
of an utterance at one or more planes of discourse organization:
ideational structure, action structure, exchange structure,
participation framework, and information states, 5 and contribute
to discourse coherence by anchoring a text to a context.
Whereas Goldberg focuses on the role that you know plays in
topical organization, Schiffrin stresses the way in which it acts
as a marker of "transitions in information states" (1987:267),
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'eg. from 'speaker knows that hearer does not know' to speaker
knows that hearer knows', and is used to establish shared
knowledge. As such it can serve to "gain attention from the
hearer to open an interactive focus on speaker-provided
information". (ibid.) In this way, it contributes to such
interactional tasks as topic generation. Thus, while Schiffrin's
analysis gives greater prominence to the informational aspect of
y'know, it supports Goldberg's contention that this particle (and
similar objects) has important properties that need to be stated
in terms of the organization of discourse.6
5.2 well
R. Lakoff (1973b) first observes that well is an expression
that seems to be sensitive to the question of the adequacy of an
utterance as a response to a prior utterance (eg. a question,
request, or invitation). Making use of Grice's Maxim of
Quantity, she suggests that well can be handled as a marker of
the violation of that maxim, ie. as a "maxim hedge". Thus, one
of its uses is "to serve notice that the speaker is aware that he
is unable to meet the requirements of the Maxim of Quantity in
full". (Levinson 1983:162). This is consonant with my character-
ization of utterance particles as one kind of linguistic resource
that provides evidence necessary for inferential processes that
take us from form to meaning-in-context.7
A Conversation Analytic approach confirms these observations
and yields further insights. Various analysts (eg. Pomerantz
1975, 1984; Wootton 1981; Levinson 1983; Owen 1981; Schiffrin
1985, 1987) have produced evidence to show that well is a design
feature that contributes to dispreferred turn shapes: it is
regularly found in locations where it prefaces turns which follow
300
questions, requests, invitations, or assessments, and which are
structurally dispreferred. Far from upsetting the organization
of discourse, well contributes to it by partaking in and
reproducing preference structures. The work of this particle
provides a clear example of the way in which linguistic items are
used to display participants' orientation to the orderly
character of talk and to the joint production of orderliness in
an ongoing conversation.
Closer phonetic analysis of this particle has uncovered
further organizations. Local & Kelly (1986) observe that well has
I nmteT of pivonotic realiTations. When occurring before a
vocalic segment, it takes a form that ends in a lateral (some
form of [1]). But when the following is a consonant, the variant
that occurs is one that ends in a vocalic segment. However, in
addition to these positional variants, there is a form that is
sensitive to sequential placement: well with certain phonetic
characteristics ("with a vocalic ending, not accompanied by
faucalization and not accompanied by a lateral articulation"
[p.190]) occurs only in those sequential contexts in which it
precedes reported speech, regardless of whether the following
segment is a vowel or a consonant. Thus, according to this
analysis, well is not a unitary phenomenon, but a conflation of
at least two forms. Nevertheless, the distributional patterns in
question have to, and are, stated precisely in terms of conversa-
tional organization. Thus, while their study does invite
analysts to look more closely at the phonetics of speech
materials, it confirms the claims made in previous studies
concerning well's conversation organizational properties. Indeed,
it adds further substance to the general observation that this
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and similar particles in English have important contributions
towards discourse organization.
5.3 OK
Taking up Goffman's (1974) suggestion that expressions like
OK and now then may be regarded as "bracket markers", Condon
(1986) examines the distribution of OK with reference to the
organization of verbal and non-verbal actions, and notes that it
often occurs at junctures where more than one of these levels
converge. 8
 One specific location in which it is often found is
at junctures between a main task and an off-task activity.
Specifically, OK often signals at such a juncture a return from
off-task activities (such as joking) to some main task, but not
the other way round. In so doing, it re-invokes interpretive
schemes that may have been temporarily held in abeyance in the
course of a side-sequence. In this sense, it may be said to have
an "orientation" and "keying" function.
If Condon's description is correct, then like several other
expressions in English, OK is a particle which has at least one
kind of use which is primarily discourse organizational.
5.4 oh
One of the most interesting studies of discourse particles
in English is Heritage's (1984) investigation of oh. A
distinctive feature of his account is the way in which the
properties of oh are described with close reference to the kinds
of sequential environment in which it occurs. Thus, it is found
to preface responses to information-offers, question-elicited
informings, and counter-informings, to signal the oh-producer's
change from a state of ignorance or misinformation to one of
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knowledge. It is also found occupying turns that immediately
follow other-initiated repairs and similar environments, as a
means of acknowledging receipt of information for a variety of
purposes. The particle is therefore characterized as a "change-
of-state token": an item which "is used to propose that its
producer has undergone some kind of change in his or her locally
current state of knowledge, information, orientation, or
awareness." (Heritage 1984:299) This contributes not only to
sequential organization, but also to speaker alignment, and helps
to define and re-define, in an ongoing discourse, participant-
role constellations (eg. knower/ information-supplier and non-
knower/ information-recipient).
In addition to these characteristics, oh also has certain
properties that are statable in terms of topic organization. In
this respect, a free-standing oh in a number of sequential
environments (eg. after a news-announcement) is found to be a
systematically inadequate response, in the sense that it
withholds rather than progresses the topic.
Thus, a particle that has always been thought to be
unstructured and not particularly meaningful is found through
meticulous attention to' sequential details, to systematically
contribute to the production of meaning, and the determination of
the sense and import of an utterance in context. Heritage
concludes:
"Although it is almost traditional to treat oh and
related utterances (such as yes, uh huh, mm hm,
etc.) as an undifferentiated collection of 'back
channels' or 'signals of continued attention',
such treatments seriously underestimate the
diversity and complexity of the tasks that these
objects are used to accomplish" (1984:335)
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Schiffrin (1987) has reached comparable conclusions. Oh is
described as a "recognition display" and an information receipt.
According to her, the primary function of this particle is
information management, which is a cognitive task. But once
verbalized, this has pragmatic effects and interactional
consequences. For instance, it can be used to preface repairs,
to signal a change in orientation, and to do recalling old
information.
5.5 The Systematic Contributions of Particles to
Discourse Organization
LK\ Ws secttion, v.le have seen how, in many recent studies,
certain 'tiny expressions' which have always been thought to be
unstructured and 'not very meaningful', have been found, upon
closer study using natural speech data, and from a discourse
perspective, to have highly systematic contributions to make
towards meaning assignment in interaction-- much more so than it
has ever been realized before. This general perspective for the
study of these and similar objects has, I believe, proved itself
to be worthy of the linguist's serious attention, for the
insights and discoveries that it has generated and made possible.
6. Utterance Particles as Conversational Objects
My study of three utterance particles in Cantonese has shown
that they form a class of items in the language which cannot be
satisfactorily handled by the usual analytical tools of syntax,
semantics, and pragmatics alone. The description of many of these
objects would benefit from a discourse perspective. They are
best approached from the point of view of how they take part in
the procedures with which interactional problems are handled in
the course of a conversation. I summarize in this section the
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general properties of this class of objects as a whole under the
following headings: recipient design, sequential organization,
preference organization, topic organization, conversational
charting, and the pervasive presence of utterance particles in
naturally occurring data.
6.1 Recipient Design
One useful way of looking at these objects which have
persistently resisted conventional linguistic analysis is to
think in terms of their functional motivations, or the communica-
tive pressures in response to which they may have emerged and
developed. For instance, politeness has been proposed as one
major source of functional pressure on linguistic structure,
which has exerted fundamental and far-reaching effects on the
structure of many languages (Brown & Levinson 1978 and 1987, and
references therein).
My investigation of utterance particles in Cantonese
suggests that they may be regarded as one kind of means available
to participants in their attempt to handle a variety of problems
arising in conversational interaction. One set of recurrent
problems has to do with what form an utterance is to take on a
particular occasion as a result of who the recipient of that
utterance is construed to be. The design of an utterance on a
particular occasion embodies, among other things, an analysis of
who the recipients are, what they can be expected to know, what
their expectations are, and how they might respond to the utter-
ance.
9
 From this point of view, one pervasive conversational
concern is "newsworthiness", ie. the question of whether a piece
of information is tellable, whether the recipient knows it
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already (Sacks 1974, Jefferson 1978a, Heritage 1984). Another
concern is the need to furnish a basis for knowledge --to build
into an utterance an indication of "how I know" (Pomerantz 1984).
Yet another recurrent concern is with the why of behaviours.
Conversational participants are constantly engaged in telling why
--providing, for a variety of purposes, reasons for some action,
argument, or assessment, and, in so doing, appeal to the
recipient's rationality and understanding (Pomerantz 1986).
Each of the three utterance particles studied in this thesis
is responsive to some aspect of recipient design. As we have
seen, the particle LA is responsive to the question of the
avaiTability of shared understanding, and the adequacy of a
description. With the use of this particle, a formulation is
presented explicitly as one whose sense and import the recipient
can be counted on to work out.
LO is a device with which conversational participants
disp7ay their orientation to questions such as whether something
is a reasonable thing to do given some circumstances, or whether
some proposition is a logical conclusion to draw from a set of
premises, and, related to these, whether a state-of-affairs is
natural, unremarkable, and uncommentworthy. All this presupposes
a recipient-analysis. To present something to a recipient as
natural, only-reasonable, or unremarkable is to appeal to his/her
ability to see it that way, eg. to apply certain principles of
common-sense reasoning to a particular situation and arrive at a
similar conclusion or judgement.
The third particle, WO, is sensitive to questions concerning
the expectedness or unexpectedness of a situation --whether an
utterance should be presented as confirming or upsetting the
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recipient's expectations. With WO, a state-of-affairs may be
described as one which is unexpected and therefore noteworthy and
commentworthy, and, through that, a variety of interactional
purposes may be served.
From this point of view, then, utterance particles in
Cantonese are a means with which speakers can signal their
awareness of and orientation to the recipient. They provide a
resource in the language for conversational participants to
design their utterances with particular reference to the person
to whom a stretch of talk is directed.
Just what categories and distinctions are relevant here?
What are the parameters that enter into recipient design? And
what kinds of linguistic means are available to express them?
These are empirical questions through and through. It would be
interesting to find out what parameters there are, which ones are
universal, and which ones specific to particular communities,
cultures, and languages. Being grammaticalizations of categories
and distinctions relevant to recipient design, utterance
particles in different languages may well provide us with
invaluable clues as to what these parameters are and how they
figure in different languages. My study has revealed that
parameters such as "the adequacy of a description", "remarkable-
ness" and "expectedness" are built into the design of utterances
through the use of utterance particles in Cantonese. As these
are intersubjective categories and are pragmatic and social in
nature, it should come as no surprise that utterance particles
are best approached from the point of view of their functions in
social interaction.
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6.2 Sequential Organization
It has been shown how the contributions of utterance
particles to meanings-in-context need to be analyzed with
reference to sequential environments. The statement of
sequential structures in turn has to make reference to particular
utterance particles.
For instance, in specifying the structure of a Realization
sequence, WO needs to be recognized as one of a small set of
resources that can serve as a turn constructional component.
Recall that the structure of a Realization sequence (see Section
7 of Chapter 5) is as follows:
Position I: Revelation
Position 2: Realization
Position 3: Confirmation
The construction of a turn occupying Position 2 of this
sequence typically makes use of certain kinds of turn construc-
tional resources. Specifically, it needs to be designed in such
a way as to signal a change in the speaker's knowledge state as a
result of some recently received information, with an indication
that this newly acquired piece of information is somehow unusual,
extraordinary, or unexpected. WO is one of the regular devices
that can be used in constructing turns with these features. It
is therefore often found occupying this particular position in a
Realization sequence, and contributes to its organization.
As another example, recall that LA has a special role to
play in pre-closing. Following a topic boundary, pre-closing is
regularly achieved through the use of an adjacency pair, both
parts of which are occupied by turns containing LA suffixed to
such materials as "see you on Saturday" (singkei-luk gin LA),
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"good" (hou LA), "OK" (OK LA), and "that's it" (hai goum sin LA).
As in the previous example, the statement of the pre-closing
adjacency pair will need to make special reference to certain
types of LA-suffixed utterances.
On the basis of such findings, it should be an expectable
feature of many utterance particles in the language that, as a
kind of turn constructional resource, they would have significant
contributions towards sequential organization.
6.3 Preference Organization
Mention has been made in the analysis chapters to the ways
in which some occurrences of utterance particles are responsive
to, and describable in terms of, preference structures. Indeed,
at least one of them contributes in interesting ways to their
organization.
Some of the uses of WO are best described in terms of
preference organizations. In sequences which contain in their
first position a rule- or norm-citation, a request to establish
contact, or a confirmation-seeking token, second pair-parts are
differentially designed, depending on whether they respond
positively or negatively to the first pair-parts. In particular,
positive responses in these sequence types are systematically
preferred. Negative responses are dispreferred, and are designed
in special ways. One of the uses of WO is to contribute to the
design of dispreferred turn shapes in such sequences: it is
regularly found suffixed to challenges to a rule- or norm-
citation, non-compliance with a request to establish contact,
and disconfirmations.
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6.4 Topic Organization
One recurrent theme of this study is the way resources are
made use of by participants to organize their talk in terms of
topic. In this respect, it is interesting to consider the role
that utterance particles play in the initiation, establishment,
continuation, and termination of a topic. (Goldberg 1981, Button
& Casey 1984, Jefferson 1984, Schiffrin 1987)
Since I have already considered in some detail the uses of
the three particles as linguistic resources for the accomplish-
ment of topic generation, continuation, shift, and termination, I
will do no more than summarize the most significant findings in
fairly general terms.
In Cha9ter 5, we saw (1(144 WO is sometimes used to do
'informing someone', ie. to provide a piece of information that
is likely to be unexpected to the recipient. In various
sequential locations this has the effect of a news announcement.
Following a substantial pause, a WO-suffixed utterance can often
be heard as retrospectively constituting the silence as a topic
boundary, and, further, offering a topic-initial elicitor (Button
& Casey 1984), ie. introducing potentially topicalizable
material, and, through that, contributing towards the generation
of topic.
LA occurs in various kinds of sequential structures (eg.
reportings and listings) and behaves in many ways like a topic
continuer. Its occurrence in these sequences is regularly heard
as a continuation proposal. Thus, unlike WO, which may be heard
as proposing to start a new topic, LA contributes systematically
to the maintenance and furtherance of talk on a current topic.
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In this respect, LO has properties rather different from the
other two particles. Its occurrence in specific sequential
places (eg. in an answer-turn) is non-contributive to topical
progression. It is regularly heard in such positions as passing
the turn back on to the co-participant, and withholding progress
on the current topic. In other sequential environments (eg. in a
story- or report-component), it often functions to propose
ending.
It should therefore be clear that a description of utterance
particles in Cantonese would benefit from a consideration not
only of the various kinds of organizations so far mentioned, but
also the ways in which these objects have systematic contribu-
tions to make to conversational interaction at the level of topic
organization.
6.5 Conversational Charting
A related problem in the business of conducting a
conversation, which participants orient to, and exploit
linguistic resources in order to deal with, is that of charting;
for example, 'where we are' and 'what to do next'. Utterance
particles provide a means with which this problem can be handled,
so that participants ca'n make manifest to each other at what
point they are in a co-ordinated project, and what they might do
next. This aspect of conversational organization has been
described in the following terms:
"...CA is examining conversation ... as a self-
explicating system.. .The policy involves seeing
how the setting makes its own organization visible
to participants, how its arrangements can be
examined from within so that people can see 'what
is happening here' and determine 'what we are
supposed to do now'. Thus, when applied to
conversation it means examining how the talk
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making up the conversation is organized so that
parties to it can determine 'what has been said',
'what we are talking about', 'where we are in this
conversation', 'what further course this
conversation might take' and so on." (Sharrock &
Anderson 1987:313)
In this respect, LA and LO are particularly interesting. As
mentioned above, LA has a forward-looking quality and regularly
projects further talk. In this sense, it is a device for the
doing of continuation and carrying-on-with-an-unfinished-account.
LO, on the other hand, is essentially backward-looking and
withholds topical progress. It is thus a device that contributes
mainly to the doing of ending, concluding and the like. An
interesting consequence of this difference is that should further
talk from the current speaker follow their occurrence, these are
heard in systematically different ways. Further talk from the
current speaker following the occurrence of LA can be, and
regularly is, heard as continuation. In the case of LO, however,
this will typically be heard as the speaker pursuing a response;
as, in general, an extension.
From the point of view of conversational charting, it is an
important question whether an ongoing project (eg. the telling of
a story) is being continued, and yet to be finished, or whether
it has come to a possible end, but is now being extended. These
are matters that have been shown to be pervasively oriented to by
participants (eg. Sacks 1974). My analysis of the particles LA
and LO suggests that different means may be available in
different languages to deal with these interactional problems.
Conversation being a minimally two-party activity, methods must
be available to interlocutors with which problems to do with the
co-ordination of their actions can be tackled. Utterance
particles are from this point of view one kind of resource in
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some languages with which participants can from time to time
document to each other where they are in the course of a project.
The conversation would then be constantly and reflexively
providing information about itself. Here we have a good example
of the sense in which "a conversation" itself may be said to be a
joint accomplishment.
6.6 The Pervasiveness of Utterance Particles in Natural Conversation
In addition to the above dimensions, my study has, I
believe, rendered noticeable a question which, once mentioned,
and seen in the light of the kinds of properties discussed above,
would seem as if it could not possibly be simpler and more
obvious. It is a question that stares one in the face as soon as
one confronts some speech data: why are utterance particles so
massively and pervasively present in naturally occurring
Cantonese conversation? My results and findings suggest that
they form a class of conversational objects whose functions are
primarily conversation organizational. It should therefore come
as no surprise that they are pervasive in ordinary conversation
but drastically reduced in frequency of occurrence or prominence
in writing and other modes of communication.
All in all, I believe that a conversation interactional
approach offers a fresh point of departure for the study of
linguistic objects like utterance particles which are
particularly unyielding to conventional linguistic treatments.
The range of observations that this perspective has allowed me to
make about three utterance particles in Cantonese should have
provided good evidence that this approach has interesting
potentials worthy of further exploration.
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CHAPTER 7
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
I. The Relevance of Conversation Analysis to Linguistics
1.1 Inter-disciplinary Considerations
One of the most exciting standpoints for an understanding of
language is at the cross-roads between disciplines which share a
theoretical interest in linguistic phenomena. Unfortunately, for
someone who wants to occupy such a position, there is a price to
pay. These inter-disciplinary points of contact are often places
where one is most likely to feel disoriented, even lost. This is
particularly true when the disciplines involved are striving to
become 'scientific', and are determined to maintain their
respective boundaries in the fear that impurities from outside
might weaken their claim to a scientific status.
Linguists and sociologists are often quick to point out that
certain kinds of interest in, and certain ways of dealing with,
language and speech, are un-linguistic or un-sociological. Button
& Lee, in their Preface to a recent collection of CA papers
(Button & Lee 1987), record the somewhat unusual fact that Ethno-
methodologists and Conversation Analysts are often considered by
sociologists as linguists, and by linguists as sociologists.
(pp.1-2) One intriguing problem raised by CA is, in so far as
linguistic interaction is concerned, whether inter-disciplinary
collaboration between Linguistics and Sociology is possible.
While this is a question that many 'borderline workers' must have
considered, there have been relatively few direct discussions of
the problems involved.'
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In the Prologue and Epilogue to Button & Lee (1987), Lee and
Sharrock & Anderson present two much needed in-depth discussions
of the problematical inter-relation between CA (as a sociological
school) and linguistics. Lee notes that the two disciplines have
very different theoretical and methodological orientations, so
much so that CA's theoretical insights and empirical findings may
be of limited interest to linguists because of the incompati-
bility between two very different sets of assumptions.
"The problem is that by and large the methodologies of
current linguistics militate against an interest in natural
conversational organization. Linguists tend to work with a
priori theories, 'scientific' models or with interest in
what is taken to be grammatical construction. If linguists
approach naturally occurring materials at all, they tend to
do so with a 'scientific' model or hypothesis in mind.
Natural materials under such a scheme represent a resource
or an auxiliary for testing or supporting a priori
theorizing. Problems which linguists pose relate to whether
or how the data might confirm a theory or support the use of
a model. This has the consequence that natural materials are
not, and cannot be, investigated in their own right." (Lee
1987:50; original emphasis)
It is true that on the whole the two traditions have quite
different theoretical and methodological assumptions. Current
schools of linguistics are almost without exception hypothesis-
forming-and-testing in character. With a priori theorizing as a
primary and overarching concern, most linguists are debarred from
taking a genuine interest in naturally occurring speech and
conversation. Natural linguistic data are of interest to this
kind of enquiry only in so far as they provide a means of
confirming or disconfirming an hypothesis formulated as a set of
predictive statements about what would and what would not happen.
But what does happen and the details of what happens (ie.
linguistic activities) are left imperceivable, and therefore
unattended to and unanalyzed. CA, on the other hand, tends to
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start its enquiries from within natural speech data, looks for
patterns that emerge from the data, and seeks to explicate how
participants manage to produce those patterns. That is, it sets
out to study speech data as phenomena that are of theoretical
interest in their own right.
On the basis of these observations, both Lee and Sharrock &
Anderson argue that "at present there are severe difficulties of
understanding" between the two subjects. (Sharrock & Anderson
1987:319) In other words, the present state of the art is such
that the possibility of a mutually beneficial collaboration seems
remote. According to this view, if CA has anything to offer to
linguistics, it would do so only at a highly abstract and general
theoretical level, rather than inthe form of any specific
contributions to the solution of linguistic problems.
"...the main value of CA to linguistics and to discourse
analysis is not to be found in the way it might provide an
auxiliary basis for testing already existing theories or
contributing to the solution of pre-established puzzles, but
in revealing the significance of the fact that.., language-
in-use is pervasively a matter of social organization." (Lee
1987:51)
The revelation that "language-in-use is pervasively a matter
of social organization" is by no means a peripheral matter or a
neglectable message for linguistics. Even if this were all that
CA had to offer to linguistics, it would still be a proposition
that merits linguists' close attention. Taken seriously, the
fact that language-in-use is in a fundamental way socially
organized is an insight that should have immense repercussions
for our investigations into the question of the possibility of
communication. This is not only a preoccupation of pragmatics
and sociolinguistics, but must also be of central relevance to
linguistic theory, which is concerned among other things with the
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nature of the organizations that govern the operation of
linguistic communication.
While Lee's and Sharrock & Anderson's are by and large fair
appraisals of the situation, It seems to me that there is perhaps
more to the connection and interaction between the two disci-
plines. It would be a most unsatisfactory state-of-affairs if a
powerful and successful line of investigation of language-in-use
like CA were to have little relevance to linguistics. Whatever
happens to be currently in vogue, linguistics is after all a
subject whose primary preoccupation is with the understanding of
how languages work. It would seem rather strange that two
disciplines, both claiming to take an active interest in
language, should have little to say to each other.2
And it is not entirely true that the questions and concerns
underlying the CA programme are alien to the linguist either.
For example, one of the aims of CA is to specify the mechanisms
with which meanings are assigned to utterances in conversation.
Its central concern being the problem of social order --
specifically, the problem of the relationship between the meaning
of social actions and their organization and coordination-- an
important problematic is the relationship between the meanings of
utterances and the prinCiples that govern their organization.
Clearly, to the extent that linguistics is concerned with the
relations between linguistic forms and meanings, the specifica-
tion of meaning is precisely one of its central concerns. That
is, whatever else linguists may be interested in, they would not
wish to avoid the problems of the description of the meanings of
linguistic expressions. But since semantics has traditionally
been the most problematical, if not the weakest, area in
linguistics, contemporary studies of meaning have found it useful
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and beneficial to import ideas from other disciplines, most
notably philosophy (eg. both Searle and Grice are philosophers).
In this context, it is interesting to note that CA's concerns as
outlined above would seem to bear some resemblance to those that
motivate speech act theory (Searle) and theories about the nature
and mechanism of conversational inferencing (eg. Grice's ideas
about conversational implicatures). In the same way that these
ideas have provided some much needed stimulation for the
linguist, I believe that many difficulties linguistics has been
having in the area of semantics and pragmatics would benefit from
a greater awareness and familiarity with the CA tradition.3
I submit that however incompatible the two disciplines may
seem to be in some respects, and however difficult it is in
practice to foster inter-disciplinary collaboration, there are
important reasons why CA's theoretical insights, analytical
techniques, and empirical findings ought to be made more widely
known to, and taken more seriously by linguists.
Some recent linguistic studies have been conducted using
theoretical and methodological tools from CA, and have made
significant contributions to our understanding of existing
linguistic problems, as well as discovered new (hitherto
imperceivable) ones. In a series of papers, John Local, Peter
French, and their colleagues (eg. French & Local 1984; Local et
al. 1985, 1986) have opened up unprecedented and exciting ways of
looking at and tackling a range of problems in phonological
description. For instance, in a paper on Tyneside English, Local
et al. (1986) tackle a long-standing problem in phonology: how is
the delimitation of linguistic units organized at the
phonological level? As the authors point out, this is a problem
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that goes at least as far back as Trubetzkoy (1939), but has
received relatively little attention since then. Little progress
has been made on the identification and description of the
phonological properties of delimitative systems. Traditionally,
the assumption has been that phonological means of signalling the
boundaries of linguistic units (eg. sentence, word, morpheme) are
ancillary. Phonological features are from this point of view
optional extras haphazardly tagged onto units which are identifi-
able independently (eg. syntactically and/or semantically).
Using the turn in conversation as a basic unit, the authors were
able to identify and describe clusters of phonetic features
having systematic distributional properties in terms of the turn-
taking system (eg. positions definable as "turn-beginnings" and
"turn-ends"). More importantly, the features so identified and
described are shown to be attended to not only by the analysts
but also by the conversation participants themselves. The
problem of the phonology of delimitative systems thus turns out
to be one that can be handled systematically and satisfactorily
in terms of how turns are interactively constructed, and how
phonetic resources take part in such organizations. By thus re-
examining an old problem in a new light, the authors have
succeeded in opening up interesting possibilities for
phonological description.
In a number of related studies using naturally occurring
conversational data from other varieties of English, more has
been uncovered concerning the relations between clusters of
phonetic features and interactive functions. (French & Local
1984, Local et al. 1985, Local 1986, Local & Kelly 1986) As a
result, much more is now known about the ways in which complexes
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of phonetic features are used to do interactive work such as
turn-transition, turn-competition, turn-holding, and turn-
yielding. Thus, far from being irrelevant, or of merely
peripheral interest to linguistics, CA has proved through these
studies to be capable of generating questions and analyses that
would address the linguist's stock-in-trade, and issues which are
central to the linguist's preoccupation with the relations
between linguistic forms and functions.
My own investigation of utterance particles in Cantonese
supports the position that some linguistic problems would benefit
from an integration with CA. Various kinds of speech particles
in many languages have been known to linguists for a long time.
However, as shown in the previous chapter, traditional
descriptions using sentence-type, modality, or speech act
perspectives have proved unsatisfactory in constructing
comprehensive and compelling accounts of these linguistic items.
Recent theoretical and methodological input from CA has given
rise to new ways of looking at these expressions and has led to
the discovery of organizations hitherto unnoticed and
undescribed. For instance, the Cantonese utterance particles LA
and LO turn out to have interesting roles to play in the
interactive management of continuation and extension in reporting
and story-telling. More generally, it has become clear in my
investigation that their raison d'etre is fundamentally
conversation interactional in nature. On the whole, I think it
is fair to say that CA has provided a useful impetus to our
investigation of these objects, and has shown that, before
linguistic expressions are dismissed far too quickly as
meaningless or unstructured, much more needs to be done to
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examine in detail their distribution and functioning in natural
conversation.
But the benefits do not simply go in one direction.
Linguistics should have something to offer to CA too. One way in
which linguists would have a contribution to make to the study of
conversational interaction arises from the fact that they have
long been concerned with the identification and description of
phonetic details. Thus, for instance, an important area of
research left fairly open in Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson's
seminal paper on turn-taking (1974) concerns the characterization
and specification of the notion of transition relevance place --
for instance, what linguistic resources are there in different
languages for the constitution of TRPs? This is obviously of
great importance to CA, and it is a problem that should benefit
from analytical efforts from linguists. Unfortunately, on the
whole linguists have not been very forthcoming on these problems,
partly as a result of a lack of understanding between the two
disciplines. However, the various papers discussed above by
Local, French and others on the applications of CA methods to
phonological description are an honourable exception to this
impasse. In their various papers, these workers have identified
significant phonetic features that go into the operation of the
turn-taking system which Conversation Analysts have either
ignored, overlooked, or, because of their lack of linguistic
expertise, been unable to describe.
It is interesting in this connection to note that Gail
Jefferson, a leading worker in CA, has acknowledged the
linguist's contribution. In a recently published paper
(Jefferson 1986) she suggests that greater care would need to be
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taken in capturing finer phonetic details in the transcription of
conversational data. For this, phoneticians and linguists would
be able to provide a valuable contribution. The view is clearly
expressed in this paper that expertise from "sequentially-
oriented phonologists" (1986:182) would be an asset and a gain
to CA.
Thus, while I appreciate the magnitude of the problems
involved in trying to make linguists and Conversation Analysts
listen to each other, these difficulties are perhaps not
insurmountable. As a linguist, I believe that CA does have
relevance to linguistic research. But it may not be the kind of
relevance that is immediately apparent. Rather than providing
linguists with "a mechanical procedure for identifying the
interactive function of a given utterance type" (Sharrock &
Anderson 1987:305), CA invites them to reflect upon some
fundamental aspects of their practice. In what follows I shall
mention very briefly a number of specific contributions of CA to
linguistic methods.
1.2 Methodological Reappraisal
J.2,1 lingvistic data.	 The value and crucial importance of
naturally occurring speech data is not often recognized in
linguistics. I have argued in Chapter 2 that not only are
natural speech data admissible and usable, there are reasons why
they are superior to other kinds of data (eg. those generated by
intuition, memory, or imagination; or 'survey data' of the socio-
linguistic kind). This is especially true for those who claim to
be studying linguistic behaviour. For these linguists, it would
be most unrealistic to dodge naturally occurring data. Rather
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than dismissing them out of hand, or merely treating them
cursorily, we have no alternative but to face them squarely, and
make our descriptions accountable to them. One of the most
disturbing problems that has been plaguing the subject is that
research results often do not add up to anything or do not seem
to be heading anywhere. Disagreements often begin from the very
basic question of whether some alleged linguistic activity does
or does not actually occur, making arguments, not to mention
progress, extremely difficult. Until linguists can sit down and
examine records of what speakers do and say, and take that as
uncontroversial data, there would not be any hope for arguements
over the relative merits of competing analysis to contribute to
progress in the subject. It is only on the basis of naturally
occurring data which are open to re-examination and re-analysis
that research efforts in linguistics would become truly
cmcw.lati nle.
2.2.2 Zingaistic details.
	 A related question is the amount of
trouble that linguists are willing to take in examining speech
materials. Conventional linguistic descriptions typically gloss
over such details as the exact location of the onset of an
utterance, laughter, pauses and silences, etc. Work in CA has
shown convincingly that participants often attend to details
which might be dismissed in an a priori manner as inconse-
quential. My analyses of the utterance particles have provided
numerous examples of the ways in which the identification of the
interactive functions of a particle depends on such linguistic
details being taken into consideration. For example, post-LA
silences are typically dealt with in very different ways from
post-LO silences. Were such silences not treated seriously, many
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interesting observations would have been missed. I believe that
linguistic research would benefit from a greater readiness to go
into the details of linguistic activities.
1.2.3 Evidence.	 It should be in the interest of the subject
to set stringent requirements on what is to count as evidence for
or against proposed analyses. It is customary in linguistics to
be given an example sentence, and be told that its meaning is so-
and-so, or that it is ambiguous. And yet we are seldom given an
account of how these 'meanings' are arrived at. For instance,
what kinds of context would need to be presupposed? It could be
argued that the analyst's specification of the meaning of a
sentence is but one possible interpretation of it, and not
necessarily the most interesting one either. If we want to learn
about the ways in which meanings are arrived at in the actual
course of a speech event, then it would be desirable to have a
constraint according to which claims and proposals must be built
upon evidence in the data: the analyst needs to show that such
claims and proposals fit in with the way in which the utterance
in question is actually treated by the conversational
participants. With such a constraint, we would be in a better
position to argue about the relative merits of competing
proposals.
1.2.4 Linguistics for the Hearer. 	 One of the characteristics
of conventional linguistic research is a prevalent preoccupation
with 'the speaker'. As recently as 1987, the need was felt to
publicize and advocate the hearer's perspective: a collection of
papers was published with a view to "redress the speaker-oriented
bias" of the subject. (McGregor 1987) In the Preface, Parker-
Rhodes is quoted as saying:
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"Ours is a speakers' civilization and our linguistics has
accordingly concerned itself almost solely with the
speaker's problem... The skilful speaker wins praise; the
skilful listener, despite the mystery of his achievement, is
ignored." (McGregor 1987, p.xi)
It can be argued that the hearer's perspective should be
given as much, if not greater, attention in linguistic theory.
For one thing, speaker intentions are in principle not open to
observation or verification, and would therefore be a dubious
parameter to use for a basis of linguistic description. But the
hearer's perspective needs to be stressed too if for no other
reason than the crucial role that hearing plays in the production
of meaning in communicative situations. Further, there is a
range of linguistic phenomena the satisfactory handling of which
will require a hearer's perspective, eg. speech processing,
speaker recognition, child language acquisition, sociolinguistic
variation, and the effect of different kinds of hearer roles (eg.
addressee vs. eavesdropper) on comprehension, to name just a few.
The same is true for grammar. Hockett, in his contribution
to McGregor (1987), argues that grammar for the hearer should
have priority over grammar for the speaker, since "hearing...
involves all the operations involved in speaking, but speaking
involves all the operations involved in hearing, plus the
logistic operation of scanning ahead and making choices."
(Hockett 1987:67)
Thus, one beneficial influence of CA's would be a healthy
shift of focus from an over-concern with such parameters as
speaker-intentions and speaker-identity to a more balanced
approach which takes the hearer's perspective duly into account.
1.2.5 A Badly Needed Empirical Tradition. 	 As a summary of the
points mentioned above, consider again this somewhat puzzling
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feature of modern linguistics, namely, its relative neglect of
speech materials and naturally occurring linguistic behaviour and
activities. One would have thought that linguistics, being a
discipline that studies language and speech, would be interested
in questions such as the ways in which people get things done
through speaking. In this sense, it might come as something of a
paradox that modern linguistics is much more well known for its a
priori theorizing about such matters as the properties of the
human mind, than its interest or expertise in handling speech
materials. This in itself is neither a praise nor a criticism,
until one realizes that the progress and the future of the
subject may depend critically upon the existence of an empirical
tradition. In aspiring to become an academically respectable
discipline, linguistics would need at the very least a tradition
in which researchers share the conviction that an account of any
linguistic phenomenon must stand or fall on the basis of its
adequacy vis-a-vis linguistic materials that are publicly
available. In this context, it is worth considering seriously
the following searching question of Levinson's (1983), which
applies just as much to pragmatics as it does to linguistics on
the whole; viz, the question of:
"... whether pragmatics is in the long term an essentially
empirical discipline or an essentially philosophical one,
and whether the present lack of integration in the subject
is due primarily to the absence of adequate theory and
conceptual analysis or to the lack of adequate observational
data, and indeed an empirical tradition." (1983: 285)
For the various reasons briefly mentioned in this section,
if for no other, the relevance of CA to linguistic studies ought,
in my view, to occupy a much more central place in our
theoretical and methodological deliberations.
326
2. Towards a Socially Constituted Linguistics
2.1 Traditional Sociolinguistics as a Social Adjunct to
Linguistic Theory
One place in linguistics where the beginning of an empirical
tradition might be found is sociolinguistics. An impetus for the
rapid development of modern sociolinguistics has been a deep-
seated dissatisfaction with the a priori and highly idealized
character of linguistic theorizing. Generative grammar is clear
and explicit in excluding linguistic performance as a viable form
of empirical data (Chomsky 1965). Sociolinguistics represents in
this sense a major attempt to break away from the limitations
imposed by linguistic theory on the study of speech phenomena
(linguistic performance). In some ways it can be seen as a
proposal to put an empirical element back into linguistics.
However, instead of happily going on to put substance into
that proposal, sociolinguistics quickly found itself slipping
back into the same mould of thinking from which it sought to free
itself.
For a time, the most popular brands of sociolinguistics were
the sociology of language (Fishman 1970, 1972) and the quantita-
tive paradigm (Labov 1972a, 1972b). The former is concerned with
the description of patterns and changes in the 'habitual language
use' of a community of speakers; for example, how, in a multi-
lingual community, the language varieties making up the
community's linguistic repertoire are distributed in terms of
socio-culturally defined spheres of activities (the notion of
domain, eg. Fishman 1970, 1972). The quantitative paradigm, in
its turn, is concerned primarily with the problem of variation;
for example, how the variant forms of a linguistic item are
distributed in terms of such social categories as class, sex and
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ethnicity.
On the face of it, these two fields of research may look
rather different. The sociology of language is concerned with
highly abstract and schematic societal patterns of language use
and language choice. The quantitative paradigm, on the other
hand, deals with 'smaller-scale' regularities in the occurrence
of linguistic items (mostly phonological segments) in the speech
of individuals. And yet in a crucial sense these two fields of
research share a	 very similar notion, which is the social
distribution of language. They are united in so far as there is
no difference between them on the question of how "social
factors" should enter linguistic description. For both
approaches, "social factors" provide a basic, pre-existing, and
independently identifiable grid in terms of which the distribu-
tion of /anguage varieties or language items can be charted.
Essentially in both types of sociolinguistics, language (as
variety or as item) is regarded as a dependent variable, and a
host of social categories as independent variables. The aim is
then to test the statistical significance of relations between
these two sets of variables. In this sense, the two fields of
research may be regarded as versions of a correlational
sociolinguistics.
Correlational sociolinguistics has created at least two
sorts of problems. Firstly, there is the problem of empirical
data. As mentioned above, sociolinguistics could be seen as an
attempt to put an empirical element back into linguistics. But
neither the sociology of language nor the quantitative paradigm
are too much about linguistic performance or the activities of
speaking as such. Working with highly idealized categories like
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class and ethnicity, correlational sociolinguistics takes an
interest in natural speech data only in so far as occurrences of
linguistic variables can be found in them, counted, and used to
confirm or disconfirm a priori hypotheses concerning the
relations between linguistic and social variables. The hope of
replacing grammatical theory with an empirical tradition has
therefore been ironically abandoned.
A second problem with correlational sociolinguistics has to
do with the status of its descriptive statements. Roughly, the
prob)em is: how can the patterns that it has identified and
described be, as it were, translated into actual and particular
instances of talk? More accurately, how can actual scenes of,
and moments in, verbal interaction be seen through these alleged
schemes and patterns, and be described in terms of them? For
example, a particular act of code-choice may violate the
specifications in a dominance configuration. An instance of a
particular variant form of a linguistic item neither confirms
nor disconfirms a variable rule. It has of course been argued
that these statements are not meant to be predictive, and that
systematicity exists only at the level of statistical
descriptions. Nevertheless, it would not be unfair to ask: if
sociolinguistic patterns are in the last analysis summaries of
observations made at the level of face-to-face interaction, then
why is it that actual acts of speaking and the dynamics of
interaction have suddenly become invisible once these
sociolinguistic patterns have been formulated?
A deep source of trouble underlying these difficulties is
the static character of these frameworks. Most models of
language are static in character, in the sense that the
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relationship between form and meaning is regarded as (at any
synchronic stage of a language) unchanging and "omnipresent". The
imagery here is mapping, or function, in the mathematical sense.
A set of forms is mapped onto a set of meanings. While the
relations between these sets of elements may undergo changes and
modifications as a result of contextualization, they remain
essentially and fundamentally constant. Correlational
sociolinguistics has added some social categories to the set of
meanings, but the nature and character of the framework remains
essentially the same.
Thus, far from challenging or rectifying the limitation
imposed by this structuralist axiom (one form, one meaning) on
the empirical study of speech data, correlational socio-
linguistics accepted it with minimal modifications. "Extra-
linguistic factors" enter the description in a way which only
reinforces the staticness of the form-meaning relationship. But
the question of whether, and if so, how, these social categories
are constituted through linguistic activities is left unasked. A
consequence of having a static model is that little attention can
be given to the ways in which meaning unfolds dynamically in the
course of a verbal interaction, and the ways in which socio-
linguistic patterns feature in the actual business of
communication.
In this way, correlational sociolinguistics, rather than
breaking away from linguistic theory, was ironically reinforcing
its assumptions. At the level of theory, therefore, socio-
linguistics was in the danger of becoming nothing more than a
kind of social adjunct to theories of grammar. Indeed, for a
time, the sociolinguistic literature was littered with such
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notions as variable rules, statistical competence, community
grammar, and the like --notions which were devised to supplement
conventional grammatical descriptions, and to ensure that they
generate the correct output.
2.2 A Socially Constituted Linguistics
The "social factors" that form the backbone of correlational
sociolinguistics have come to be seriously questioned in recent
years. 4
 One of the most articulated statements is the following
by Gumperz (1982:29):
"Social scientists of many persuasions are now questioning
the very basis of traditional ethnic and social categories.
Earlier views in which larger social aggregates were seen as
made up of independent culture bearing population units have
begun to be abandoned in favor of more dynamic views of
social environments where history, economic forces and
interactive processes as such combine either to create or to
eliminate social distinctions.
"In this view, ethnic categories, like the social categories
studied by sociologists interested in small group inter-
actions, are coming to be seen as symbolic entities which,
subject to constraints imposed by history, can be manipu-
lated by individuals to gain their ends in everyday
interaction. If both social and linguistic categories are
thus signalled and subject to change in response to similar
forces, how can one set of categories be used to establish
an objective basis against which to evaluate the other?"
Gumperz is questioning here the very assumption that
linguistic variables can be described in terms of social
variables which are sofflehow definable and identifiable
independently of language, and that this somehow constitutes an
explanation of linguistic phenomena. But if the social
categories themselves turn out to belong to the symbolic order,
then the relationship between them and language is likely to be
much more complex than a straight-forward one of language marking
or signalling social categories, which has been the assumption
behind traditional sociolinguistics.
For instance, it is customary in sociolinguistics to think
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of social relationships as determinants of linguistic forms. But
there is also a sense in which social relationships can be heard
through talk. Indeed, the Ethnomethodologist would suggest that
there may even be a reflexive (mutually explicating) relation
between these two sorts of categories. There is a need therefore
for "a shift from considering how social relationships determine
the course of talk to asking what social relationships consist
in, considered as exchanges of talk." (Sharrock & Anderson
1987:318)
Le Page has also expressed interesting views on these
issues. He insists that every act of speaking is to some extent
an "instant pidgin" (Le Page & Tabouret-Keller 1985:202), created
on a particular occasion, designed in specific ways to suit the
particularities of the circumstances, and responsive to such
parameters of variation as who the interlocutor is (construed to
be), what he or she can be expected to know, and so on. That is,
the "social meaning" of an act of speech cannot be given
exhaustively by a set of sociolinguistic rules (or, for that
matter, any other kind of rules). Thus, for him, "meaning is
always to some extent idiosyncratic" (ibid., p.208) This in a
way echoes the ethnomethodological notion that meaning is always
to some extent an occasioned accomplishment. Traditional models
of language and society cannot really allow an analyst to see the
kinds of complex relations between language and society alluded
to by Le Page, let alone handle any of these insights
satisfactorily.
It would seem worthwhile in this context to reconsider a
programmatic statement made by Hymes back in 1972 about the need
for an as yet non-existent kind of sociolinguistics, a "socially
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constituted linguistics", in addition to, and ultimately to
replace, a "socially realistic" one. In a concluding address to
the 23rd Round Table on Language and Linguistics, Georgetown
University, Hymes (1974:196) proposed a "socially constituted
linguistics" as a vision for the future:
"The phrase socially constituted is intended to express the
view that social function gives form to the ways in which
linguistic features are encountered in actual life. ..Such a
point of view cannot leave normal linguistic theory
unchallenged... A 'socially constituted' linguistics is
concerned with.., language as part of communicative conduct
and social action." (Hymes 1974:197)
The emphasis here is on the way in which language may be
seen and studied as part of communicative conduct and social
action; indeed, as communicative conduct and social action. One
interpretation of this proposal is that a socially constituted
linguistics will be one in which "social factors" are given the
meanings that they have for the participahts themselves lh as
emerging social scene; where the 'socio' of linguistics is no
longer an adjunct but an essential ingredient of linguistic
theory. When seen in this light, sociolinguistics as we know it
today has a long way to go before anything approaching an
adequate description is available of the complex ways in which
the meaning of an act of speech is reflexively related to the
social setting in which it occurs, and of which it forms a
constitutive part.
Nevertheless, some attempts have been made in that
direction. For instance, Gumperz (1982) has established a
valuable research tradition in which the primary focus is on
language as social interaction, and the ways in which common-
sense reasoning enters into interpretation and understanding.
Hence, "interactional sociolinguistics". On another front, Labov
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& Fanshel (1977) illustrate an approach to the study of talk by
turning the analytic attention away from social categories and
their correlations with linguistic items towards the explication
of linguistic forms and meanings within the context of an
unfolding discourse.
These traditions share certain similar concerns and
interests with, although they are also very different from,
conversation analysis. 5
 Whatever the outcome of their mutual
influence, they have drawn our attention strongly towards the
possibility and value of studying speaking as a social activity
iNi -tits ovili 'right, and to shift our emphasis from static
?inguistic items and patterns of variation to speaking as a
dynamic process.
My own investigation of the Cantonese particles has, I hope,
provided some illustration for the value of an interactional and
interpretive sociolinguistics in tackling linguistic problems. In
particular, as discussed in the previous chapter, the close
contextualized examination of these conversational objects has
uncovered a number of interesting ways in which interactional
problems can be seen to have motivated their participation in the
organization of language.
In the light of this scenario, it is interesting to note two
developments in recent years, namely, a shift of emphasis from
speaker to hearer, or, more accurately, to language as social
interaction; and, secondly, a change from the concern with
linguistic items (phonological and other variables) to the
investigation of how linguistic resources participate in and
integrate with complex inferential and sense-making procedures in
communicative situations. Brown and Levinson (1987:2) describe
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this shift thus:
"a shift in emphasis from the current preoccupation with
speaker-identity, to a focus on dyadic patterns of verbal
interaction as the expression of social relationships; and
from emphasis on the usage of linguistic forms, to an
emphasis on the relation between form and complex
inference." (Brown & Levinson 1987:2)
This shift of focus from the speaker to the hearer would
mean that one can begin to envisage not only rules of speaking,
but also "rules of listening" (Coulter 1973:181). Hymes
(1986:59) shares the view that traditional perspectives have been
restricted far too much to "the speaker as a reference point".
While it is always dangerous to predict or to project, it
might not be too optimistic to say, at this juncture, that the
prospect of a socially constituted linguistics is looking a
little more of a possibility than before, although this is still
far from being a certainty. It would be rewarding indeed if the
investigation reported in this thesis turns out to have made a
contribution to this emerging tradition, and to have paid tribute
to the various sources of inspiration which could well be on the
way to forging a new kind of linguistics for the future.
335
Notes
Chapter 1
1. Ma Shi Wen Tong, first published in 1898 by Ma Jian-
zhong, and generally regarded as the first modern grammar of
Chinese, has been highly influential in Chinese grammatical
studies in the twentieth century. Y.R. Chao, for example, in his
A Grammar of Spoken Chinese, mentions Ma as the first person to
whom he owes an intellectual debt (Chao 1968:ix).
2. There has been an implicit assumption in grammatical studies
of Chinese in the past that, when an English gloss is given to an
example sentence, the linguistic phenomenon (whatever it is) is
then somehow deemed to have been described. But the provision of
a gloss is clearly not the equivalent of, nor can it ever be a
substitute for, analysis. To give a gloss in another language is
to translate, which achieves nothing more than delaying the
analysis.
3. Chao (1968:503) discusses the distinction between form and
content words as follows:
"(1) Full or content words, of open classes, or low or
medium frequency, mostly tonal, for example, zhu (pig), Jan
(blue), pao (run), kwai (fast), and (2) empty or function
words, of listable classes, of high frequency, mostly atonal
(neutral), for example, shi (is), de (thereof), zai (at), ba
(interrogative or advisative particle."
It is interesting that he gives an utterance particle as an
example of a function (empty) word.
4. The same observation has been made about Finnish clitics.
Karttunen (1975b:9) remarks that these clitics, which from
Karttunen's description in many ways look like sentence particles
in Chinese and Japanese, are a "speech phenomenon", frequently
encountered in speech, but much less so in writing.
Chapter 2
1. Apart from Garfinkel's own work (1984 [1967]), general
accounts of Ethnomethodology are available in , Wootton (1975),
Atkinson & Drew (1979), Heritage (1984), Sharrock & Anderson
(1986), and the Introductions to various collections, eg.
Atkinson & Heritage (1984) and Button & Lee (1987).
2. See, for example, Lyons (1977), ch.15 and Levinson (1983), ch.2.
3. More detailed and comprehensive accounts of CA are
available in the literature: Atkinson & Drew (1979),ch.1; West &
Zimmerman (1982), Levinson (1983), ch.6; Heritage (1984), ch.8
and (1985); Sharrock & Anderson (1986), ch.6; and Wootton (1975).
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Chapter 3
1. Yau is forced by his own conception of a "denotative value
scale" into postulating half-way categories like "SQ-type". They
do not on the whole seem very convincing intuitively, nor is it
very clear from his own description what such categories might
refer to except as summaries of the subjects' scalar ratings
demanded by the experimental situation itself.
2. Admittedly, during that period of silence, non-verbal cues
may be available to M on the basis of which she could have come
to the "no-recognition-problem" interpretation, which might then
have motivated her continuation. Unfortunately, no video-
recording is available here.
3. That the item in question is suffixed with the particle LO
rather than LA is a complication that cannot be dealt with until
an account of LO has been given in the next chapter. Suffice it
to say at this point that the use of LO in this position is
related to J's treatment of the item as one that was ordered on
M's recommendation.
4. I use 'context-sensitive' here in the sense of 'context-
shaping and context-shaped', as discussed in Chapter 2.
5. In James' account, expressions like "a very sort of matter-
of-fact friend" and "all right kind of thing" are represented as
"compromiser + head" and "head + compromiser" structures
respectively.
6. Admittedly, there may be degrees of context-dependency. For
instance, Bernstein's distinction between "elaborated" and
"restricted" codes is obviously intuitively appealing and useful
for certain investigative purposes. However, the point remains
that the extent to which a particular formulation selected on a
particular occasion is an adequate description is essentially and
always a negotiable matter, a potentially open question.
7. Indeed, they can propose courses of action that are to be
performed by a third party. For instance, in the course of
deciding on the positions of a football team, one might say, in
the absence of X, "X daa lungmun LA" ("X keeps the goal, OK?")
8. The discussion in this section relies heavily on Schegloff
and Sacks (1973).
9. For more discussion on 'rush-through's, see Schegloff 1981,
and Local & Kelly 1986.
10. See, for example, Lewis 1969, Schiffer 1972, Karttunen &
Peters 1975, Karttunen 1977, Stalnaker 1977, 1978.
11. See, for example, Clark & Marshall (1981), and Clark &
Carlson (1982). Smith (1982) contains many arguments on this
issue, as well as a useful bibliography.
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12. In order to avoid the difficulties of this infinity of
conditions for a psychological model, in which the processing
time that can be spent on an utterance must be finite, Clark &
Carlson (1982) modify this schema by postulating "mental
primitives of the form: 'A and B mutually believe [or know] that
p', along with the [recursive] inference rule: 'If A and B
mutually believe [or know] that p, then (a) A and B believe [or
know] that p and believe [or know] that (a)'." (1982:5) These
details, however, will have no bearing on my argument, and need
not concern us here.
Chapter 4
1.	 The relationship between the segmental make-up of utterance
particles and their tonal accompaniment is a question on which
little work has been done. While there do seem to be certain
connections and similarities between particles which share the
same segmental composition, the exact degree and nature of their
relatedness is unknown, and extremely elusive and hard to pin
down. For instance, it has been observed that 1o55 and 1o21 may
"occur in the same contexts" (Kwok 1984:58). But it is at least
equally clear that in many contexts they have quite different
meanings. Take another example: the three particles wo44 and wo24
and wo21 have rather different uses. wo24 has a Quotative use
("hearsay"), which, although to some extent shared by the other
two, is arguably much less prominent. On the other hand, the
"unexpectedness" property of wo44 which will be discussed in
Chapter 5 of this thesis does not seem to be as relevant the
descriptions of the other two particles.
The other aspect of the question concerns the question of
whether the tones involved have any systematic contribution that
can be stated independently of the segments. Here again, the
picture is confusing. For instance, it might seem that the low
level tone is associated with "questions" --eg. aa21 and jaa21
are often used to ask questions. And yet there are plenty of
counter-examples to that too, eg. wo21 and lo21 cannot be
described as question markers in any sense.
The conclusion at the present state of knowledge about such
questions is that they might turn out to be interesting and
productive questions, but then again they might not. Without a
considerable degree of knowledge and understanding of a large
number of these particles, one simple does not know. The remarks
offered here are a prior thoughts based on some rather uncertain
and hazy intuitions, and should not (and do not deserve to) be
treated seriously. My point is that rather than theorize about
such things, the surest and most interesting way of finding out
about them is look at a whole range of actual instances of
particles across a whole range of situations in considerable
detail. This is an immense project which would require a great
deal of time and research efforts. The present study could well
turn out to be a small contribution towards an understanding of
these and related problems.
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Chapter 5
1.	 Of the three, WO (ie. wo44) is by far the most frequently
encountered: instances of this particle can be easily found in
any conversation that lasts more than a few minutes. And it is
this particle which will be studied in this chapter. wo24
appears relatively infrequently in my data, probably due to its
rather specialized and restrictive functions (basically a
"hearsay" particle, for formulating reports the authorial source
of which lie elsewhere than the speaker). The third particle with
the segmental shape /wo/, wo21, is extremely rare: there is only
one instance of it in over twenty hours of natural speech data.
Interestingly, Yau (1965) also found only one instance of this
particle in over twenty hours of data. Due to the scarcity of
data, I will ignore this particle altogether in the following
discussion.
2. The notion of preference organization is presented in some
detail in Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (1977), in which it is
observed that repairs in conversation are achieved in ways which
are systematically sensitive to such structures as (very roughly)
"self initiation of repair being preferable to other-initiated
repair", and, in the case of other-initiated repairs, "self-
completed repair being preferable to other-completed repair".
Such patterns are observable in the design of the turns
constituting the repair initiations and completions. See also
Owen (1983), Wootton (1981b), and Pomerantz (1975, 1984a).
3. The word-by-word glosses are provided by me, in keeping with
the conventions used in this thesis, and were not found in the
original; the translations, which are the point of interest here,
are quoted from the original.
4. In fact there is no entry for wo44, only one for wo33 (woh6
in Lau's notation), but since there is no /wo33/ in the language,
I take it that his woh6 is equivalent to my WO.
5. Data extracts (7) and (14) are clear instances of non-
interrogative uses of 7owo, ie. there is no evidence in either
case of the speaker intending the utterance as a question, or the
recipient hearing it as one.
6. Apart from the particle ne, cai in Mandarin has been
described variously as an "adverb" (Tsao 1976) or a "focusing
particle" (Biq 1984) which marks unexpectedness. This suggests
that many of the questions considered in this chapter may also be
relevant to the study of certain linguistic items in Mandarin.
7	 I am assuming here that their description of ne is valid and
adequate. But it seems to me that in some ways Li and Thompson's
description is probably just as restrictive for ne as it is for
WO. But this is a question that cannot be answered short of a
detailed investigation of ne.
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Chapter 6
1. McGinn (1984:37) talks about Wittgenstein's "multiple
application thesis", according to which "the repeated use that is
required for there to be meaning is something spread out over
time; meaning is, so to say, an essentially diachronic concept."
There is also a sense in which to different degrees a word can
acquire a meaning as it were, diachronically (through time)
through a process of decontextualization. Dictionary-makers, for
example, take a special interest in collecting particular
instances of words in use, and then generalizing and decontext-
ualizing from those instances a small set of meanings for each
word.
2. It is interesting to note in this connection one hearsay
particle discussed in Blass (MS). She notes that the utterance
particle re in Sissala, a Niger-Congo language, has been
described traditionally as a modal particle whose function is to
indicate that some information being reported was gathered from
someone else. She argues, however, that to describe this
particle in terms of the speaker's degree of commitment to the
truth of a proposition would be a distortion: it has important
discourse functions which would be missed in a modality
account.
3. One of the more fully developed accounts of modalities and
the linguistic means in different languages which encode such
modalities is Palmer's (1986). Palmer (1986:88-89) cites
sentence-final particles in (Mandarin) Chinese as an example of
there being a "close relationship between discourse and modality"
(P-93).
4. For details of James' account, see Chapter 3, section 5.
5. Schiffrin's framework includes five planes of discourse
organization. "Exchange structure" includes such organizations
as adjacency pairs and a range of sequential structures, with
"turn" as the basic unit. "Action structure" concerns the
situation of speech acts within social settings. The basic unit
is "act". "Ideational structure" are semantic in nature, but it
also includes cohesive and topical relations. The basic unit here
is "proposition". "Participation framework" is borrowed from
Goffman (1981), and is the component that deals with different
participant constellations, of which speaker and addressee is
only one kind. Finally, "information structure" focuses on the
cognitive capacities of speakers and hearers, eg. their knowledge
states at particular points in an interaction. For more details
about these planes of organization, see Schiffrin 1987, chapters
1 and 10.
6. Closer attention to the phonetic details of you know has
yielded interesting results. Local, Wells & Sebba (1985), in a
study of turn delimitation in London Jamaican (a variety of
English with influence from Jamaican Creole, spoken in London by
Black speakers of West Indies descent), argue that a set of
phonetic features is regularly found at turn endings. When you
know is accompanied by this set of phonetic features (eg.
rhythmically short and integrated to the preceding syllables,
340
narrow falling pitch movement, absence of decrescendo), it serves
as a turn-delimitation device. There is however a second class
of you know occurrences, which is prosodically characterized by
a step-up in pitch from the first syllable (you) to the second
(know). These usually are post-completers that occur after a
turn transition relevance place. Although it might appear that
this study has cast doubt on the idea that you know and similar
objects are particles that have discourse functions (because it
is the phonetic features, not the particle, that performs the
turn-delimitation), it should nevertheless be compatible with
their position to say that particles like you know, in
combination with, or as carriers of, certain phonetic features,
may have conversation organizational functions that are statable
in terms of the turn-taking system.
7. Unfortunately, many particles cannot be defined in terms of
a specific maxim or set of maxims. To take the example of WO, it
is used regularly to signal deviance from normal expectations,
not the non-fulfillment of some conversational maxims. Nor is it
used to mark an utterance as somehow not fully co-operative. A
general description of this particle needs to make reference not
to some specific maxim or the co-operative principle, but to
'normal expectations', which is a notion of an entirely different
order. It is true that in order to describe these objects
adequately, one has to make reference to conversational inference
("the description of certain lexical items [such as discourse
particles] requires reference to modes of conversational
inference." (Levinson 1983:163)), but the admission of this
general conclusion does not commit one to analysing the utterance
particles specifically in terms of Grice's maxims.
8. For further details of this account, see Chapter 3, section 5.
9. The notion of 'recipient design' is widely known and
accepted within the CA tradition. See, in particular, Sacks &
Schegloff 1979. A summary of this notion can be found in Sharrock
& Anderson (1987).
"Utterances in conversation are not directed towards
anonymous 'speakers of the language' but toward specific
others, and conversationalists therefore pay pervasive
attention to the issues of to whom they are talking, what
such persons may be expected to know, what they will be
interested in and so forth. 'Recipient design' points the
investigation towards the ways in which utterances are
constructed specifically so that they will be understood by
this recipient." (Sharrock & Anderson 1987:312)
Chapter 7
1.	 Concerning the problematical relationship between
linguistics and sociology, little direct and in-depth discussion
is available in the literature. In such such research traditions
as represented by Gumperz (1982), there are traces of CA
influence. But even in the latest work in this tradition,
Schiffrin's (1987) study of discourse particles in English, there
is little discussion of this problem of interdisciplinary
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relationship. Conversation Analysts are very often regarded by
linguists as a different kind of animal. Part of the problem is
no doubt to do with the radical, if not revolutionary, character
of their theoretical assumptions. But it may also be due in part
to a relative lack of communication between the two traditions.
2.	 Although it is true that in a sense what Conversation
Analysts are really interested in is not conversation as such,
but conversation as a locus for the observation and study of the
the coordination of social actions at work, I think it is still
fair to say that they do take an active interest in language and
its description as a serious task.
3. For a discussion of CA's conception of meaning, see section
2 of Chapter 2.
4. Although she has not expressed any explicit dissatisfaction,
Milroy's (1980) notion of social networks is the first "social
variable" that was used in correlation studies which has a built-
in element of language, ie. its very identification takes into
account the fact that a large part of daily social interaction is
linguistic. While her approach as a whole is still largely
Labovian, it provides an interesting example of an early step
towards a different conception of "social factors" in
conventional sociolinguistics.
Hudson (1980) looks at this from a different point of view,
and records explicitly his doubt about whether the conception of
society as consisting of objectively distinct groups of people,
using language each in their peculiar ways, is the most fruitful
approach to sociolinguistics. The alternative approach which is
briefly considered, but not discussed in any detail, is the use
of a model in which "typification" plays a central role.
5. Some linguistics have expressed on the whole rather positive
views about the relevance of CA to sociolinguistics. For
instance, Levinson (1983:374-375) argues that CA ought to have a
)ot to offer to sociolinguistics:
'Indeed conversation analysis in general has a great deal to
offer to sociolinguistics. For example, the view of
conversation as basic or paradigmatic and other forms of
talk exchange as' specializations... may help to put the
ethnography of speaking on a sounder comparative basis...
Similarly, the variationist paradigm associated with
Labov... would benefit greatly from the systematic
application of Labov's own observation that sociolinguistic
variables are in part discourse-conditioned.... But the
fields have so many common concerns that there is no real
danger of the lack of cross-fertilization, especially
amongst sociolinguistics with an interest in language
understanding."
Similarly, Hymes suggests that the concept of context would
benefit from a conversational perspective (1986:68):
"...the inspiration to understand the orderliness of
interaction as an accomplishment of those who interact is a
major source of revealing work, affecting anthropologists
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like John Gumperz, whose notion of 'conversational
inferencing' can be seen to have an ethnomethodological
character, in that it interprets the notion of context as
something not fixed throughout an interaction, but as
something evolving and redefinable by the participants."
343
References
Allwood, J., Andersson, L-G., & Dahl, O.
1977	 LOCOC in linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Arbini, R.
1969	 "Tag questions and tag imperatives in English". Journal of
Linguistics 5:205-214.
Arndt, W.
1960	 "Modal paticles in Russian and German". Word 16:323-336.
Atkinson, J.M. & Drew, P.
1979	 Order in court: the organization of verbal interaction in 
judicial settings. London: Macmillan.
Atkinson, J.M. & Heritage, J. (eds.)
1984 Structures of social action: studies in conversation 
analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Auer, J.C.P.
1984	 Bilingual conversation. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins
(=Pragmatics & Beyond series, V:8).
Bach, K. & Harnish, R.
1979	 Linguistic communication and speech acts. Cambridge,
Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
Bauman, R. & Sherzer, J. (eds.)
1974	 Explorations in the ethnography of speaking. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Berger, P. & Luckmann, T.
1985	 The social construction of reality: a treatise in the
sociology of knowledge. Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin. [1966].
Big, yung-o.
1984	 The semantics and pragmatics of cal and jiu in Mandarin 
Chinese. Ph.D.dissertation, Cornell University.
Bloor, D.
1983	 Wittgenstein: a social theory of knowledge. London and
Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press. (Theoretical Traditions
in the Social Sciences Series)
Brady, M. (ed.)
1983	 Computational models of discourse. Cambridge, Mass. :MIT
Press.
Brown, G. & Yule, G.
1983	 Discourse analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, P. & Levinson, S.
1978	 "Universals in language: politeness phenomena". In
Goody (ed.), 56-311.
344
1987	 Politeness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(=Studies in Interactional Sociolinguistics 4)
Button, G. & Casey, N.
1984 "Generating topic: the use of topic initial elicitors".
In Atkinson & Heritage (eds.), 167-190.
Button, G., Drew, P., & Heritage, J.C. (eds.)
1986 Human Studies. Vol.9, Nos. 2-3. Special double edition
on interaction and language use.
Button, G. & Lee, J.R.E. (eds.)
1987 Talk and Social Organization.Clevedon, Phil.: Multi-
lingual Matters Ltd. (=Intercommunication series, No.1)
Chao, Y.R.
1968	 A grammar of spoken Chinese. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Chomsky, N.
1965	 Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, Mass.:
M.I.T. Press.
Cicourel, A.V.
1971	 "The acquisition of social structure: toward a develop-
mental sociology of language and meaning". In Douglas (ed.),
136-168.
1972	 "Basic and normative rules in the negotiation of status
ackd role". lc\ Sdno% Ced.), 229-258.
1973	 Cognitive sociology. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Clancy, P.
1972	 "Analysis of a conversation". Anthropological Linguistics 
14:78-86.
()ark, H.N. & Car?son, T.8.
1g62 'Speech acts and hearers' beliefs". In Smith (ed.), 1-36.
Clark, H.H. & Lucy, P.
1975	 "Understanding what is meant from what is said: a study in
conversationally conveyed requests". Journal of Verbal 
Learaipg andjerba? Behaviour 14:56-72.
Clark, H.H. & Marshall, C.R.
1981 "Definite reference and mutual knowledge". In Joshi, Sag &
Webber (eds.)
Cole, P. (ed.)
1981	 Radical Pragmatics. New York: Academic Press.
1978	 Syntax and semantics 9: Pragmatics. New York: Academic Press.
Cole, P. & Morgan, J.L. (eds.)
1975	 Syntax and semantics 3: Speech acts. New York: Academic Press.
Condon, S.L.
1986	 "The discourse functions of OK". Semiotica 60(1/2):73-101.
Corum, C.
1974	 "Adverbs.. .long and tangled roots". Proceedings of the 
Tenth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society.
90-102.
345
1975	 "Basques, particles and baby talk: a case for pragmatics".
Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting of the Berkeley
Linguistics Society. 90-99.
Coulmas, F. (ed.)
1981	 Conversational routine: explorations in standardized 
communication situations and prepatterned speech. The
Hague: Mouton.
Coulter, J.
1971	 "Decontextualized meanings: current approaches to
verstehende investigations". Sociological Review
19:301-323.
1973	 "Language and the conceptualization of meaning". Sociology 
7:173-189.
1979	 The social construction of mind: studies in ethnomethodology
and linguistic philosophy. Totowa, N.J.: Rowen & Littlefield.
Coulthard, M. & Montgomery, M. (eds.)
1981	 Studies in discourse analysis. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
Davidson, J.
1984	 "Subsequent versions of invitations, offers, requests, and
proposals dealing with potential or actual rejection".
In Atkinson & Heritage (eds.), 102-128.
Douglas, J.D. (ed.)
1970	 Understanding everyday life. Chicago.
Drew, P.
1984	 "Speakers' reportings in invitation sequences". In Atkinson &
Heritage (eds.), 129-151.
Duncan, S. Jr.
1972	 "Some signals and rules for taking turns in conversations".
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 23:283-292.
1973	 "Towards a grammar for dyadic conversation". Semiotica
9(1):29-46.
1974	 "On the structure of speaker-auditor interaction during
speaking terms". Language in Society 3:161-180.
Feldman, C.F.
1974	 "Pragmatic features of natural languages". Proceedings of
the Tenth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society.
151-160.
Fillmore, C.J.
1973	 "May we come in?" Semiotica 9:97-116.
1981	 "Pragmatics and the description of discourse". In Cole (ed.),
143-166.
Fishman, J. A.
1971	 Sociolinguistics:a brief introduction. Rowley:Newbury House.
1972a The sociology of language: an interdisciplinary social 
science approach to language in society. Rowley: Newbury
House.
346
1972b "Who speaks what language to whom and when?". In Pride, J.B.
& Holmes, J. (eds.) Sociolinguistics. Harmondsworth, Middx.:
Penguin. 15-32.
1972c "The sociology of language". In Giglioli, P.P. (ed.) Language
and social context. Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin. 45-58.
1972d "Domain and the relationships of micro- and macro-socio-
linguistics". In Gumperz & Hymes (eds.), 435-453.
Frances, D.W.
1986	 "Some structures of negotiation talk". Language in Society
15.1:53-79.
Freedle, R.D. (ed.)
1977	 Discourse production and comprehension. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex.
French, P. & Local, J.K.
1986	 "Prosodic features and the management of interruptions".
In Johns-Lewis (ed.), 157-180.
Garkinfel, H.
1972	 "Studies of the routine grounds of everyday activities".
In Sudnow (ed.), 1-30.
1984	 Studies in ethnomethodology. Cambridge: Polity Press.
(First published by Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
1967).
Garfinkel, H, & Sacks, H.
1970	 "On formal structures of a practical actions". In Mackinney,
J.C. & Tiryakian, E.A. (eds.) Theoretical sociology.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Gazdar, G.
1979	 Pragmatics: implicature, presupposition and logical form.
New York: Academic Press.
Gerhardt, J.& Savasir, I.
1986	 "The use of the simple present in the speech of two three-
year-olds: normativity not subjectivity". Language in Society
15:501-535.
Gibbons, J.
1980	 "A tentative'framework for speech act description of the
utterance particles in conversational Cantonese". Linguistics 
18:763-775.
Goffman, E.
1959	 The presentation of self in everyday life. Garden city,
New York: Doubleday.
1963	 Behaviour in public places. The Free Press of Glencoe,
Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London.
1967	 Interaction ritual: essays on face-to-face behaviour. 
New York: Doubleday (Anchor).
1975	 Frame analysis: an essay on the organizational of
experience. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
1979	 Forms of talk. Oxford: Blackwell.
347
Goldberg, J.
1980 Discourse particles: an analysis of the role of y'know, 
I mean, well, and actuall y in conversation.
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge.
Goodwin, C.
n.d.	 "Interactive construction of the sentence within the turn"
1981	 Conversational organization: interaction between speakers 
and hearers. New York: Academic Press.
1986	 "Between and within: alternative and sequential treatments
of continuers and assessments". In Button, Drew &
Heritage (eds.), 205-18.
Goody, E.N.
1978	 "Towards a theory of questions". In Goody (ed.), 17-43.
Goody, E. N. (ed.)
1978	 Questions and politeness: strageties in social interation.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gordan, D. & Lakoff, G.
1971	 "Conversational postulates". Proceedings of the Tenth 
Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. 63-84.
Grice, H.P.
1968	 "Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning".
Foundations of Language. 4:1-18. (Reprinted in Searle.
1971. Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. 54-70.)
1975	 "Logic and conversation". In Cole & Morgan (eds.), 41-58.
1978	 "Further notes on logic and conversation". In Cole (ed.),
113-128.
1981	 "Presupposition and conversational implicature".
In Cole (ed.), 183-198.
Grosz, B.J.
1981	 "Focusing and description in natural language dialogues".
In Joshi et al (eds.), 84-105.
Gumperz, J.J.
1982	 Discourse strategies. Cambridge: Cambridege University Press.
(=Studies in . Interactional Sociolinguistics 1)
Gumperz, J.J. (ed.)
1982	 Language and social identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. (=Studies in Interactional Sociolinguistics 2)
Gumperz, J.J. & Hymes, D. (eds.)
1972	 Directions in sociolinguistics: the ethnography of
communication. Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Gundel, J.K.
1985	 "'Shared Knowledge' and topicality". Journal of Pragmatics 
9:83-107.
Habermas, J.
1978	 Knowledge and human interests. Tr. by Jeremy J. Shapiro.
(2nd ed.) London: Heinemann.
348
Halliday, M.A.K.
1970	 "Functional diversity in language as seen from a considera-
tion of modality and mood in English". Foundations of
Language. 6.3:322-361.
Halliday, M.A.K. & Hasan, R.
1976	 Cohesion in English. London: Longman.
Heritage, J.
1984a "A change-of-state token and aspects of its sequential
placement". In Atkinson & Heritage (eds.), 299-345.
1984b Garkinfel and ethnomethodology. Cambridge: Polity Press.
1985	 "Recent developments in conversation analysis."
Sociolinguistics Newsletter 1-18.
Hinds, J.
1977	 "Paragraph structure and pronominalization". Papers in 
Linguistics 10:77-99.
1985	 "Misinterpretations and common knowledge in Japanese".
Journal of Pragmatics 9:7-19.
Hockett, C.F.
1986	 "Grammar for the hearer". In McGregor ed., 49-68.
(Originally published in R.Jakobson, ed., Structure of
language and its mathematical aspects [Proceedings of
Symposia in Applied Mathematics XII; New York: American
Mathematical Society, 1961]. 220-236).
Holmes, J.
1986	 "Functions of you know in women's and men's speech".
Language in Society 15.1:1-21.
Holzner, B.
1973	 "The construction of social actors: an essay on social
actors: an essay on social identities". In Phenomenology and 
sociology, ed. by Thomas Luckmann. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
291-310.
Horn, L.R.
1973	 "Greek Grice". Proceedings of the Ninth Regional Meeting of
the Chicago Linguistic Society. 205-214.
House, J. & Kasper, G.
1981 "Politeness markers in English and German". In Coulmas (ed.),
157-185.
Huang, P.F.P.
1970	 Cantonese dictionary. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Hudson, R.A.
1975	 "The meaning of questions". Language 51:1-31.
1980	 Sociolinguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hymes, D. H.
1974	 Foundations in sociolinguistics : an ethnographic 
approach. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
349
1986	 "Discourse: scope without depth". International Journal of
the Sociology of Language 57:49-89.
James, A.R.
1983	 "Compromisers in English: a cross-disciplinary approach
to their interpersonal significance". Journal of
Pragmatics 7:191-203.
James, D.
1973	 "Another look at, say, some grammatical constraints on,
oh, interjections and hesitations". Proceedings of
the Ninth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society.
242-251.
1978	 "The use of oh, ah, say and well in relation to a
number of grammatical phenomena". Papers in Linguistics 
11:517-535.
Jefferson, G.
1972	 "Side sequences". In Sudnow (ed.), 294-338.
1973	 "A case of precision timing in ordinary conversation:
overlapped tag-positioned address terms in closing
sequences". Semiotica 9:47-96.
1974	 "Error correction as an interactional resource". Language 
in Society 2:181-199.
1978	 "Sequential aspects of story-telling in conversation". In
Schenkein (ed.), 219-248.
1983	 "List construction as a task and resource". In Psathas (ed.),
63-92.
1984	 "On stepwise transition from talk about a trouble to
inappropriately next-positioned matters". In Atkinson &
Heritage (eds.), 191-222.
1985	 "On the interactional unpacking of a 'gloss'". Language in 
Society. 14:435-466.
1986	 "Notes on 'latency' in overlap onset". In Button, Drew &
Heritage (eds.), 153-84.
Jefferson, G. & Lee, J.R.E.
1981 "The rejection of advice: managing the problematic
convergence of a 'troubles-telling' and a 'service
encounter'". Journal of Pragmatics 5:399-422.
John-Lewis, C. (ed.)
1986	 Intonation in discourse. London: Croom Helm.
Johnson-Laird, P.N.
1981	 "Mental models of meaning". In Joshi et al (eds.), 106-126.
Joshi, A.K., Webber, B.L. and Sag, I.A. (eds.)
1981	 Elements of discourse understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Karttunen, F.
1975a "The syntax and pragmatics of the Finnish clitic -han".
Texas Linguistic Forum 1, 40-50.
1975b More Finnish clitics: syntax and pragmatics. Indiana
Linguistics Club Papers, Bloomington.
350
1975c "Functional constraints in Finnish syntax". In Papers from
the parasession on functionalism ed. by Crossman, R.E.,
Sam, L.J. and Vance, T.J. Chicago Linguistic Society,
Chicago, 232-243.
Karttunen, L.
1977	 "The syntax and semantics of questions". Linguistics and 
Philosophy. 1:3-44.
Karttunen, L. & Peters, S.
1975	 "Conversational implicature and Montague grammar".
Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting of the Berkeley
Linguistic Society. 266-278.
Kendon, A.
1972	 "Some relationships between body motion and speech: an
analysis of an example". In A.W. Siegman and B. Pope, eds.
Studies in dyadic communication. New York: Pergamon.
1985	 "Some uses of gesture". In Tannen & Saville-Troike (eds.),
215-234.
Kwok, H.
1984 Sentence particles in Cantonese. Hong Kong: Centre of
Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong.
Labov, W.
1972a Sociolinguistic patterns. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
1972b Language in the inner city : studies in the Black English
vernacular. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Labov, W. & Fanshel, D.
1977	 Therapeutic discourse: Psychotherapy as conversation.
New York: Academic Press.
Lakoff, R.
1972a "Hedges: a study in meaning criteria and the logic of
fuzzy concepts". Proceedings of the Eighth Regional 
Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. 183-228.
1972b "The pragmatics of modality". Proceedings of the Eighth 
Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. 229-246.
1972c "Language in' context". Language 48:907-927.
1973a "The logic of politeness : or, minding your p's and q's".
Proceedings of the Ninth Regional Meeting of the Chicago 
Linguistic Society. 292-305.
1973b "Questionable answers and answerable questions". In Kachru,
B.B. et al, (eds.), Issues in Linguistics: papers in honor
of Henry and Renie Kahane. Urbana, Ill., 453-467.
1974	 "What you can do with words : politeness, pragmatics and
performatives". In Berkeley studies in syntax and 
semantics, vol.1:XVI:1-55. Institute of Human Learning,
University of California, Berkeley.
Lau, S.
1977	 A practical Cantonese-English dictionary. Hong Kong: the
Government Printer.
351
Lee, J.R.E.
1987	 "Prologue: talking organization". In Button & Lee
(eds.), 19-53.
Leech. G.
1983	 Principles of pragmatics. London: Longman.
LePage, R.B.
1968	 "Problems of description in multilingual communities".
Transactions of the Philological Society. 189-212.
LePage, R.B. & Tabouret-Keller, A.
1985	 Acts of identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levinson, S.
1983	 Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, D.
1969	 Convention : a philosophical study. Cambridge, Mass.
Li, Charles N. and Thompson, S.A.
1979	 "Third-person pronouns and zero-anaphora in Chinese
discourse". Syntax and Semantics 12:311-335.
1981	 Mandarin Chinese : a functional reference grammar.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Li, Jinxi
1955	 Xinzhu Guoyu Wenfa. (A New Grammar of Mandarin Chinese).
Shanghai: Commercial Press.
Local, J.K.
1986	 "Patterns and problems in a study of Tyneside intonation".
In Johns-Lewis (ed.), 181-198.
Local, J.K. & Kelly, J.
1985	 "Notes on phonetic detail and conversational structure".
Belfast Working Papers in Language and Linguistics 
7: 1-15.
1986	 "Projection and 'silences': Notes on phonetic and
conversational structure". In Button, Drew & Heritage (eds.),
185-204.
Local, J., Kelly, J. & Wells, W.H.G.
1986	 "Towards a pohonology of conversation: turn-taking in
Tyneside English". Journal of Linguistics 22:411-437.
Local, J.K., Wells, W.H.G. & Sebba, M.
1985 "Phonology for conversation: phonetics details of
turn delimitation in London Jamaican". Journal of
Pragmatics 9:309-330.
Longacre, R.E.
1976	 "'Mystery' particles and affixes". Proceedings of the 
Twelfth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society.
468-475.
1979	 The paragraph as a grammatical unit. In On understanding
grammar, ed. by Givon, T. New York:Academic Press.
352
LO, Shuxiang & Zhu, Dexi
1953	 Yufa Xiuci Jianghua. (Talks on Grammar and Rhetoric).
Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe.
McGregor, Graham (ed.)
1987	 Language for hearers. (=Language & Communication Library 8)
Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Maynard, D.W.
1986	 "Offering and soliciting collaboration in multi-party
disputes among children (and other humans)". In Button,
Drew & Heritage, 261-86.
Mehan, H. and Wood, H.
1975	 The reality of ethnomethodology. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Meyer, B.F. & Wempe, T.F.
1947	 The student's Cantonese-English dictionary. New York: Field
Afar Press. Third edition. (First published in 1935).
Milroy, L.
1980	 Language and social networks. Oxford: Blackwell.
Minsky, M.
1975	 "A framework for representing knowledge". In Winston (ed.),
The psychology of computer vision. New York: McGraw-Hill,
211-280.
Moerman, M.
1972	 "Analysis of Lue conversation:providing accounts, finding
breaches, and taking sides". In Sudnow (ed.), 170-228.
Murray, D.
1983	 "Conversational concerns: issues". Journal of Pragmatics 
7:1-15.
Orletti, F.
1984	 "Some methodological problems in data gathering for
discourse analysis". Journal of Pragmatics 8:559-567.
Ostman, J.-0.
1981 you know: a discourse functional approach. Amsterdam:
John Benjamips. (=Pragmatics & Beyond 11:7)
Owen, M
1981	 "Conversational units and the use of well...".
In Werth (ed.), 99-116.
1983	 Apologies and remedial interchanges:a study of Language
use in social interaction. Berlin: Mouton.
Palmer, F.R.
1979	 Modality and the English modals. London: Longman.
1986	 Mood and modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Perkins, M.R.
1983	 Modal expressions in English. London: Frances Pinter.
Polanyi, L.
1979	 "So what's the point?". Semiotica 25(3/4), 207-241.
353
Pomerantz, A.
1975	 Second assessments: a study of some features of
agreements/disagreements. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
School of Social Science, University of California at Irvine.
1984a "Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments: some features
of preferred/dispreferred turn shapes". In Atkinson &
Heritage (eds.), 57-101.
1984b. "Pursuing a response". In Atkinson & Heritage (eds.), 152-163.
1984c. "Giving a source or basis: the practice in conversation of
telling 'how I know'". Journal of Pragmatics 8:607-625.
Power, R.J.D. & Dal Martello, M.F.
1985	 "Methods of investigating conversation". Semiotica
53(1/3):237-257.
1986	 "Some criticisms of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson on
turn-taking". Semiotica 58(1/2):29-40.
Prince, E.F.
1985	 "Fancy syntax and 'shared knowledge'". Journal of Pragmatics 
9:65-81.
Psathas, G.
1986	 "Some sequential structures in direction-giving". In Button,
Drew & Heritage (eds.), 231-46.
Psathas, G. (ed.)
1979	 Everday Language: studies in ethnomethodology. New York:
Irvington.
1983	 Interactional competence. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Rogers, A., Wall, B. & Murphy, J.P. (eds.)
1977 Proceedings of the Texas conference on performatives, 
presuppositions and implicatures. Washington: Centre for
Applied Linguistics.
Ryave, Alan L.
1978	 "On the achievement of a series of stories". In Schenkein
(ed.), 113-132.
Sacks, H.
	
• 1964	 Fall 1964 Lectures 
1972a "On the analyzibility of stories by children". In Gumperz &
Hymes (eds.), 325-345.
1972b "An initial investigation of the usability of conversational
data for doing sociology". In Sudnow (ed.)
	
1974	 "An analysis of the course of a joke's telling in conver-
sation". In Bauman & Scherzer (eds.), 337-353.
	
1975	 "Everyone has to lie". In Blount, B. & Sanches, M. (eds.),
Sociocultural dimensions of language use. New York: Academic
Press. 57-80.
	
1978	 "Some technical considerations of a dirty joke". In
Schenkein (ed.), 249-269.
	
1984	 "On doing 'being ordinary'". In Atkinson & Heritage (eds.),
413-29.
354
Sacks, H. & Schegloff, E.
1980	 "Two preferences in the organization of reference to
persons in conversation and their interaction". In
Psathas (ed.), 15-21.
Sacks, H., Schegloff, E.A. & Jefferson, G.
1974	 "A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-
taking for conversation". Language 50.4:696-735.
Sankoff, G & Brown, P.
1976	 "The origins of syntax in discourse". Language 52.3:631-666.
Schegloff, E.A.
1972a "Notes on conversational practice: formulating place". In
Sudnow (ed.), 75-119.
1972b. "Sequencing in conversational openings". In Gumperz &
Hymes (eds.), 346-80.
1979	 "The relevance of repair to syntax-for-conversation".
Syntax and Semantics 12:261-286.
1984	 "On some questions and ambiguities in conversation". In
Atkinson & Heritage (eds.), 28-52.
1986. "The routine as achievement". In Button, Drew & Heritage
(eds.), 111-52.
Schegloff, E.A., Jefferson, G., & Sacks, H.
1977 "The preference for self-correction in the organization
of repair in conversation". Language 53:361-382.
Schegloff, E.A. & Sacks, H.
1973 "Opening up closings". Semiotica 7.4:289-327.
Schenkein, J.
1971	 Some substantive and methodological issues in the analysis 
of conversational interaction. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
School of Social Science, University of California at Irvine.
1972	 "Towards an analysis of natural conversation and the
sense of Heheh". Semiotica 6.4:344-377.
1978	 "Identity negotiations in conversation". In Schenkein (ed.),
57-78.
Schenkein, J. (ed.)
1972 Studies in the organization of conversational interaction.
New York: Academic Press.
Schiffer, S.R.
1972	 Meaning. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schiffrin, D.
1982	 Discourse markers: semantic resources for the construction 
of conversation. Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Pennsylvania.
1985	 "Conversational coherence: the role of well". Language 
61:640-667.
1987	 Discourse markers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(=Studies in Interactional Sociolinguistics 5)
355
Schubiger, M.
1972 "English intonation and German modal particles: a comparative
study". In Bolinger, D (ed.), Intonation. Harmondsworth:
Penguin. 175-193.
Searle, J.R.
1969	 Speech acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1975	 "Indirect speech acts". In Cole & Morgan (eds)., 59-82.
1976	 "The classification of illocutionary acts". Language in
Society 5:1-24. (Reprinted in Searle 1979:1-29).
1979	 Expression and meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
1983	 Intentionality: an essay in the philosophy of mind.
Searle, J.R. (ed.)
1971
	 Philisophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, J.R., Kiefer, F. & Bierwisch, M. (eds.)
1980	 Speech act theory and pragmatics. Dordrecht: Reidel.
(=Synthese Language Library 10)
Silverman, D. and Torode, B.
1980	 The material word: some theories of language and its 
limits. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Sinclair, J. McH., & Coulthard, R.M.
1975	 Towards an analysis of discourse. London: Oxford University
Press.
Siu, Si
1985	 Staying put. Hong Kong: Wah Hon Publishing Co.
Sharrock, W. & Anderson, B.
1986	 The ethnomethodologists. Chichester Ellis Norwood Ltd.
and Tavistock Publications Ltd.
1987	 "Epilogue: The definition of alternatives: some sources
of confusion in inter-disciplinary discussion."
In Button & Lee (eds.), 290-321.
Smith, N.V. (ed.)
1982	 Mutual knowledge. London: Academic Press.
Smith, W. J.
1977	 The behaviour of communicating: an ethological approach.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D.
1982 "Mutual knowledge and relevance in theories of comprehension".
In Smith (ed.), 61-85.
1986 Relevance. Oxford: Blackwell.
Stalnaker, R.
1977	 "Pragmatic presuppositions". In Rogers et al (eds.), 135-147.
1978	 "Assertion". In Cole (ed.)
Stubbs, M.
1983	 Discourse analysis:the sociolinguistic analysis of
natural language. Oxford: Blackwell.
356
Sudnow, D.
1972	 "Temporal parameters of interpersonal observation". In
Sudnow (ed.), 259-279.
Sudnow, D. (ed.)
1972	 Studies in social interaction. New York: Free Press.
Tannen, D.
1984	 Conversational style: analyzing talk among friends.
Norwood, NJ:Ablex.
Tannen, D. & Saville-Troike, M. (eds.)
1985	 Perspectives on silence. London: Ablex.
Taylor, T.J.
1981	 "A Wittgensteinian perspective in linguistics". Language
and communication 1:263-74.
Torode, B.
n.d.	 "Trust as a condition of stable concerted discourse:
a reconsideration of four case studies in conversational
analysis". Paper presented to Sociolinguistics Symposium 6,
University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, April 16-18, 1986.
Tsao, F.F.
1976	 "'Expectation' in Chinese: a functional analysis of two
adverbs". Proceedings of the Second Annual Meeting of
the Berkeley Linguistic Society. 360-374.
Tsuchihashi, M.
1983	 "The speech act continuum: an investigation of Japanese
sentence final particles". Journal of Pragmatics 7:361-387.
Turner, R.
1971	 "Words, utterances and activities". In Douglas (ed.), 169-187.
Uyeno, T.
1971 A study of Japanese modality: a performative analysis of
sentence particles. Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of
Linguistics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Van Valin, R.D.
1975 "German doch: the basic phenomena". Proceedings of the 11th 
Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. 625-637.
Verschueren, J.
1985	 "Review article on Geoffrey N. Leech, Principles of
Pragmatics, and Stephen C. Levinson, Pragmatics."
Journal of Linguistics 21:459-470.
1987	 Pragmatics as a theory of linguistic adaptation. Antwerp:
International Pragmatics Association. (=IPrA Working
Document 1).
Volosinov, V.
1973	 Marxism and the philosophy of language. New York:
Seminar Press.
357
Wang, Li
1955 Zhongquo Xiandai Yufa. (A Modern Grammar of Chinese).
Beijing: Zhonghua.
Wardhaugh, R.
1985	 How conversation works. Oxford: Blackwell.
Werth, P.
1981	 "The concept of 'relevance' in conversational analysis".
In Werth (ed.), 129-154.
Werth, P. (ed.)
1981	 Conversation and discourse: structure and interpretation.
London: Croom Helm.
West, C. & Zimmerman, D.H.
1982	 "Conversation analysis". In Scherer, K.R. & Ekman, P. (eds.)
Handbook of methods in nonverbal behaviour research.
Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. 506-541.
Wieder, D.L.
1971	 "On meaning by rule". In Douglas (ed.), 107-135.
Wilson, D. & Sperber, D,
1981	 "On Grice's theory of conversation". rn Uerth (ed.1, 155-178.
Winograd, T.
1972	 Understanding natural language. New York: Academic Press.
Wittgenstein, L.
1953	 Philosophical investigations (translated by G.E.M.
Anscombe). Oxford: Blackwell.
1958	 The blue and brown books. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wootton, A.J.
1975	 Dilemmas of discourse:controversies about the sociological 
interpretation of language. London: George Allen & Unwin.
1981a "Two request forms of four-year-olds". Journal of Pragmatics 
5:511-23.
1981b "The management of grantings and rejections by parents in
request sequences". Semiotica 37:59-89.
n.d.	 "Remarks on the methodology of conversation analysis"
Yau, S.C.
1965	 A study of the functions and of the presentation of Cantonese
sentence particles. M.A. thesis, University of Hong Kong.
Yngve, V.H.
1970	 "On getting a word in edgewise". Proceedings of the Sixth 
Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. 567-578.
358
